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After an introductory chapter on the territorial 
structure of the Great Seljuq Empire, the thesis aims 
at describing various Seljuq institutions, and the 
conditions under which they developed. The functions 
of the central government, the military organisation 
and the position of the Turkish amirs to the state are 
discussed. An outline is given of provincial govern­
ment and local administration, and some aspects of 
urban life are briefly examined. The last chapter 
deals v/ith the attitude of the Great Seljuqs towards 
the caliphate. In giving a general outline of some 
of the most important features of the Great Seljuq 
period, an attempt has been made to present a more de­
tailed account of these institutions than has been 
hitherto available.
J
The following work is the result of my own researches. 
Those aspects of the Seljttq period v/hich I have investigated 
have not previously been examined in detail. I have exam­
ined those sources available to me and attempted to describe 
various Seljuq institutions. I think I am right in stating 
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PREFACE. ?
The Seljuq period marks a turning point in the history
of western Asia. Its primary importance was an ethnological
one. The Seljuqs were not invaders who came and went, hut
were the leaders of a tribal migration, who became almost
1by chance the rulers of a vast empire. They introduced the 
Turks as a permanent element in the population of western 
Asia, and thus altered the balance of the population, of 
which formerly the important elements had been Arab and 
Persian. The Seljuq movement had also a subsidiary religious 
and economic importance. It made possible the reunification 
of the Sunni world, against which the Crusaders were unable 
to achieve a lasting success; upon the ruins of the Seljuq 
empire arose the Atabeg dynasty of Maw§il, which in turn 
gave rise to the Ayyubid dynasty, before which the Christian 
kingdom of Jerusalem was ultimately to perish. The emergence 
of these powers as the defenders of Sunni Islam would have 
hardly been possible, but for the Sunni revival which took
^ That they did bo was due largely to the fact that a suc­
cession of military leaders coincided with a complete 
breakdown of settled government in the lands of the 
Eastern caliphate.
ii
place tinder the Seljuqs. They were not themselves respon­
sible for this revival, but only for creating the conditions 
which made such a revival possible. Not only, however, is 
the Seljuq period important in the history of Islam as 
being a period of Sunni revival, it is also marked by the 
appearance and widespread development of that phase of the
BatinI movement which is known among the Arab historians 
••
as ad-dafwat al-jadlda. It is not, however, with these 
aspects of the Seljuq period that the present work is con­
cerned, but rather with certain aspects of the organisation 
of the Great Seljuq empire.
The field of these studies is limited in time to the 
period extending from the beginning of the Seljuq movement
(its 7)
down to the death of San jar in 55^ arid- in space to the 
area over which the central imperial government exercised 
control. The Seljuq kingdoms of Syria, Anatolia and Kirman, 
in so far as they became virtually independent of the Great 
Seljuq sultan, lie outside the field of the present work, 
and have only been referred to where their development 
throws light upon the institutions of the Great Seljuq 
empire.
Various aspects of the civil and military administration 
from the year 485 (1092) to the year 5^1 (1117) have already 
been briefly described by Sanaullah in "The Decline of the
Seljuqid Empire", while Siddiqi in "Caliphate and Kingship 1 
in Medieval Islam" has dealt fully with the theoretical 
aspect of the caliphate and its relations with the sul­
tanate, and no attempt will he made to go over the ground 
already covered by these two works.
It remains for me to record my thanks to my supervisor, 
Sir E. Denison Ross, for his kindness and advice throughout 
my studies. It is with deep gratitude that I also express 
my thanks to Professor H. A. R. Gibb for his guidance and 
many helpful suggestions during my researches. I have 
lastly to thank Professor Tritton and Mr. Taqizadeh for 
their help in translating various passages, and Mr. Minovi 
for his advice on different matters.
CHAPTER I.
THE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE OP THE SELJtfQ EMPIRE.
i. The Ghuzz Movement .
Towards the end of the 4th and the beginning of the $th
century A.H. various tribes in Turkistan were in a state of
unrest, and showed a general tendency to move westwards.
Among these were the Ghuzz, who were migrating in separate and
often independent groups. One of such groups was that led by
Seljuq b. Duqaq, who settled in Jand in J45 (956/7)*^ 375
(985) the Seljuq Ghuzz, or a section of them, were again on
the move, and we are told that they migrated from Turkistan
into Transoxania, because their pastures were insufficient to
supply their needs, and settled in Nur Bukhara and Sughd of 
2
Samarqand. There they took part in the struggles of the 
various local rulers and gradually increased in power.
Other groups of Ghuzz were probably meanwhile also 
passing into Khurasan, but the first large movement did not
Seljuq had been in the service of one of the Turkish leaders, 
but hearing that one of the latter* s wives had advised his 
destruction on the grounds that he was plotting against 
her husband, he migrated to Jand (A.S.D. 2; I.A. IZ.J22),
 ^T.G. 434; Bart*old: Turkestan 257*
occur until 420 (1029) when Mahmud b. Sebuktegln, after 
seizing Isra’Il b. Seljuq, ordered the tribes under him to
migrate into Khurasan* According to Gardlzl 4000 tents
—  -  —  2crossed the Oxus into Khurasan during the reign of Mahmud,
and it is presumably to this occasion that he refers. These 
Ghuzz, after creating disturbances, were subsequently dis­
persed.^ Some 2000 tents went to Igfahan, while a more nu-
-  —  A
merous group went to Balkhan Kuh. Other bodies of Ghuzz 
seem to have pushed on into Jzerbaijan, for on MaJjmud’s death 
Mas'ud b. Mahmud wrote to the Ghuzz in that province, and a 
thousand of them joined his service.^
Meanwhile the principal Seljuq leaders, Tughril Beg,
The story of Mahmud’s meeting with Israeli, and his ques­
tioning him as to how many men he could furnish him (Maijmud) 
with in case of need is well known. Giving an arrow to* 
Mahmud, Israeli said 100,000 would come to him if he sent 
the arrow to the Seljuq horde^ while a second arrow would 
fetch 50*000 horse from Balkhan Kuh, and his bow would 
bring 200,000 horse from Turkistan, (R.S. 90^3; T*G, 435 J 
R.D.f.237b* 238a; A.S.D. 3; I.K. III.225,) The custom 
of summoning the tribes by sending them an arrow was also 
found among the Urtuqids. Da*ud b. Suqman in case of need 
would send an arrow to invite the Turkoman tribes to join 
him (Receuil des Histoires des Croisades. Historiens 
Orientaux, vol.II. part II.pp.70rl).
2 G. 85.
^ G. 89,90; I.K. III.225-6.
I.A. IX.J2J-4; 266. A group numbering 1500 under Qizil 
were for a time at Rei with ‘Ala ud-Dawla II.A. IX.269).
^ At their request Masud gave an amnesty to the Ghuzz whom 
Mahmud had dispersed, and Qizil, Buqa, Kuktash and other 
leaders joined him, but after a time they returned to 
th&ir predatory habits IB.71).
Chaghrl Beg Da*ud and. BaighB, who succeeded Mika^Il b. Seljuq, 
in the leadership of his followers, had remained in Trans- 
oxania, and moved to the borders of Khwarazm in 425 (1053/4-)* 
because they had fallen out with ‘^ lltegjn's sons in Bur 
Bukhara. On the death of Harun the Khwarazmshah in 426, 
they were obliged to move again, for they feared that Shah 
Malik, who had already attacked them in 425* would fall upon 
them, once the protection of Earun had been removed. Accord­
ingly, ?00 of them suddenly crossed the Oxus into Khurasan. 
Their numbers rapidly increased - whether other groups fol­
lowed them across the Oxus, or whether they were joined by 
Ghuzz already in Khurasan is not clear - but when they
reached Marv and Nasa, the combined numbers of the Seljuqs
—  —  —  2and Bayaliyan (?Yanaliyan) were 10,000 horse.
Having entered Khurasan, the Seljuqs asked permission to 
live under Mas*udfs protection, and offered to send some of 
their number to serve at his court. Further, in return for 
permission to settle at Baseband Farava, they offered to 
prevent any disturbances arising in Balkhan Kuh, Dihist an, 
Khwarazm or the neighbourhood of the Oxus, and to attack the 
Turkomans of *Iraq and Khwarazm.  ^ This suggests that the
1 B. 856-7; 859.
2
B. 582. It seems likelyjthat they were joined by bodies of 
Ghgzz already in Khurasan. Ibn Isfandiyar states that when 
Masud returned from Jurjan, he learnt that 2000 Turkomans 
had reached Marv and been joined by Yaghmur and Buqa (p.2J5)*
2 B.538.
4Ghuzz ■who had entered Khurasan at an earlier date and moved 
on into *lraq, and also those who were in Khwarazm were inde­
pendent groups of Ghuzs, and that it was therefore only after 
success had come to the Seljuqs that they came to be regarded 
as the leaders of the Ghuzz in general.^ On the other hand 
Israel's reported statement that a token from him would
bring the Ghuzz of Turkistan and Balkhan Kuh to the help of
p —Mahmud supports the view that the Seljuqs were the hereditary
leaders of the Ghuzz in general, Further Ibn ul-Athlr states 
that the Ghuzz who had gone to Rei under Qizil were the sub­
jects of Ibrahim Yanal, Tughril Beg and Da’ud,^ while Tughril 
Beg in a letter to Jalal ud-Dawla in 435 (1043/4) claimed the
Ghuzz who had migrated westwards before the main movement of
-  -  4the Seljuqs as Seljuq subjects.
It is unnecessary to go into the somewhat complicated 
history of the struggle between the Seljuqs and Mas*ud, which 
culminated in the defeat of Mas'ud at Dendenqan in Ramadan 
431(1040). During this period the Seljuq leaders, Tughril 
Beg, Da'ud and Baighu acted together in a kind of loose con­
federation. Demanding fresh pastures, they harried the Ghaz- 
navid forces, but avoided direct conflict with them whenever
1 iIn Muharram 428 they complained to Mas ud of other Turko­




5possible, and took possession of districts whenever the Ghaz- 
navid forces withdrew, hut evacuated these on their return.**' 
The nature of the Seljuq movement, and of the Ghuzz movement 
in general, was that of a tribal migration. There were no 
centres to which they returned after making their raids; and 
they were, moreover, accompanied by their families and flocks. 
Gradually, however, as increasing ^ though not uninterrupted 
success attended the efforts of the Seljuqs, they became
o
transformed into military conquerors. They began to appro­
priate to themselves the rights of rulers and to have their 
names included in the khutba and to strike coins.^ The final 
point in this transition was marked by the battle of Denden-
qan, which brought to an end the effective resistance of the
4.
Ghaznavids in Persia. After this it only remained for the
1 A.S.D. 5-12; G.101,106-8; B. 610-1; 627-8; 775-6;
R.D.f.258B; T.N. 129-
0  f  d Wr M
Cf. Abd as-Samad, Mas ud’s wazlr who said when Tughril 
Beg, Da’ud and Baighu entered Khurasan, "up to now we were 
dealing with shepherds ... now amirs who are seizing pro­
vinces have come." (B. 5^4).
2 Bart’old: 12 Vorlesungen, p.105.
4 -It is_interesting to note that, according to Baihaqi, the
Seljuqs were on the point of leaving Khurasan before Den- 
denqan, because of_the loss and distress they had suffered* 
on account of Mas*ud’s superior power and equipment.
Da?ud, however, had taken the view that Mas ud would pur­
sue them and write to the local leaders to oppose them if 
they went to Dihistan, as some of them proposed doing, 
without first fighting Mas'ud. The other Seljuq leaders 
took his advice, and they joined battle with Mas ud at 
Dendenqan (B. 775-6)•
Seljuqs to consolidate their conquests in Khurasan and the 
neighbourhood, and to continue their conquests westwards.
In due course the majority, if not all the Ghuzz, became 
associated with the Seljuqs, but control and unity was never 
fully established over the movement as a whole, which was com­
posed largely of semi-independent bodies each acting virtually 
on its own behalf. As the Seljuqs advanced westwards, the 
tendency was admittedly for the Ghuzz to be absorbed by them, 
but the control of the central imperial government did not 
extend over any but the nearer bodies. The outlying groups, 
although nominally acknowledging the overlordship of the Sel­
juqs, continued to act on their own behalf, in spite of this 
nominal association. Atsiz b. Abaq, who took Jerusalem on his 
own account from the Fatimids, and the whole of Palestine with 
the exception of Ascalon, is an example of a semi-independent 
Ghuzz leader. He did, admittedly, finally recognise Tutush 
as suzerain?- but he cannot be regarded as having been under 
any central control during his earlier exploits, nor did his 
recognition of Tutush in fact imply any control by the central 
government over him.
The geographical extent of the operations of the Ghuzz 
was thus far wider than the extent of the central imperial 




narrower area than that usually included under the name of the 
Seljuq empire.1
The central imperial structure of the Seljuq empire, 
although it arose out of the Ghuzz movement, was nevertheless 
a reintegration of the Perso-Arab empire. Foreign to the sub­
ject population though the Seljuqs were by origin, their Muslim 
upbringing prepared them for a rapid acceptance in its broad 
outlines of the imperial tradition - and with this the cultural 
institutions - of the civilized Muslim world. But the old 
usages of the steppes and the nature of their armed forces 
necessarily produced some modification of the imperial struc­
ture. Politically,the Seljuq empire was a loose confederation 
of semi-independent kingdoms over which the Great Seljuqs 
exercised nominal sovereignty. Only during the last five 
years of Malikshah's reign was any degree of unity achieved. 
Generally speaking, the Seljuqs were opposed to central control 
and in any case the central government had not the power to 
maintain permanent control over the different parts of the 
empire. Both the Seljuq kingdom of Bum and the Seljuq kingdom 
of Syria broke away at an early date from the Great Seljuqs, 
and developed along more or less independent lines, governed
1 _
Not only did the Seljuqs fail to incorporate within their
empire groups of Ghuzz in Asia Minor and Syria, they failed 
also to unite their Central Asia brethren, against whom 
Sanjar eventually had to fight Icf. Bart1 old: 12 Vorlesungen
p.112).
8by local conditiohs. Similarly, the SeljJuqs of*Kirman, 
although subject perhaps to a greater degree of interference 
from the Great Seljuqs, were virtually independent, and 
exerted little influence on the general course of events.
ii. The Sultan.•*
The Great Seljuq dominion can be divided into ..three 
main periods: the period of expansion under Tughril Beg,
during which the latter was gradually transformed from the 
joint leader of a nomadic migration into the ruler of a large 
territorial empire, the autocratic^period under Alp Arslan 
and Malikshah, during which the Great Seljuqs were at the 
height of their power, and the dec ay and final b reak-up of 
the Great Seljuq empire from the death of Malikshah to the 
end of Sanjar's reign.
The Seljuq family, whether by hereditary right or by 
virtue of their success as military leader^ were regarded, 
or came to be regarded, as the leaders of the Ghuzz. Their 
original conception seems to have been of the leadership 
vested in the family as a whole, and of a loose confederation 
of tribes led by different members of the Seljuq family.
This conception survived in a modified form throughout the 
Great Seljuq period, and is seen in the tendency to assign
9provinces to minor members of the Seljuq. family and in the 
growth of the Seljuq. dynasties of Rum, Syria and Kirman, In 
the beginning it seems that the status of Tughril Beg, Dafud 
and Baighu was virtually equal. Gradually Tughril Beg esta­
blished his position as the supreme leader of the Ghuzz; he 
did not, however, exercise this position to the exclusion of 
his brothers, especially Da/ud.^ Indeed the lack of jealousy 
and family rivalry among the Seljuqs is a marked feature of 
the movement during its early period, and is seen in the later 
period also in the spirit of conciliation shown by different 
sultans on various occasions to rebellious princes.
Once the early period of expansion was over and the 
Seljuqs found themselves in possession of a large territorial 
empire, inhabited to a great extent by people possessing a 
higher culture than their own, the conception of the ruling 
khan* s family as the guardian of the tribe or group of tribes 
was in due course inevitably replaced by the Persian ideal of 
an autocratic sovereign, which prevailed in the conquered 
territories, foreign though this was to the Turkoman con­
ception. Towards the end of Tughril Beg’s reign this ideal 
had already begun to influence the conquerors, and by the
1 -  -In some cities in Khurasan the khutba was read in the name— »
of Tughril Beg and in others at the same time in the name 
of Sa ud (Bart*old, p.306). further in 438(1046/7) the 
khutba was read in Ibrahim Yanal’s name in Hulwan (I.A. IX. 
Jo“ ," 'and at ad-Daskara in 440 (1048/9) (I.A. IX.376). On 
the other hand I.K. states that Tughril alone (of his 
people) pretended to sovereign authority (III.222).
10 I
time of Alp Arslan it had been adopted hy them, even if in a 
somewhat modified form,1
Da'ud, as governor of Khurasan, like his sons after him, 
did not dispute the consolidation of Tughril Beg’s position 
as the supreme leader of the Ghuzz. Ibrahim Yanal also seems
p
to have acquiesced in this at first. Further, the local 
rulers seem to have recognised Tughril*s predominant position. 
Iflhen Abu Kalljar wished to negotiate for peace with the Sel­
juqs in 439 (1047/8), it was to Tughril Beg he sent,^ and 
not to Ibrahim Yanal, although the latter was the leader of 
the Ghuzz in the Jibal. In 441 (1049/50) the family unity of 
the Seljuqs was, however, temporarily disturbed by Ibrahim x 
Yanal, who refused to hand Hamadan over to Tughril Beg. The 
latter then defeated his half-brother, but instead of dis­
gracing him, offered him the option of returning to his former 
position or remaining with him, the latter of which alterna­
tives he chose.^ Subsequently in 450 (IO58) Ibrahim Yanal
T-------------------------------------!------ :----------------
Various survivals from the tribal period are found in the
royal insignia. On the Seljuq chatr was shown a bow and 
arrow (Muhammad Ibrahim, p.lO)f the tughra also contained a 
bow and arrow (Bu.152; Muhammad Ibr3hlmr"p. 10). Alp Arslan 
before the battle of Manazkird clothed himself in white and 
tied a knot in the tail of his horse (Koprulii: Les Institu­
tions Juridiques. p.32).
^ 7?hen Tughril Beg came to Hei in 434/1043/4) Ibrahim Yanal 
handed over to him the city and other towns which he had 
conquered and himself went to Slstan (I.A. IX.347). In the 
same year Tughril sent him with an army to Kirman (I.A. IX. 
349-56), while in 437 (1045/6J Ibrahim Yanal went, at Tugh- 




rebelled again and was eventually captured by Alp Arslan b.
*L _ w #-1,
Da'ud and put to death. Yaquti b* Da*ud and Qawurd b. Da ud 
also joined forces with Tughril Beg on this occasion, but 
Muhammad and Ahmad, sons of Irtash joined Ibrahim* Of other 
members of the Seljuq family, Qutulmish seems to have preserved 
amicable relations with Tughril. Rasultegln, son of Tughril1 s 
mother, on the other hand seems to have acted as a more or 
less independent marauder; in 449 (1057/S) he went with Fulad,
the Dailamite to plunder Arrajan which had been assigned by
— 2 Tughril Beg to Hazarasp b* Banker.
The loose confederation over which Tughril Beg had at­
tempted to establish some kind of central control was far 
from being firmly united by the time of his death. It was 
perhaps only to be expected that it would be his own relations, 
above all, who would resent such an attempt to curb their free­
dom. Ibrahim Yanal had already done so during the life-time 
of Tughril Beg, and on the latter1 s death difficulties at 
once arose. Al-Kundurl, in accordance with Tughril's will, 
put Sulaiman b* Da*ud on the throne, but seeing that the 
amirs opposed his accession, he proclaimed Alp Arslan sultan 
in QazwTn and had the khutba read in Eei in the names of both 
Alp Arslan and Sulaiman.^ Meanwhile Baighu b* Mika*Il, governor
^ I.A._IX.444. Al-Basaslrl is stated to have incited Ibrahim 




of Herat rebelled 1456), but Alp Arslan, after defeating
1him, was reconciled to him, Qutulmish also rebelled, and 
Alp Arslan accordingly returned from Nlshapur in Muharram 
456 (December 106j-January 1064) to Rei* On reaching 
Damghan, he sent to Qutulmish, commanding him to abandon his
rebellions intentions. The latter, however, paid no heed,
_ 2
and so Alp Arslan advanced and defeated him at Rei. On
this occasion Alp Arslan seems to have considered abandoning 
the traditional policy of conciliation towards his family, 
for he ordered Qutnlmishfs relations, including his son 
Sulaiman, and those of his followers who had been captured, 
to be killed. Nizam ul-Hulk, however, interceded success- 
fully for them, and advised that they should be deprived of 
all the privileges of governorship and kingship, and sent to 
live on the frontiers.^ Having put down these rebellions,
Alp Arslan's position as sultan was established, and he had 
little more difficulty from his relatives, with the exception 
of Qara Arslan, who rebelled unsuccessfully in Kirman in
459 (1066/7)* After defeating him Alp Arslan reinstated him
—  4in Kirman in his former position.
It may well be that the opposition which Alp Arslan
1 1.4. x.22.
2 ibid. 25-4.
3 E.D. f.240b; I.A. X.24; T.G.49O.
4 I.A, X.36-7.
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encountered from Baighu and Qutulmish was a turning point 
in the relations between the sultan and his family. It 
seems not unreasonable to suppose that Alp Arslan may have 
realised that to keep even a limited control over the dif­
ferent members of his family a standing army, loyal to him­
self, was necessary. Further as the conception of an auto­
cratic ruler began to replace the conception of the ruling 
9 khan, so was the moral basis of the Seljuq authority weakened, 
and some substitute had to be found for the former tribal 
loyalties, fcy which the Seljuqs had held their position. To 
some extent this was replaced by the central government, 
which supplied an element of unity, but it was only effective 
as long as it was supported by a strong central control.
Under Alp Arslan and Malikshah this condition was fulfilled, 
and the latter especially, largely by means of a strong 
standing army, succeeded in imposing some measure of control 
throughout the empire.
Alp Arslan before his death appointed Malikshah his 
wall-* ahd, and distributed the kingdom among his relatives 
(see Chapter ¥.), in order to lessenttheir opposition to 
this.'** Nevertheless Malikshah* s succession was not undispu­
ted. Qawurd, ruler of Kirman, on the death of Alp Arslan
2determined to make himself master of the kingdom. According
1 I.A. X.52; I.K. III.440; A.S.D. 41.
2 - According to the A.S.D, he wrote to Malikshah, stating he
was more fitted to sudceed Alp Arslan on the grounds that 
he was the eldest brother of the latter$rwhile Malikshah was 
only a young son (p. 56).
1*5 a
to one account, some of Malikshah* s amirs wrote to Qawurd 
asking him to come,'*’ and when hattle took place between Malik­
shah and Qawurd, many of the formers army were favourably 
- 2inclined to Qawurd. The latter nevertheless was defeated, 
and subsequently killed. His rebellion did not, however, 
involve the disgrace of this branch of the Seljuq family; 
they continued to rule in Kirman, and in 472 (1079/80) Malik­
shah, when he went to Kirman, confirmed Sul aim ans hah b,
Qawurd as ruler of that province.^ > In 473 Takash,to whom 
Malikshah had assigned Balkh and Tukjiaristan? rebelled, 
after being joined by 7000 men whom Malikshah had dismissed 
from his army. He made himself master of Marv, Tirmidh, and 
elsewhere, and set out for Hlshapur, intending to conquer 
Khurasan. Malikshah, hearing of his revolt, immediately 
set out for Khurasan, and made peace with Takash without 
jointhgsbdttle.^ in 477 (1084/5) the latter again rebelled,
^ Muhammad Ibrahim, p. 12-3•
2 LA. X.53.
' ibid. 74-3* _According to Muhammad Ibrahlmi Malikshah. as a 
result of Qawurd* s revolt marched to Kirman with a large 
army, determined to root out Qawurd*s family. Sultanshah 
took refuge in Bardsir and Malikshah departed after seven­
teen days (p.17). 1
4 I.A. X.64. I
5 ibid. 76.
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and this time Malikshah defeated and captured him, and had 
t
him "blinded. Yet another attempt to establish independence 
in the eastern provinces was made by Tughril b. Yanal in 
482 (IO89/9O), but Malikshah prevented this by playing off 
Yafqub, the brother of the king of Kashghar, against him.
In Syria, which Malikshah had assigned to Tutush in 
470 (1077/8), Malikshah^ nominal authority seems to have 
been recognised, though twice Malikshah had to intervene in 
person.^ In 484 (IO91) Tutush came himself to Baghdad to
_ A
pay homage to Malikshah.
Malikshah, as stated above, did succeed at the end of 
his reign in establishing some kind of unity. This was due, 
not so much to loyalty of the members of his family towards 
him, for as is shown above some of them did rebel against 
him, but rather to his superior military strength, which 
enabled him to march against and defeat rebellious princes.
Tughril Beg had held his position in part by hereditary 
right but primarily by his own prestige and prowess, which 
singled him out from the other members of his family, but in 
measure as the emphasis began to shift, towards the end of 
his reign and subsequently, to a hereditary and autocratic
1 I.A. X.88-9.
2 ibid. 116.
^ See Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, pp.20-1. 
4 I.A. X.133.
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basis of power, the sultan tended to appoint his successor 
from among his own children. In so far, however, as the 
tradition of the tribal period had not been completely aban­
doned, this inevitably met with opposition from other members 
of the family in cases where it involved the elevation of a 
child to the throne*^ Malikshah, and other sultans after 
him, all left comparatively young boys or children to succeed 
them, and consequently the death of a sultan was almost al- 
ways followed by struggles for supremacy among his surviving 
uncles, brothers and cousins. Such struggles had, admittedly, 
not been lacking in the earlier period also, but from the 
death of Malikshah onwards, this state of affairs was more 
marked, partly because the situation was complicated by the 
growing power of the amirs, who endeavoured to put their 
own nominees on the throne (see Chapter IV,). Further there 
was also a personal factor, which was probably not unimportant 
'Whereas Tughril Beg, Alp Arslan and Malikshah had been out­
standing figures, the quality of the subsequent sultans, with 
the exception of Sanjar and perhaps also to a lesser degree
It seems the succession of Malikshah was disputed by 
Qawurd partly because of his youth (cf. A.S.D. 5b, 
Muhammad Ibrahim, p. 12^15). Similarly Sanjar opposed 
the succession of Mahmud b. Muhammad on the grounds of 
his youth (I.A, X.380).
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of Muhammad, b. Malikshah, was not very high.1
On the death of Malikshah, the superficial unity imposed 
towards the end of his reign collapsed, and the struggle for 
power immediately arose. Turkan Khatun succeeded in placing
p
her son Mahmud (b. 480 (1087/8) ) on the throne, but she was 
ultimately unable to defeat the opposition which crystallized 
round Barkyaruq, even though she eventually tried to secure 
the aid of Isma*Il b. Yaquti from Szerbaijan to do so.^ Tutush, 
ruler of Syria, also made a determined effort to obtain the 
sultanate, but was finally defeated by Barkyaruq in §afar 487 
(1094).^ With the failure of this attempt to unite Syria with 
Persia and the eastern provinces, Syria receded once more into 
the background. Nominally the Great Seljuq sultan was recog­
nised in that country, but the control exerted by him over 
Syrian affairs was negligible. It is moreover significant 
that when Muhammad b. Malikshah sent a Sejjuq army under
BursuqJ jto Syria in Ramadan (ill?), Seljuq vassals in 
Many of them were dissipated and given to indulgence. Bark­
yaruq was addicted to wine (I.E. I, 251), while his entourage 
at the beginning of his reign seems zo have been an evil one 
(Bu. Sulaiman b. Muhammad and his wazlr, Pakhr ud-Dln
Abu Tahir ware similarly dissipated (Bu. 212), while under 
Mahmud b. Muhammad immorality was general (Bu. 11J). Malik­
shah b, Mahmud was also addicted to wine (R.S. 249).
2 I.A. X.145.
^ ibid. 152; U.H.S* 74. Her death in Ramadan 487 (1094) was 
followed shortly by Mahmud1 s (I.A.iIX.l63).
^ I.A. X.I58; Grousset I., L,LI.
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Syria united with the Christians in opposition to it.*1*
Barkyaruq meanwhile established himself as sultan, and
by 490 (1097), when he recovered possession of Khurasan, of
which Arslan Arghu had made himself master on the death of
Malikshah, ^  he was recognised over the whole of Persia with
the exception of Kirman and ‘Iraq. He was not however to
remain in undisputed possession for long. In 492 (IO98/9)
his brother Muhammad rebelled against him, and for the next
few years he was engaged in a struggle for the sultanate with
Muhammad. Finally after many vicissitudes he established in
497X U O 3/4) a slight supremacy, but it had been achieved only
at the cost of general disorder throughout the country, and a
decline in the prestige of the sultanate. Moreover by the
terms of the peace Muhammad* s status was virtually that of an
independent ruler. Barkyaruq was not to thwart him in the
tabl in the territory from the Sefid Hud to the Bab al-Abwab,
Diyar Bakr, Mawsil, Syria, ‘Iraq and gadaqa's domains, nor 
(Barkyaruq * s)
was his/name to be mentioned alongside Muhammad* s in these 
districts, and correspondence between them was to be through
** I.A. X.356. object of this expedition was not merely' a
counter Crusade. Its intention was also to bring Syria 
once more under the control of the Central government - 
not only Frankish Syria but also Mgslim Syria. But in this 
it failed (Cf. Grousset I.496-5°0)*
2 Bu. 2J6.
I
the medium of the two wazlrs.1 Hence the kingdom was divided 
into two virtually independent principalities. On his death­
bed in 498 (1105) Barkyaruq nominated his son Malikfahah as 
his successor, but althou^i the khutba was read in the latter* s
name in Baghdad (RabI* II.), Muhammad soon succeeded in estab-
-  2 lishing himself as sultan (see also Chapter IV.).
Under Muhammad b. Malikshah the rule of the Great Seljuq
sultan extended once more over the whole of Persia, with the
.■ -.i.-tft... .
exception of Kirman, and although his reign did something to 
restore the prestige of the sultanate, the unity of the empire 
was never again effectively reimposed. Rum was virtually in­
dependent, while in Syria, although the Great Seljuq sultan 
was nominally recognised, he did not exert any effective con­
trol.^ San jar meanwhile, in Khurasan, was nominally governor 
on behalf of Muhammad, but was in fact all but independent; 
he was occupied in laying the foundations of his power, which 
was to enable him after the death of Muhammad, to make himself 
sultan.■1—  - f t ... .
Uhen, on the death of Muhammad b. Malikshah, San jar estab­
lished himself as sultan after defeating Mahmud b, Muhammad, 
whom Muhammad had nominated as his successor, at Sava (JumadI
1.515(1119) )»* he did not transfer the seat of his government
-1 1.a. x .254; Bu. 239; T.g. 453.
2 I.A. X.262.
5 Grousset I. 479•
4 I.A. X.387-8; M.Z. 47-8;j
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to a more central position, and allowed a Seljuq prince to 
rule in the Western provinces of Persia and in *Iraq. This 
may have been due perhaps to the fact that he had not any 
personal following outside Khurasan, or that the pressure 
upon the eastern frontiers of the latter province was such that 
he thought it unwise to absent himself permanently from that 
region; or, lastly, it may be that the reason was partly a 
personal one, for Ibn ul-Athir states that Sanjar’s mother, who 
was Mahmud’s grandmother, persuaded him to make peace with
Mahmud.1 In any case he gave back to Mahmud his domains with
2 - — ' the exception of Rei, and himself returned to Khurasan. The
status of Mahmud and that of his successors was that of a
malik, although they used the title of sultan. The support
which Mahmud and the sultanSn after him received from San jar
failed moreover to deter other Seljuq princes on their own
initiative or on the initiative of different amirs and atabegs
from rebelling against him. Thus the arrangement was hi^ily
unsatisfactory, and San jar was forced to interfere on various
occasions. Khurasan was, it seems, an unsuitable place fgom
1 I. A. 1.388.
2 -He retained Reiuas a precaution in case Mahmud should rebel
again (I.A. X.^89). According to the A.S^D. he retained 
also Mazandaran, Tabaristan, Qumis, Damghan, and the dis­
trict from Dombavend to Khurasan (p.89)# while the T.G-. 
states he kept something in the possession of his diwan 
in every district (p.458).
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from which to exert control over the rest of Persia and 'Iraq., 
and San jar proved quite unable either to restrain the in­
creasing ambitions of the amirs and atabegs or to prevent 
the ultimate disintegration of the empire*
iii. Directly Administered Areas.
The Seljuq empire may be divided into directly adminis­
tered and indirectly administered areas. The division was 
not a constant one, and the extent of the area directly ad­
ministered varied from time to time. The general tendency 
was for the directly administered areas gradually to increase 
up to the death of Malikshah and subsequently to decrease.
The directly administered areas were chiefly composed 
of the capital and the surrounding districts. Tughril Beg 
levied taxes in Gilan and fabaristan and appointed governors,^ 
but this perhaps scarcely amounted to direct administration. 
Marv, which Da*ud made his capital, was apparently always 
directly administered.^ Similarly Isfahan,^ and possibly a
1 Ibn Isfandiyar, p.236.
2 Sanjai; when Bakhtiyar, the Ghuzz leader, asked to be as­
signed Marv, said, ”This is the dar ul-mulk. It is not 
permissible for it to be an iqt a‘belonging to anyone.”
(I.A. XI.117). “ J
^ Part of Isfahan was assigned by San jar to Seljuqshah b. 
Muhammad in 512 (Bu. 122; A.S.D.90).
/
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district surrounding it extending to the confines of Rei,
Qazwln, Hama dan, Kermanshah, Fars,and Yazd, was directly
administered throughout the major part of the period. Part
of the province of Pars, Khuaistan and 'Iraq were at various
times also directly administered.1 Baghdad was under a kind
of dual control exercised hy the sultan and the caliph,
until the latter part of the period, when the caliphate
- 2emerged as a succession state of the Seljuq empire. Sanjar, 
when he reinstated Mahmud h. Muhammad as ruler of the western 
provinces of Persia, is said to have retained various places, 
including Rei, in the possession of his diwan (see above), 
but these do not seem in fact to have been directly adminis­
tered by him. Rei was assigned to al-Muqarrab Jawhar and 
subsequently to 4Abbas.^ On this occasion Sanjar also made 
various assignments to Tughril b. Muhammad and Seljuqshah b. 
Muhammad, and various amirs took or had already taken posses­
sion of different districts, so that no land remained under 
Mahmud’s diwan, and the only source of revenue remaining to
A
him was confiscations.
Muhammad b. Malikshah had an * amil in Khuzistan and in Pars, 
which suggests that districts in those provinces were direct 
ly administered by the central government at that time 
(I.A. X.368; Bu. 111).
2 Taxes, however, were during part of the Great Seljuq period 
collected bjr the sultan’s officials in Baghdad (see Chapter
II.). Mas ud b. Muhammad's officials collected ’illegal” 
taxes in Baghdad also (Bu. 178).
^ In the earlier period when Rei was the capital it was presu­
mably directly administered (see also Chapter VI.).
4 Bu. 122-3.
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iv. Indirectly Administered Areas,
The vast majority of the territory of the Great Seljuq 
empire (i.e. the area over which the Central Imperial Govern­
ment had control) falls tinder this category. Firstly there 
were "settled" areas, administered by former local ruling
families, secondly "tribal" areas, and thirdly areas alienated
- — — ^  —  <v» t'tf+y
from the direct administration of the central government see
Chapter W.l*)* The extent of the territory falling under
these sub-divisions was not constant, and in so far as the
members of former local ruling families, in "settled" or
"tribal" areas, were assigned or farmed part of the lands they
formerly held, this group merges into the last group. At the
beginning of the period the greater part of the country was
administered by the former local ruling families as Seljuq
vassals or governors. Centralisation gradually increased up
to the de$th of Malikshah, after which the practice of making
assignments to the Turkish amirs and others grew, until the
directly srifcainistered areas were almost negligible. In this
section only the areas administered by members of former local
ruling families and tribals areas will be dealt with. The
settled areas comprised chiefly such districts as were still
held by the Buyids during the early years of the Great Seljuq
empire, and various districts in the Caspian regions, which
were ruled by local dynasties, while the tribal areas included
23
Aral), Kurdish and Turkoman territory.
The relations of the Great Seljuqs with the former ruling 
families, whether in settled areas or in tribal areas may be 
divided roughly into three phases. ^Firstly, during the early
years of the Ghuzz expansion, the Seljuqs, and the Ghuzz general­
ly, were looked upon by the local rulers as a reserve of mer­
cenaries upon whom they could draw in their quarrels.1 During 
this phase the payments the Ghuzz received from the local 
rulers were not tribute, as they are often represented, but
rather payments to mercenaries for their services, and hence,
■ >
quite naturally, when the Ghuzz left the district these payments 
2
ceased. This phase was rapidly succeeded by another.
As the Seljuqs conquered large districts, although in some
local
cases they drove out the former/rulte, in many cases they con­
firmed the latter in his possessions, or in part of them, as 
their vassal. Such ^p<^icy j)f indirect administration was
1 The employment of the Ghuzz by Mas*ud b. Mahmud and * Ala ud- 
Dawla has already been mentioned.
o
In 434 (1042/3) Tughril Beg imposed an annual tribute of 
27,000 dinars on Kamru (I.A. IX.348). Subsequently in 434 
Tughril 'besieged Qazwln, and Kamru and^MardawIj b. Bassu, 
whom Tughril had made governor of Jurjan in 433 (I*A. IX. 
340) made peace with him for 80,000 dinars (I.A. X.348).
In 434 Tughril Beg obtained from the Salarid ruler of Tarim 
a sum of money (see p. 25 note 2 below), while in 454(lB^) 
Tughril made another expedition to Tarim and fixed a tribute 
of 100,000 dinars and 100 garments upon MusafI, its ruler
(I.A. x.15)* >£>
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probably forced upon the Seljuqs by circumstances. They were 
nomads with little experience of settled government. Clearly 
they could not hand over to their fellow-tribesmen extensive 
territories, of which they suddenly found themselves in pos­
session, for the latter, in addition to their inexperience of 
administration, in all probability looked upon the settled 
population merely as booty. Farther in the absence of a 
strong central government, if the Seljuqs were to maintain 
control of the conquered territories they had to obtain the 
goodwill of the population, or at least their acquiescence. 
This was certainly not likely to be achieved by handing them 
over to the Ghuzz. Moreover, not only was it in the field 
of administration that the Seljuqs appeared to have been un­
able to dispense with the help of the local ruling families;
their relations with Hazarasp b. Bankir suggest they were
2also in need at this time of an experienced diplomat. The
T------------------------------------------------------------Haturally the local people preferred the rule of their own
people to that of the Ghuzz. When Tughril Beg assigned 
Balad to Hazarasp in 448 (1056/7), the people of the 
country fled there (I.A. HdJ2).
2 —On more than one occasion Hazarasp played the part of a
peacemaker between Tughril Beg and the local rulers. In 
448 (1056/72 Nur ud-Dawla b. Dubais and Quraish b. Badran 
sent to Hazarasp asking him to mediate for them, and he ob­
tained pardon for them, but they refused to join Tughril 
unless Hazarasp went to them and gave them an oatfi for 
their safe conduct. Tughril accordingly sent him to them, 
but they still fearecL and eventually sent representatives 
to Tughril, but refused to go themselves (I.A. IX.433)*
In 45i (1059) Hazarasp again mediated for Hur ud-Dawla 
with Tughril (I.A. X.5).
TT
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following incident also suggests this. When Faramarz, ruler 
of Isfahan sent his vazir, Abu1! Fath RazI, on an embassy to 
Tughril Beg, the latter made Abu*l Fath his wazlr.^
The third phase, which began perhaps towards the end of 
Tughril Beg's reign, is marked by the establishment of adminis 
tration by Seljuq officials. From this statement the Arab 
and Turkoman areas must, however, generally speaking, be 
excluded. Whereas the Kurdish and other local tribes in 
Persia were placed under the control of provincial governors 
and others, the Arab and Turkoman tribes were left chiefly 
under their own leaders. Throughout these .different phases, 
but especially during the period of expansion, the relations 
of the Seljuqs with the local ruling families were marked - 
with exceptions, such as the case of the Buyid, ar-Rahim - 
by a spirit of compromise, which also characterised their
p
relations with one another, as stated above.
The Seljuqs probably realised that they were foreigners 
in the conquered territories, and that in so far as they did 
not exterminate former ruling families, it was essential for 
them to keep on good terms with these, and if possible to 
merge them into the Seljuq imperial structure. This was all
 ^T.S. 260-1. Eventually Abu^l Fath was allowed tp resign.
He then became wazlr to Abu Kali jar.
2 For example when Tughril Beg demanded 200,000 dinars from 
the Salarid ruler of Tarim in 4}4 it was finally settled 
that the latter should give obedience and some money (I.A,
IX.348).
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the more necessary in view of the fact that the Seljuqs,
generally speaking, failed to win either the goodwill or the
support of the general mass of the people, between whom and
the Turkish governing classes there was always some opposition
Firstly, in order to control the local leaders, hostages were
taken from them. These resided at the sultan* floooufct as a
» «  ■ -
kind of insurance against rebellions by their relatives 
For example, Tughril Beg took one of the sons of Su#dain b, 
Abi'sh Shawk, the Kurd, as a hostage in 444 (1052/3)*^ while 
in 446 (1054/5) he took Abu Man§ur Wahsudan b. Muhammad ar- 
Bawadlws son as a hostage.^ Other sultanfei also followed 
this practice. *AlI b. Shahriyar, one of the sons of the 
Ispahbad, Shahriyar b, Qarin as-Sarl, was sent as a hostage 
to Muhammad b. Malikshah1 s court,^ Further after Dubais 
made peace with the sultan and the caliph in 516 (1122/5), 
it was agreed that his son Man§ur should be sent to the court 
as a hostage,^ The enlisting of tribesmen in the royal army 
was also, in a way, a form of taking hostages to ensure the 
good behaviour of the tribes to whom they belonged (see 
Chapter III,).
T 1----------------------------------------------------------







Secondly, in order t<^  merge the forner ruling families \ 
into the Seljuq imperial structure, the Seljuqs followed a j 
policy of making marriage alliances with persons of local  ^
influenced Tughril Beg married Abu 'All b. Abl Kali jar in 
445 (1053/4) to a Seljuq woman, and made various assignments
p .
to him ( see Chapter V.). Alp Arslan married Hazarasp to 
his sister in 462 (1069/70), and when Hazarasp died, he gave 
the latter* s bride to Muslim b. Quraishd Further Malikshah 
married the latter in 479 (1086/7) to his daughter, Zulaikha 
Khatun, and assigned to him Rahba and other placesd Ibrahim 
b. Quraish was also married to a Seljuq woman, namely §afiyya, 
Malikshah* s auntd Dadd’s daughter Arslan Khatun,who had 
been married to the caliph al-Qa^m, was married to *A1I b.
Abl Mansur Faramarz b. 'Ala ud-Dawla Abl Ja'far b. Kakuya in 
469.^  Qawurd, malik of Kirman, followed a similar policy.
^ The tendency to make marriage alliances with the local
leaders is found even in the early period of the Ghuzz ex­
pansion. _A group of Ghuzz under Kuktash and Mansur invi­
ted Abu Kali jar to settle with them and rule over them 
allying themselves to him in marriage. However when Abu 






6 - — - —Bu. 49* Arslan Khatun had left^Baghdad on hearing of the
death of her brother Alp Arslan. Al-Qa’im subsequently 
died and she then married 'All b* Abl Mangur,
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He is said to have had forty daughters, some of •whom he gave
to the Buyids, hut the majority of whom he gave to the *Alids.
* Ala ud-Dawla Garchasp b. Faramarz b. Kakuya, governor of Yazd, 
was married to Sitara, sister of Muhammad b. Malikshah and
p
Sanjar. The Mazyadids do not seem to have been incorporated 
in this way until Mas*ud b. Muhammad gave his daughter in 
marriage to gadaqa b. Dubais b. Sadaqa in 531 (1136/7) in 
order to have a hold over him? while in 532 (1129) Mas#ud was 
married to gufra, the daughter of Dubais b. gadaqa. Ali b. 
Shahriyar b* Qarin was offered by Muhammad b. Malikshah the 
handoof his sister in marriage, but he, fearing the jealousy 
of his elder brother, suggested the honour should be accorded
to his elder brother. The sultan approved this suggestion and
the marriage contract was drawn up.^ The Ispahbad Taj ul- 
Muluk b. *A1I b, Mardawlj was also married to a sister of 
Sanjar.^
^ Muhammad Ibrahim, p. 13* The policy ofjnaking marriage al­
liances was also followed by the Seljuqs in their relations 
with external rulers, such as the Ghaznavids and the Khaqan.
2 i.a. x.387; ij.h.s. 69.
2 I,A. XI.30.
4 ibid. 43; I.K. 1.506^ M.Z. 99-
* Ibn Isfandiyar, p.243- 
ibid. p.66.
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The mosJ important local ruling family in Persia and / 
‘Iraq at the time of the advent of the Seljuqs was the Buyid,^ 
On the death of Jalal ud-Dawla in 435 (1044), his nephew Abu 
Kalljar successfully disputed the succession with his heir 
al-‘AzIz.2 In 437 (1045/6) he prepared to challenge Ibrahim 
Yanal, who was pushing his raids into the S.W. Jibal and 
Luristan, but was incapacitated by an outbreak of disease 
among his transport animals. Meanwhile Abu Mansur b. *Ala 
ud-Dawla, who had rebelled against Abu Kalljar, went to Kirman 
and gave allegiance to Tughril Beg, but on the latter1 s re­
turn to Khurasan in 437 be returned to the allegiance of Abu 
Kali jar. ^ Subsequently Tughril besieged him in Igfahan for
nearly a year, and when he finally took the city he assigned
- - - 4to Abu Man§ur the districts of Yazd and Abarquya. In 439
(1047/8) Abu Kali jar resolved to ally himself with the Sel­
juqs, Tughril Beg welcomed his advances and instructed
^ In this section I am much indebted to the article by Bowen 
entitled The Last of the Buwayhids (J.R.A.S* 1929* pt.II.), 
The territories in the gossession of the Buyids at this 
time comprised only ‘Iraq, Khuzistan, Pars, Kirman and 
‘Uman. Mas ud had conquered Isfahan from them (Bowen, p. 
228)z ^Tughril Beg when he defeated Mas ud told Paramarz 
b, Kaku"that he should be given Isfahan and Rei (B. 788).
Al-*Aziz spent the next five years moving from one provin­
cial court to another feegging assistance wherewith to as­
sert his rights, but always in vain._ He tried to obtain 




Ibrahim Yanal to encroach no further upon Buyid territory.
The pact was cemented by the marriage of Tughril to a daughter
married a daughter 
of Abu Kalljar and Fulad Sutun b. Abl Kalijar/bf Da’ud.*
This alliance divided the Buyids into two groups, and Tughril
2was able to use one in defeating the other* On two occasions 
he actually helped Fulad against ar-Rahim with reinforcements 
once in 444 (IO52/5) 'and again in 446 (1054/5) when he sup­
plied him with a force'of Turkomans to conquer Khuaistan.^
On this occasion Fulad succeeded in driving ar-Rahlm back 
into *Iraq. In 447 when Tughril Beg entered Baghdad he as­
signed Kermanshah to Abu *A1I b, Kalljar (see Chapter V.)^ 
and meanwhile seized and killed ar-Rahim,^ This latter event 
marked the end of the Buyids as a dynasty, but a branch of 
the Buyid family still continued to rule in Yazd as Seljuq 
governors for some time, Muhammad b. Dushmanziyar b. *Ala 
ud-Dawla Abl Ja*far b. Kakuya was governor of that city under 
Barkyaruq,^ while * Ala ud-Dawla Garchasp b, Faramarz b*
Kakuya was in the. service of Muhammad b* Malikshah^ and
* ^ Bowen p*. 255-4.
2 See Bowen pp.254-7.







governor of Yazd under Mahmud b. Muhammad. ^
In the Caspian provinces there were various local
dynasties. Tughril Beg’s relations with the Salarids of
Tarim have already been mentioned. The Ispahbads in Tabaris-
tan continued to rule locally throughout the Great Seljuq
period. Husrat ud-Din Bustam b. *Ali b. Shahriyar b. Qarln's
power extended over Jajarm, Jurjan, Bistam and Damghan to 
- 2Muqan, but the rule of the other members of this dynasty was 
not over such an extensive area. A Seljuq army under Mas‘ud 
b. Muhammad, sent by Sanjar to Astarabad to take Shahriyar 
Kuh from the Ispahbad, Husam ud-Dawla Shahriyar b* Qarln, was 
severely defeated in 521 (1127)* and Mas*ud, having lost half
his army, fled with Jawull to Jurjan.^ Sanjar, infuriated by
u U
this reverse, sent Bazghash to avenge it, but the latter was
eventually recalled by Sanjar without having achieved any 
4success.
I.A. X.J87. VThen he delayed in coming to pay homage to 
Mahmud, the latter assigned Yazd to Qaraja as-Saqi, and 
Ala ud-Bawla joined Sanjar.
2 —Ibn Isfandiyar, p.60.
 ^ ibid. 246. The cause for this expedition was that Sanjar 
had commanded the Ispahbad to wait on him. The latter, on 
the ground of his advanced age, apologized and offered to 
send his sons iifstead. Sanjar, angered at this, sent Mas*ud 
against him. The Ispahbad was joined by Kiya Buzurg ad- 
Da*I ilS'l Haqq (b. al-J HadI with 5000 Dailamites and af­




At different times various Seljuq princes and others / 
took refuge with the Ispahbads. Mas#ud b* Muhammad twice 
went to 'Ala ud-Dawla f All b. Shahriyar b, Qarln, firstly when 
al-Mustarshid was assassinated (529/1135)* secondly when 
he quarrelled with Tu^iril b, Muhammad, he brought his women­
folk thither and placed them in the palace of the Ispahbad* s
son, Shahi GhazI, and himself received help to enable him to 
* —  1return to Iraq, Tughril himself, after being defeated by 
Mas*ud in Ha jab 527 (1133)* also fled to the Ispahbad in
_ p
Tabaristan. gadaqa, ruler of Hilla, was another who took
refuge with the Ispahbad on one occasion.^
The Kurds formed an important element in the population j
i
of the Great Seljuq empire. They were found chiefly in Kurdis^
tan and al-JazIra. They took an active part in the struggles
between the Seljuqs under Ibrahim Yanal and the Buyids. Surda
b. Abl *sh Shawk, owing to family quarrel^ joined Ibrahim
Yanal, who promised to conquer for Su'da what his father had
-  4held, and sent a body of Ghuzz with him to Hulwan. Subse­
quently Su#da was captured by his uncle Muhalhil and Surkhab.
In 4J9 (1047/8) some of the Kurds together with a section of' 
Surkhab1 s army seized the latter because of his oppression
1 Ibn Isfandiyar p. 59*
^ Bu. 155; Ibn Isfandiyar, p.59*
2 Ibn Isfandiyar, p.60,
4 I.A.IX.565.
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and took him to Ibrahim Yanal, who demanded the release of 
Su*da. Surkhab refused this demand, hut his son, * Askar, 
set Sucda free, and came to Ibrahim to ask for Surkhab’s 
release. Ibrahim refused and so * Askar wrote to the caliph 
and Abu Kalljar offering them obedience.*1’ The following year 
Ibrahim Yanal made an agreement with Su^da, that the latter 
should conquer whatever was not in his (Ibrahim’s) possession. 
Sucda accordingly conquered ad-Daskara and the surrounding 
country.^ Subsequently in 445 (1053/4) Badr b. Abl’sh Shawk 
came to Tughril Beg and asked him to send to Sucda to obtain 
his uncle Muhalhil's release. Sufda thereupon returned to 
the allegiance of ar-Rahlm, but was defeated by Ibrahim 
Ishaq end Sakht Kaman whom Tughril had sent with Badr.?
The Kurdish dynasty of the Marwanids, although one of 
the more important local ruling families at this time, wes;? 
nevertheless unable to resist the Seljuqs effectively. In 
441 (1049/50) the khutba was read by Kasr b, Marwan in the 
name of Tughril Beg,^ and in 448 £1056/70 when Tughril 
besieged Eazlra b. *Umar, which belonged to Masr, the latter 






to Tughril many presents* including 100*000 dinars.1 During 
the reign of Malikshah the Marwanid ruler tried to re-estab- 
lish his independence* and read the khutba and struck coins 
in his own name. Malikshah accordingly assigned Diyar Bakr
to gakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahlr in 476 (1083/4), and sent him
o
with an army to conquer it. In 478 (1085/6) Kakhr ud-Dawla 
also conquered 3mid* Mayyafariqln and Jazlra b. *Umar from 
the MarwaMds.^ This was virtually the end of Marwanid rule, 
although the last Marwanid possession, al-Hattakh (var. ]
was not finally lost to Hus am ud-Din Tlmurtash b. Ilghazi, 
the Urtuqid^till 532 (1137/8).4
Although the Marwanid kingdom was thus destroyed* the 
Kurdish tribal areas were not thereafter directly adminis­
tered by the Great Seljuqs. The majority probably remained 
under their local chieftains, many of whom were little more 
than highway robbers.5 Moreover since one of the principal 
Kurdish areas fell within the governorship of Mawsil it was 
the ruler of that district, rather than the sultan, who had■— ■ ■■ ,tt., i
^ I. A._IX.433 • Bundari states that when Alp Arslan came to 
Diyar Bakr in 463 Hasr b. Marwan offered him 100,000 




 ^When Alp Arslan heard a body of Kurds were practising 
highway robbery in the district of Hulwan, he sent an 
army against them and made Beg Arslan governor of that 
district (A.S.D. 34-5).
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to solve the Kurdish problem.'*-
In *Iraq and al-Jazlra there was in addition to the
Kurdish problem, an< Arab problem, and this the Great Seljuqs
never really solved. The slightest weakening of the central
government was usually followed by disorders on the part of 
2
the bedouin. Further, generally speaking the Arabs of this 
to *
region, and/some extent the Kurds also, had Shi a leanings,
and accordingly were ready to support *Alid movements against
the Seljuqs. This was not duQ however, only to sectarian
differences, but also to a general inclination of the tribes
to ^pport-n-distant ruler,, in this pase the Fatimid caliph of
Egypt, rather than a near One.
At the beginning of the period the *Uqailids were the
most powerful of the Arab rulers. Quraish b. Badran apparently
in the beginning thought -it wise to side with the Seljuqs, and
Jayush Beg, governor of Maw§il (509 (1115/6) ) attacked and 
took many of the fortresses belonging to the Hakkariyya, 
Zuzan, and Bashnawiyya Kurds, and dispersed the Kurds so 
that the roads were made safe and the people reassured. 
Later Zangi, ruler of Mawsil, in person and through his 
deputy Haslr ud-Din Juqurj attempted to subdue the Kurdish 
tribal area within his domains, for these Kurds preyed upon 
the population of the neighbourhood and laid the country 
waste. In 528 (1153/4-) &e reduced the Hamldiyya Kurds, 
took a number of fortresses which belonged to the Muhran- 
iyya, and also seized *AlI, the leader of the Eabiyya (I#A. 
XI-.7-9)2. and in 541 (1146/7) he besieged Husam ud-Din al- 
Bashnawl because he did not wish there to be a malik in the 
middle of his domains (I.A. XI.71)- After the death of 
Zangi, Xain ud-Dln * All assigned the Hakkariyya country to 
Qaraja, ruler of the ‘imadiyya, and conquered the remaining 
fortresses of the Hakkariyya (I .A. XI.8J.
2 -The death of both Tughril Beg and Malikshah was followed by
outbreaks of the Bedouins of *Iraq (I.A. X.17, 147).
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when Tughril Beg came to Baghdad in 447{he joined him. In
the following year he was captured by Mur ud-Dawla Dubais and
al-BasasIrl when they defeated Qutulmish, with whom Quraish
to ,
had been. They seem to have won him over/the Alid cause, 
and all went to Mawsil, where they read the khutba in the name
_  p
of the Eatimid al-Mustansir. It may be that Quraish had •« •
realised that the Seljuqs were more powerful than he had ori­
ginally thought, and that were he to side with them he would 
merely become a vassal, or perhaps even be gradually dispos­
sessed of his possessions altogether, and hence threw in his 
lot with the opposing forces.
Tughril Beg's relations with him are marked *4th fcy the 
usual spirit of compromise; he attempted by means of assign­
ments to incorporate the *UqailId domains within the Great 
Seljuq empire. He marched on Mawsil when Quraish, Nur ud- 
Dawla and al-Basasiri rebelled, but made peace with Quraish 
and H u t  ud-Dawla, and assigned Hahr ul-Malik, Baduraya,
Anbar, Hit, Dujail, Nahr Baitar, 'Ukbara, Aw an a, Takrit,
■2 ( i O S t )
Mawsil and Uaslbin to the former.^ Subsequently in 450/^ al- 
Basasirl again joined Quraish, but when Tughril marched on 
Maw§il they fled to Magibin.^ Meanwhile Ibrahim Yanal rebelled.
1 I.A. IX.419.
2 ibid. 430.
5 ibid. 433; Bu. 12.
4 ibid. 440.
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Tughril was forced to go in pursuit of him to Hamadan, where­
upon al-BasasIrl, Quraish and others came to Baghdad and read 
the khutba in the name of the Fatimid caliph.^ A further at- 
tempt was made to bring the *Uqailids into closer relations 
with the Great Seljuq empire, when Sharaf ud-Dln Muslim b. 
Quraish, who succeeded his father in 453 (106l), was married, 
as stated above, to Alp Arslan’s sister. Alp Arslan,when he 
came to Baghdad in 453 (1066), also assigned to Muslim b.
-r - - «r 2Quraish Hit, Anbar, Harba as-Sinn and al-Bawazij; but this 
was probably merely official recognition of Muslim’s possession 
of these places.^
During the reign of Malikshah, the ^Uqailids began tem­
porarily to expand westwards. In 472 (1079/30) Sharaf ud- 
Dawla took Aleppo in the absence of Tutush, who had conquered 
it in the previous year, and Malikshah, in answer to his re­
quest, confirmed him as farmer of that city.^ Subsequently 
Muslim b. Quraish tried once more to obtain help from the
1 I.A. IX.440-J.
2 ibid. X.35.
' It seems that Alp Arslan subsequently became displeased with 
Muslim b. Quraish, and shortly before the sultan’s death^ 
the latter set out with the naqlb un-nuqaba for Alp Arslan’s 
court. While on the way news of Alp Arslan’s death reached 
them and so they joined Malikshah and were present with 
him in his battle with Qawurd (I.A. X.54).
4 I.A. X.74.
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Fatimids, and in 474 (1081/2) he appealed to the Fatimid 
caliph for aid to surround Damascus in Tutush’s absence on 
the Syrian coast. The latter, however, returned and defeated 
Muslim.’1' Meanwhile it seems that Malikshah determined to 
reduce the power of the *Uqailids and in 477 (1084/5) k© 
sent 4Amid ud-Dawla b. Jahlr to take Maw§il, sending with him 
Sqsunqur and Urtuq b. Aksab. Muslim b# Quraish had meanwhile 
been reinforced by Ibn Marwan, and eventually Malikshah him­
self set out to conquer Muslim’s domains, but when news reached 
him of Takash’s rebellion in Khurasan, he returned and sent 
Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk b. Uizam ul-Mulk to Muslim to make peace 
with him. Mu*ayyad ul-Mulk then brought Muslim b. Quraish to 
Malikshah to whom he paid homage.^ Muslim b. Quraish was sub­
sequently killed at .Antioch in battle with Sulaiman b* Qutul- 
mish, who had refused to pay him tribute* Sulaiman then took
A t
possession of Aleppo. The power of the Uqailids disappeared 
with Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b# Quraish. Various members of
1 I.A. X.82.
2 ibid. 87; Bu. 70-1.
* I.A. X.86-8; A.M. 14; Q. 117* Muslim b. Quraish bribed 
Urtuq to let him escape, and after this Malikshah sent 
Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk to him (Bu. 70).
4 I.A. X.91.
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his family held minor posts subsequently, but none attained 
to his influence and power.^ In 479 (1086/7)* Malikshah as­
signed Rahba and the surrounding districts, Harr an, Saruj,
2
Raqqiu.and Khabur to Muhammad b. Muslim b. Quraish, but in 
482 (1089/90) Malikshah seized his brother Ibrahim and sent 
Pakhr ud-Dawla b* Jahlr to Mawsil, which he conquered.*^
With the disappearance of the ‘Uqailids, the only impor­
tant Arab kingdom remaining within the Great Seljuq Empire 
was that of the Mazyadids of Hilla, who became the leaddrs of 
the Arab revolt in ‘Iraq and the neighbourhood against the 
Seljuqs. The Mazyadids were Shl‘as, and their tendency to 
support the *Alid movement has already been noted. During 
the reign of Malikshah the Mazyadids began to increase in im­
portance. This was due perhaps to the fact that the influence 
of the ‘U^ailids was on the wane in al-Jazlra, and that they 
were looking westwards rather than eastwards for expansion; 
the Mazyadids hence had no important Arab rivals to contend 
with, and the Great Seljuqs moreover at this time had apparent-
4
ly little desire to administer the Arab tribal area directly.
^ Salim b. Malik still held Ja‘bar in540 (1145/6)* which Malik­





Their inability to do so was probably one of the reasons whjcb. 
induced them to keep the Mazyadids in power. When the BanI Umir 
plundered Bagra in 485(1090/1) Gawhar a In went with gadaqa to 
Bagra to right the matter (I.A. X.122). When Muhammad b. Malik­
shah assigned Kufa to QaJimaz in 498 (1104/5)* ordered
(Continued on next page.)
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In 474 (1081) Baha ud-Dawla Mansur b. Dubais was confirmed in
his father’s possessions and an annual tribute of 40,000
dinars placed upon him.'*' He died in 479 (1086) and was suc-
2ceeded by his brother Saif ud-Dawla §adaqa, who became a 
powerful figure in *Iraq and al-JazJra. gadaqa’s policy 
after the death of Malikshah was to weaken the position of the 
Great Seljuqs by encouraging their internal dissensions, 
thereby to ennable him to establish his independence. To a 
considerable extent he succeeded, but two principal factors 
limited his influence. In the first place he was a Shi*a, and 
hence the caliph, although he was obliged on various occasions 
to turn to gadaqa for help, (see Chapter VIII.) was ultimately 
an obstacle to the latter* s expansion, in the same way as §ada- 
qa for his part limited the caliph’s power. Secondly Sadaqa's 
power was based chiefly upon the -Arab tribes round Hilla and 
to some extent on the Kurdish tribes in that neighbourhood 
also, and these formed a somewhat unstable basis of power.
(Continuation of Note 4 of previous page.)
Sadaqa to protect Qa?imaz from the Khafaja (I.A. X.272-3).
6n the other hand during the reign of Tughril Beg, the 
Seljuqs had had direct relations with ^he Khafaja. In_452 
(1157) Tughril reinstated Muhammad b. al-Akram al-Khafaji 
as amIr~of the Ban! Khafaja and returned to him the gover­
norship of Kufa, and farmed to him his (Tughril’s) private 
domains there (I.A. X.8; see also Chapter V.).
^ Bu. 67; I.A. X.78.
2 -I.A. X.99; see also E.I. article gadaka b. Mansur.
41
Broadly speaking, their desires were limited "by plunder and 
they had little interest in making permanent territorial con­
quests. Purther, gadaqa, in spite of his influence in Hilla, 
was not able to exert a close control over the Arab tribes 
such as the fUbada or the Khafaja.1
At first §adaqa supported Barkyaruq, but nevertheless 
withheld his annual tribute, and when Barkyaruq sent his wazlr, 
Abu*l Mahasin ad-Dihist anl to him in 494 (1101) demanding 
over 1,000,000 dinars which had become due over a number of 
years, gadaqa read the khutba in the name of Muhammad b. Malik-
- p —
shah. In spite of Barkyaruq1s efforts to make peace, §adaqa
refused to agree unless Abu*l Mahasin was surrendered to him,
and when Barkyaruq refused to do this, he went to Kufa and
seized Abu#l Masasin’s iqta/, and turned out from it the
• - -»» -
sultan’s deputy.^ Prom then on §adaqa opposed Barkyaruq in 
*Iraq.^
When the Khafaja and *Ubada quarrelled in 499 (1105/6),
Sadaqa secretly helped the_Khafaja (I.A. X.27o), but sub­
sequently summoned the TJbada and offered to help them take 
vengeance on the Khafaja (I.A. X.290-1).
2 I.A. X.209.
2 ibid. 209-10.
In 496 (1102/3) §adgqa made a pact of loyalty_to Muhammad t>. 
b. Malikshah_with IlghazI and Suqman and Yanal (I.A. X.243). 
Suqman, IlghazI and gadaqa then began to plunder the country 
whereupon the caliph sent to §adaqa asking him to stop this. 
He agreed on condition Sumishtegln, Barkyaruq1 s shihna was 
turned out of Baghdad^ and this was done in HabI* il.496 
(I, A. X.247)* In JumadI 1.497(1104), IlghazI, however, read 
the khutba in Baghdad in the name of Barkyaruq, whereupon 
Sadaqa sent to the caliph threatening to turn out IlghazI 
(I.A. X.255),
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Once Muhammad b. Malikshah had succeeded Barkyaruq as
sultan, Sadaqa no longer continued to support him, ^  perhaps
“because as sultan he was likely to curb §adaqa*s power.
Finally in 501 (1107) he rebelled. The immediate cause of
this was that Muhammad b, Maliks hah had demanded from gadaqa
-  If -the surrender of Abu Dulaf Surkhab b, Kai Khusraw, governor of
-  2Sava and Iva, who had taken refuge from Muhammad with him.
Sadaqa, refused to surrender him. The caliph then sent to 
Sadaqa forbidding him to oppose the sultan, who also sent to 
him asking him to join him in a jihad against the Franks, 
gadaqa again refused, and so Muhammad prepared to march against 
him.^ The former, encouraged by assurances of support from 
Ilghazi and Jawuli Saqawu, determined to fight. The caliph 
meanwhile tried to negotiate for peace between the two parties,
It is true, however, that in 499 (1105/6) at Muhammad b. 
Maliks hah* s^re quest he besieged and defeated Isma/il Arslan- 
jiq in Ba$ra, after which he appointed a na1 ib over Basra. 
Muhammad subsequently sent a shihna and a nna'ib to that 
ciiy (I.A. X.284).
2
§adaqa*s court had become a reguge for those in disgrace 
whether from the caliph or the sultan. Taj ur-RuAasa, son 
of the sister of Amin ud-Dawla Abu"3a d b. al-Mawsilaya, 
who had been accused by Barkyaruq*s wazir of inclining the 
caliph towards Mghammad b. Malikshah took refuge with him 
in_RabI_ 1*4^5 (, December 1102/January 1103) (I*A. X.241-2). 
Abu*l Qasim All b. Jahlr, who had been dismissed from the 
caliph*s wazirate also took refuge with Sadaqa in Safar 
500 (1106) (I.A. X.505).
^ The *amid, Abu Ja#far Muhammad b. al-Hus a in al-Balkhl, had 
meanwhile made mischief between gadaqa and Muhammad, saying 
gadaqa*s power and independence had increased*(I,A. X.J06).
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but failed, gadaqa was then killed in the ensuing battle in 
Rajab 501 (IIO9).1
This revolt of gadaqa was not only due to the question of 
his "honour w and his refusal to surrender Surkhab b. Kai 
Khusraw, which furnished the immediate reason for it, "but was
probably also the avowed revolt of the Arab element against
2the hegemony of the Turkish element* With the death of 
Sadaqa this movement largely collapsed. It no longer threaten­
ed the Great Seljuqs in *Iraq, although Dubais b* §adaqa, whom
Muhammad appointed to succeed his father,-^  it is true, intrigued 
against the Seljuqs until the end of his life, and lost no
opportunity of urging minor Seljuq prinoes to rebel. His posi­
tion and influence was, however, greatly inferior to that of 
Sadaqa.^- When Muhammad made him ruler of Hilla, he also ap­
pointed SafId b. Hamid al-*Umari, §adaqa*s sahib jaish, to be 
governor of Hilla*5 it seems, moreover, that Muhammad took
1 I.A. X.307-11.
of. Grousset 1.519* 
5 I.A. X.314. ^
He held at one time apparently the office of deputy shihna 
of *Iraq, from which he was dismissed in 513 (1119/20)*
(I,A* X*394). It does not seem that the sultan any longer 
relied upon the Mazyadid ruler to control the bedouin.
When the Bani Khafaja in 536 (1141/2) created disorders in 




Dubais away with him, and that he only returned to Hilla on the 
accession of Mahmud b* Muhammad.^ The appointment of Dubais 
in spite of his father’s revolt is in keeping with the Great
* Seljuq policy of toleration and compromise, and also perhaps
i —
\ significant of the inability of the Great Seljuqs to administer 
Arab areas except through their own leaders, Nevertheless 
Dubais probably lost control more and more over the Arab 
tribds and it was largely: do this cause that the decline of 
the Mazyadids eaaarbe ascribed.
In the family struggles of the various Seljuq princes 
after the death of Muhammad b* Malikshah, and in the 
struggles between the Seljuqs and the caliph in ‘Iraq and the 
neighbourhood, Dubais played an active part. His efforts 
were not however attended by the success that gadaqa’s 
efforts were. He failed to extend his influence in ‘Iraq 
or al-Jazira. Moreover, on two occasions he was forced to 
leave the neighbourhood and to go to Syria. Finally he was 
killed by Masfud b, Muhammad outside Khuy in 529 (1154).^
1 A.M. 42; Bn.111.
 ^I.A. XI. 18; Kamal nd-Din, p.664; T.M. f.l651). In the
struggle between Mahmud and Mas ud, the sons of Muhammad, 
Dubais sided with the latter (I,A. X.J95)* &&& when Masfud 
was defeated by Mahmud in 514 (1120), he plundered 'Iraq in 
spite of remonstrances from the caliph and the sultan (I.A.
X.397-8; M.Z, 55). Finally the caliph sent al^Bursuql to 
turn Dubais out of Hilla in 516 (1122); al-Bursuql was de­
feated (I*A. X.422), but in the following year (517) he 
avenged his defeat, and Dubais went to Syria (I.A. X.45O), 
Subsequently the latter joined Tughril b. Muhammad, whom he 
induced to attack ‘Iraq in 518 £1124/5) (I.Al X.441; Q,210),
(Continued on next page.)
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Dubais was succeeded by his son gadaqa* on whose death in 
the battle between Mas'ud b. Muhammad and Da*ud b, Mahmud in 
552 (1137)* Mas'ud appointed Muhammad b# Dubais to succeed 
him, with Muhalhil b. Abl’l 'Askar to administer his affairs,1 
Muhammad b. Dubais was turned out by his brother 'All in 540 
(1145),2 As a result of numerous complaints against the lattei*s
(Continuation of Uote 2 on previous page.)
When, however, the caliph and al-Bursuqi marched to meet 
them they left 'Iraq and eventually joined San jar in Khura­
san (I.A. X.445). There Dubais continued to ^make
trouble, and finally induced Sanjar to set out for 'Iraq, 
having told him that Mahmud b* Muhammad and the caliph had 
agreed to oppose him (I.A. X.452)* kis return Khura­
san, Sanjar sent Dubais to Mahmud, and ordered the latter
to reinstate him in Hilla.
In 525 (II29) Mahmud b# Muhammad’s wife, Sangar’s daugh­
ter, who was occupied with Dubais* affairs and in averting 
evil from him, died, and from then on he was treated with 
less leniency by Mahmud, In the same year Mahmud fell i&L 
in Hamadan; Dubais thereupon seized one of his sons, and 
went to Hilla, which he reached in Hamadan, Mahmud sent 
Qizil ancL Ahmadlll after Dubais, and shortly afterwards 
followed them to Iraq himself. The caliph meanwhile had 
assembled troops, and Dubais after failing to win the satis­
faction of either the caliph or Mahmud, plundered Ba§ra and 
went toSJria (I.A. X.46I). There he was captured by Taj 
ul-Mulfik Burl, who handed him over to Zangl (I*A. X.470),
He remained with_ZangI and came with_him to Iraq in 526 
(1132)> when Mas ud b. Muhammad, Seljuqshah b, Muhammad and 
the caliph, having_made aualliance against SanjarTt'ftie 
latter ordered them^Cb^attack 'Iraq (I.A. X.477). They 
were, however, defeated by the caliph (I,A. X.478). After 




oppression, Mas*ud b. Muhammad finally assigned Hilla to 
Salarkurd in $42 (1147/8J,1 but in the following year (543)
*Ali recovered possession of Hilla. ^ On his death in 545 
(1150) the Mazyadid territories were absorbed by the Zangids,
In Pars there were various tribal areas * Generally 
speaking these wece not directly administered. The most im­
portant of the tribes in Pars were the Shabankara. Alp 
Arslan made an expedition against them in 459 (1067).^
Pa$luya, the Shabankara leader, afterwards revolted and was 
defeated by Nizam ul-Mulk.^ By 492 (IO98/9) the Shabankara 
had, however, increased in power and gained the mastery over 
Pars owing to the disputes among the other tribes there. Unar 
was sent against them by Turkan Khatun, but in spite of an 
initial victory he was unable to hold the province.5 Subse­
quently Jawuli Saqawu subdued the Shabankara and other tribes 
in Fars and dismantled various castles, but since he had 
been assigned Pars, the problem of controlling the tribal areas 
1 of Pars was not the direct concern of the sultan. During theI ---a  0
1 I.A. 21.80-1.
2 ibid. 88.
? I.A. 2.37; R.S. 118.
4 - -E.I* Article on the Shabankara.
5 I.A. 2.192.
6 F.N. 157-8, 167.
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reign ofjMahmud t>* Muhammad there -was another insurrection of 
the Shabankara owing to the wazlr Hafir b. *A1I ad-DarkazIni 
illtreating them.1
Lastly there was the problem of the TurkomSnjtribes. j;
? f
Firstly there were those tribes who entered Persia with or !/ 
about the same time as the Seljuqs, and secondly those who 
remained in Central Asia and moved into Khurasan and the 
neighbourhood towards the end of the Great Seljuq period, and 
finally overran Khurasan on the death of Sanjar* Of the first 
group many pushed on into Asia Minor and Syria and do not con­
cern us here* Others remained in the provinces over which 
the central government exercised control. Some of these were 
incorporated into the service of the sultan (see Chapter III.), 
but the majority continued to follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic 
existence. This involved not only a constant movement from
summer to winter pastures, but also migration in search of 
2
new pastures. The general tendency throughout the period was 
for the tribes to continue to move in a westerly direction, 
especially towards Syria. ^ The main concentrations of
E. I . Ai'fc’i'cJ* Sk^(r-av\ jccLnts. .
2 -For example,_a tribe of Turkomans named falghar, under a
certain Qarabuli, came to Surkhab b. Badr b. Muhalhil’s 
country in search of new pastures. Surkhab opposed them, 
but they defeated him, and spread through his-domains with 
the exception of Duquq and Shahrazur (I.A. X.238).
^ In 527 (1132/5) a numerous body of Turkomans from al-Jazira 
crossed into Syria and raided Tripolis (I.A. X.480-1).
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Turkomans were to be found in al-JazIra,^" *Iraq, ^  and Azer­
baijan,^ and to some extent in Khuzistan also.^ Such concen­
trations were not however necessarily constant throughout the 
Great Seljuq period.
Until the death of Malikshah the Turkoman problem did 
not become acute. The power of the central government held 
them in check. The weakening of the Great Seljuq empire on 
the death of Malikshah and the subsequent dissolution of the 
kingdom created by Tutush in Syria restored the freedom of 
the Turkomans, and within two or three years several of them 
had succeeded in founding independent principalities.^ Several 
of them were officers of the suljgan, notably IlghasI b* Urtuq, 
who was shibna of Baghdad on behalf of Muhammad b* Malikshah 
in 495 (1101/2), and this fact,'that the Turkomans were offi­
cers of the sultans, helped them to transform themselves 
quickly into small territorial princes, when the central 
authority declined.
^ Barkyaruq met a large group of Turkomans when he went from 
Baghdad to Shahrazur in 493 (1099/H00) (I«A« X.199).
p i •• *When^Mas ud al-Bilali, Albaqish Kun Khar, and Tar shah came 
to *Iraq in 549 (1154/5)* many Turkomans with their families 
and flocks joined them (I.A. XI.129).
^ Isma*Il b._YaqutI, when he set out from Azerbaijan to join 
Turk an Khatun to aid her against Barkyaruq, assembled many of 
the Turkomans (I.A. X.152). (1135 6)
^ Da*ud b« Mahmud after his defeat_at Maragha'in 53c/, assembled 
many Turkomans and others in Khuaistan, and their numbers 
exceeded 10,000 horse (I.A. XI.30).
5 Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle, p.25.
6 I.A. X.225: Tptush also appointed a Turkoman shihna of Bagh­
dad, named Yusuf b. yibaq in 488 (1095) (I.XTXIE6).
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Various Turkoman leaders succeeded in establishing themselves 
in some strong fortress, which formed a point of union and 
refuge for plundered riches} but by far the most important 
Turkoman leaders were the UrtuqJds, who became the rulers of 
Diyar Bakr and elsewhere. The kingdom they founded resembled 
on a smaller scale the Seljuq kingdom in so far as the same 
tendency to divide the kingdom among different members of the 
family, one of whom was the ruling khan, is found, but whereas 
the Seljuqs eventually maintained themselves by the support of 
Turkish slaves and freedmen, the basis of the Urtuqid power 
during the Great Seljuq period remained nomadic. The centre 
of Ilghazi’s power was Diyar Bakr, and not Syria, which was 
the scene of most of his activities, apart from the period
when he was shihna of Baghdad, and for every campaign he had
— 2 to return to Diyar Bakr to assemble his Turkoman followers.
The founder of Urtuqid power was Urtuq b. Aksab, who as 
governor of Hulwan was sent by Malikshah to help Fakhr ud- 
Dawla b. Jahlr, who was besieging Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim b. 
Quraish in Amid in 447 (1055/6)* The latter bribed him to
Such a one was Qipchaq b. Arslan of Shahrazur. No one at­
tacked him because of the impregnable nature of the country 
in which he had established himself, and his power and the 
number of his Turkoman followers increased, until Zangl 
attacked and defeated him in 534 (1159/40) (I.A. X.I50).
p
Cahen: Diyar Bakr ... J.A. 1956, p.257* \
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effect his escape,^" and Urtuq, knowing this would compromise 
him with Maiikshah, entered the service of Tutush and “became 
governor of Jerusalem on the latter*s “behalf in 479 (1086/7). 
This tendency of the Turkomans to unite with the Arabs was a 
marked feature of the time, and is seen especially in the 
subsequent relations of the Urtuqids and the Mazyadids.
Dubais b. §adaqa was married to a daughter of IlghazI^ and 
he took refuge with the latter from the caliph and the sultan 
in 515 (1121/2).^ Farther IlghazI and Suqman b* Urtuq had 
united with §adaqa and Yanal in support of Muhammad b# Malik­
shah against his brother Barkyaruq in 496. ^ This alliance 
between the Urtuqids and the Mazyadids was temporarily dis­
turbed in 497 (1104) when IlghazI read the khutba in Baghdad
in the name of Barkyaruq after the latter had made peace with
6 ■ —Muhammad, whereupon §adaqa threatened to turn IlghazI out of
Baghdad. However, when §adaqa rebelled against Muhammad in
(IIO738) _ 7
501/ IlghazI assured him of his support.
^ I.A. X.86; Bu. 70. According to Bundarl>Urtuq was angered 
at the domination of Fakhr ud-Dawla.








Urtuq, was succeeded in 484 (109U by M s  son Suqman, to 
whom Tutush assigned Jerusalem, and when the Fatimids took 
that city in 489 (IO96), Suqman went to ar-Ruha andMghazi to 
*Iraq,^ where he eventually became shihna of Baghdad as stated 
above. Gradually the Urtuqids began to increase their power. 
Suqman b. Urtuq came to help Musa, the Turkoman governor of 
Mawsil against Jigirmish in 495 (1101/2) and Musa gave him 
Kaifa.^ YaqutI b. Urtuq took Mardln in 498 (1104/ 5)j which 
district subsequently passed into the possession of Suqman.^
Meanwhile Balak b. Urtuq who had lost Saruj to the Franks
- _ 4had taken Ana and al-Haditha. The chief Urtuqid leader at
this time was however IlghazI.
During the reign of Muhammad b* Malikshah the power of 
the sultan was sufficient to limit IlghazI* s independence, ^
1 I.A. X.193.
2 I.A. X.235-6.
' YaqutI was_succeeded fey his son 1 All, and when he proposed 
handing Mprdin over to Jigirmish, governor of Mawsil,
Suqman took it away from him and gave him assignments in 
Jabal Jawr in place of Mardln (I.A. X.268-70).
^ I.A. X.252. In 498 IlghazI appointed Balak over the Khura­
san Road district in Iraq to restrain the Turkomans from
plunder (I.A. 272).
 ^In 5O8 (1114/5) k© submitted to the sultan’s governor, al- 
. Bursuql, who was on the way to Syria/ Shd sent an army with 
him_under his son Ayyaz. Al-Bursuql subsequently seized 
Ajryaz because IlghazI refused to appear before him. Tlgha- 
zi then went to Kaifa to obtain help from the governor, 
his nephew Rukn ud-Dawla^Da/ud b. Suqman, and they defeated 
al-Bursuql and freed Ayyaz towards the end of the year. 
(I.A. X.351-2).
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and when Muhammad sent £LJ B & e h ' t & v & m ia^ -aa^ e^ ,,,i*cfc-Jiad
defeated al-Bursuql in $QQ, IlghazI took refuge with Tughtegln,
ruler of Damascus, and made a pact with him and the Prankish
governor of Antioch.1 The last years of IlghazI's life were
years of real power; by this time Muhammad b. Malikshah had
died (511/1117) and IlghazI was no longer threatened in the
2 -  -  ^east by a relatively strong sultanate♦ On Ilghazi*s death
in 516 (1122) his domains were divided among his sons and 
nephew (see Chapter V.). The subsequent fortunes of the Urtuqid 
dynasty belong rather to the history of the Zangid Atabegate 
than to the history of the Great Seljuqs.
Secondly were the Ghuzz who had remained in Central Asia 
and on the borders of IQiurasan, Towards the end of the Great 
Seljuq period that branch of them whose pastures were in 
Khatlan, one of the districts of Balkh, had become very numerous
I.A. X.352»H. IlghazI then set out for Diyar Bakr to collect 
the Turkomans and to return. He was captured en route by 
Qirkhan_b. Qaraja, governor of Homs, but set free in return 
for Ayyaz, whom Qirkhan took as*a hostage.
2 In 511 bhe people of Aleppo handed the city over to Mm, and 
he, after making a truce with the Pranks and appointing M s  
son Hus am ud-Dln Timurtash over the city, returned to Mardln 
to collect soldiers (I.A, X.372-3)*nnd in the following 
year Mayyafariqln was handed over to M m  at the command of 
the sultan (T.M. f.l6la). In 513 (1119/20) and 514 (1120/1)
Ilghazremade successful raids upon the Pranks (I.A, X. 390; 
400), On the other hand when the muslims of the north of 
Armenia summoned him against the Georgians in 5^5 (112l/2), 
after first conquering numerous localities in Bum, he finally 
suffered a_severe defeat with M s  allies Dubais b. gadaqa, 
Tuqan Arslan of Arzan and Tughril Beg of Arran; this affair, 
however, did little to shake his authority (Cahen, p..236-7).
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They were apparently in direct relations with Sanjar. Some
of their number served at his court and were probably hostages
"  lfor the good behaviour of the remainder. They paid an annual
o
tribute of 24,000 sheep to the sultan’s kitchen (matbakh).
These were collected by an official sent by the khwansalar, 
who used to oppress them and haggle over the sheep, and demand 
bribes from the Ghuzz leaders. The latter refused to give him 
bribes, and one day they killed him in secret. The khwansalar 
did not dare tell the sultan and so paid their due himself. 
Finally he told Qumaj, governor of Balkh, who informed the 
sultan. Qumaj then made ah offer to punish the Ghuzz if he 
was made military governor over them, and to pay JO, 000 sheep 
to the royal kitchen. This offer was accepted. When, however, 
Qumaj sent to the Ghuzz demanding the customaiy tribute, they 
refused to pay on the grounds that they were the special sub­
jects of the sultan and did not come under the jurisdiction of 
anyone else.^ The ultimate result of this was the defeat of 
Qumaj by the Ghuzz in battle, and subsequently the defeat and 
capture of Sanjar himself in 548 (1153)-4
^ Qaraghud and ®uti Beg were at court (Bu, 257)*
 ^According to the U.H.S. it was 25,000 sheep (p.101).






The keystone of the central government was the wazir.
He was in charge of virtually all aspects of the administra­
tion over which the .central government had control, including 
finance and justice. He was also paymaster of the army in so 
far as this was paid in cash, and took part himself in mili­
tary campaigns. He was in addition a court official, and 
lastly, to some extent, he was charged with the supervision 
of religious matters. Nizam ul-Mulk, in his exposition of
administrative theory in the Siyasat Nama, stresses the im-
----
portance of the wazirate. It is moreover probably true, that 
when the wazlr'was strong and able, the administrative system 
worked fairly well, but when he was weak, the system broke 
down. There were, of course, other factors influencing the 
matter, but the personal factor was of enormous importance 
during the Great Seljuq period.
The extent to which the wazlr controlled the administra­
tion to the exclusion of the sultan differed from time to time, 
according to the personal qualities of the wazirs and the
1 S.N. 150. He attributes the fame of former kings to their 
wazirs.
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sultans concerned. Nizam ul-Mulk, although in practice he 
had in many respects a free hand himself, emphasizes the 
importance of the personal supervision of every branch of 
administration by the sultan. He states, nthe condition of 
the wazirs must be enquired into, and the way in which they 
carry out their office, for the soundness and the corruption 
of the ruler and the country depend upon the wazir. When the 
wazir is of good conduct and judgment, the kingdom flourishes 
and the army and subjects are contented, quiet and wealthy, 
and the ruler happy at heart, but when the wazir is of evil 
conduct, indescribable confusion appears in the kingdom, and 
the ruler is always distressed and afflicted in mind, and 
the kingdom disturbed."^ It may well be that Nizam ul-Mulk 
nevertheless intended the wazir to have a free hand in the 
details of the administration, for, although he stressed the 
necessity of a close supervision of all matters by the sultan, 
he did not recommend the issue of orders directly from the
sultan, on the grounds that such orders, if frequently issued,
2
would lose prestige. The infliction of punishments such as 
execution, the cutting off of hands or feet, and emasculation, 
however, were the prerogative of the sultan, and any encroach­






The wazir in his various capacities was the head of the 
dlwanJwhich was divided into various departments, each dealing 
with a particular branch or branches of his many duties. The 
two principal departments were the dlwan uz-zamam wa’l istlfa 
and the dlwan ul-insha* wa't-tughra. The latter was con­
cerned primarily with the supervision of incoming and outgoing
correspondence. It is possible that it had also charge of the
2 -
| pigeon post and couriers. The Seljuqs used the pigeon post 
at times, if not regularly.-^ The holder of the office of 
ll tugjhra*I, who was the head of this branch of the administra-! | A .. ... - ---
tion, did not necessarily need to be an able or intelligent 
man; the chief requisite was "curved" handwriting ( 0^
The dlwan ul-istlfa was concerned with finance and the keeping 
of accounts. The head of this office was the mustawfI; 
nominally he was subordinate to the wazir, but his position 
enabled him at times to attain to great power. The most
^ Under_the *Abbasids this bureau was called the dlwan nl- 
insha* (Maqrlzl: Kttab al-Khitat ed. Bulaq II. 226), and 
under_theMSeljuqs it came to 15e"known as the dlwan at- 
tughra (Koprulu: Les Institutions Juridiques ... p.jij.
2 -Under the Egyptian Mamijaks^ this was so (see Bjorkman, p.89).
y e.g^ Mas ud b. Muhammad sent a letter by pigeon post to 
Khass Beg, who was besieging Maragha, when news arrived 




notable case is that of the mustawfi# Majd ul-Mulk al-Balasani 
(see p.irj ). Malikshah*s mustawfi, Sharaf ul-Mulk Abu Sa*d 
Muhammad b* Man§ur (d. 494 (1100/1)) was also a prominent 
figure.1
As head of the administration the wazir to some extent 
appointed the officials of the dlwan, and also the officials 
in the directly administered area. Al-Kundurl appointed
al-*Izz Abu Sa*d, whom he had seized when he was wazir to
< - ? - ar-Bahim, overseer of Iraq. It was probably Nizam ul-Mulk
who,more widely than any other Wlffir, made appointments. In
481 (1088/9) when the people of Marv demanded redress at the
royal court from the *amil, who was placed over them, Nizam
ul-Mulk gave that office to Sharaf ud-Din Abu Tahir b. Sa'd
ud-Dln b. *A1I al-Qummi, who subsequently became head of
Sanjar’s mother's dlwan and then wazir to Sanjar;^ on another
occasion Nizam ul-Mulk appointed his grandson, *Uthman b.
Jamal ul-Mulk, ra^Is of Marv.^ This is but one of the many
instances of his giving office to members of his family.
Another case was the appointment of his son, Mu^ayyad ul-Mulk,
to be head of the dlwan ul-insha* in succession to Kamal ud-
hawla,^ Nizam ul-Mulk is also credited by Bundarl with *•
It is said that he had a complete suit of clothes for every 






having systematized the ranks of the scribes (katibs)
Mu' ayyad ul-Mulk, when wazir to Barkyaruq., appointed Sa*d ul-
2 — TMulk Abu’l Mahasin mustawfi. Abu'l Qasim ad-Darkazini, when 
he persuaded Sanjar to appoint him his wazir in 526 (1131/2), 
being at that time already wazir to Tughril b. Muhammad, to 
which office Sanjar appointed him, did not give up this posi­
tion, but appointed Zahir ud-Din rAbd ul-Aziz al-Hamldi to 
deputise for him in Sanjar*s wazirate.^
The chief aspect of the wazirate was the financial one. 
The sources of revenue were largely regulated by the wazir, 
who was expected to keep the finances of the state in a 
healthy condition and to keep sufficient in reserve for 
emergencies. Further it was his business to improve the 
resources of the country and to increase the revenues of the 
state, without causing injury to the cultivation of the land.^ 
The keeping of the accounts of public income and expenditure 
was the work of the dlwan ul-istifa, but the presentation of 
these to the sultan was the duty of the waair. The method of 
keeping accounts appears to have been a somewhat cumbrous one. 




4 For details concerning the revenue, see below.
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for a "balance sheet* The wazir replied that it would take 
two years to complete. Hasan as-Sabbah, who was at that 
time employed in the dlwan, said he could prepare it in forty 
days. The sultan accordingly charged him with the matter. 
Nizam -ul-Mulk had to agree, but he feared lest he should be 
dismissed on account of this. On the day the balance sheet
was to be handed to the sultan, Nizam ul-Mulk sent his secre-_ in i ** ••
tary with a bribe to Hasan's scribe to induce him to show
the statement to Nizam ul-Mulk first. Nizam ul-Mulk took 
the account and found no criticism to make against it. Ac­
cordingly he thought of a wile; saying it was nonsense, he 
threw it down on the floor, so that the leaves were scattered. 
At that time the debit and credit sides were written on dif­
ferent pages, and the latter were not numbered, hence if the 
pages were disarranged, some time was required to put them in 
order again. Hasan's scribe then picked up the leaves in 
disorder. When the time appointed for the audience came,
Hasan wanted to show the sultan the statement, but finding 
the pages in disorder, he began to rearrange them. The 
sultan ordered him to hurry, but Hasan kept saying, "Just a 
minute, just a minute." Nizam ul-Mulk then broke in and said, 
"How shall an ignorant man finish in forty days a book, 
which it takes a learned man two years to complete? The 
result of that is nothing but 'just a minute, just a minute.'" 
The sultan was angry with Hasan, who, as a result of this
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episode, left the court. Because of this incident the method 
of keeping accounts was altered. The debit and credit sides 
were after this written on one sheet, and the pages were 
numbered.1
Hizam ul-Mulk under Malikshah, and perhaps to a lesser 
extent under Alp Arslan also, probably controlled, mot only 
the details of the financial administration, but aleo to a 
considerable extent financial policy itself. There are
various references to wazirs after him repealing and imposing
2taxes, but more often the sources attribute such actions to 
the sultans. Kamal ud-Dln Muhammad b. al-Husain, who was appoiar 
ted wazir to Mas*ud b. Muhammad in 532 (1137/®)* made a deter­
mined effort to reform the abuses of the financial administra­
tion. He organised the collection and payment of taxes, and 
revived practices which had become neglected. To do this he 
exposed the fraudulent practices of the officials and others,^ 
and tried to break the power of the amirs and to prevent their 
corrupt practices. He achieved some measure of success and 
succeeded in collecting the taxes with greater regularity
1 T.G. 440-1.
2 ^ —On the death of the wazir as-Samir ami, Mahmud b. Muhammad
repealed the mukus and taxes on merchants and dealers, 
which as-Samir ami had levied (I.A. X.425). Kamal ftd-Dln 
Muhammad b. al-Husain is said to have dropped the mukus 
(I.#A. XI.42). (See p.120 )
5 I.A. XI.42.
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than any wazir after Nizam ul-Mulk*1 Eventually, however, 
he paid the usual penalty of opposing the amirs and lost his 
life (see Chapter IV.).
In so far as the army was paid in cash, this was super­
vised by the wazir (see Chapter III.). His subordinate, who 
was in special charge of this, was the 'arid ul-jaish.^  The 
fact that the wazir paid the army gave him great influence 
over the military classes, hut in measure as the army came to 
he paid less in cash and more and more hy grants of land, so 
the control of the wazir, as head of the "civil” administra­
tion, over the military machine declined. Recruitment, as 
well as the payment of the standing army, seems to have heen 
also a recognised function of the wazir during the time of 
Nizam ul-Mulk. The latter, when accused of misappropriating 
the revenue during the reign of Malikshah admitted to having  ^
spent part of the revenue (legitimately) upon the standing 
army.^ Sa'd ul-Mulk Abu*l Mahasin, Muhammad h. Malikshah1 s
~ - Awazir also assembled soldiers in the sultan's service.
1 Bu. 169-70; D.V.212.
Abu*l Mafakhir al-Qumml and subsequently ‘izz ul-Mulk b. 
al-Kafl al-l§fahanl, was 'arid ul-jaish during the wazirate 
Sa'd ul-Mulk Abu’l Mahasin (Bu. 86;. Anushlravan b. Khalid 
was at one time *arid*ul-jaish, in which office he was suc­
ceeded by Shams ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk (Bu. 92).
2 I,A. X.84 ineoc=alnn--<lh-apter V;-}t
4 Bu. 83.
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It is -unlikely that the wazir, although he was head of 
the "civil” administration, controlled or had much influence 
in the granting of assignments, except in exceptional cases.
In any case, it seems certain that there was no officially 
recognised system of control exercised hy the wazirate over 
the granting of iqta* s, and that hence large parts of the 
country together with the revenue, or part of it, were aliena­
ted from the control of the wazirate. The extent to which the 
wazir was able to exert influence in the matter depended there­
fore upon his personality. Nizjim ul-Mulk, at the height of 
his power, had no doubt considerable influence in the matter. 
After the capture of Aleppo and the submission of the ruler of 
Shaizar, Na§r ul-Kinani, he advised the sultan to give Aleppo 
and its govemships, Hama, Manbij, Laodicea and what was at­
tached to them to Qasim ud-Dawla Kqsunqur. This was apparently 
because Nizam ul-Mulk was jealous of the latter*s growing in­
fluence.^ The sultan accordingly assigned these places to
Aqsunqur and they remained in his possession until his oxcctf
p —tioii in 487 (1094). Nizam ul-Mulk was moreover accused by 
Ahufl Mahasin b. Kamal ul-Mulk, the sayyid ur-ru*asa, to the 





Arslan Arghu, when he desired to obtain the assignment of 
Khurasan,sent concerning this, not only to Barkyaruq,hut also 
to his wazir Mu*ayyid ul-Mulk b. iliaSmul-Mulk,^ *Izz ul-Mulk 
Tahir b. Muhammad al-Burujirdl, Mas#ud b. Muhammad’s wazir,
t * 2also was said to assign the provinces independently of Mas udt 
Sanjar’s wazir, Na§Ir ud-Dln Mahmud b. Abl Tauba, is another 
case of a wazir who made assignments. He gave part of Rei 
to ad-DarkazInl in 526 (11J1/2). The governor of Rei on 
behalf of the muqta* al-Muqarrab Jawhar, however, prevented 
ad-DarkazInl taking possession of this.^ Mas#ud b, Muhammad's 
wazir, Kamal ud-Dln, who attempted, as stated above, to reform
the financial administration, only gave iqta’s and allowances
»  4to the amirs according to the numbers of their armies.
In so far as justice was not administered by the sharia 
courts, it came under the supervision of the wazir. By 
Great Seljuq times the sharl'a courts probably only dealt 
with matters relating to family affairs and inheritances; 
hence the jurisdiction of the wazir as a judicial official 
extended over an extremely wide field. In the words of the 




4 B.S. 230; U.H.S. 121.
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all kinds of subjects and. all kinds of people.” The mazalim 
court seems to have existed throughout Great Sehjuq times.
At the beginning of the period it may perhaps have been the 
occasion of an exceptional appdal for redress to the sovereign
in person. Such was probably the mazalim court held by
— — 2 Tughril Beg in Nlshapur in 429 (1038). However, although
Nizam ul-Mulk maintains in his "ideal” theory that it was in- 
dispensible for the ruler to hold a mazalim court twice a week 
in order to exact redress from the unjust, to dispense justice 
and to listen to the words of his subjects without interme­
diary, ^ the majority of the Great Seljuq sultans, with rare 
exceptions,^ in all probability delegated this function to 
their representatives. In this case it was probably the
1 H. f.lb.
2 I.A. IX.>12; Bu,7.
' S.H. 10. This recommendation was Based chiefly upon expe- 
diency and not upon love of justice: "always there will be
many persons at the court demanding redress for injustice, 
and if they do not receive an answer they will go away, and 
foreigners and envoys who come to the court and see this 
complaining and disturbance will think that great tyranny 
takes place at this court.” (p.207).
4 -Malikshah1 s justice was such that no one dared to commit 
an injustice against anyone else; he was not separated from 
those who demanded justice, but listened to grievances and 
gave justice personally (R.D. f.24^a). Many stories are 
told of his justice. Once when he was hunting near Isfahan, 
some of his ghulams took an old woman’s cow, killed and ate 
part of it. The old woman came to Malikshah, who gave her a 
sum of money and seventy cows in exchange, arid punished the 
ahulams (ILD. f.l68a,b). Another story is told of his punMt 
Ing a Imamluk who had taken a poor man’s water melon without 
paying for it,by giving him to the latter as a slave, so 
that he (the mamluk) had to buy his freedom (A*S.H. 73;
Bu. 64-5; I.K. III.44J).
wazir who represented the sultan.^ Thus the mazalim court 
over which the wazir presided "became, as Amedroz states, not 
an exceptional appeal to the sultan in person; "but an every­
day application to his representative to "be dealt with accord-
2ing to a settled practice.
The majority of cases which came "before the wazir and 
his subordinates were probably related chiefly to the collec­
tion of taxes and litigations. The execution of their judg­
ment, it seems, was carried out by the military^  Even quite
trivial matters appear to have come before the wazir. Nizam
ul-Mulk relates how in the days of Alp Arslan an * amil who
owed some money to the treasury died. To pay off this debt a
garden in his possession was seized. When his children claimed 
redress on the grounds that the garden had been part of their
1 — ••e.g. Kamal ud-Dln Muhammad b. Al-Husain put right grievances
(I.A. XI.42).
2 -  -Amedroz: The Mazalim Jurisdiction in the Ahkam as-Suitaniyya
of MawardI, J.fi.A.S. 1911* pt.II. p#655.
 ^cf. S.N. p.68. "A great number of ghulams are sent from the 
court; some carry farm an s, other are without farmans. All 
cause vexation to the people and they extort sums of money 
from them. Eor a litigation of which the value is 200 
dinars, a ghulam goes and exacts 500. The geople in this 
way are exterminated and become poor. Ghulams must not be 
sent except when the affair is important, and must not be 
allowed to depart except with a royal farman, and it must 
be settled with the ghulam, "the value of the litigation is 
so much: exact no more than this.”
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inheritance from their mother, Nizam ul-Mulk ordered it to be 
returned to them,**"
The following story which is related in the Muntakhabi 
Tarlkhi Na§irl suggests that although the sultan may have 
delegated the administration of justice to the wazir, never­
theless the latter referred to him before giving a decision 
even in comparatively small matters. Some one in Khuzistan 
reported to Nizam ul-Mulk that a wealthy man had died, 
leaving no heir except a sister’s child, and that he had 
great wealth, which ought to go to the state treasury.
Nizam ul-Mulk, although he mentioned this matter three times 
to Malikshah, could get no answer from him, the sultan saying
he would tell him on the following day. On the morrow, how­
ever, he set out for the chase, and Nizam ul-Mulk, in his••
eagerness to augment the royal treasury, followed him. On 
his return from the chase, Malikshah passed through the camp 
bazaar, and since he was hungry ordered one of his attendants
to get some wheaten cakes (tutmaj). These were brought to
*
the camp and the sultan sat down with his amirs to eat them. 
These cakes sufficed for all the amirs and their attendants. 
After having eaten Malikshah asked his attendant how much they 
had cost. The latter told him four and a half dangs.
1 N. f.lb, 2a.
Maliks hah paid this, turned to Nizam ul-Mulk and said, "So 
considerable a number of followers have eaten their fill at the 
cost of four and a half dSngs, therefore it would be the 
height of inhumanity to covet the property of orphans,1,1 This 
story may well be apocryphal, but nevertheless it probably 
indicates the kind of conditions which existed at the time.
In spite of the importance of his position, the wazir 
was probably accessible to all* A story is related of how a 
poor woman came to Nizam ul-Mulk asking for help. He began to 
speak to her and she to him, but one of his hajibs showed his 
disapproval of this, Nizam ul-Mulk then reproved him and said, 
"I took you as a servant only for such occurrences, Amirs and 
prominent persons, they have no need of you," He then dis-
_ p
missed the hajib.
In view of the military nature of the Great Seljuq system 
it is not surprising that the wazir in addition to his adminis­
trative functions also had military duties. He was expeoted 
to accompany the sultan on military campaigns,^ and also on
1 T.H. 141-2.
2 I.A. X.54.
^ Instances of the sultan being accompanied, by his wazir are 
numerous. Nizam ul-Mulk was with Alp Arslan when" he met 
Qutulmish in Battle in 456 (1064) (I.A. X.24). During 
Alp^Asslan’s expedition to Azerbaijan in 459 (1055/7)*
Nizam ul-Mulk captured the fortress of Bihinzad, and Alp 
Arslan increased his rank and jurisdiction as a result 
(I.A. 1^199)• Al-Khatlr Abu Mansur wl-Maibudl Muhammad b, 
Malikshah’s wazir was”entrusted By Muhammad with the defence 




occasion to -undertake expeditions himself. At one time
(circa 502), it seems indeed that the wazir in Kirman was also
pthe leader of the army. In some cases it seems, further, to 
have "been the wazir and not the sultan who actually despatched 
military expeditions.^
The wazir was also a court official, and as such had 
various functions* Firstly, he probably supervised the expendi­
ture and arrangements of the royal household and court, but 
since there was no clear distinction between the atate revenue 
and the sultan1 s personal income, he did this perhaps in his 
capacity as the head of the financial administration. Kamal 
ud-Dln Muhammad b. al-Husain, Mas#ud b. Muhammad’s wazir, for 
example, supervised the sultan1 s expenditure on provisions and 
payments in cash for pensions ( ^  The
1 - - -Alp Arslan sent Nizam ul-Mulk to Fars at the head of a large
army in 464 (1071/2) and he besieged FadGLuya (I.A. X.48-9; 
F.N. 166; N. f.2j5b-24b). Nizam ul-Mulk Ahmad b. Nizam iel- 
Mulk when wazir to Muhammad bV Malik shah was sent on* an ex­
pedition to Alamut in*Muharram 5^3 (1109) (I.A. X.535)*
2 I.A. X.J64.
' Nizam ul-Mulk sent an army to besiege Alamut after hearing 
Hasan a§-gabbah had taken it (I.A. X.216). Sanjar’s wazir 
al-Mukhtass Abu Nasr Ahmad b. al-Fadl sent an army against 




majority of the court officials were mamluks and members of 
the standing army (see Chapter III.) and in the later period, 
at least, probably did not in practice come under the juris­
diction of the wazir,whose supervision of the court was pro­
bably confined to financial matters. Secondly, he was the 
sultan’s representative on ceremonial occasions. On the ac­
cession of a new caliph, it was the wazir who usually gave 
the oath of allegiance to him on behalf of the sultan. On the 
death of al-Muqtadl *Izz ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk, the wazir, 
mourned his death with other officials and prominent men, 
gave the oath of allegiance to the new caliph al-Mustazhir and 
then went to Barkyaruq. to take from him an oath of allegiance^ 
In 479 (1086/7) when the caliph gave an audience to Malikshah 
and his amirs, Nizam ul-Mulk presented the latter one by one 
to the caliph. When the caliph al-Qa,im*s daughter was be­
trothed to Tughril Beg in 454 (1062), documents were written 
in the name of al-Kundurl.^ In the following year when Tughril
came to Baghdad al-Kundurl went to the caliph’s palace to
4demand his daughter. When the caliph asked for the hand of 
Malikshah* s daughter in 474 (1081/2), the sultan commanded
*■ I.A. X.157«*TChen, however, al-Mustarshid was assassinated 
in 529 (1134/5)* Mas ud b. Muhammad wrote to Bak Aba, the 
shihna of Baghdad to give the oath of allegiance to ar- 
Rashid (I.A. XI.17).




Nizam til-Mulk to go with Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahlr, the caliph’s 
wazir and envoy, to discuss the matter with Arslan Khatun, who 
had been married to al-Qa*im.^ When the matter had been ar­
ranged and the sultan’s daughter was eventually taken to the 
caliph's palace, she was escorted there by Nizam ul-Mulk (see 
also Gkupbei VlfT.). The wazir Kama! ud-hin Abu'l Barakat ad- 
Darkazlnl was Mas#ud b. Muhammad’s wakll in the marriage of 
the caliph to Fatima b. Muhammad in 531 (1137)p while Nizam 
ul-Mulk Ahmad was mutawalli on behalf of Muhammad b. Malikshah’; 
sister when she was married to the caliph al-Mustazhir in 502 
(1109).4
Further the wazir was the intermediary between the sultan 
on the one hand and foreign rulers, vassals and to some extent 
governors on the other. Hence he had almost diplomatic func­
tions. Envoys presented their petitions and desires to the 
wazir, who informed the sultan. ^  When Malikshah sent to Samar- 
qand in 466 (1073/4-) to put down the revolt of lltegln, the 
latter sent a letter to Nizam ul-Mulk excusing himself.  ^
Jigirmish, when he heard of Barkyaruq’s death sent to Sa#d
1 I.A. 1.77.
2 ibid.. 106.





ul-Mulk Abu*l Mahasin, wazir to Muhammad b* Malikshah, offer­
ing obedience to Muhammad, and Sa*d ul-Mulk took Jigirxnish 
to the sultan1 s presence.^*
Although the wazir was, at times, in charge of the court 
and its upkeep, he was not generally speaking in charge of the 
sultan1 s treasury, over which there was a treasurer responsible 
only to the sultan, Anushiravan b. Khalid was treasurer to 
Muhammad b. Malikshah, and as such was favoured with private
2 —  -  ' ' - m  -audiences, lfflhen Abu Hashim, ra*is of Hamadan, paid Muhammad 
b. Malikshah 700,000 gold dinars to counter intrigues against 
him (see below), Anushiravan was sent to Hamadan to collect 
the money, which he paid into the treasury, Muhammad then en­
trusted to him the administration of this money.^ This sum 
was therefore presumably acquired by the sultan personally 
and not for the state.
Lastly the wazir exercised a general supervision over 
the religious institution.^ In so far as he was concerned 
with religious matters, it was firstly no doubt to prevent 




4 cf. A diploma issued for one of the great wazirs preserved 
in a collection of documents known as at-Tavassul ila't 
Tarassul (see Chapter V# p» by which the wazir
was given general charge of "civil" and religious affairs 
(PP- 75-7).
72
practical matters such as the administration of endowments.1 
The early sultans, Tughril Beg, Alp Arslan, Malikshah and 
Muhammad b. Malikshah were all strictly orthodox, Hanafls by 
rite, and during the early period of Great Seljuq rule, the 
wazir was probably required to be a majority Sunni, i,e. a 
Hanafi of a Shafl'l.2 Alp Arslan indeed apparently frequently 
expressed his regret that Nizam ul-Mulk was a Sha^l'l (and 
not a Hanafi). He would say, *Alas, if my wazir had not been 
a ShafI#I, he would have had (greater) authority and prestige^ 
Nizam ul-Mulk1 s predecessor, al-Kundurl had been a fanatical 
Hanafi.^ He had instituted the cursing of the rafidls and
cf. Bundarl, who states Nizam ul-Mulk supervised the awqaf 
(p.55). In keeping with Ihe wazir*s position as the super­
visor of religious affairs, and it might almost be said 
with his position as the guardian of religious orthodoxy, 
was the patronage and building of schools by wazirs, 
notably Nizam ul-Mulk, The latter was also a zealous 
patron of learned and holy men. His court was frequented 
by doctors of the law and sufis, towards the latter of 
whom he was very beneficent (I.K. 1.415). Al-Ghazall 
relates that when he left Nishapur on the death of the 
imam ul-haramain, he went to the army, where he met with 
and honourable reception from Nizam ul-Mulk. A number of 
men of eminent talent were at that time at the wazir*s 
court, and al-Ghazall had some public conferences with 
them (I.K. 11.622).
2 _
Nizam ul-Mulk makes this a condition for holding the office 





j ash/aris from the mimbars, which practice Nizam ul-Mulk sub-lj V
| sequently abolished. The latter, however, was nevertheless 
fanatically opposed to any unorthodoxy in religious belief or 
practice.2 This fanaticism, both on the part of the sultans
i ■ ■ i   * »■
and the wazlrs, was relaxed as time went on. No longer was it
necessary for a wazir to be a Hanafi or a Shaf 1*1. Indeed,
Anushiravan b. Khalid, who was wazir to Mahmud b. Muhammad in
521 (1127) and to Masrud b. MuJaammad in J29 (H34/5)> a
Shl*a.^ Sa#d ul-Mulk Abu*l Mahasin, Muhammad b. Malikshah1 s
wazir,was so far from being orthodox as to have conspired with
BatAnis in the fortress of Shahdiz outside I§fahan, while
4Muhammad was besieging them.
It was not unknown for the uulfran' s wazir to hold also 
the position of wazir to a malik, appointing himself a deputy 
to carry out one of these offices, as did ad-DarkazInl. Nizam 
ul-Mulk seems to have held during the reign of Alp Arslan, in 
addition to the wazirate of the sultan, also that of Malik- 
shah. A diploma of Alp Arslan conferring this upon him is 
preserved, but it seems that Nizam ul-Mulk nevertheless con­
tinued to be wazir to Alp Arslan until the latter's death. In 
this diploma he w$s instructed to watch over the welfare of
1 I.A. 1.141.
2 cf. S.N.
2 I.A. X.452; XI.11.
4 U.H.S. 89; Bu. 84. I,A. merely records that he acted with 
treason towards the sultan (X. 304).
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the subjects and to see to the affairs of Malikshah, preserving 
a happy medium between their interests.1
The wazir had, during the reigns of the first three Seljuq 
sultans and probably later also, direct access to the sultan; 
official business was, however, also transacted through the 
medium of an official known as the waklldar, whose duties were 
to act as an intermediary between the sultan and the wazir, 
and to bring answers to letters. His position was more privi­
leged than that of the hajibs. He had to be eloquent and bold 
in difficult situations, prepared to swallow angry words, inde­
pendent in establishing proof if necessary, forbearing, and
understanding the different moods and characteristics of the
- 2 - sultan. In the later period the wakildar was in all proba­
bility superseded by the amir hajib, who was, however, a member 
of the military classes, and not of the bureaucracy. He, ac­
cording to Bundari, received orders in person from the sultan 
and transferred them to the sultan’s wazir.^ This development
is significant of the changing emphasis in Great Seljuq society
-
Collection of Letters (Abu'l Qasim Tvaghll Haidar)^add. 7688
f.Jb-4b. Plurality of office was common in the Seljuq em­
pire. For example Muhammad al-Jawzaqani was 'amid of Bagh­
dad. Muhammad b. Malikshah made him jughra*!) h.e also had 
charge*of the wasirate of Gawhar Khatun. Isma*Il b. Yaquti’s 
daughter^ Muhammad ’s wife (Bu. 92 )• The * amid of Khurasan, 
Muhammad b. Mansur an-HasavI was in 456 (l O W )’ also ' amil 




and. the increasing militarisation of the state.
The pay of the wazir was chiefly, if not entirely, by
1 T -  _ J
assignments of land or its produce (see Chapter V.). 
dition he seems by custom to have been entitled to a propor­
tion of the total revenue. This did not, however, go straight 
into the wazir*s pocket, for there seem to have been various 
recognised items of expenditure which this money went to meet. 
In 476 (1083/4) Nizam ul-Mulk, when accused by Taj ul-Mulk 
Abu’l Ghana*im of misappropriation of the revenue, as stated 
above, admitted to taking one tenth of the revenue, which he 
had spent on the standing army, alms (sadaqat), gifts and 
endowment s (awqaf ).
It seems to have been a recognised practice for officials
to take a percentage of the money passing through their hands. 
The following story illustrates this. There was a certain
1 —Kamal ud-Dln ash-Shahrazurl, when frazlr to Zangl, apparently 
received 10,000 amiri dinars annually, whereas others 
(?wazlrs or officials)" only"received 500 dinars (A.M. 113). 
This would seem a comparatively small sum, and it may per­
haps be assumed that the wazir had in addition an iqta , and 
perhaps augmented his salary from other sources alsoV-
2 -  _I.A. X.84-£._ Taj ul-Mulk accused Nizam ul-Mulk of spending
300,000 dinars annually on the fuqufca and sufls (A.S.D.68). 
According to the Siraj ul-Muluk, Nizam ul-Mulk spent 600,000 
dinars annually upon building houses of learning for the 
fuqaha, madras as for the *ulama, ribats for the pious, the 
righteous and the poor, and feave them"pensions (p.217).
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'amid of 'Iraq who held office for a year, during which period 
he acquired great wealth. On one occasion when Mas*ud b. 
Muhammad came to 'Iraq he asked for the accounts. The 'amid 
summoned a mushrif known as Ibn ul-Hakim "by the people of 
Baghdad, and asked him to draw up the accounts in such a way 
that what he (the 'amid) had taken would not be noticed. The 
mushrif answered, "I do not dare to cover up anything, and for 
every item I mention I must produce a note. Rely upon me to 
hide much of the crimes that are hidden, and‘many of the un- 
canonical taxes, hut I cannot do otherwise than collect to­
gether what you have taken hy way of abundant commodities and 
open benefits.” They finally agreed 5^,000 dinars should be 
entered in the accounts without stating that the 'amid had 
taken this sum. The, 'amid then offered Ibn ul-Hakim 2,000 
dinars to enter this sum in the accounts in such a way that it 
would not attract notice, in the hope that the wazir would 
neglect it. The mushrif, however, refused and said, "I must 
make a single and separate mention of it.” He did this and 
the first thing the wazir, 'izz ul-Mulk al-Buruj irdif s eye 
fell upon was that entry, and when he was told what it was, 
he struck it off and said, "How do you permit yourself to add 
to the account what is taken from it by way of his (the 'amid's) 
recognised allowances (rusum) and the allowances of his ser­
vants? This man stayed at court two years getting into debt, 
and when he has recovered his financial position and obtained
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recognised allowances, it is not generous to take these hack 
from him, for the office was only given him that he might 
benefit from it*”'*'
A further and not unimportant source of wealth for the 
wazir was confiscations and fines from former wazlrs and 
others, I see below) while bribery, as regards the more un­
scrupulous wazlrs, if not all the wazlrs, also formed a not 
insignificant source of income to them particularly before the 
wazirate declined. The court, as stated elsewhere (see 
Chapter IV.) was a hotbed of intrigue. As long as the wazir 
was the most important and influential man in the kingdom, 
those who desired office whether at court or in the provinces, 
and also those who feared they had incurred the sultan’s 
displeasure, no doubt endeavoured to buy his support. The 
latter may further even have threatened to discredit indivi­
duals in the eyes of the sultan unless he received a sum of 
money from them. Mu*In ud-Dln Abu Nasr b. Ahmad al-Kashl, 
who was wazir to San jar, towards the end of his life had a 
proclamation made throughout the kingdom to the effect that 
whoever had given money or goods by way of bribes to Mu*ln 
ud-Dln, the wazir, was to refer to his waklls and to take 
back the amount, and he summoned the qadls and besought them 




ul-Mulk was himself not above briberyi When Malikshah
 ^ — _ seized and blinded the sayyid ur-ru asa, Abu1! Mahasin b.
Kamal ul-Mulk, in 476 (1083/4) after the latter had accused 
Nizam ul-Mulk and his friends of misappropriating the revenue 
of the state, his father, Kamal ul-Mulk, who was the mustawfl 
and a supporter of the wazir, gave Nizam ul-Mulk 200,000 
dinars.^  This is, moreover, significant of the vast increase 
in bribery wince the beginning of the Great Seljuq period.
When al-Kundurl sought to buy Nizam ul-Mulk*s favour after 
Tughril Beg's death he offered him only 500 dinars.
The intrigues were not, however, all on one side. The 
wazir himself was also obliged to spend large sums of money 
to retain the favour of the sultan, and if possible to prevent 
his rivals intriguing against him, For example, on one occa­
sion when Alp Arslan sent an envoy to Shams ul-Mulk, ruler of
Transoxania, Nizam ul-Mulk, who was wazir at the time, sent.. ■ " ■ ■ "■ ■*
a certain Danishumand Ushtur with the sultan’s envoy to tell
him what occurred. It so happened that Shams ul-Mulk's own
envoy (who had been to the Seljuq court) mentioned that Nizam
to
ul-Mulk was a rafidi. Danishumand at once wrote/the wazir.
The latter was greatly perturbed at this, and spent 30*000 
gold dinars to prevent this report, false though it was,
1 -I.A, X,85. According to Bundarl, Kamal ul-Mulk gave
300,000 dinars to the sultan's treasury (p.57)*
2 I.A. X. 20; Bu. 28.
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reaching the sultan’s ears,1
The expenses of the wazir, apart from those he incurred 
on "behalf of the sultan in connection with the standing array,M
gifts and endowments as mentioned above, were chiefly bribes
or presents, and the upkeep of his own "private1 army. The
wazir, like other prominent persons, had his own troops, and
the "private" army of a wazir such as Nizam ul-Mulk was of
considerable size (see Chapter III.). His court was, moreover
the refuge of innumerable persons who sought redress, or
office, or some other favour. When Nizam ul-Mulk came to
Baghdad in 480 (1087/8) with Malikshah, many beggard and
others came to his court, and none went away disappointed.
When he left Baghdad he ordered the gifts to be counted and
they were found to amount to 140,000 dinars. The second time
— — — — —  !
he came to Baghdad he did not give presents in the customary
way, until Abu Sa#Id Mu*ammar b. Abi /lmama, the wa*iz remon-
2strated with him, after which he resumed his former practice.
From the large sums which passed in these various in­
trigues, and also from the considerable sums which the sul­
tans confiscated from their wazlrs (see below) it will be 
seen that many of the wazlrs were comparatively wealthy men.
Abu Ja#far Muhammad b, Nizaia ul-Mulk had unlimited jewels and• •• ■
other possessions, and 1,000,000 dinars in cash was found 
belonging to him when Sanjar seized him.-^
1 S.'S. 88-90.
2 T.S. 272-7. 
5 I.A. X.J85.
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The qualifications required of one who was to fill the
office of wazir were numerous and varied* According to the
Na§a*ih Nama the wazir had in the first place to have some
knowledge of all subjects, so as to he able to take part in
discussions at court, while in the second place it was indis-
pensible for him to be deeply versed in accounts and history,
for upon a knowledge of these two arts financial affairs and
1sovereignty respectively depended* Further, as stated above, 
it was understood in the early Great Seljuq period that the 
wazir should be orthodox in his belief*
In view of the technical aspect of the functions of the 
wazir it is not surprising the office should usually have 
been filled by a man who, by training and sometimes by family 
tradition also, belonged to the bureaucracy. The most striking 
case of family attachment to the wazirate is that of the 
Nizami family. Many of the sons and grandsons of Nizam ul- 
Mulk after him were wazlrs. This, however, can probably be 
accounted for largely by the popularity and reputation of 
Nizam ul-Mulk. It was certainly not due to the merits of his 
descendants (see below). *Izz ul-Mulk was wazir to Barkjiruq? 
Mu*ayyid ul-Mulk to both Barkyaruq and Muhammad b* Malikshah,^
1 H.
2 I.A. X.148-9.
2 ibid. 159; 195.
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'imad ul-Mulk Abu*l Qasim to Arslan Arhgu,1 Fakhr ul-Mulk to
o _
Sanjar and Barkyaruq, Nizam ul-Mulk Ahmad to Muhammad b. 
Malikshah,^ and Shams ul-Mulk 'Uthman to Mahmud b* Muhammad*4, 
His grandson Naslr ull-Dln Tahir b * Rakhr ul-Mulk was wazir to
Sanjar,  ^and Nafir ul-Mulk b. Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk was wazir to
6 -Muhammad h. Malikshah; his great-grandson Nizam ul-Mulk Abu
'All al-Hasan b. Tahir b. Rakhr ul-Mulk to Sulaimanshah, ^ and •  **
his nephew Shihab ud-Dln Abu*l Mahasin was also wazir to 
Sanjar.**
Al-Kundurl who became wazir to Tughril Beg was the son 
of a dihqan of Kundur; he studied in Nlshapur, and then be­
came the ha jib ul-bab at the sultan's court and subsequently 
wazir,9 Nizam ul-Mulk apparently began his career in the
1 I.A. X.179-80. ;
2 ibid, 288.
2 ibid. 304.




8 R.S. 167; Bu. 245; I.A. X.385.
' A.S.D. 23. According to I.E. al-Kundurl had been a katib 
(111,290-1), while according to the T.S. he had a varied 
career before entering the waz irate. He studLied fiqh and 
then became land agent to Abu Muhammad Shafl'l, who subse­
quently handed over to him his deputyship at Tughril Beg's 
court. The sultan liked him and gave him the"office of 
post-master IT? )• Subsequently he made him gover­
nor of Khwarazm, but having gone to that province al-Kundurl 
rebelled. Tughril defeated him, castrated him and subse­
quently made him wazir (p*26l. cf. A.S.D, 24),
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service of rbn Shadan, * amid of Balkh, who kept accusing him 
of misappropriation of goods* and used to confiscate his 
possessions, until finally Nizam ul-Mulk fled to Marv and
joined Dl^ud. The latter sent him to serve his son Alp
-  - 1 Arslan and refused Ibn Shadan1 s demand for his return*
Normally wazlrs rose to that rank from subordinate posi­
tions in the dlwan. Sard ul-Mulk Abu11 Mahasin, who became 
wazir to Muhammad b # Malikshah had been muatawfI: Mukhtass
ul-Mulk al-Kashl before he became wazir to Sanjar was head 
of the dlwan ur-rasa* mustawfl,^ after he had been
wazir to Gawhar Khatun, the sultan’s wife*^ Kamal ul-Mulk 
as-Samir ami was also in Gawhar Khatun’s wazirate, after which 
he held the office of ishraf al-mamlaka:^  he subsequently
1 If: According to I.A. Nizam ul-Mulk was with an
amir called Yakhir, the leader of Da’ud* s *askar* who gave 
him"only enough to live on and confiscated at the end of 
every year what he had over, Nizam ul-Mulk became disgus­
ted at this, and after placing his sons Mu,ayyid ul-Mulk 







1 —  2 became mustawfi and finally wazir to Mahmud b, Muhammad;
al-Marz-JLban '
and Mu*ayyid ud-Dii$ who became wazir to Mas ud b* Muhammad
was formerly ^ughra*!.^ *Imad ud-Dln Abu*l Barakat ad-Darka-
zini who was also wazir to Mas*ud had been *arid ul-jaish;4
*Izz ul-Mulk ad-Dihistani who became wazir .to Bakryaruq had
been an *amid;^ while Na§ir ud-Din al-Muzaffar al- Hhwarazmi,
at one time wazir to Sanjar, had been at the beginning of his
career an inspector (mushrif) of the royal kitchen (matbakh)
and stables, after which he was promoted to being mushrif of
the revenue of the kingdom, and finally to the wazirate.^
fhere are also various instances of a man who had been employed
in the caliph’s dlwan being appointed wazir to the sultan,
Ar-Eabib Abu Mansur b, Abi Shuja*, who became wazir to Mahmud
b, Muhammad, had been wazir to the caliph,^ He was appointed
on the suggestion of other officials, who did not wish a strong
man to be given office, lest their freedom should be thereby
curtailed, and they therefore recommended someone who was em-










to "both Mahmpd b, Muhammad'1' and to Mas#ud b. Muhammad,^ was 
also wazir to the caliph in 526 (1131/2).^ Very exceptionally 
there are cases of wazlrs being appointed from other classes. 
Muhammad b. Sulaiman al-Kashgharl, who became wazir to Sanjar, 
had been at the beginning of his career a merchant, while 
Abu^l Qaslm ad-DarkhzInl was the son of a peasant.^
The appointment of the wazir, in view of the existing 
state of affairs, was obviously often the cause for intrigue, 
and there are instances of the office actually being bought* 
Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk came to Barkyaruq after he 
had defeated Tutush in 488 (1095)* He gave him many presents, 
including a jahraml pavilion (saraparda) and a tent (nawbatl) 
of atlas, weapons and jewelled implements, Arab horses, hunt­
ing birds and an armourer’s hop (zarradkhana), and became 
wazir.^  Mu'ayyid ul-Mulk b.llizam ul-Mulk, after being cap­
tured by Barkyaruq when he defeated Muhammadmb. Malikshah in 
494 (1101), gave 100, 000 gold dinars tn Barkyaruq to become 
wazir.^  Qumaj bought Sanjar’s wazirate in Muharram 516 (1122)
1 I.A. X.452.
2 ibid. XI.11.
* ibid. X.480. Nizam ul-Mulk Ahmad b. Nizam ul-Mulk, after he 
had been wazir to Muhammad b! Malikshah, was appointed 
wazir to the caliph (i.A. X.425).
4 Bu.114.
5 H.S. 143.
R.S. 147; U.H.S. 80; R.D. f.245b. Actually Mu*ayyid ul-Mulk 
was killed before the transaction was completed.
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for 1,000,000 Nlshapurl dinars for Muhammad b. Sulaiman al- 
Kashgharl, The latter had, because of his knowledge of TurkI 
and his expenditure in bribes, ingratiated himself with the
sultan, and had become tax-collector of Balkh.^___
The most eminent of the Great Seljuq wazlrs was Nizam ul-
2Mulk. Al-Ghazall compares him to the Barmakids. There is
little doubt that he enjoyed a great reputation among all
classes of the population, including the army.^ His personal 
is
prestige/shown by the caliph's reception of him on the occasion 
of the *aqd between the caliph and Malikshah's daughter in 
474 (1081/2). As the sultan's followers were going to the 
caliph's court on this occasion, Nizam ul-Mulk at the caliph's 
command rode while the other great men walked. When they 
reached the caliph's audience, the wazir was put on a throne 
(masnad), and he was given a khil'a with a taraz "in the namesr—ir-mr-mA- j-
of the just and perfect wazir, Nizam ul-Mulk, radl amlri'l
mu'minln", which was reputed to be the first time this laqab
-p 4 —was given to a wazir. Previous to this when Nizam ul-Mulk'.s
1 D.V. 191.
p _
Naslhat ul-Muluk, p.100. Bundarl'also praises him (p. 53)-
^ Taj ul-Mulk Abu'l Ghana* im desired Nizam ul-Mulk's dismissal, 
but he was not able to obtain this b&cause of the inclina­
tion of the soldiers towards him (A.S.D. 67).
^ D.V. 158; N. f.22a. cf. I.K, I.41J who states the calipft 
allowed Nizam ul-Mulk to be seated in his presence.
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daughter, the wife of *AmTd ud-Dawla b, Jahir died in 470
(1077/8) when giving birth to a son, who also died, they were
both buried in the caliph’s palace. According to Ibn ul-Athlr
"it was not customary to do this to anyone, it being done out
of respect for her father."1
It was not only Nizam ul-Mulk who enjoyed great prestige.
To some extent this seems to have extended to his family also.
When the sawid ur-ru* asa Abu*l Mahasin Muhammad, son of Kamal
ul-Mulk head of the dlwan ul-insha‘, who was his father’s
deputy in the dlwan, became ITizam ul-Mulk's son-in-law, a
pavilion was put up for him, and kettle-drums struck far him;
2
he also had a standard, horses and retinue. Two members at 
least of the Nizami family were moreover "touchy" about their 
prestige. Nizam ul-Mulk during the reign of Alp Arslan offer­
ed the wazirate of the sultan’s son, Malikshah, to his own son•«
Jamal ul-Mulk. The latter refused on the grounds that it was 
beneath his dignity. He said, "one like me will not be wazir 
to a boy!"^ Subsequently he became governor of IBalkh. The 
other was Mu*ayyid ul-Mulk* When he came to Baghdad in 466 
(1073/4), his reception was cancelled because the floods were 
out. He thought, however, that the caliph had not wished to 





to Mm, he refused to see them, saying that the caliph had
schemed against him* The caliph then sent someone to him to
offer his excuses, and gave him a robe of honour.^ Mu*ayyid
ul-Mulk later, when he became wazir, tried to arrogate to
2himself royal insignia, but was prevented from doing so.
After Nizam ul-Mulk* s death, the prestige which he had 
enjoyed as an administrator appears to some extent to have 
been transferred to his sons, ffakhr ul-Mulk b, Nizam ul-Mulk, 
when on his way to help Barkyaruq., fell into Tutush's hands in 
487 (1094), and was spared on account of the popularity of 
his father with the population; YaghI Siyan further advised 
Tutush to make him wazir, in order to incline the people 
favourably towards his (Tutush*s) house.^ Moreover, when, 
after the death of Nizam ul-Mulk, the wazirate began to 
decline and weakness appeared in the kingdom, his son *Izz ul- 
Mulk, in spite of his weak and evil character, was appointed 
to the wazirate in the hope that he would re-establish order
A » *
therein. Through Nasir ul-Mulk Muhammad b. Mu ayyid ul-Mulk 
b. Nizam ul-Mulk, although he was ignorant and lacking in ex­
pedience, Bundari states that the dlwan ul-insha/, of which he
1 Bu. 47.




was head, during the wazirate of Abu*! Masasin ad-Bihistanl, 
had prestige.3” Similarly, when Muhammad b. Malikshah seized 
the wazir Sard ul-Mulk Abu’l Mahasin in Shawwal $00, he ap­
pointed in his stead Abu Na§r Ahmad b. Nizam ul-Mulk with the 
laqabs of his father, Qawam ud-Dln Nizam ul-Mulk gadr ul-Islam,
on the grounds that the country had been prosperous during the
- 2wazirate of Nizam ul-Mulk.•*
To what exactly Nizam ul-Mulk* s popularity was due is 
not altogether clear. According to his own account, he strove 
to be just in his dealings with the people, and in the giving 
of decrees,^ but it is difficult to believe, in view of his 
treatment of al-Kundurl, that he did not stoop to the usual 
intrigues and bribery practised at the time. He did, it is
a
true, counsel moderation and toleration on various occasions. 
Further he was no doubt an able administrator. He was proba­
bly also a good judge of character; Bundarl states that he 
selected each man for the work he was best suited for, and 
gave him office accordingly. ^
1 Bu. 85.
2 I.A. X.5O4.
cf. The story of Nizim ul-Mulk and the *amil (H. f*lb ■£&). 
After relating this story Nizam ul-Mulk said that he never 
thereafter gave a decree until he had thoroughly investiga­
ted the matter(rv, f.
4 -TChen Alp Arslan, after his defeat of Qutulmish, wantdd to
kill the prisoners he had taken, Nizam ul-Mulk persuaded
him to forgive them (A.S.D.32J.
 ^Bu. 54.
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During the reign of Alp Arslan, Nizam ul-Mulk enjoyed 
great influence, while under Malikshah he was the virtual | j 
ruler of the kingdom for some twenty years The fact that j
many of his sons held office under him inevitably increased '
his power, although it also roused the sultan's jealousy (see 
below). Various incidents which are related bear witness to
the power of the Nizami family. Jamal ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-
Mulk, while governor of Balkh heard that J a W a k ,  the sultan’a
I M  i  . .  1 "
jester had slandered his father, and attributed the wazirate
to Ibn Bahmanyar. He was enraged at this, and set out for the
sultan's court, took Ja*farak from before the sultan, beheaded »• *•— ^
him, and then successfully plotted to poison Ibn Bahmanyar.
Another interesting case is the refusal of Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk b. 
Nizam ul-Mulk, while tughra’i to Malikshah, to give a post on 
the sultan’s order to Ja'far ZawzanI, the na'ib of the previous 
tughra*!. Ultimately, however, he was forced to do so.^
Malikshah appears to have resented the influence of Nizam 
ul-Mulk, and Bowen states that one aspect of his reign was the 
history of repeated attempts by the young sultan to assert him­
self, but always in vain.^ In 472 (1079/80) Nizam ul-Mulk
** cf. Bowen: Nizam ul-Mulfc (E.I.).
2 Bu. 68-9; I.A. X.79-80.
5 J.H. f.l92aJ'b. (Or.2676).
E.I. Article on Nizam ul-Mulk.
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suffered, a momentary setback. Ibn 4Allan, a Jew, who was the 
farmer of Ba§ra, took refuge with Nizam ul-Mulk from Khumar- 
tegln and Gawhar A/Tn. They, since they were personal enemies 
of the wazir, slandered Ibn * Allan before the sultan, who ac­
cordingly ordered him to be drowned. Nizam ul-Mulk after this 
kept away from the royal cortege for three days. He then made 
a feast for the sultan and gave him many presents, and remon­
strated with him for having drowned Ibn * Ulan. Malikshah
-  -  1 nevertheless farmed Basra to Khumartegm. At one time Malik­
shah showed favour to the sayyid ur-ru1 as a Abu'l Mahasin and
- - 2Ibn Bahmanyar, who plotted against Nizam ul-Mulk; finally
Abu'l Mahasin fell and Malikshah seized and blinded him, while
Ibn Bahmanyar was killed as stated above by Jamal ul-Mulk. In
revenge for the death of Ibn Bahmanyar, however, Malikshah
contrived the murder of Hamal ul-Mulk.^ Lastly, in a final
attempt to get rid of Nizam ul-Mulk, he made a favourite of
m ATaj ul-Mulk Abu*l Ghana im. There was a feud between the 
wazir and Taj ul-Mulk, who conspired against him with Sadid ul- 
Mulk Abu'l Ma'ali, and Majd ul-Mulk al-Balasanl. 5 Taj ul-Mulk 





5 Bu. 58-9; T.S. 281; I.E. III.151.
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the assassination of Nizam ■ul-Mulk,**'
Generally speaking, of the wazlrs who held office after
2 ^
Nizam ul-Mulk, few were either popular or able. Kamal ud-Din
»9
M-uhammad b. al-Husain has already been mentioned. Kamal ul- 
Mulk as-Samirami was, according to Bundari, well versed in the 
affairs of the wazirate, and restored the prestige of the sul­
tanate of *Iraq.,^  but according to Ibn ul-Athir and the Mir*at
- 4 — -r 'uz#aman he was tyrannical and unjust. Bundari states that
Mu*ayyid ul-Mulk b, Nizam ul-Mulk was peerless in his time,-* 
but Ibn ul-Athir records that he was miserly and of evil nature 
towards the amirs. Qawam ud-Din b. All ad-Darkazini was an 
evil character. In the words of Bundarl wno one was kind to 
him, but that he (ad-Darkazini) filled him."^ He had, it seems,
^ R.S. 1J5; I.K. 1.415* Nizam ul-Mulk*s assassination was also 
attributed to an emissary of Hasan as-Sabbah (see E.I.).
2 This falling off in the character of officials was not con­
fined to the wazlrs, but generally_speaking extended through 
all ranks of the bureaucracy. Nizam ul-Mulk was served in 
the dlwan by able and intelligent"men (Bu. 56-7)* but after 
his death there was apparently a striking change.
3 Bu. 119-20. ' .
4 I.A. X.425; M.Z. 66.
5 Bu. 78.
6 I.A. X.206.
' Bu. 114; The T.&., however, records that he was able (p.464).
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almost a Inst for blood and murdered many persons. He con­
spired with a number of Batinls to murder the qadl, Zain ul- 
Islam al-HawawI in 518 (1124/5), because he feared the latter 
would reveal his (ad-Darkazini1s) true nature to San jar.1 
Others he murdered were * Ala ud-Dawla, the ra1 is of Hamadan, 
*Ain ul-qudat al-Miyanchi, one of the grfeat imams of Hamadan, 
the mallk *Ala ud-Dawla Garchasp b. *Ali in Yazd, whom he had
_ p _ ■
disgraced, and the ra is of Sava. Mahmud b, Muhammad, whose
wazlr he was, apparently permitted him to persecute and kill
the great men of the state openly,^ When Sanjar came to the
Jibal in 526 ( H 32) ad-DarkazIni obtained a number of signed
orders from him on the pretext that these would be necessary
for the administration of the kingdom, after Sanjar returned
to Khurasan. These, however, ad-Darkazinl used to order the
4
death of different persons.
*Izz ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk, wazlr to Barkyaruq, was 
lacking in judgment and ability; he spent his time largely in 
drinking, and was finally dismissed because he was unable to 
carry out the obligations of his office.  ^ Abu*l Mahasin ad- 
Dihistani, who was also wazlr to Barkyaruq, had, according to
1 Bu. 1J1-2,
2 ibid. 1 3 7 - 8 .
2 ibid. 1 3 3 .
4  ibid. 1 5 2 -3 .
5 ibid. 77; D.V. 178.
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Bundarl, neither ability nor virtue; he was long-handed in 
tyranny and took away estates from their owners and assigned 
them to other people.1 The baseness of ftaslr ul-Mulk b. Mu’ay- 
yid ul-Mulk who eventually became wazlr to Muhammad b* Malik shah
2  *rhas already been commented on. Similarly Khatir ul-Mulk al- 
MaibudI, another of Muhammad’s wazirs was lacking in the neces- 
sary training for the wazirate, and was obstinate, cunning, 
deceitful and dishonest Muhammad b, Sul aim an al-KSshgharl, 
wazlr to Sanjar, was evil-natured, grasping, lying and hated 
alike by rich and poor (khyass o *amm).^ Various others of 
the descendants of Hizam ul-Mulk appear also to have been 
worthless. Diya ul-Mulk was not suited to the wazirate, and 
after his dismissal remained twelve years in prison.5 gadr 
ud-Dln Muhammad b, Fakhr ul-Mulk, Sanjar*s wazlr was corrupt, 
and when he took many valuable jewels for himself on the occa­
sion of the conquest of Ghazna by Sanjar, the latter was angry
1 Bu. 82; I.A. on the other hand states that he was generous,






and a number of people beat §adr ud-Dln Muhammad to death,^
Shams ul-Mulk *Uthman was extortionate and tyrannical, and when 
a number of prominent persons in *Iraq sent a complaint to 
Sanjar, the latter forwarded this to Mahmud b, Muhammad, whose
p —
wazlr he was, and Mahmud killed him. According to Bundarl 
it was largely ad-DarkazTnl, who was responsible for the in­
trigue which resulted in Shams ul-Mulk1 s death.^
From what has already been stated it will be seen that 
the wazlr1 s task was not an easy one. The dangers and diffi­
culties of his office are described in the Hasa'ih Hama
(Wasaya Hama) of Hizam ul-Mulk. Actually this document was
-  4probably not the work of the famous Hizam ul-Mulk, but whoever 
was its author, it does give a clear picture of conditions 
prevailing during the Great Seljuq period. The author warns 
his son to avoid the wazirate, which, he states, although it 
was second only to the sultanate in influence, was a very dan­
gerous office.^ The greatest danger attaching to it was that 
the wazlr was forced to vex several thousand persons - small
1 D.V. 188-9* I.A., however states that Muhammad b, Fakhr ul-
Mulk accomplished for Sanjar, because of* the inclination of 
the people towards him, what could not have been accomplished 
by numbers of soldiers (X. 386),
2 D.V. 209.
5 Bu. 168.
4 For a discussion of this document see Bowen: The sar-gudhast-
i sayyadna, the "Tale of the three Schoolfellows", and the 
wasava of the Hizam ul-Mulk (J.R.A.S. Oct. 193D*
5 N. f.la.
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and great, rich and poor - in the hope of gaining the satis- 
faction of one person (i.e. the sultan), which satisfaction 
was nevertheless never acquired. Inevitably the ruler became 
jealous of the wazlr, and suspected him of corruption* Fur­
ther, although the wazlr might accomplish many matters suc­
cessfully for the state and effect numerous economies, yet he 
seldom, if ever, obtained real gratitude or praise for his 
work. Such actions the courtiers did not bring to the notice 
of the sultan; on the other hand, if some slight damage occur­
red to the state through the wazir, it was not forgotten, and 
even if the sultan were to refrain from mentioning it himself, 
his courtiers would bring it to his notice.^ The question of 
retaining the goodwill of the courtiers was a difficult one for 
the wazir, for he had to restrain them and their followers 
from taking possession of the property of the state, and if 
knowledge reached him that they had done so- it was his duty
_ A
to tell the sultan.
m----------------------------------------------------1-------
To illustrate this the author relates a story of Nizam ul-
' Mulk and the Imam ul-Har amain al-Juwainl. The former com­
plained to the latter*of Alp Arslan’s secret ill-feeling 
towards him, in spite of his almost_superhumanlefforts in 
the interests of the state, - The Imam al-Haramain replied 
that since the wealth and property of the "sultan were in the 
hands of Nizam ul-Mulk^ inevitably the suit an** suspected him 
of corruption, The Imam ul-Har amain further went on to say 
that some of the demands the "sultans made on their wazlrs 





Secondly, the wazlr was in danger of incurring the dis­
satisfaction of the'sultan's sons. If their desires were op- 
posed, or they were not given full control or allowed to inter­
fere in financial or other matters, they tended to believe 
that any opposition which they encountered was the fault of 
the wazlr, in spite of the fact that these matters were in 
reality in the hands of the sultan. Hence they became ill- 
disposed towards him. Moreover inexperienced courtiers,
desirous of self-advancement, would encourage them in this,
1hoping thereby to become favourites themselves. The follow­
ing story, if true, illustrates this difficulty. On one occa­
sion when a son was born to Muhammad b. Malikshah, Malikshah
asked what he was to be called, Muhammad said, "Sultan• ..
Bayazid", the child having been born near Bastam, Malikshah 
applauded this, and gave the revenue of Bastam to him for the 
expenses of the cradle, midwives and foster-mothers. By 
chance the child died after two days, but for over seven 
years Muhammad continued to receive the equivalent of the 
revenue of Bastam by virtue of these words. He did not dare 
ask for a renewal of the grant, or to mention it to the 
nobles of the court, for fear it should be revoked, nor did 
he allow Nizam ul-Mulk to mention it to the sultan in aM M
private audience. The wazlr also did not consider it
1 N. f,6a.
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expedient to do this, for he knew the sultan’s decree would 
not he in accordance with Muhammgd’s wishes, and that the 
latter would consequently attribute the failure to renew the 
grant to his (Nizam ul-Mulk1 s) shortcomings or intrigue. Ac­
cordingly throughout those years Nizam ul-Mulk paid the equi­
valent of the taxes of Bastam to Muhammad out of his own es­
tates in Qumis.***
Another story is related which again, if true, shows 
how difficult was the position of the wazlr in consequence of 
the corruption and intrigue of the followers of the sultan’s 
sons. On one occasion, tribute and presents were brought 
from Byzantium, at a time when Malikshah, as a young man, 
was wintering in Rei, His instructions were to investigate 
the affairs of all who came from Byzantium, Georgia, Syria 
and 'Iraq, and to send them on to the court accompanied by a 
trustworthy official. Byzantine envoys arrived, and Malikshah 
ordered the *amld Man§ur to examine the tribute and presents 
they had brought. Among these were bales of cloth, of all 
colours, each colour being in a separate box. Mansur took 
the bales of white cloth, either with or without the knowledge 
of Malikshah, and forced the Byzantine envoys to erase the 
mention of this cloth from the list they had with them. Mean­
while spies had sent Nizam ul-Mulk news from Rei that Malik-*«
shah one day had mentioned his ability and efficiency, and
1 N. f ,6b-7*>.
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how not a single dinar could he taken, but that he (Nizam ul-
Mulk) disclosed it, to which the * amid Mansur had replied,
"It is all the result of the sultan’s power, otherwise one••
could easily sell the ox of Tus so that he himself would not
know." The *amld came to the sultan’sicourt with the Byzan-
tine envoys, and when the tribute and presents they had brought
were shown, Nizam ul-Mulk wondered why there was no white
cloth. He asked the envoys, who gave a non-committal reply.
Then he turned to the *amld, and sensed that the latter’s
demeanour had immediately altered; Mansur, meanwhile, before
Nizam ul-Mulk asked him about the cloths, said, "White is not 
••
a colour,” Nizam ul-Mulk was disturbed in his mind about the 
matter, and after the Byzantine envoys had gone, sent two men 
to their lodgings to seize theidocuments they had with them. 
These revealed nothing, and Nizam ul-Mulk asked forgiveness 
of the 4 amid for having entertained suspicions as to his inte­
grity. The 4 amid, however, was proud and afterwards made 
various remarks to Malikshah, saying, "the peacock of the 
court, that honest Gabriel, tried to find fault with me," 
which revived Nizam ul-Mulk?s suspicions. Then he remembered 
that the Byzantine empress had also sent her servants with 
presents to Alp Arslan's wife, and a list of these had been 
included in the presents sent to Alp Arslan; he thought, 
therefore, that conversely a list of the presents to Alp 
Arslan might be included with the presents to his wife.
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She was at this time at Radekin recovering from an illness, 
and so Nizam ul-Mulk sent to her, and had the list of presents, 
which were in a sealed case, brought to the diwan. Nizam ul- 
Mulk then summoned in private the leader of the Byzantine 
envoys, who told him what had happened. He was much exercised 
in his mind as to what he should do, for if he were to disclose 
the matter, Malikshah might well he turned against him. Even­
tually he wrote a ruba'I to the *amld, in which he said, "Put 
out of your head royal pride. Do not aspite to being a pea­
cock. Leave it to Gabriel. Now bring back all the woollen
cloths of Cyprus, and do not call the man of Tus the ox any
%
more." The *amld*protested his innocence, and finally Nizam 
ul-Mulk, for the sake of the honour of Malikshah*s court, be­
came satisfied with the assurance that the ramld should not 
repeat those words, while he himself agreed not to mention 
the episode.1
Thirdly, was the problem of maintaining friendly rela­
tions with the amirs, or at least of avoiding their enmity.
This proved an increasingly difficult task, and cost more than 
one wazlr his life (see Chapter IV.). In his official busi­
ness, the wazlr was continually having to associate with the 
amirs, and it was therefore difficult for him not to be friend­
ly with them on the one hand, or not to fall out with them on 




in the Nasa'ih Nama for avoiding friendship with the amirs 
are curious. The author states that they were a class who 
were always seeking the loss and disadvantage of one another, 
and since friendship demanded enmity with the enemies of 
one’s friends, friendship with the amirs was impossible, for, 
being all of mixed feelings towards one another, friendship 
with all logically involved enmity with all. Thus friendship 
with them collectively was impossible, and friendship with 
them individually was dangerous, for it attracted the enmity 
of those who were excluded from the friendship. Iftirther, 
friendship of the wazlr towards the amirs engendered the sus­
picion and the ill-feeling of the sultan.^ Once, when Nizam 
ul-Mulk was on a campaign with Alp Arslan, he alighted, while 
investigating the numbers and conditions of the soldiers 
prior to distributing among them money, at the tent of Altun- 
taq, a Turkoman, the leader of the amirs of the diwan. He 
did this to honour Altuntaq, and staged a short while with 
him. Alp Arslan, however, attributed his visit to ulterior 
motives, and although Nizam ul-Mulk had several disputes 
with Altunt^q over affairs connected with the diwan, to such 
an extent that they both wanted to resign, the sultan thought
it was a pretence, and never got rid of his suspicion, on 
account of which Nizam ul-Mulk, according to his own account,
p
suffered much loss.
1 N. f.lOb, 11a.
2 N. f.lla,b.
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Lastly, according to the Na^a/ih Hama, the wazlr was in 
danger from his own subordinates — scribes, tax-collectors 
and other offioials. He had to share with them the general 
benefits of office, and even to give them the lion’s share.
He had to raise them from poverty to riches, from weakness to 
power, from misery to prosperity and from insignificance to 
fame, until finally they would seek to encompass his destruc­
tion; and even if they happened naturally to be inclined 
towards good faith, others would not be lacking who would
T 1induce them to quarrel and to oppose the wazlr.
The author of the Nasa* ih Nama warns his son from trying
to avoid this danger by appointing his relatives and friends
to office, for that led, he stated, to even greater evils.
The case of Nizam ul-Mulk himself illustrates this. He had••
appointed his sons to different offices throughout the kingdom, 
in order that they should keep him informed of all that went on, 
Turkan Khatun, Malikshah1 s wife, however, became ill-disposed 
towards him. She wanted the sultan to make herP son, Mahmud, 
his heir-apparent, but since Barkyaruq appeared to be ,a more 
suitable candidate, her desire was not accomplished for her.
She put down this failure to Nizam ul-Mulk*s lack of ardour 
in her cause, and continually attributed seditious motives to 
him, which resulted in a change of outlook on the part of 
Malikshah towards him. .All she could accuse him of was that 
he had divided the kingdom among his children, butjnevertheless
1 N. f. 141), 15a.
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these words had the desired effect on the sultan.'*"
■ ■ ■ i f ....
From Ibn ul-Athlr's account also it would seem that 
Nizam ul-Mulk’s appointment of his sons and grandsons to 
office aroused Malikshah1 s jealousy. When Qudam shihna of 
Marv complained that he had been seized by Nizam ul-Mulk and 
his grandson, the ra*Is of Marv, Malikshah wrote to the wazlr 
reproaching him, "these thy children have each one of them 
gained the mastery over a large district and govern a large 
province, but this does not satisfy them, and they exceed 
what is politic and desire to do this and that." Nizam ul-
Mulk defended himself, but this event roused the sultan’s
~ 2
jealousy and led him to plot against the life of the wazlr.
From the foregoing it will be seen that intrigue was 
rife among all classes: the royal family itself, the cour­
tiers, the amirs and the officials, generally speaking.
This tended to the formation of factions in the bureaucracy, 
and when a wazlr fell,his supporters usually fell with him. 
The earliest case of the dismissal of a wazlr was the result 
of intrigue during this period was that of al-Kunduri in 456 
(1064), as the result of the efforts of Nizam ul-Mulk.2
Subsequently various factions, as mentioned above, were
1 N. f,15a,bj cf. T.G. 447.
2 I.A. X.1J8-9; cf. also Bu. 59-60. 
? I.E. III.294; I.A. X.20.
10>
formed against the latter. The one headed “by Taj ul-Mulk
Abu*l Ghana*im was ultimately successful, in so far as Taj
ul-Mulk succeeded his rival in the wazirate, while Majd ul-
Mulk al-Balasani and Sadid ul-Mulk Abu'l Ma*all replaced
Nizam • ul-Mulk* s devoted henchmen, Sharaf ul-Mulk Abu Sa*d,
•«
the mustawfi,'*" and Kamal ud-Dawla Abu’r Rida, the *arid res-
pectively. There are numerous other cases of subordinate
»
officials falling when the wazlr fell. When Sa*d ul-Mulk
Abu*l Ma^asin was dismissed from Muhammad b. Malikshah’s
wazirate, both the mustawfi, Zain ul-Mulk Abu Sa*d b. Hindu
and the *ari£ ul-jaish, *Izz ul-Mulk b. al-KafI were dismissed'?
Similarly as-§afl Awhad, mustawfi under ad-DarkazinT, was
killed by the sultan shortly after the latter fell, and his
people fined 200,000 dinars.^
In view of the existing circumstances the wazirs and
other officials all schemed for the downfall of any possible
rivals. The unscrupulous probably also schemed against the
appointment of any honest or relatively honest man to office.
This perhaps partly explains the opposition to Anushiravan b.
Khalid. He became na*ib to the wazlr, Khatlr ul-Mulk al-■     “ ■ ••
Maibudi. The latter thought he was a spy on behalf of the
^ Bu. mentions Sharaf ul-Mulk’s excellence (p.31)*
p




sultan, and other officials of the diwan, following his lead, 
also opposed Anushlravan and held hack his salary and allowan­
ces.^ Similarly when AnushTravah subsequently became wazlr to 
Mahmud b. Muhammad, the'tughra* 1, ash-Shihab As'ad, and thet • •• ^
mustawfi, as-Safl Abu*l Qasim, and the amir hajib, Arghan, and 
his wife plotted against him; Anushlravan accordingly resigned,
and was succeeded by ad-DarkazIni, who had won Arghan over
2 —  —  —  with bribes. Anushlravan then retired to Baghdad. Ad-Dar-
kazinl, in spite of the fact that Anushlravan had advanced him
money when he had been imprisoned, seized his property, taking
a house he had- built on the Tigris by bringing forward false
witnesses.-^
Intrigue having become the general rule, few wazirs 
failed to make use of their position to levy fines upon their 
enemies and rivals and to confiscate their possessions. In­
deed, as stated above, this was an important source of wealth 
for them. In 493 (1099/100) the possessions of the BanI Jahlr, 
who had formerly been employed in the caliph’s wazirate, were 
sold and the proceeds went to the sultan’s wazlr, Mu*ayyid ul-
Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk.^ The latter was himself killed in the #•
1 Bu. 100.
Bu. 136-7. On a former occasion ash-Shihab As*ad and a§- 
gafl had successfully plotted for the dismissal of Anushl­
ravan from office (Bu. 125).
( 5 Bu. 137.
4 I.A. X.203.
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following year. His possessions were taken by the wazlr al- /
AbuJl Mafasin ad-Dihist anl. When, however, al-*Izz was
killed in 495 (1101/2), his possessions were shared chiefly
_ p
between the sultan and his successor in the wazirate. When 
ad-DarkazIni was murdered and was succeeded by Sharaf ud-Din 
*AlI b. Baja, the latter began to fine the followers of ad- 
Darkazlnl.^
Khatlr ul-Mulk al-Maibudi intrigued against al-Muwaffaq
Abu Tahir al-Khatunx and demanded 100,000 dinars from him,
■ — 4 — , ' ‘summoned him from Jurjan and took all his money. Abu 1
Qasim ad-DarkazIni made many confiscations; he fined Qutligh ! 
ar-Bashidl, the us tad ud-dar of Mahmud b. Muhammad, 80,000 
dinars and subsequently dinars, Jamal b, Manara a mer­
chant of Hamadan, 30,000 dinars, Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Abl Hashim 
al-Hasahl," ra*is of Hamadan, 20,000 dinars, Zarqan, ra*Is 
of Tabriz, 70,000 gold dinars, and Taj ud-Dln Dawlatshah b.
*Ala ad-Dawla, and the letter’s mother and wazlr 150,000 
dinars.^  Ad-Darkazjni also tried to obtain large sums of 
money from the mustawfi, as-§afl. The latter offered Tughril 
b. Muhammad, whose wazlr ad-Darkazinl was, 100,000 dinars not ; 









relates how ad-Darkazlnl persecuted his (*Imad ud-Din’s) 
family. His uncle *AzIa ud-Dln was a na/ih in the diwan ul- 
istlfa in the time of iifehmd b. Muhammad. Sanjar sent an envoy 
to demand the inheritance of his two daughters, both of whom 
had died after being married to Mahmud. Ad-DarkazIni deputed 
someone to say to Mahmud that Sanjar would be satisfied in 
this matter with the witness of al-*Az!z, whose integrity he 
(Sanjar) trusted. He advised him to imprison al~*Aziz, and 
to pretend the latter had acted corruptly in connection with 
this matter. Mahmud rejected this idea. Ad-Darkazlnl then 
offered him 500,000 dinars to imprison al-*AzIz; Mahmud 
agreed and al-*Az!z was imprisoned in Kakrit (525/HJl).^ 
Mahmud then sent to ad-DarkazIni demanding the promised 
money. The latter delayed in sending it, and sent to Igfahan 
and seized *Imad ud-Dln’s father, gafl ud-Dln and. his uncle
p
piya ud-^ Dln, imprisoned them and took their estates. Such 
of their estates as remained were subsequently seized by al- 
BurujirdI, Qarasunqur’s wazlr.^
An interesting story is related of Ahmad b. Nizam ul- 
Mulk, who, while wazlr to Muhammad b. Malikshah, determined to 
attack the sayyid Abu Hashim, raJIsjof Hamadan, He gave the
1 ■ 4 'The M^Z. mentions that al- Aziz was fined and imprisoned by 
Mahmud b, Muhammad in 521 (p.77b and also records his im­




sultan 500,000 dinars to hand him over. Abu Hashim learnt of
this and went to Isfahan by an unknown road, and asked the
night,
sultan’s intimates to send him with a khadim to the sultan at/ ».  »* *
To Lala (jarategln, who was appointed to do thisy Abu Hashim
gave at once 10,000 dinars. fflhen he was taken to the sultan’s
presence, he offered the sultan 800,000 dinars, instead of
500,000 which Ahmad b* Nizam ul-Mulk had offered, if he would
hand over the wazlr to him. Muhammad accepted his offer, and
gave Ahmad to Abu Hashim to wreak his vengeance.*1’
Another wazlr, who oppressed and fined the people was
Shams ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk, wazir to Mahmud b, Muhammad.•• ■    • •
He was hated by the people. He appointed as his deputy one 
al-Kamil b. al-Kafl al-IsfahanT, who was equally hated. The
U.S. l62-5l TJ.H,S. 91-3; T.G. 456. Accordingly to the_ 
latter Abu Hashim gave the sultan 700,000 dinars. Bunda­
rl ’ s account is siightly different. According to him a 
number of prominent persons wanted al-Mutawwaj b. Abl 
Sa*d al-Hamadani to become rafIs and so they united against 
Abu HasMm, proposed to confine him to his house with his 
children and imposed a fine of 700,000 gold dinars upon 
him, apart from what was confiscated from his numerous 
retainers.^ Because of this opposition to him Muhammad 
b. Malikshah was turned against Abu Hashim and sent his 
treasurer, Anushlravan, to collect thejnoney. After AnushI 
ravanjiad paid the fines into the sultan*s treasury in 
Isfahan, he told the sultan of the plot against Abu Hashim, 
and so Muhammad reinstated him as ra*Is, and sent him mag­




first thing the latter did was to imprison the preceding
wazlr, Kama! ul-Mulk as-Samiraml's family, and to order the
return of the allowances (rusum) and pensions (idrarat), which
as-Samlraml had had. He further wrote to the provinces and
demanded that all who had received pensions (sadaqa) for two
years past, whether in cash or in kind, should return the 
1same.
From what has gone before, it is not surprising that the
position of the officials in general and of the wazlr in parti-
2 -cular was extremely insecure, Nizam ul-Mulk himself, in spite
of his power, had evidently no confidence in the security of
his position. The fact that he should have considered it
necessary to have his own spies throughout the kingdom is
adequate proof of the atmosphere of intrigue and distrust
his
He himself was able to maintain his position until/assassina­
tion, but after his death the security of the wazlr1 s position 
decreased and wazirs succeeded one another often with great 
rapidity. This was due to the increase of intrigue, and partly 
also to the prevailing financial stringency, for the dismissal 
of a wazlr and the confiscation of his goods by the sultan was
1 Bu. 126-7, 99.
p
A change of sultan also frequently involved a change of 
wazirate, for She wazlr was the servant, not of the state, 
but of the sultan.
2 cf, p,78.
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a means of temporarily relieving this. The readiness with
which the later sultans listened to intrigues against their
wazirs contrasts with the earlier period. Alp Arslan on one
occasion when he received a letter slandering Nizam ul-Mulk,
gave it to him and said, "If they are right in what they have
written, repair your nature and mend your ways, and if they
liedmthen forgive them their slip."'*’ Further, as stated
above, when Abu*l Muhasin.the sayyid ur-ru*asa, accused Nizam
(1083/41"
ul-Mulk and his friends in 476/of misappropriating the state
revenue and offered to extort money from Ma^if he was handed
«— pover to him, the sultan seized, blinded and imprisoned him.
From the death of Malikshah onwards, the number of 
wazirs, who escaped either being murdered or imprisoned and 
whose goods were not confiscated on dismissal, is small. 
Barkyaruq seized and killed Mu*ayyid ul-Mulk in 494 (1100/1) 
and confiscated his possessions.^ An earlier example is 
that of the malik Arslan Arghu, who exacted 300,000 dinars 
from his wazlr rImad ul-Mulk b, Nizam ul-Mulk in 490 (1097)
4 _ _





ibid. 180^ Acoording to Bundarl, Imad ul-Mulk was Burl/b. 
Alp Arslan’s wazlr, and when Burl Bars was killed Arslan 
Arghu seized and fined *Imad ul-Mulk 300,000 dinars and 
then killed him (p,236, A.S*D„ 85^6).
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al-Khatir al-Maibudl, and. with him two of the children of al- 
KafI and their sister, who was the wazlr*s wife, and imposed 
a fine of 150,000 dinars upon them,'*' Mahmud b. Muhammad
seized and killed Kamal ul-Mulk as-Samirami in 516 (1122/3)
2 -and took his treasury* In the following year Mahmud also
seized and killed the wazlr Shams ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk.^
Tughril bf Muhammad killed his wazlr ad-DarkazIni in 527 (lljjjt 
Sanjar also killed Muhammad b. Fakhr ul-Mulk b. Nizam ul-Mulk
and took his possessions. The latter treated the amirs with
contempt, so they complained of him to Sanjar who accordingly
killed him.5
During the reigrs of Tughril Beg, Alp Arslan and Malikshah 
the wazlr was, after the saltan, the most influential person in 
the kingdom. Al-Kunduri, Tughril Begfs wazlr, in accordance 
with the latter*s will, placed Sulaiman b. Da*ud on the throne 
on Tugjiril’s death. Seeing he was not generally supported, he
^ Bu. 105.
Q. 206-7. According to I.A,, he was assassinated by a
Batini (I.A. X.424J.#•»
2 I.A. X . Bu. 128. Sanjar1 s wazlr Abu Tahir al-Qumml,
who was an enemy of the Nizami family, induced him to do 
this.
4 I.A. X.483; Bu.154.
5 I.A. X.J85.
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proclaimed Alp Arslan as sultan instead,^ and endeavoured at 
the same time to win over the letter's wazlr, Nizam ul-Mulk;
he failed to do so and was superseded hy his rival in the
2wazirate. It is noticeable that it was a question, on this 
occasion, of the rivalzy between the two wazirs and not 
between the rival amirs, whose ambitions later dominated the . 
question of the succession of the Great Seljuq sultans. 
Similarly when Alp Arslan was on his deathbed, he charged 
Nizam ul-Mulk with authority over the accession of his heir- 
apparent Malikshah.  ^ From the death of Nizam ul-Mulk onwards, 
as stated above, the wazirate began to decline. The fact J
that the caliph, when he agreed to Turkan Khatun's request 
to read the khutba in the name of her infant son Mahmud, 
stipulated that Taj ul-Mulk Abu*l Ghana1 im, the wazir, 
should be in charge of all officials and taxation and that Una^  
the leader of the army, should act on Taj ul-Mulk1 s advice? is 
perhaps an indication that the military classes were beginning 
to oppose the wazlr and were seeking to dominate him. Under 
the later Great Seljuq sultans there was a striking change 
in the position of the wazlr relative to the amjars (see also 
Chapter IV.). It is perhaps significant of the decrease in
1 I.A. X.18,19-
2 ibid. 20.
2 ibid. 51; Bu. 45; cf. T.G. 445-
4 I.A. X.145,
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the wazlr* s power that when Barkyaruq died in 498 (1104), 
Ayyaz, Malikshah b. Barkyaruq* s at ah eg went with Malikshah 
to Baghdad and sent the wazlr al-Maibudl with Barkyaruq*s 
corpse to Isfahan, a comparatively unimportant task.'*’ When 
Muhammad b*, Malikshah was dying, no one entered to him ex- 
cept his amir hajib, *A1I b. *8mar b. Sarma. Mahmud b* 
Muhammad when he was dying in 5^5 (1131) appointed his son 
Da*ud as sultan with the wazlr, Abu*l Qasim ad-DarkazIni,M
and the atabeg,Aqsunqur Ahmadlll, to see over his affairs.^ 
Da*ud did not become established as sultan; Sanjar appointed 
in his stead Tughril b. Muhammad in 5^5 and made ad-Darkazlnl 
his wazlr.^ When Sanjar assigned Ehwarazm to the mallk 
Sulaimanshah b. Muhammad in 533 (113^/9) he appointed for 
him not only a wazlr and an atabeg, but also an amir hajib, ^
The amir ha jib of Mas'ud b* Muhammad, *Abd ar-Rahman Tughra*- 
— —— — — — —  - ^
Irak, was the virtual ruler of his kingdom for a time* In­
deed by this time the wazlr was quite overshadowed by the 
powerful amirs. Kamal ud-Din Muhammad b. al-Husain made an 
attempt, as stated above, to restore order in the kingdom and 








and lost his life in the attempt.
It was, moreover, not only in relation to the amirs that 
the importance of the wazlr declined. Other officials tended 
also to increase in influence relatively as the wazirate de­
clined. This is illustrated hy the case of Majd ul-Mulk al- 
BalasanI, the mustawfi, and Pakhr ul-Mulk h. Nizam ul-Mulk, 
wazlr to Barkyaruq. Power was in the hands of the former, the 
latter "being merely a figurehead.^- That Majd ul-Mulk did not 
seize the wazirate himself may have "been "because he thought he 
would "be safer as mustawfi, and could still concentrate in his 
own hands all power without drawing so much attention to him­
self.
Further, as the wazirate declined in importance, the wazlr 
was no longer the intermediary between the sultan and the 
various branches of the administration. Instead of reports* • 
passing through the hands of the wazlr who ^presented them to 
the sultan, there was a tendency for the sultan, in so far as 
he exercised control, to deal with the heads of the departments 
individually. This does not mean that in the early period all 
business invariably went through the wazlr, or that in the later
^ Bu. 79^ Oil "the defeat of Tutush in 497 Majd ul-Mulk went to 
Isfahan and proceeded to win the favour of Barkyaruq*s 
mother. He then seized and blinded the mustawfi Abu *A1I 
and took that office himself.
i
114
period the reverse was the case - practice varied from time
to time, and the most that can he stated is that the general
tendency was as mentioned ahove. Mahmud b. Muhammad, for
example, used daily to ask the mustawfi for the daily register
and accounts and to go through these, and similarly he used
to atek the *arid for his registers.*1’
It was probably due to the increasing danger of the
wazirate and to the general lowering of moral standards in
official circles that there appeared, after the death of
Malikshah, a tendency - not admittedly a very marked one -
to avoid the wazirate. The prevailing financial stringency
forced the wazlr, as head of the financial administration, to
2practice extortion in the collection of taxes, and this was, 
no doubt, repugnant to many. This objection to office on 
what may almost be termed religious grounds was not a tendency 
confined to the Great Seljuq period. But it did not become 
noticeable during that period until after the rule of Malik- 
shah. The author of the Nasa*ih Kama expresses it, and warns 
his son not to choose the wazirate after him, and tells him 
not to be deceived by worldly vanities "because of the 
delights of that office (i.e. the waz irate M n  the beginning
1 R.D. f.251a.
2 When Abu*l Mahasin ad-Bihistanl was appointed wazlr to
Barkyaruq, there was no money or revenue, and. he did of 
necessity what made the people fear him (I.A. X.230).
r '<- / / “i f J~anc.CS ^  /> % / / !  i sher
civ #-*-c4v j, ■'6* rc f l ftcxAl£ <ekieLt\ /vtqj
SkxKf-a.t iU- ;w/c <$***_ /rut&v0 b ***•$* c<
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are not worth the regret# it entails in the end; in truth 
they are a dream and nothing hut a delusion, to which is 
joined the punishment of the next world.Anushlravan b. 
Khalid refused Muhammad b. Malikshah1 s invitation to become 
deputy wazir but was forced to accept. Subsequently he re­
signed or was dismissed. lRhen he was again summoned to take 
office he agreed, but unwillingly.  ^ Another case was that of 
rAzIz ud-Dln Abu Nasr b, Hamid, the mustawfi, who refused 
Mahmud b. Muhammad’s offer of the wazirate and recommended 
the sultan to appoint Abu*l Qasim ad-DarkazIni.^ Subsequently 
al-#AzIz offered his resignation from the office of mustawfi.^  
Ibn Darast apparently preferred the wazirate of Buzaba to the 
wazirate of the sultan Mas'ud b. Muhammad; this was not due 
to religious scruples, but it is striking proof of the decline 
in popularity and power of the sultan’s wazirate.^
1 N. f.la.
2 Bu. 99.
? I.A. XI.47; T.S. JOl.
4 Bu. 129 -
5 Bu. 135.
I.A. XI.77; see also Chapter IV.
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ii. Financial Administration.
In view of the fact that the extent of the directly ad­
ministered area varied from time to time, as stated in Chapter 
I., there were probably considerable fluctuations in the 
revenue. The general tendency was for this to decrease 
towards the end of the period, by which time the major part 
of the country had been alienated from the control of the 
central government. Similarly the various items, and the 
amount received from each source, underwent considerable 
change.
The taxes were collected by tax-collectors (*amils) of 
the central government. Practice varied locally. In some 
cases taxation may have been levied on individuals, in others 
upon the inhabitants of a locality as a whole, some local man 
being responsible for the collection and payment of this to a 
tax-JEollector. In Baghdad the shihna was to some extent con­
cerned with the collection of taxes. Al-Bursuql, while shihna, 
was collecting taxes in 518 (1124) when news arrived of his
dismissal from office. He then handed the matter over to his 
and successor
deputy/Yaranqush. It was not, however, the invariable 
practice for the shihna of Baghdad to collect taxes. Muhammad
^ I.A. X.439. When Mas*ud b. Muhammad sent Isma'Il b. Chahar- 
dangl and Albaqish Kun Khar on an expedition to Fars and 
Khuaistan, they were to defray their expenses by collecting 
taxes in Baghdad. They failed, however, to do so, for when 
they advanced on *Iraa, the shihna prepared to resist them 
(I.A. XI.51). — —
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b. Malikshah in 494/5 (1101/2) appointed Abufl Ma'all al- 
Mufad$al b. *Abd ar-Razzaq over the collection of taxes.***
Taxes were collected probably both in cash and in kind. The 
money and goods so obtained, or what remained after defraying 
current e^enses, were paid into the treasury.
It was probably during the reign of Malikshah that the 
revenue of the empire was highest. In the Tarlkhi Guzlda, 
Hamdullah MustawfS states that the annual revenue of Malik-
* p
shah's kingdom was 10,000,000 currency dinarsr He also 
records that it was reported in the yisalati Malikshah! that 
the revenue in the days of Malikshah amounted to 215,000,000 
and odd gold dinars (i.e. * Abb as I dinars) and since these 
dinars were to be reckoned at 2y (currency) dinars of his day. 
the sum amounted to somewhat over 500,000,000 (currency) 
dinars.^  This figure is, of course, absurd. The entire 
revenue of the Islamic Empire in the time of the early 
*Abbasids was only some 25 million dinars.2*" He also states
1 I.A. X.225.
I
p _ _ _
T.G. 449* The sum is given in tumans; a turn an was the 
equivalent of 10,000 currency dinars (Nuzhat, transl. p.
of Persia excluding Khurasan during his time 
y Nuzhat ul-Qulub, p.27* He further states that the revenue j 
amounted until the first years of G-hazan Khan to 17,000,000 
currency dinarsj after which it reached 21,000,000 dinars;*
4 Von Kremer:Ueber das Budget des Harun in VII. International 
Congress of Oritatalists, Vienna, 1888.
*when he wrote, however, it did not probably amount to half 
that sum.
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that he had seen an account dm the handwriting of his great­
grandfather Amin ud-Din Ha§Ir, the mustawfl, who was account­
ant to the treasury of 'Iraq in the time of the Seljuqs, ac­
cording to which Persian *Iraq in thosfciidaysfp&id in the cur­
rency of his own time 25,200,000 and odd (currency) dinars.^  
A relatively important item in the revenue at the begin­
ning of the Great Seljuq period was the land tax, hut in the
course of time it became an almost negligible item, for the 
majority of the land was alienated from the control of the 
central government. The land tax was probably collected 
both in cash and in kind. In theory it fell due after the 
harvest, but in practice it was probably often demanded be­
fore the harvest, which caused considerable hardship to the 
2 -cultivators. Alp Arslan is said to have taken the land tax 
(kharaj) injtwo annual instalments.^
In so far as the land tax and other items of the revenue
Nuzhat ul-Qulub, p.48. Some MSS. give 2,568,000 dinars, 
which seems a more likely figure (Nuzhat, transl. p.55)* 
Hamdullah states that in his time by reason of the ruin of 
the country, this sum had been reduced to 350,000 (curren-
cy) dinars.
2 cf. Nizam ul-Mulk, who writes, "The tax-collectors must be 
charged to treat well the people of God, and only to take
the due amount (from them in taxation) and also to demand 
that with civility and courtesy.” He further stresses the 
fact that the taxes were not to be demanded before they 
fell due, because this led ■Jo the ruin and dispersal of 
the peasants. Also if the amil were to take anything in 
excess from the peasants, he was to be removed from office. 
(S.N. 18). *
> A
a -S.d . 30; I.A. X.£L.
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were farmed, they brought in a certain sum annually to the 
state treasury; the amount of land farmed was, however, insig­
nificant compared with the land which was alienated in the 
form of military and administrative iqta*s (Chapter V.).
The chief source of revenue was in all probability wil­
legal” taxes (mukus). As regards these there was a constant 
conflict between religious scruples and financial practice. 
Those sultans who desired to observe the religious law tended 
to revoke "illegal” taxes, but never with lasting success, 
and with disastrous results upon the revenue. Mention of 
the revocation of "illegal” taxes is frequent, and from this 
very fact it is clear that their repeal was either not car­
ried out, or was shortlived. Malikshah in 479 (1086/7) order­
ed the abolition of the mukus levied upon traders for all 
kinds of merchandise in #Iraq and Khurasan.’*’ He also sup-
pressed all tolls and duties (khafarat) throughout his domin-
2 _ __ 
ions. Muhammad b. Malikshah, on his arrival in Baghdad in
Sha*ban 501 (1108), abolished mukus, customs dues (? )
market dues ( transit dues ( ) and simi­
lar dues which were levied in *Iraq and all his provinces,
1 Q. 118; I.A. X.105.
2 -  **I.K. III.441. khafarat were sums paid by travellers for an
escort or safe conduct when passing through dangerous 
country (445* Jn). Malikshah also abolished pilgrim dues 
( ) in 48I (1088/9} and ear-marked an equivalent
sum from the produce of Iraq. Formerly it had been the 
custom to take from every district seven gold mithqal 
(T.G. 444).
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1and. tablets concerning this were hung up in the markets.
TVhen he went back to I§fahan, "illegal" taxes were again 
levied on the merchants, according to custom. Muhammad, on 
his return to Baghdad, was told of this, whereupon he con­
firmed the repeal of these taxes and warned those who dis- 
obeyed. Tughril Beg, on the other hand, reimposed in 455 
(IO65) what the ra^s of the two *Iraqs had abolished by way 
of confiscations of inheritances and mukus.^  Mahmud b. Muham­
mad, on the advice of his wazir, as-Samlrami, decided to renew 
the mukus in *Iraq in 5^5 (1121). Actually he refrained from 
doing so immediately, taking as a warning against this out- 
breaks of fire in the sultan* s palace in Baghdad and in the 
,1amif of Isfahan. It seems that the mukus were, however, 
renewed, for on the assassination of as-Samlrami in 516, the
sultan revoked what he (as-Samlrami) had renewed of mukus, and*• . . .
also abolished the taxes which the wazir had imposed on mer­
chants and dealers.  ^ Kamal ud-Dln Muhammad b. al-Husain,
1 I.A. X.}17; 369; Q. 162.
2 Q. 162.
' I.A. X.l6. According to Nasiri Khusraw, Tughril Beg, when 
he took Iffahan, commanded the taxes to be remitted for 
three years (N.K. 92-5)*
4 I.A. X.420.
* ibid. 425. The M.Z. also states as-Samlrami renewed the 
mukus in Baghdad (p.66).
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Mas#ud b. Muhammad’s wazir, let fall the mukus, but it seems 
unlikely that this repeal came into force, or if it did, it 
was extremely short-lived. He did not become wazir till 532 
(1157/8), and in 533 he was murdered;**' in the same year Mas'ud, 
when he came to Baghdad, revoked the mukus and wrote tablets 
to that effect, which were placed on the gates of the jami*s
2 (1146/7)
and suqs. In 541/the mukus in Baghdad were again abolished
in Baghdad.^
A not unimportant source of revenue was confiscations 
and fines from dismissed officials and others. Tughril Beg 
confiseated in 449 (1057/8) from Taj ud-Din b, Sakhta, the 
*Alid, and from Ibn Simha, the Jew, in Basra, 100,000 and
20,000 dinars respectively.^ Under Alp Arslan there were said 
to have been no confiscations.^ Subsequently this practice 
became common and, as stated in Chapter I., the only source 
of revenue remaining to Mahmud b. Muhammad * s diwan was confis­
cations.^ Muhammad b. Malikshah seized Abu Qasim al-Husain b. 
rAbd al-Wahid, the sahib makhzan, and Abu*l Faraj, son of the 








and finally set them free on condition they gave him some
money.^ Tughril b. Muhammad fined §afi ud-Din, ■ the mustawf1,
200,000 dinars in 526 (11J1/2).2 These examples could be
multiplied (see also p.109).
A further source of revenue was from the buying of offices
and from presents from those who wished to secure or regain
the sultan's favour. The buying of the office of wazir has
already been mentioned (see p. 84). A considerable amount of
money wlso passed in securing provincial governorships (see
also Chapter IV.). It is possible the granting of khil * as
and similar honours were conditional upon the giving of money
to the sultan or his officials. Kamyar, to whom Muhammad b*
•# •
Malikshah handed over Zain ul-Mulk Abu Sa*d al-Qumml, the 
mustawfi, pretended when he got to Rei, Zain ul-Mulk's home, 
that the sultan had given Zain ul-Mulk a khil€ a in return for 
a certain sum of money, and obtained thus much money from al- 
Qummi's people, after which he killed Zain ul-Mulk.^
Tribute was paid to the Great Seljuqs by various rulers 
and vassals, but this can hardly be regarded as a regular 
source of revenue. Various local rulers during the early
1 I.A. 2.330.
2 A.S.D. 102.
* I.A. 2.345- Ifon til-Athxr states that the reason for this_ 
was that Zain ul-Mulk had abused the caliph and the sultan. 
Bundarl gives rather a stifferent account of the death of 
Zain ul-Mulk. He states that a group of amirs and others 
persuaded^the sultan to hand Zain ul-Mulk over to them for
200,000 dinars. TEey then killed him and made the sultan
forget the 200,000 dinars which Ibn ul—ILafi, the deputy 
wazir had misappropriated (p. 96).
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Seljuq period made sundry payments from time to time to the
Seljuqjs. For example, Faramarz, ruler of Isfahan, paid an
indemnity of 100,000 dinars to Tughril Beg (see also Chapter 
1.).^ The Byzantine emperor,Eomanus, agreed after his cap-
•T mm p
ture hy Alp Arslan to send as njizya" 1,000 dinars a day,'
It appears that some kind of annual payment or present was in 
fact made for a time (see p.97). Malikshah ms also reputed 
to have received wjizya” from the Byzantine emperor.^ The 
ruler of Shlrwan agreed during the reign of Malikshah to pay 
an annual tribute to the Great Seljuq state, which was finally 
fixed at 40,000 dinars. This su&,however, was not regularly 
paid.^ Sanjar imposed a tribute of 1,000 dinars a day to be 
paid from the taxes of Ghazna to his treasury, and he establish­
ed in that city an *amil from his dlwan to collect this.^
There were various other minor items of taxation. The 
nomads in some cases were apparently taxed by the central 
government so much per tent.^ The Ghuzz on the borders of 
Khurasan as stated above (see Chapter I,) paid at one time an 





5 R.S. 168; T.Q. 458.
6 A.M. 91.
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probably paid special dues to the diwan. Those who quarried 
millstones in Khullar in Pars paid 700 dinars annually to the 
dlwan.^
The most important charge upon the revenue was the payment
and upkeep of the standing army and the cost of military expe-
2ditions. Secondly there was the upkeep of the royal court, 
and thirdly the expenses of the administration and the payment 
of officials. The latter, however, were largely paid by assign­
ments (see Chapter V.). Lastly, among incidental expenses were 
the giving of alms at Hamadan and other times, gifts and awqaf 
(see above). Alp Arslan gave in alms annually at Hamadan
1,000 dinars in each of the following cities, Balkh, Marv,
Herat and Hlshapur, and 10,000 dinars in his court. ^ Malikshah 
used to give alms to the extent of 10,000 dinars.^  Sanjar was 
liberal in his gifts. On one accasion it is said that on five 
consecutive days he distributed the greater part of the contents 
of his treasury, and gave over 700,000 gold dinars, while the 
value of the horses and garments he bestowed was even greater.5
1 F.N. 146.
2 This involved a considerable expenditure for those at court 
were numerous. Alp Arslan used to have slaughtered every 
day 50 head of sheep and these, with other food, were par-^  
taken of by the amirs and the poor (A.S.D. 54).
5 A.S.D. JO.
4 Bu. 65.
5 ibid. 251; I.K. 1.600-1.
The surplus revenue was paid into the treasury, but, as 
stated above, it is difficult to draw a clear line of demarca­
tion between the sultan’s personal treasury and the state 
treasury, indeed, there probably was no such distinction. 
Generally speaking, the sultans were accompanied wherever they 
went by their treasuries. In addition some of them, notably 
Alp Arslan and Malikshah, had stores of money in different 
strongholds scattered throughout the kingdom. The purpose of 
these were chiefly military. Alp Arslan had such a store in 
the fortress of Glv near Parrahan, so that if he should travel 
from Khurasan to 'Iraq, or vice versa, he could repair from 
there anything of which he was short. On one occasion when 
Alp Arslan reached there on his way to Anatolia, money suffi­
cient for the expenses of the expedition, which was expected 
to be a long one, amounting to 1,000,000 dinars were taken 
from the fortress.1 Malikshah had similar stores. "When he 
reached Nishapur in Rabi' II. 465 (1073)* he took much wealth 
from the fortress of Quhandiz and tried to incline therewith 
the amirs of the 'askar towards him.^ Malikshah, during his 
reign, probably accumulated considerable stores, but these were 
dissipated by the succeeding rulers. Turkan Khatun, when she
N. f.30a,b. Zangl, the atabeg of Maw§il, followed a similar 
practice, having stores in Maw§il, Sinjar and Aleppo, so 
that if trouble broke out in one of these places and he was 
prevented from getting at the treasury there, he would be 
able to obtain money from one of his other stores (A.M. 143)
2 A.S.D. 56.
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went to Isfahan after the proclamation of her son Mahmud as
sultan, distributed the stores ( ), which had been*» /—
accumulated over a long period.’*' Later when Barkyaruq came 
to Isfahan to besiege the city, she emptied the treasury and 
gave the amirs and members of the standing army gold without
p _
stint. Barkyaruq seems frequently to have been in difficul­
ty for money. In 49} (1099/100)* when AbuVl Mahasin became 
wazir to him, no revenue or money remained.^ Further, when 
Barkyaruq reached Baghdad in 494 (1101), he had no funds 
and sent to the caliph for help; after negotiations, the 
latter sent him 50*000 dinars. Muhammad b. Malikshah, 
during his reign appears to have accumulated once more consi­
derable sums. #Imad ud-Dln relates that he found a balance 
sheet (taf§Il) in the hand of his uncle, *Azlz ud-Dln, in 
which the treasury of Muhammad b. Malikshah contained 18,00QP0C 
dinars apart from gold ornaments ( ), precious
jewels and garments embroidered with gold and silver thread 
( 'cs-^ )#5 On his deathbed, Muhammad ordered
200,000 dinars to be dispersed to make his enemies and those 








amir hajib, *Ali Bar, is said to have entered the treasury 
and taken boxes of jewels.'1’
At the beginning of the reign of Mahmud b* Muhammad, his 
followers emptied the treasury he had inherited from his
p
father. During his reign the area under his control was 
greatly diminished and the revenues consequently reduced. 
Bundarl relates how Mahmud b. Muhammad and his officials 
lacked funds even to provide the daily allowance of beer.
They sent out, therefore, to the brewer a number of empty 
boxes from the treasury, so that he should sell them for 
what they would fetch and obtain what he needed with the 
proceeds.^ Mahmud, on another occasion, asked Shapur, who had
been Muhammad b. Malikshah’s khazin, for some perfume made of
/ *  -  -musk and other ingredients ( and Shapur asked a
few days* delay in which to procure it. Mahmud then said,
"Tell the company hOw much perfume there used to be in my
»
father’s treasury. Shapur answered, "In the fortress of 
Isfahan there was nearly 180 ritl of it in gold, silver, 
crystal and china vessels, and we had in the ’field” treasury 
( ^  ) }0 ritl.”^  Mas#ud b, Muhammad’s treasury
was also usually empty. Such revenue as arrived from the
1 B-u. 114.
2 ibid. 112, 141.
2 ibid. 141; I.E. III.337.
4 Bu. 141-2.
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outlying districts he used to distribute in his Audience at
once.'3" Of the later sultans Sanjar was probably the only
one who had a relatively well-filled treasury. Rare and
valuable objects/ necklaces, jewels, pearls, priceless
pendants, purses full of money and garments were collected
in his treasury. His jewels were in sealed drums. When he
needed anything from them, he would take out what he required
2and then reseal the drums. It appears that Sanjar fs 
treasury was kept at Marv.^
1 R.S. 226.
2 Bu. 251-2.
* When he was engaged, with the Qara Khitay in 532 (1137/8) 
the Khwarazmshah, Atslz, captured Marv by assault and 
tbok Sanjar1 s chests of jewels. Subsequently Sanjar inva­




During the aarly period of expansion the Seljuqs drew 
their power from the Turkoman tribes, "but once they had begun 
to meet with success it was not long before they became, from 
having been merely the leaders of a tribal migration, rulers 
of a vast military empire. This transformation involved a 
change in the basis of their power. It was no longer possible 
for them to depend only upon tribal forces. The problem 
facing them was to find some more stable element, whose in­
terest would be bound up with theirs as a dynasty, and which 
would therefore maintain them in power. The way in which the 
Seljuqs attempted to solve this problem was not a new one; 
they sought to maintain their position by mercenary armies 
composed of slaves and freedmen.^ This solution - even if it 
did not prove adequate in the long run - in addition to 
assuring, temporarily at least, the maintainence in power of 
the Seljuqs, was also in addition a solution in part to the
I . H I M  . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . ■  —  I .  I , —  . I I, »        ,     i . . i — . . . .  . . .
^ The standing army of this period is usually termed *askar 
by the muslim historians. The term jund was applied in 
contradistinction to askar to local troops. These were 
probably maintained in the provinces by the sultan but did 
not accompany him on all his expeditions, or were perhaps 
only called up in emergencies. (Cf. the gratuity Nizam ul- 
Mulk gave to the ajnad on the accession of Malikshafi, after 
which they returned to Khurasan, see note 3 P* 145)*
Tribal auxiliaries were also sometimes known as jund. The 
town militia were similarly designated by this term (see 
Chapter VII.).
130
administrative problem, for these slaves and freedmen formed 
a plentiful reserve from which administrative officials could 
be chosen. Lastly, the royal court being essentially military 
in character, it is difficult, except in the case of those 
officials and attendants whose duties brought them into con­
tact with the sultan’s haram, to draw a distinction between
• •  *  r
the members of the standing army and the officials of the
court, which was in all probability largely formed by members
of the standing army.
In breaking away from tribal tradition there was. a danger
that if the rupture with the past were too sudden the result
would be to alienate the tribes, who were still an important
element in the military forces of the sultan. Nizam ul-Mulk. •#
in all probability recognised this danger. In the Siyasat
Nama he states that the Seljuq dynasty was under an obligation
to the Turkomans owing to blood ties and because of the share
of the latter in the foundation of the empire; for this reason
the disorders created by them could not be suppressed by
severe measures. He recommended, therefore, that 1,000 young
Turkomans should be enrolled ixfco the service of the sultan••
and trained as ghulams of the court, and this number was, if 
necessary, to be increased to 5,000 or 10,000.1 If his sug­
gestion was acted upon it will have tended to make the trans­
formation in the basis of the Seljuq power appear less
1 S.N. 94.
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striking, and it seems reasonable to suppose this change was 
in fact relatively gradual.
The distinction between slave (mamluk) and freedman was
not an absolute one, nor was there apparently any difference
in social status. Either could attain to the highest posi­
tions of the state; there are cases of mamluks and freedmen 
marrying into the royal house, such as Arghash the Nizami 
who married the daughter of Yaquti b. Chaghrl Beg,*3- while
the atabeg system is further proof of the fact that there
2was no social stigma attached to the slave or freedman. 
Freedom was either bought by the mamluk, given by the sultan, 
or, as it were, usurped, for when a mamluk attained to a 
powerful position, he became virtually free.
The mamluks were carefully trained to fulfil their 
various functions. Large numbers of boys during their train­
ing were kept in fortresses, such as Shahdiz outside Isfahan? 
Niz am ul-Mulk gives an account of the system of training pre­
vailing under the Samanidsf and it is probable- that the- ^
1 I.A. 1.185.
2
This is interesting in view of the fact that Israeli b* 
Seljuq when sending a message to the members of his family 
to fight for MaJjmud b. Sebuktegln’s kingdom spoke of the 
latter in contempt as the son of a slave (mawla) (R.S.91)*
2 cf. E.S. 156; U.H.S. 84.
4 S.N. 95.
1}2
cLa.y Wit* /*t» pUft+M-e -
-Seljuqp trained thoir slaves "±n a like-manner. The mamluks
did not all remain at court and many of them held provincial
governorships* and generally speaking, only joined the sultan
on military campaigns. As provincial governors, th^y had
often ample opportunity to acquite power, and even to establish
their virtual independence. Only those mamluks who belonged
to the standing army or the royal court will be included in
this chapter. Many of these also attained great influence,
and in some cases succeeded in dominating the sultan. This»•
seems to have occurred on several occasions during the reign
of Sanjar. Bundarl states that the latter used to buy a
ghulam, make him a favourite, and inveBt him with authority;
then, after a brief period, it usually happened that the
ghuljuft .fell from favour and even lost his life.^ " Such was the
fate of the mamluk Sunqur al-Khass. Sanjar at first regarded
him as the apple of his wye, gave him full disposition over
his treasury and seal, and accorded him royal privileges,
ordering his wazir, Zahlr ud-Dln #Abd ul-rAzIz, to pitch a
suradiq for him like his (Sanjar1 s), to buy for him 1,000
to
mamluks to walk at his stirrup, to assign/him a suitable iqta' 
and a treasury like his (Sanjar’s), and to establish for him a 
dlwan with excellent scribes (katibs) and learned deputies 
(na*ibs), so that he should become after two weeks the owner 
of 10,000 horse. Zahlr ud-Din asked a respite of three months
1 Bu. 248.
in which to do this, hut Sanjar only gave him a month and a 
half, and Zahlr ud-Dln in carrying out Sanjarfs command spent
700,000 rukniyya dinars in twenty days apart from what he 
spent in iqta/s, allowances (taqrlrat), governorships (al- 
wilayat), royal paraphernalia and garments. Before two years 
had passed, Sanjar “began to hate Sunqur, who had “become fami­
liar with him and dominated him, and so one day Sanjar sum­
moned his amirs to a private audience “by ones and twos and 
told them to stah Sunqur al-Khass as he entered, and this 
they did."1" Qa*imaz was another mamluk with whom Sanjar “became 
intimate. Rivalry then arose “between Qa^imaz and the wazlfr, 
gadr ud-Dln Muhammad b. Fak.hr ul-Mulk b. Niaam ul-Mulk, which 
ended in Qa*imaz cutting off the head of the wazir, and taking 
it to the sultan. Sanjar became alarmed at his boldness in 
doing this, and told Qumaj, who had the clearest judgment among 
his followers, to go and see what Qa*imaz had done to the 
wazir, and to murder him. Qumaj replied that this would make 
a scandal and that Sanjar, in order to preserve his honour, 
must pretend he had hims&Lf ordered the wazir to be killed. 
Sanjar took his advice and kept the matter secret, and then 
after some time had elapsed ordered Qa^imaz to be killed.^




Jawhar; Sanjar wearied of him also and al-Muqarrab was as­
sassinated by the Batinls with Sanjar1 s acquiescence.^"
Ho such difficulty in controlling the mamluks is apparent 
under the early Great Seljuq sultans. Prom the death of 
Malikshah onwards however, there was a striking increase in 
the power of the mamluks and amirs generally. Bundari men­
tions especially their increasing disobedience after the ac-
2cession of Mahmud b. Muhammad.
The source of supply of mamluks was varied. The majority 
were Turks, who themselves or their forebears had been cap­
tured or bought on the eastern frontiers of the Islamic world. 
The Turkoman tribes, who had migrated westwards with the Sel­
juqs, also, as stated above, provided a recruiting ground, as 
did probably other tribes, such as the Shabankara of Pars.^
A certain number of Armenians and Georgians,4 who had been 
captured on the western frontiers or who were the children of 
such captives, were also enrolled in the royal army. After 
the Turks, however, the most important group was the Dailamtea 
These, in contradistinction to the Turks, who were cavalry,
^ Bu. 250.. Jawhar was the mamluk of Sanjar’s mother, and when 
she died in 5^7 k© was transferred to Sanjar’s service.
2 Bu. 112.
^ cf. S.N. "If there are some Georgians and Shabankara it is 
lawful for such men are good." (p.92). See also below, 
p. 149.
4 Bu. 248.
were chiefly infantry* There were also a number of slave 
markets throughout the empire. A story ±s told of Muhammad b. 
Malikshah, who bought a number of mamluks from some merchants.^ 
The p;pice of a mamluk no doubt varied considerably, Sanjar 
bougjit Sunqur al-Khass for 1,200 rukniyya dinars. He was 
one of Sanjar1 s favourite mamluks (see above), and therefore 
it may perhaps be assumed that this was the. price of a good 
slave.
Nizam ul-Mulk advocated that the army should be a "mixed"••
one, on the grounds that this lessened the danger of embroil-
p _ t 5
ments, revolts and slackness. He proposed 2,000 Khurasanls 
(i.e. Turks) and 2,000 Dailamites should be kept at court,^ 
and that the royal body-guard should be composed of 200 picked 
men - 100 Khurasanls^ and 100 Dailamites.^ In practice al­
though the army was composed of different elements, it seems
I. A.KJ68-9; A.M. 29 • The sum due for these mamluks was to 
be paid by the *amil of Khuzistan. The latter paid part of 
it, but held back the gayment of the rest. The merchants 
complained at the sultans law-court (maj 1 isful-hakam), and 
the sultan hearing their story summoned the amil, ordered 
him to pay the money and punished him.
2 S.N. 92.
' Kh.ura.sanl in the Syrian usage means sappers, but here it pre- 
sumably means Turks, cf. "When Zangi besieged Ruha in 559 
(1144/5) of Khurasan and Aleppo who were familiar
with the technique of sapping, and bold in carrying it out, 
set to work and made saps at a number of places which they 




likely that the Turkish element greatly predominated. In other 
words, assuming that, broadly speaking, the Turks were cavalry 
and the Dailamites infantry, the cavalry predominated over 
the infantry, although in the "ideal” theory of Nizam ul- 
Mulk they were equal in numbers. When Muhammad b. Malikshah, 
for example, was besieged by Baxkyaruq in Isfahan in 495 
(1102), he had 1,100 horse and $00 foot with him, ^  but these 
were of course not necessarily all members of his standing 
army.
The standing army was divided into groups, each with 
their own leader. The sultan’s body-guard, according to 
Nizam ul-Mulk, was formed of groups of fifty men over each 
of which was a naqib The importance of upholding the 
prestige of these army commanders, who were to be the spokes­
men of the troops to the sultan? was moreover stressed by
Niaam ul-Mulk. Thus, whereas in his ’ideal” theory, the 
«•
population, generally speaking, was to have direct access to
^ In all the Latin accounts the Turkish cavalry always appears 
as the most numerous part of any Seljuq force in Syria and 
the neighbourhood. To at least one Latin chronicler (Fulk 
of Chartres), all the Turks were mounted, and in western 
accounts of the First Crusade the infantry is seldom men- 





the ruler, the soldiers were to be denied this privilege.
The commander-in-chief of the army was the sultan. During the
early Seljuq period he led the army in person, and the link
between the army and the sultan was thus a fairly close one.
After the death of Malikshah, however, the sultan less fre-•*
quently led the army himself, and delegated this office more 
and more to others. That this should be so was inevitable in 
the case of the accession of young boys and children, but the 
result was a weakening in the ties between the sultan and his 
army, and a strengthening of the tendency of the soldiers to 
give their loyalty to their own immediate commanders rather 
than to the sultan. Wot only lack of loyalty to the sultan 
but also the personal quarrels of the various leaders tended 
to obstruct military policy. This happened when Mahmud b. 
Muhammad* s army was lead by the isfahsalar *A1I Bar and 
Mangubars on the occasion of Sanjar*s advance on Bei in 522 
(1128).^ Again, when Mas*ud b. Muhammad besieged the assas­
sins in the fortress of Qahira in the province of Qazwln, the
siege was abandoned because the army was slack and quarrel- 
2some, but on this occasion it was not due to the absence 
of the sultan, who was himself leading the army.




person corresponds with an increasing tendency towards dis­
loyalty on the part of the soldiers. Desertions from one 
side to the other become a frequent occurrence. Barkyaruq*s 
*askar with the exception of 200 horse deserted him in 492
(1099), plundered his and his mother, Zubayda Khatun’s tents 
on account of their dislike of her, and joined Muhammad b.
Malikshah, They also demanded the surrender of al-Balasanl, 
whom they suspected of being a Bat ini, in return for which 
they offered to return to Barkyaruq’s obedience*^ (see also 
Chapter IV.). Muhammad b. Mahmud’s army "as was the custom 
of the Turks*1 ware disloyal and dispersed when Sulaimanshah 
rebelled in 548 (1153/4).^ Such example® could be multiplied.
The equipment of the standing army was provided by the 
sultan, or perhaps in part by the soldiers themselves. The 
cavalry were probably under the obligation to provide them­
selves with a horse or two horses. When Alp Arslan went from 
Syria to Azerbaijan to join battle with the Byzantine emperor, 
he had with him 15*000 choice men, all of whom had a spare 
horse.^ The Khurasan army under Sanjar also had elephants.
In 513 (1119/20) when he marched against Maijmud b. Muhammad 
he had eighteen, and Mahmud* s horses took fright at them./*
The principal weapon of both the cavalry and the infantry
I.A. S. 195-7. It was not only the *askar but also the amirs 





was the how and. arrow. Spears, swords and clubs were also
1
used. For protection shields were used and m  some cases
2the horses had some kind of armour. The equipment of the 
sultan’s bodyguard was provided by the sultan. It was kept 
in the royal arsenals and distributed when required.^ Nizam 
ul-Mulk states ’they (the bodyguard) must have good cloths; 
their arms must be held ready and given them ih time of need 
and taken back when no longer required. .Among these arms must 
be twenty gold swordbelts and gold shields, and a hundred and 
seventy silver sword belts and shields, also silver spears 
and khattl spears. Twenty outfits of special weapons set 
with jewels must also be kept ready in the treasury and when­
ever an envoy comes from one of the neighbouring states, 
twenty ghulams dressed in fine clothes must stand around the
4
throne holding these weapons.”
Some kind of siege engine was used. It was probably not 
very effective for besieged towns, if their provisions were 
sufficient, in most cases were able to withstand the efforts 
of the besiegers. It was known as a manjaniq and from it
1 of. Zangl who ordered his a.jnad to ride with a sword at 
their waists and a club under their knees. (I.A. XI.91*)
^ cf. I.A. X.206; Bu . 2J8. The author of the Gesta Francorum 
states that the ghulams and their horses were entirely 
covered with^ armour (Histoire Anonfeme de la premiere 
Croisade, Brehier. Paris 1924, p.112).
^ cf, Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle, p,jJ8.
4 S.N. 85-6.
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were hurled miSSiles, usually stones. Of these there was
sometimes a shortage.^ On occasion, however, man.ianlqs were
used with effect. Zangi, when he attacked Ba*albek in 533
(1139)» is said to have mounted against the city 14 man.ianlqs.
hy which it was bombarded in turn, night and day, until the
inhabitants were on the verge of destruction. This went on
until news arrived that it had surrendered on terms owing to
the greatness of the distress suffered by the inhabitants, the
2blockade and breaching of the wall. Perhaps the deadliest 
siege weapon of the age was the mine. This was employed in 
Syria during the Great Seljuq period, but it does not appear 
that it was used in *Iraq or Persia at this time. An under­
ground tunnel was driven beneath the foundations of a tower or 
part of the city wall, shored up with wood, and then set fire
to.^ Zangl, at the siege of Edessa in 539 (1144/5), having
4successfully mined the walls, took the city by assault. Simi­
larly during the siege of Banyas by Hur ud-Dln b. Zangl in 552 
(1157) a tunnel was driven under a tower in the city wall and 
fire thrown into it, whereupon the tower which had been tinder- 
mined fell down and the troops forced their way in through the 
gaps and entered the city*^ Jawuli Saqawu laid siege to Balis
x cf. Bu. 226. I "
2 Q. 269; Damascus Chronicle, p.255- 
2 cf. Hitti, pp.102-3; Q.279.
4 I.A. XI.65; Q.279.
5 Q. 341.
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in Safar 502 (1108) for five days, and took it after one of 
the towars had "been mined. On this occasion the tower fell 
■upon the sappers and killed many of them. In a description 
of a battle between Alp Arslan and the Byzantines, the former
is stated to have ordered sacks ( <3-^3^' ) ■filled with straw
( ) and earth ( ) tp he piled *up in heaps pn
which stood slingers ( ) throwers of Greek fire
( , missiles, ( arrows and spears
)f* Greek fire was also -used by Muhammad b. 
Mahmud in the siege of Baghdad in 552 (1157/8).^
The sultan’s army in some cases seems to have been accom­
panied by a field hospital. *Imad un-Bln mentions in the
Khar Ida that Abufl Hakam al-Maghrib! was attached as a physi­
cian to the camp hospital which always followed Mahmud b. 
Muhammad’s army, to transport which there were forty camels.
He also states that as-Sadld Abu*l Wafa Yahya b* Sa*id b.
Yahya b. al-Muz&ffar, known as Ibn al-Murakhkhim, afterwards 
chief qadl of Baghdad in the reign of al-Muqtadl, was a 
phlebotomist and a physician attached to the same hospital.^ 
mustawfi *AzIz ud-Dfn Abu Hasr A^mad b. Hamid appointed a 
hospital for the sultan’s army. It was equipped with instru­






orderlies (ghulams) and for its transport were 200 Baotrian 
camels***'
The administration of the army was controlled hy a kind
pof military inspection office, in which were military regis­
ters and through which went all matters relating to military 
pay* In the registers were entered the names not only probably 
of the members of the standing army, but also the names of the 
nlandedn amirs and their troops, together with their equipment, 
pay and iqta's.^ The soldiers of Malikshah’s army were stated 
to have been entered in such military registers ( -vV ^
and there is no reason to suppose this was not also the prac­
tice of other sultans after him.
.Among the various administrative posts filled by mamluhs 
to do with the daily administration of the army or the court, 
was the position of akhur salar or master of the horse, whose 
duties included looking after the royal stables, saddlery and 
(horses1) clothing. The 'amid of Khurasan, Muhammad b.* Mansur 
an-NasavI, who had been qas§ab of the suq al-'askar, was one 
of the boon companions of Tughril Beg!s akhur salar. and when 
the latter died he succeeded him. Subsequently the sultan
1 Bu. 124.
2 of. I.E. 111.296.
' of. the statement that Mur ud-Dln b. Zangl registered the 
names of all tjie a.jnad of every amir in his diwan and their 
arms and animals \ a ) fearing lest the avarice of an 




(Alp Arslan?) entrusted him with the control of the officials 
of the lamps ( &j\*\ ); he then 136081116 a favourite
of Alp Arslan, who entrusted to him the kharaj of Nishapur 
and its environs
The standing army was paid partly in cash and partly hy 
assignments of revenue and land (see Chapter V.,). Nizam ul- 
Mulk stressed the need for holding liquid the wages of those 
doldiers who did not have iqta*s, so that hills to meet their 
demands should not he drawn on the treasury without the know­
ledge of the ruler, and he considered it important that they 
should he given their pay at the right time* He further advo­
cated that the ruler should give the soldiers their wages with
his own hands, to increase thereby their affection and loyalty 
2
towards him. The wages of the body-guard were also to he 
kept ready.^ In practice the soldiers probably received both 
actual cash and drafts on the revenue of different places, 
which were presumably cashed by brokers or others. Bundarl 
states that Nizam ul-Mulk would for example allot to a soldier 
(.iundl) 1,000 dinars annually, half of which would be on a 
town in Asia Minor (Rum) and half upon a place in the most 





used, to be paid immediately without any charge.^" This was, 
however, the pay of local troops and not the standing army.
In actual fact in spite of Nizam ul-Mulkfs advice the pay 
of the army was probably often in arrears. Even during the 
reign of U p  Arslan this seems to have been the case. On one 
occasion when he made an expedition to Asia Minor, when he
reached Rei from Khurasan, the wages and allowances of the
2 —soldiers were overdue. After the death of Malikshah there was
frequently difficulty in actually finding the money with which 
to pay the army. This financial stringency was due partly to 
the practice of assigning large tracts of the country to the 
amirs, and the conwequent decrease in the directly administered 
area, and hence in the revenue.
Also in the period following the death of Malikshah there 
was no doubt a general decline in the revenue of the directly 
administered area owing to the prevailing anarchy. When Bark- 
yaruq was in Baghdad in 494 (1101) he complained to the caliph 
of a shortage of funds, and his wazlr said to the qadl of
7 aiso A.S.D. 6S.
Bu. £5. Houtsma, p.5$/ Thid is probably an error for 100 
dinars. This would then be in keeping by the figures given 
by Ibn Shaddad, who relates that the revenues from the rural 
dependencies of Saruj before the Tatar invasion amounted to
400,000 dirhams and served *for the upkeep% of 3^0 soldiers 
(Cahen: La Djazina au Milieu du ljieme Sieele ... R.E.I. 
1934-* p.112). One dinar at this time was equal to about 15 
dirhams.
The wife of Kogh Basil, the Armenian, who ruled Samos at a, 
Mar*ash, Khishum and Ra*ban, ruled these countries after 
her husband*s heath in 1112; she gathered together a large 
army of horsemen and footmen and each month she gave 12
dinars to (each) horseman and 3 dinars to (each) foot;-
soldier. (Gregory Abu'l Faraj, ed. Budge, p.246).
2 N. f,30a.
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Jabala whose goods he confiscated, "The *askar ask of the
sultan what he has not got, and we desire from you 30j000
. . . . .  -
dinars.w  ^ The increasing insistence of the demands of the 
army from this time onwards is notable. Before this any 
signs of insubordination were papidly checked. For example, 
after Malikshah defeated Qawurd, his army demanded an increase 
of allowances (nanpara), and they gave Nizam ul-Mulk to under­
stand that they would support Qawurd if their demand was not 
acceded to. Nizam ul-Mulk talked the matter over with Malik- 
shah and that night Qawurd was poisoned and his two sons
blinded. This frightened the army and they did not repeat
2
their demand.
In addition to their regular pay the soldiers received 
various additions such as accession gratuities,^ and presents 
on special occasions.^ They also by custom received a share 
of the booty taken in battle or elsewhere. Tughril Beg,after 
defeating the Ghaznavid forces at Nlshapur, shared the plunder 
among his followers, 5 and after he had made Rei his capital he
1 I.A. X.212.
2 H.S. 127; T.G. 44}; R.D. f243a; U.H.S. 60.
' Nizam ul-Mulk added. 700*000 dinars to the pay of the ainad 
on the accession of Malikshah after receiving which they 
returned to Khurasan (I»A. X.52). This reference refers to 
local troops and not to the standing army, but similar 
grants were no doubt made to the standing army also.
4 -After the capture of Bihinzad in 459 Nizam ul-Mulk gave
presents to the soldiers (I.A. X.57).
5 B.788.
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distributed the wealth he found in it among his army."*"
There was a strongly marked tendency shown by the 
standing army and the Turks and Turkomans in general to plun­
der (see also below). On various occasions the sultans attemp­
ted to check this. When Alp Arslan marched on Isfahan on the 
rebellion of Qawurd, he issued most stringent orders to his 
troops against all sorts of looting and violence, in which 
matters he was so earnest that even in the case of the most
favoured of his courtiers and of the dearest of his sons death
pwould have been the inevitable penalty of disobedience.
After San jar and Muhammad b* Malikshah defeated Barkyaruq in 
495 (1100) their *askar sacked Damghan.^ When Muhammad b. 
Malikshah entered Baghdad in 494 (1101) his * askar remained 
behind on the Khurasan Road and laid the country waste.^
When Sanjar took Ghazna in Shawwal $10 (1117) his troops ac­
quired unlimited booty and Sanjar in an attempt to restrain 
them crucified a number of them.^ These examples could be 
multiplied.^
T^.G. 437.





It seems to have been the common practice for the troops to 
oppress the local population^ Nizam ul-Mulk warned Malik­
shah after he had defeated Qawurd"in 455 (IO63) of the evil I 
that would result from this (I.A. X.54). Barkyaruq1 s troops* 
when they reached Baghdad in 494 (1101) oppressed the people 
and took their possessions (amwal) so that the people wjshed 
they would go away (,I.A. X.209). j
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The cost of the annual upkeep of the standing army was no 
doubt considerable, but it is difficult to estimate what the 
actual figure was. When Taj ul-Mulk Abu*l Ghana*im accused 
Nizam ul-Mulk before Malikshah of spending 300,000 dinars 
annually on the £ u q aha and sufis, Nizam ul-Mulk said in 
defence of this that the sultan spent double that amount every 
year on military campaigns.^* Alp Arslan on one of his expe­
ditions to Asia Minor paid 0,000,000 dirams to his army when
2he reached Rei en route for Asia Minor. Sanjar fixed an 
annual charge of 30*000 dinars on AiJsiz the Khwarazmshah, - 
when the latter submitted to him, for the expenses of his 
(Sanjar*s) army, and Atslz paid this as long as he lived.^
We are unfortunately not told what proportion this formed of 
Sanjar1 s military expenditure.
The numerical strength of the royal * askar varied with 
the power of the sultan. The 'askars of Alp Arslan and Malik-
shah were no doubt considerably larger than those of the later 
sultans. The figures which have come down to us must, however 
be accepted with caution: at most they are only approximate, 
and, further, the standing army is not always mentioned sepa­
rately from the sultan’s entire military forces, which in­
cluded the armies of the amirs and tribal auxiliaries, and 





to Alp Arslan had, it seems, 15,000 soldiers attached to him.^ "
As suit an he had a large standing army. According to the
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■  2 
Eahat us-£udur 46,000 horse were always in his service. It
is not certain hy any means however that these were all members
of his standing army proper, since the names of the amirs hot
residing at court were in all probability also included in
the military gegisters.
Nizam ul-Mulk in the Siyasat Niima denounced economies in 
military affairs, whether in the form of reductions in actual 
numbers of the soldiers, in their provisions or their pay, and 
advocated irather that the standing army should be increased.
The fact that he thought it necessary to mention this suggests 
that there was a tendency at the time he wrote to carry out 
economies in military affairs. He clearly realised that the 
Seljuq empire had been won by the sword and could ultimately 
only be held by the sword ajso. 111£" he wrote, "the sultan 
gives 400,000 men salary ) he will of necessity be
master of Khurasan, Transoxania, Kashghnr, Balasaghun, Khwarazm, 
Nimruz, *Iraq,, Pars, Syria, Szerbaijan, Armenia, Antioch and 
Jerusalem. If he had 700,000 horse in place of 400,000 his 
kingdom would be greater, and Sind, India, Turkistan, China 
and Machin would be his, and as far as Abyssinia, Berbery,
1 A.S.D. 47;
U.S. 131. The T.G. puts the number at 47.000 (p.449).
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Asia Minor (Eum), Egypt and the Maghrib would he in his obe­
dience. If the sultan keeps 7 0 , 0 0 0  horse out of 400,000,
530,000 will have their names erased from the dlwan and will 
he added to those who have nothing to hope for from this dynas­
ty. They will abandon all restraint and discipline, make one 
of their number their leader and attack in every direction 
and give so much work to the government that the treasury 
which has been inherited will soon be empty. The kingdom can
I .
be held by men and men by gold*? Nizam ul-Mulk(s advice was
not followed. In 473 (1080/1) Malikshah after reviewing his
army dismissed 7*®00 Armenians. The consequences were as
Nizam ul-Mulk had foreseen. They joined Takash who shortly
2 -afterwards rebelled. Alp Arslan at Manazkird had, according 
to the Eahat u§-Sudur and the Tarikhi Guzlda 12,000 men,-^  
but Bundarl and Eashld ud-Din put thd number at 15*000;^ these, 
however, were only a selected force and therefore not the 
whole of his *askar (see p.l66). At the time of his assassina­
tion 2,000 slaves were present.^ These were perhaps M s  spe­
cial body-guard.
The numbers of the standing armies of the sultans after 
Malikshah, as stated above, probably showed a large decrease in
1 S.H. 144.
 ^Bu. 66.
2 R.S. 119; T.Gt 441.
4 Bu. 37; R.D. f.241a.
5 U.H.S. 52.
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numbers. Generally speaking the standing army numbered not 
more than 10,000 to 15*000 men. Larger figures are prbbably 
exaggerations or perhaps include tribal auxiliaries.^
Tutush, when he defeated Ibrahim b. Quraish in 486 (1095)* 
had 10,000 men while Ibrahim had 50,000 (I.A* X.50), hut when 
he defeated Barkyaruq in 487 (1094) he had 50*000 men, while 
the latter had only 1,000 (I.A. X.159)* Barkyaruq, when he ad­
vanced on Isfahan after Mahmud h. Malikshah had heen put on the 
throne there, had 20,000 horse with him. These were probably 
chiefly the Nizamiyya mamluks who had rescued him from I§fa- 
han (U.H. S. 75-4). Muhammad b. Malikshah, when he defeated 
Barkyaruq in 495 (HOO) had nearly 20,000 men. In_the follow­
ing year when Barkyaruq defeated Muhammad at Hamadan, they had, 
according to one account 5^,000 men and 15*000 men respectively 
(I.A. X.199), and according to another 15*000 and 7*000 (Bu. 
258). Muhammad was then joined by Sanjar, and their joint 
army when*they subsequently came to Hulwan numbered, apart 
from camp followers, 10,000 horse (I,A. X.210). In 495 (H0!/2) 
at Rudrawar both Muhammad and Barkyaruq had 4,000 Turkish 
horse while at Rei in the same year they each had 10,000 (I.A.
X.279)
Turkan Khatun when she died is stated to have had only
10.000 Turkish horse left (I.A. X.I65) This suggests she had 
at one time a larger force. This was hardly a standing army 
in the usual sense, but probably rather a number of ambitious 
amirs whohoped for personal advancement by supporting her 
cause. Qawurd, malik of Kirman, is said to have had in his 
service 5*000 or 6,000 Turkish horse (Muhammad Ibrahim p.2). 
Arslan Arhu’s son came to Barkyaruq after his father’s death 
with 5*000 horse according to one account (A.S.D. 87)* and 
with 15*000 according to . another (Bu.257)* Rudwan had 10,000 
horse with him when he went to Ra§lbln in_4£9 ( HO5/6) (I.A. 
X.279)- Qilij Arslan, when he reached Khabur in 500 (1107) 
had 5*000 men with him, but some of his forces had remained 
with the malik of Rum fighting the Pranks (I.A. X.298). Mah­
mud b. Muhammad, when he left Hamadah in JumadI 1*513 (1119)* 
was at the head of a detachment of 10,000 horse. In the fol­
lowing year when he defeated Mas*ud b. Muhammad and Jayush Beg 
at Asadabad in Rabi* I._he had nearly 15*^00 men (I.A. X.596). 
When he went from Baghdad to Hilla in Shawwal in the same year
1.000 boats ferried his army over the river (I.A. X*598).
M£B*ud b. Muhammad sent 10,000 horse from his * askar to help 
Zangi against the Crusaders in 55f (1159/40) (A.M. 112), from 
which it can be assumed that his askar at that time numbered 
considerably more than 10,000. When Mas ud b. Muhammad came to
(Continued on next page.)
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The royal army was usually accompanied by a host of camp 
followers. These included persons attached to the sug al- 
* askar or military bazaar, the sultan1 s women-folk, his court 
and treasury. When Muhammad b. Mahmud was preparing to leave 
Baghdad which he was besieging in;__552_jll57)^ army mounted
guard over the storehouse (t?khail khana) > sultan* s tent 
(saraparda). baggage (buna), stables((? paygah)J treasury sheds 
(? chub khana) and girls of the palace.^ Barkyaruq, when he 
reached Isfahan in JumadI I. 495 (1102), had over 15*000 horse 
with him and 100,000 camp followers (
(Note continued from previous page.)
Baghdad in 526 (1151/2) he was at the head of 10,000 horse, 
but these were not mainly members of his standing army, 
since he is said to have assembled this force in the country 
of the Turkoman Qafchaq (A.M. 78). When he put Tughril b. 
Muhammad to flight in Rajab in the following year he had
6.000 horse while_the latter had ^,000 (A.S.D. 104; Bu.155)* 
Malikshah b. Mahmud came to Baghdad in 551 (II56) with
2.000 horse (I.A. XI.I36). Sanjar, when he fought the Qara 
Khitay in 5?6 (1141/2), had, according to Bundarl, 70*000 
horse with him (Bu. 254). The fact, however, that Bundari 
states that the Uz Khan was said to have had 700,000 war­
riors on this occasion suggests that his figures are not 
altogether to be trusted.
1 The text has 550. This_is presumably an error for 552. In 
550, according to Bundari, Muhammad b. Mahmud had to give 
up his project of attacking Baghdad because the amirs re­




The movement through the country of such large bodies of 
people clearly required some organisation if commisariat dif­
ficulties were to be overcome. Nizam ul-Mulk recommended that 
fodder and provisions should be kept at every stage through 
whibhthe ruler was likely to pass with his army, so that the 
local population should not suffer hardship through the 
* askar being billeted on them, and the ruler should not be 
hindered from attaining his object through lack of prepara­
tions. To ensure this land was to be acquired in the neigh- 
bourhood and the produce not required by the army was to be 
sold and the proceeds brought to the treasury.^  Under.Malik-
_ . V 1 ':* '/
shah this plan was to some extent followed (see Chapter V.). 
After his death it very probably fell into disuse. In any 
case, whereas Malikshah had carried out expeditions without 
apparently experiencing any grave commisariat difficulties, 
the later sultans encountered such difficulties. Barkyaruq1 s 
forces, after defeating Muhammad b. Malikshah near Hamadan in 
494 (1100/1101) had to disperse owing to the scarcity of pro­
visions, but Barkyaruq was accompanied, on this occasion, not 
only by his standing army, but also by the forces of the 
amirs. In spite of Nizam ul-Mulk’s advice it seems, moreover, 




itself and made little or no return for what it took. Mas'ud 
b. Muhammad when he arrived in Baghdad in Rabi* I. 5jJJ (11J8) 
ordered that no soldier (jundi) should halt at the house of 
any of the people of Baghdad without permission. He made 
this order at the instigation of his wazlr, al-Kamal al- 
Khazin,1 and the fact that such an order was necessary sug­
gests that it was a common practice for the soldiers to he 
billeted on the people. When Mahmud b. Muhammad was in Bagh­
dad some years earlier in 520 (1126), people complained to 
him that some of his * askar alighted at their houses and he
p
(Mahmud) ordered them to be turned out.
The mobility of the * askar was considerable, in spite of 
the large numbers of its camp followers. These on forced 
marches did not invariably accompany the * askar. For instance 
Alp Arslan, when he went to meet the Byzantines at Manazkird, 
sent his baggage and women-folk to Tabriz.^ On another occa­
sion he is said to have marched with 100,000 men from Bala- 
saghun to the Euphrates to relieve al-Qa*im^ who was being 
pressed by the Byzantines, in sixteen days.^ These, of course, 
were probably not all members of his standing army. Malik­




4 - , _
Ibn Isfandiyar, 256. In the Tabaqati Uadiri it is said he
covdred the distance in sixteen or seventeen days with
180,000 horse (T.N. 135).
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Rlshapur in ten days but only 100 horse remained with him.1
The Rahat us-Sudur touches briefly upon military theory, 
hut how far this was carried into practice is uncertain*
There were, according to the author, two main types of battle 
formation: "closed” ( ) and "open" (
the soldiers fought as a body or as individuals). In the 
former case the army was drawn up in three ways: erect (— — r)j ) 
lying on the ground ( ) or in a triangular formation
( ), and in each case the army was composed of a
right wing, left wing, centre and rear-guard ( * )•. ^
The "closed" foimation was used when the army was composed 
entirely of armed cavalry and the battle took place in an 
open plain, so that the army could be drawn up company by 
company ( )> the formation of each company being prefer- .
hbly in the shape of a triangle, the base of which formed the
p
rear. The choice of battlefield was governed by the equip­
ment and composition of the army. If the royal armyvwas 
cavalry and the opposing force infantry, an open plain was 
chosen and the army drawn up in a curved formation ( )
with two companies ( <3^  ) on either side forming a kind
of support ( and infantry ware stationed on either
side to prevent the enemy infantry advancing either when the 
royal army was wheeling ( ), or when the enemy army




and not allowed to scatter. If on the other hand the enemy 
army was predominantly cavalry and the royal army infantry, 
a narrow compact battlefield was chosen. The infantry were 
stationed on the right and left with the cavalry behind them, 
and the ranks were straight. The infantry were not allowed 
to go bdhind the enemy cavalry and another group of infantry 
was stationed behind the cavalry to guard against enemy am­
bushes and to support the right and left wings. When the 
royal army attacked the infantry was moved forward in companies 
( —;r ) and the cavalry carried out flanking movements.
If the battlefield, however, was situated in open country 
( ), the army drew up in a circle ( ) with the
experienced fighters ( ) facing the enemy. In such a
case, the author adds, "victory will be by heavenly chance”.
If the royal army happened to be composed entirely of 
cavalry and the enemy forces of infantry, the army was divided 
into companies (c ) under the leadership of experienced 
warriors ( ). The encampment was pitched far away
from the enemy and night attacks ( ) from the
enemy guarded against. When the royal army engaged the 
enemy, successive attacks were made by different companies so 
that the enemy was given no respite. fl)f, on the other hand, 
both armies were Infantry or both cavalry, the choice of 
battlefield depended upon local conditions. The centre was 
so arranged as to he able to reinforce either flank if
necessary* and groups of warriors were drawn up on the flanks 
ready to fill a "breach wherever it should occur* If in the 
enemy army there was some redoubtable warrior, a group of men 
was specially charged with attacking him and following him 
wherever he went. The ranks on such occasions were curved 
like a strung bow*
If the enemy army had elephants, the royal army would 
use chariots (? - X  ) and fearful instruments to frighten
the elephants and to make them shy. Mbushes were also made 
and small pits dug before the battle so that the elephants, 
smelling fresh earth, would refuse to go on. The elephant- 
drivers were seduced if possible, or attacked and killed, for 
the elephants were no good without drivers. During the 
battle a ceaseless hail of arrows was kept up against the 
elephants, but the army did not directly attack the elephants, 
but attacked to the right and left of them, for when the men 
on their flanks flee, the elephants themselves will not work.^ 
Gdbb describes the tactics of the muslim armies in Syria 
in the following words. ’'The usual mode of attack was to take 
up a position opposite the enemy and to engage first in an 
archery duel. When the enemy showed signs of weakness, the 
cavalry charged with their lances and engaged in hand-to-hand 
fighting with the sword. To charge on an unbroken line seems 
generally to have been avoided, as well as undue precipitancy
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in engaging the enemy. The Arab cavalry maintained their
traditional tactics of advancing and wheeling in simulated *
. . . . . .  . . . . . .
| j  flight before reaching the opposing line, then when the enemy
1 !
S! started in pursuit, wheeling round again at a prearranged 
point and charging upon them ... The infantry played little 
part in the actual battle; the fortunes of the day were deci­
ded by the cavalry charge and the infantry of the defeated 
force were ruthlessly cut down, and taken prisoner by the 
victorious horsemen." Generally speaking it appears that 
similar tactics were also followed by the Great Seljuq armies 
outside Syria. The Turkish cavalry in a like manner would 
pretend to flee, and having lured their opponents to break 
their ranks and to start in pursuit, they would then turn and 
charge.
The Great Seljuq forces, in addition to the standing
also
army which formed the core, included/the private armies of
the "landed" amirs, governors and others, tribal auxiliaries,
and occasionally the forces of Seljuq vassals. All amirs
who had attained to a position of any importance and even
2some "civil" officials had their own "private" armies. The
1 The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 39?40.
2 -Dizam ul-Mulk indeed urged all great men who had large 
salaries to show ostentation in military equipment and im­
plements of war and to buy military slaves (ghulams), 
stating the dignity and honour of an amir in the eyes of 
the ruler and of his own companions would be according to 
the measure in which he carried out this recommendation 
(S.N. 112).
A
wazir, Nizam ul-Mulk, had a considerable force numbexirrgucc&Ed- 
ing to one account 20,000 mamluks.^  The holders of military 
or "administrative" iqta/s, with their contingents, would 
join the sultan on his military campaigns, after which 
would disperse again to their iqta/s. For example, in 495/ 
after Barky aruqi and Muhammad b, Malikshah had made peace, thor
- c 2 t -armies broke up and the amirs went to their iqta s. Mas ud 
b, Muhammad gave permission to the soldiers who were with 
him to return to their domains in Muharram (ll}6) when 
he heard ar-Hashid had left Maw§il, and he (Mas*ud) remained 
with 1,000 horse.^
The private armies of the "landed" amirs were composed 
also of a nucleus of slave troops to which were added in some 
cases the forces of the lesser amirs to whom they had assigned 
part of their iqta/s (see Chapter V.). The mamluks and freed- 
men of "private" armies were sometimes incorporated on the 
death of their master into the royal * askar, forming a divi­
sion known by the name of their late master. The Nizamiyjjta 
mamluks played, for example, an important part in the years 
following the death of Malikshah, still forming a unit al­






They took Barkyaruq out of the prison into which he had "been 
thrown in Isfahan by the orders of Turkan Ehatun, and read the
l
khutba in his name* ffln other cases these private armies
either dispersed on the death of their master or passed on to
his heirs. The amir Ikhur's * askar on his death in 494 (1100/1)
2joined Ayyaz, his adopted son and heir.
The equipment of the private armies, their administration 
and pay were, broadly speaking, similar to those of the royal 
standing army. Nizam ul-Mulk stated that the holders of as­
signments must hold ready the pay of the army^ and in so far 
as the muqta* was under guarantee to provide on demand so many 
soldiers, it was reasonable that the central government should 
make such a demand. In fact it was probably often disregarded, 
Zangi, ruler of Maw§il, had a large number of Khurasanls in his 
service * forming no doubt part of his standing army. They 
were paid a large salary ( ) which an official of
his diwan collected from diverse sources and divided among them 
every three months.^ A story is related that their pay was 
delayed on one occasion, and so Zangi summoned the amir ha jib 
and the officials of the diwan to enquite into this. They were 
reprimanded and dismissed, and paid the salaries out* of their
1 Their support of Barkyaruq was due to their dislike of Taj ul- 
Mulk whom they suspected of being implicated in the murder of 
Nizam ul-Mulk. Taj ul-Mulk being with Turkan Khatun they sup­
ported Barkyqruq in opposition to him. Taj ul-Mulk in 485(1q92 
/3) succeeded in buying over a number of them, but the rest re­
fused to be satisfied and finally killed Taj ul-Mulk(I.A. XL47I
2 I.A. X.205.
2 S.N. 91.
4 A.M. 148; see also P- 135» note 3, above.
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own pockets. Zangi*s army, however, can perhaps hardly he 
counted as a "private1 army since he was to all intents and 
purposes an independent ruler.
The "private" faskars, like the royal army, were mobile 
- perhaps even more so, since they were not accompanied by so 
many camp followers. Buzaba, on hearing Mas*ud b. Muhammad 
was in Hamadan in 542 (1147/8), advanced from Isfahan to at­
tack him, covering a distance of thirty farsakhs, which inclu­
ded mountain passes to Marj Qarategln (? /£• ) in a
2day and a night.
There was a tendency of the "landed" amirs, however, to 
refuse to undertake campaigns at certain times of the year. 
Muhammad b* Mahmud went to Hamadan in the spring of 550 (1155) 
intending to go to Baghdad to besiege it. After going several 
stages, he returned because the amirs and the army refused to 
leave their iqtars because it was harvest time. He then re­
turned to Azerbaijan and after an engagement with his uncle 
Sulaimanshah again meditated an attack on Baghdad. Knowing,
however, that the army would not leave in summer because of 
%
the heat of Baghdad, he made an agreement with them to go in 
the autumn.^ The refusal of the amirs to go to Baghdad in 
summer because of the heat suggests the army, used to condi­





itself to other conditions. Supporting this is the fact that
when Qarasunqur and Da*ud b, Mahmnd set out from Fars for
Hamadan via Khuzistan many men and animals perished owing to
the climate of Khnaistan.^
A not “unimportant element in the royal forces was formed
"by tribal* chiefly Turkoman* auxiliaries. It was important
for the sultan to treat these well* because in addition to 
••
being reinforcements for his own army* they were a potential
addition to the strength of the enemy. They were extremely
mobile and would assemble in a short space of time. Their
guiding motive was plunder, and wherever this was to be found
there also in all'probability were the Turkomans. IlghazI
never waged long campaigns against the Franks; only greed
rallied the Turkomans to his standards. They could be seen
arriving each with a bag which contained flour and strips of
dried mutton. IlghazI was forced to count the hours of a
campaign, and he returned as soon as possible; for it it were
prolonged the Turkomans disbanded. He had no money (with
which he might retain their services). In 5^5 (1119)* after
defeating Hoger of Antioch, Tughtegin and IlghazI missed an
opportunity of taking Antioch owing to the fact that the
Turkomans had hurried ahead to engage the Franks without making 




the troops ( ) in taking possession of the spoils,
"wherewith their hands were filled and their spirits fortified,
111and with whose beauty their hearts were rejoiced. Tribal 
auxiliaries, Arab, Kurd and Turkoman, were also used by the 
amirs and others. The Mazyadids notably relied largely, if 
not entirely, on such forces. Sadaqa, when he heard Muhammad 
b. Malikshah had come to Baghdad in Rabl* II. 5^1 (1107/8), 
assembled, according to the A'fchbar ad-Dawlat as-Saljuqiyya,
scattered bands of Kurds, Turks, Daylamites and Arabs number-
2  ^
ing 20,000 horse, while, according to Ibn ul-Athlr, his forces
on this occasion numbered 20,000 horse and JO,000 foot.^
Dubais b. §adaqa in 512 (1118/9) assembled large numbers of
Kurds and Arabs and dispersed amongst them much money and
weapons.^- The Urtuqids also presumably relied largely upon
the Turkoman tribesmen.
In addition to the "private" armies of the amirs there
were to be found throughout the Great Seljuq empire bodies of
unemployed soldiery, who were ready to join the standard of
any leader in the hope of plunder. The existence of such
bands facilitated the rebellion of discontented princes and
amirs. Barkyaruq in 488 (1095) left Isfahan with a small
^ Q. 201; The Damascus Chronicle, p.l6l.




party of warriors. By the time he had reached Jurbadhaqan 
soldiers had joined him from every quarter and "his forces 
numbered 30*000-^ Karbuqa and AltuntiLqi on "being released
from prison in Aleppo "by Rudwan (in 489 ?) were joined by many
/ 2 —  _
unemployed soldiers ( ^ ^  ). Jawull gaqawu,
after being deserted by many of his followers in Syria in 502 
(H08/9)> was joined by a body of vulunteers ( ).^
The following examples also show the ease with which an army 
could be collected. IlghazI b. Urtuq came to Mardin from 
Aleppo in 513 (1119/10) to collect volunteers ( )
for a raid against the Crusaders, and nearly 20,000 persons 
united with him.4 These were no doubt mostly Turkomans.
Dubais b. §adaqa left Mahmud b. Muhammad in 523 (1129) a*1*! 
advanced on *Iraq. He arrived with 300 horse, but almost im­
mediately 10,000 horse had collected round him.^ These, howevet; 
were very probably Arab tribesmen.
As stated above statements relating to the numerical 
strength of the armies must be accepted with great caution. It 
is clear, however, that after the death of Malikshah the size 
of the "private" armies of the amirs increased relatively to 







towards the end of the Great Seljuq period the armies of the 
individual amirs at times outnumbered the royal army. The 
forces of the amirs were not probably generally speaking sub­
stantially larger than in the earlier period, but the royal 
easkar had by this time greatly decreased in size. It was 
indeed this change in the relative strength of the forces, 
due to a variety of causes, perhaps chief among which was 
financial stringency owing to the alienation of the majority 
of the country from the control of the central government, 
which was one of the most important factors in the downfall 
of the Great Seljuqs. The * askars of the amirs probably did 
not number more than a few thousand men - perhaps at the out­
side five or six thousand men, but on occasion they were able
to muster considerably larger forces, being joined by other
-» * 
amirs or tribal auxiliaries. The 9askar of al-MuqarrAb
Qaslm ud-Dawla Aqsunqur, when marching against Tutush in 
487 (1094) had with him 20,000 men according to some, and
6,000 according to others. Reinforcements_had reached him 
from the_Bani Kilab and a group of the ahdas of Aleppo, Dailam 
and Khurasan (Kamal ud-Din 708); Yusuf b. Abaq, governor of 
Rahba, had also joined him with 25OO horse (Kamal ud-Din 707-8) 
It’may be that the latter figure refers to Qaslm ud-Dawla's 
standing army and the former to all the forces with him, in­
cluding tribal auxiliaries and other reinforcements. Qudan 
and Yariqtash when they rebelled in 490 (1097) kad. with them 
l^, 000 men and the amir Dad who was sent against them by Bark­
yaruq had not the power to oppose them (I.A. Z.182), Some 
three years later in 493 (1099/H00) the amir Dad, when he 
went with Barkyaruq to meet Sanjar, had 20,000 horse (Bu. 238).
When Sanjar marched against Habashi b. Altuntaq (? circa 493 )* 
the latter who had brought most of Khurasan, Tabaristan and 
Jurjan under his control, had 20,000 men with"him and some 
5>000 Batini horse, followers of Isma/ll al-Kalakl, governor 
of Tabas"(Bu. 238). Kandoghdi, when he deserted Sanjar in
u
(Continued on next page.)
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Jawhar, one of Sanjar1 s favourite mamluks, however, is said 
to have exceeded 50,000 men.1 'Abbas, governor of Rei, who
was one of al-Muqarrab's mamluks, was joined by 4,000 of his
_ p
master's mamluks after the letter's death, and when he was
with Mas'ud b. Muhammad in Baghdad in 541 (1146/7)» his 'askar
was more numerous than the sultan's.^ The following also il-. . .
lustrates the decrease in the strength of the sultan's forces 
in relation to the forces of the amirs. Mas'ud b* Muhammad
(Note continued from previous page.)
495 (1101/2) for Qadar Khan, had 6,000 horse with him (I.A. 
X.239). When Jawull gaqawu defeated Jigirmish near Arbll 
in 500 (1106/7) the former had 1,000 horse with him and the 
latter 2,000 (I.A* X.292). The latter had had 3*000 horse 
with him in 497 (1103/4) when he had joined Suqman b* Urtuq 
to fight the Crusaders (i.A. X.256). Jawull gaqawu, when 
he departed from Mawsil in 501 (1107/8) left with his wife 
1500 Turkish horse apart from others and foot soldiers to 
defend the city (I*A. X.32O). Al-Bursuqi's force when he 
met Rubais b. §adaqa in 5^7 (1123/4) numbered 8,000 horse 
and 5,000 foot. The latter, who was defeated, had 10,000 
horse and 12,000 foot (I.A. X.429; A.M. 42), these being 
probably largely tribal auxiliaries. Qarasunqur, when he 
came to Hamadan (circa 5 with the two maliks Seljuq b. 
Muhammad and Da’ud b. Mahmud, had 10,000 soldiers (Bu. 170). 
Jawull,when he halted outside Miyanij to intercept Buaaba^ 
who was coming from Fars to join fAbd ar-Rahman b. Tughra- 
Irak, had a large army including 12,000 men*with armour and 
soldiers from Armenia and Arraniya (Bu. 184). Bursuq b. 
Bursuq, when he joined the caliph in 529 (II34/5)* k&d
7,000 horse and Iqbal al-Murshidl, who remaine^. in 'Iraq 
when the caliph and Bursuq marched against Mas ud b. Muham­
mad, had 3*000 horse (I.A. XI.15). Qumaj, governor of 
Balkh, when he marched against the Ghuzz during the reign 
of Sanjar, had lg,000 horse with him (I.A. XI.116).
^ Bu. 250. This is probably an exaggeration. According to
9 another account he had (only) 2,000 mamluks (D.V, 200).
Bu. 174.
2 I.A. XI. 76.
166
who was in Hamadan in 542 (1147/8) with 3,000 horse was 
joined by Haidar, governor of Zanakar (? Zanjan) with 1,000 
horse, Akaz with 5*000 horse and Khass Beg Balankari with
12,000 horse."*'
The total forces mustered on occasion by the Seljuq 
sultan, composed of his standing army, the "private” armies 
of the amirs, and the armies of his vassals and tribal auxi­
liaries were very considerable. Nevertheless the figures 
here also must be accepted with reservation. Al-QalanisI
states the Islamic army - Turks and tribes - at Manazkird num-
it counted
bered 400,000, and according to Ibn an-Nizam/500,000.^ This 
figure is probably a gross exaggeration because Alp Arslan 
had sent his baggage and women to Tabriz and remained only 
with a selected force.^ The Byzantine emperor, according to
- «r 4 -Bundari,was with 500,000 men. YJhen Alp Arslan crossed the 
Oxus in 465 (1072/5) he is said to have had 100,000 horse 
with him over and above ghulams (ffe.e. members of the standing 
army) and train ( other accouhts put the num~
bers at 200,000 and state it took a month to transport them 
over the Oxus.^ In 526 (1151/2) when Sanjar came to the
1 Q. 294-5.
2 Q. 99-
3 U.H.S. 46. ___
4 Bu. 57.
5 A.S.D. 53.
6 Bu. 44; I.E. III.230.
r  I .
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Jibal he was said to have 100,000 horse.^ When he crossed 
the Oxus in Zu*l Hijja 532 (H39) during a period of six 
months there assembled with him 100,000 horse; he was joined 
on this occasion by the rulers of Sistan, Ghur, Ghazna, and 
the maliks of Khurasan and Mazandaran.^ In Muharram 548 
(1155) when Sanjar was defeated by the Ghuzz, he was said 
again to have had 100,000 horse.^ These figures perhaps 
included large numbers of tribal auxiliaries; they are in 
any case only approximate. When Mahmud b, Muhammad met Sanjar 
in 513 (1119) he had 50>0Q0 men. On that occasion *AlI b, 
Umar, the amir hajib, Mangubars, Ghazghuli, the Banl Bursug, 
Sunqur al-Buhharl and Qaraja as-Saql were with him*^ Mas*ud 
b. Muhammad had nearly 1500 horse with him in Hamadan in 
529 (1134/5) when the caliph marched against him, but after 
having made peace with most of the neighbouring leaders, his 










In the foregoing chapter the composition of the sultan’s 
military forces was "briefly touched, upon, and it was shown that 
the ’’private" armies of the amirs were an important element 
in these. The difference between the amirs and the mamluks 
of the standing army was not in any way an absolute one. By 
origin they were all mamluks or freedmen, and many mamluks 
can be classed better among the amirs than among the members 
of the standing army; similarly it is difficult to draw a line 
of demarcation between the amirs and atabegs. The latter with 
rare exceptions were all amirs, but although the title of 
atabeg once conferred seems to have been retained by the per­
son to Whom it was given, the relationship was not necessarily 
permanent; the same person might technically be an atabeg at 
one period but not at another. The composition of the three 
classes therefore - if they can be termed such - was extremely 
fluid.
It was also indicated in the preceding chapter that 
whereas the size of the sultan’s standing army after the death 
of Malikshah decreased, the military forces of the amirs tend­
ed rather to increase, and that finally the sultans came more 
and more to rely, not so much upon the standing army, as upon 
the forces of the amirs. This change in the relative strength
1*9
of the army of the central government and the armies of the
amirs led to difficulties, for since the ultimate guarantee
for the maintainance of the Great Seljuq empire was military
force, "by alienating this from their direct control and
placing it in the hands of the amirs, the Bultans invited the
latter to assert their independence. One aspect, indeed, of
the internal political history of the Great Seljuq empire
after the death of Malikshah, and more especially from the
reign of Mahmud b. Muhammad onwards, is that of a series of
struggles between the amirs and atabegs to establish their
supremacy over the sultan and to set up virtually independent
governments. Some, such as the Khwarazmshah Atsiz, were
successful. His father, Muhammad b* Anushtegin, was made
governor of Khwarazm by Dad Habashi b, Altuntaq. On Muhammad’s
death, Atsiz was confirmed in the possession of Khwarazm by
Sanjar.1 He was the real founder of the dynasty of the
Khwarazmshahs, and as he was by the end of his life virtually
a vassal of Sanjar he can scarcely be counted aaong the amirs.
Bart’old giv&s an account of his struggles with Sanjar and
2his foundation of an independent kingdom, and it is unneces- 
sary to go into details here. But, apart from the Khwarazm­
shahs who thus broke away from the Great Seljuq. empire,
1 I.A. X.18J.
2 Turkestan, pp.324-31-
Khurasan itself under Sanjar was relatively undisturbed by 
the struggles of the amirs, although various mamluks did 
succeed, if we are to believe Bundarl, in establishing an 
undue influence over Sanjar (see Chapter III. ). This com­
parative absence of difficulty with the amirs was probably 
due partly to the fact that the situation in KhuBasan was not 
complicated, as it was in other provinces, by the existence 
of numerous maliks and atabegs. Further it is possible that 
Sanjar did not, to the same extent as other sultans, assign 
the territory under him to his amirs.
As a class the amirs may be divided into three groups: 
the amirs who were at the sultan’s court, ’landed” amirs, who 
held provincial governorships, and ’’wandering” amirs, who 
owed no permanent allegiance to anyone, but moved about the 
empire serving different leaders, or taking possession of 
districts as opportunity arose. It must not, however, be 
thought that this grouping was a constant one: the amirs at 
court frequently changed, nor is it always easy to distinguish 
between a "landed” amir and a "wandering” amir, particularly 
in cases where an amir usurped control of a district and was 
afterwards given official possession of it by the sultan.
1 Prior to the reign of Sanjar there were instances of rebel­
lion by amirs in Khurasan. In 488 a number of amirs be­
sieged Hishapur unsuccessfully (I.A. X.171) whil.e in 490 
Qudan and Yariqtash tried to seize Khwarazm but failed.
(I.A. X.182).
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Once power had "been put into the hands of the amirs 
they did not hesitate to use it for their own aggrandisement 
or even to turn it against the sultan, only, whereas they 
acted against one another or against outside forces, such 
as the Crusaders, without obtaining first the sanction of the 
sultan, they seldom directly attacked the sultan or openly 
rebelled against him without first obtaining the nominal 
support of some Seljuq prince.^ This was due partly to the 
fact that sovereignty was inherent in the Seljuq family, and 
could therefore only be exercised by an amir on behalf of a 
Seljuq prince. Secondly the amirs as a class had no community
p
of interest. Their intrigues and jealousies prevented, 
apart from irare instances, any large measure of co-operation 
between them, except for a very limited period. The domina­
tion of any single amir was immediately resented by his fel­
lows, and hence it was only through acting on behalf of a 
Seljuq prince that his cause could obtain sufficient prestige 
to obtain the support of other amirs. If the amirs were 
nominally fighting for a Seljuq prince, it was theoretically
1 -rThere are cases of amirs openly rebelling against the sul­
tan without obtaining the nominal support of some Seljuq 
prince first, but these are the exception rather than the 
rule. Unar was induced to do so by Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk b. 
Nizam ul-Mulk, whom Barkyaruq dismissed from the waxirate 
in 488(1095)- Unar accordingly set out from Rei for Isfa­
han, intending to seize the kingdom, but when he reached
Spva he was assassinated by a BatinI (U.S. 144-5).»•
 ^cf. Chapter II. p.100,
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possible for any one of them subsequently to establish domina­
tion over the prince, but if the cause was openly that of an 
amir, the position at once became rather different. It was 
largely this question of prestige which gave importance to 
the political atabegate.'1'
The existence of such a class of amirs, having no com­
munity of interest with each other, nor yet being identified 
either with the interests of the sultan or of the population,
many of whom had considerable military forces which they used
for their own personal advantage, was an important factor in
the chronic condition of insecurity which prevailed at this
time. The extent to which they formed an unstable element did
not become clearly apparent phtil after the death of Halikshah,
although there had been indications of their instability 
2
before this. The greater control maintained over them in
The question of prestige gained by the presence of a Seljuq 
prince is illustrated by the following. When a number of 
amirs advanced on Baghdad in 548 (1153/4) to recover their 
iqta/s which the caliph had seized, they sent to Mas*ud al- 
Bilali, who v/as_at Takrlt^ where were imprisoned the two 
maliks, Malik shah b. Seljuq b* Muhammad b. Mai ikshah and 
Arslanshah b. Tughril b. Muhammad*b. Malitehah, asking him 
to bring out for them Arslanshah so that "the ajnad and 
the Turkomans might be strengthened by his presence" (Bu. 
216).
2
e.g. On the death of Alp Arslan the amirs intrigued with 
Qawurd and successfully urged him to rebel. On two occa­
sions Malikshah seems to have doubted the loyalty of his 
amirs, namely, when he marched against Ibrahim b. Mas*ud 
the Ghaznavid in 482 (1089/90) (I«A. X.lll) aiid when he sent 
to reproach Nizam ul-Mulk in 485 (IO92/3) for seizing the 
shihna of Marv*’(I.A. X.139)*
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the early period was mainly due, firstly, to the greater mili­
tary strength of the standing army under Alp Ar si jinn and Mai ik­
shah relative to the forces of the amirs, and secondly, to the 
prestige the sultan had acquired owing to the succession of 
three apparently great leaders in Tughril Beg, Alp Arslan and 
Malikshah. On the death of the latter there was no one among 
his children who was able to exert a strong hand and prevent 
the anarchy which followed; the success of the different 
claimants to the throne depended largely upon the measure of 
support they received from the amirs, the instability of 
whose allegiance greatly prolonged the struggle.1 The dominant
figures during the period following Malikshah’s death were
-  2nevertheless the Seljuq princes, whereas in the later period, 
after the death of Muhammad b* Malikshah, outside Khurasan, it 
was the atabegs and amirs who played the chief roles. in
i _
One of the reasons which led Barkyaruq to make peace with 
Muhammad b. Malikshah in Rabi* II. 497 (1104) was that 
during their struggles the power of the amirs~had increased, 
and”the sultanate was coveted and under the influence of 
others and the great amirs preferred this state of affairs 
and betrayed him (Barkyaruq) to perpetuate their having 
their own way and to gratifying their arrogance and pre­
sumption” (I.A. X.253).
 ^There is little doubt, however, that those amirs who sup­
ported Turkan Khatun and her infant son Mahmud on the death 
of Malikshah hoped thereby to bring the sultanate under 
their own power. Wien she invited Isma/Il b. YaqutI to 
marry her and to help her in her struggle against Barkyaruq, 
he left her before the marriage took place because of mutual 
fear between him and the amirs (I.A. X.152), who presumably 
saw in him an obstacle to their own domination.
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Muhammad like Malikshah left a number of young sons as his
successors. Disintegration had already begun on the death
of Malikshah and proceeded rapidly during the struggles
between Barkyaruq and Muhammad, The consequence was that
on the death of Muhammad, the disintegrative processes
having already been active for some years - although they
had been to some extent checked during the reign of Muhammad
- the ensuing anarchy was proportionately greater than that
following the death of Malikshah*
Even during the reign of Barkyaruq, however, although as
stated above the dominant figures were the Seljuq princes,
notably Barkyaruq and his brother Muhammad, various amirs did
succed in seizing districts for themselves, as, for example,
Karbuqa. In 489 (IO96) Rugwan had set him and his brother
Altuntaq free from the prison in which they had been confined
after Tutush had captured them. Karbuqa then took Maw§il and
Rahba,*^ and in 490/1 (1097/8) he undertook a campaign against
2
the Crusaders. As governor of Mawgil he was, however, under 
the allegiance of the sultan to a greater extent than subse­
quent governors of that city; in 494 (1100/1) he was sent by 
Barkyaruq to Azerbaijan to join Mawdud b. Isma*Il b. YaqutI?
After conquering most of that province he died at Khuy in 495■ ■ *
■when on his way home.
1 I.A. X.176-7.
2 ibid. 188-90.
2 ibid. 207. 
4 ibid. 235.
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Another example is that of Isma/Il b. Arslanjiq, who Y/as
Barkyaruq’s na*ih in Qumaj’s iqta/ in Basra. When the latter
went to Khurasan as atabeg to Sanjar, Isma/il made himself
independent in Basra. Eventually after varying success in
extending his influence he was turned out by Sa*d Muhammad b.
Mudar b. Muhammad in 495 (1101/2).^
Every amir was potentially if not actually the rival of
his fellow. Generally speaking the rise of any single amir
o
served temporarily to unite the other amirs against him. Any 
attempt by one of their number to bring the sultanate directly 
under his power was immediately opposed. Such was the case
of A^yaz, whom Barkyaruq on his deathbed appointed atabeg
\
to his infant son Malikshah. When Muhammad b, Malikshah fol­
lowed Ayyaz and Malikshah to Baghdad, where Ayyaz had the 
khutba read in the name of his charge, Abu*l Mahasin, Ayyaz!s 
wazlr warned the latter that the amirs, in spite of their pro­
fessed allegiance to him, only refrained from opposing him 
because of their lack of numbers and money. Ayyaz accepted 
his advice and negotiated for peace with Muhammad to whom
1 i.a. x.277-9; 232-4.
p -
The following p e  a few examples. Mahmud b. Muhammad’s 
amirs envied All b. *Unar, the greatest of MaJnmud’s amirs, 
who had formerly been Muhammad b, Malikshah’s hajib, and 
they succeeded in turning Mahmud against him. 4All fled 
to Khuzistan and the BanI Bursuq killed him on Mahmud’s 
orders, in spite of having given him a compact for safety 
(I,A. X.291-2). The amirs in 516 (1122) incited Mahmud to 
kill J^yush Beg, which he did outside Tabriz (Ramadan $16) 
(I.A. X.426).
Similarly Sanjar’s amirs were jealous of one another’s advan­
ces When Atsiz attained to a position of high rank, the 
amirs made trouble between him and Sanjar (T.G. 487).
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the sultanate was handed over.'*'
The following incident also well illustrated the chronic 
condition of instability and distrust prevailing among the 
amirs. In 5O5 (llll) Muhammad b. Malikshah sent an *askar \ 
under Mawdud, governor of Maw§il to Syria to fight the Crusa­
ders, and Tughtegln joined Mawdud at Ma*arrat an-Nu*man. Some 
of the amirs told Tughtegln that intrigues against him were 
afoot, and, fearing he would lose Damascus, he secretly made j 
a truce with the Franks. Subsequently in the same year the 
* askar c dispersed, because Bursuq b* Bursuq had gout, Sukman 
al-QutbT had died and Ahmadll, governor of Maragha, determined 
to return to ask Muhammad b. Malikshah to assign him the pos-
i ^  O
sessions of Suqman b* Urtuq and Tughtegln.
Intrigue was rife throughout the empire, as indicated in 
Chapter II., and the centre of this was the royal court. Those 
amirs who remained at court formed a plentiful reserve of 
rivals to the amirs who were absent, holding provincial gover­
norships. Hence it was necessary for absent amirs to keep on 
gooc^terms with the sultan, for if they failed to do so, they 
soon found their domains had been assigned to some rival. Il­
lustrating this general condition of distrust and intrigue is 
« - ' who ' ' _
the case of Abd ar-Rahman b. Tugh^a,rrak/ when Mas ud b.
Muhammad made him governor of Ganjai- :: and Arran and atabeg;
1 I.A. X.264-5.
2 ibid. 341-2; the Damascus Chronicle 114-117*
to his son Malikshah, asked the sultan to send with him Ilde-*•
giz, Khass Beg and Baha ud-Din Qai§ar because he did not feel 
secure from their enmity if they remained at court while he 
went away.1
It was largely because of this chronic condition of in­
trigue and instability, and the likelihood that their domains 
would be assigned to a rival that the amirs, although they at 
tempted to obtain the substance of independence, nevertheless 
maintained an attitude of nominal submission to the sultan.
Further to retain the goodwill of the latter even the strongest 
amirs took considerable pains, probably spending large sums 
of money to this end; in some cases they had in addition their 
own agents at court to inform them of current developments,
0
and to act as their spokesmen. In $06 (1112/}) Mawdud, gover­
nor of Mawsil, sent his son and wife to the wourt of Muhammad 
b, Malikshah in Isfahan to clear him of accusations which 
jealous enemies had trumped up iagainst him and thereby inspired
-  2the sultan with a certain suspicion of him and aversion to him.
R.S^ 237; U.H.S. 125. When they reached Izerbaijan these 
amirs, whether at Masfud*s orders or not,assassinated *Abd 
ar-Rahman (Bu. 197).
2 The Damascus Chronicle, 132-3. The following story also in­
dicates the prevailing intrigue and corruption. A number of 
the amirs induced Hasir ud-Din al-Muzaffar al-Khwarazml, 
Sanjar*s wazir, to attack al-MuqarraE Jawhar, one of Sanjafs 
great amirs. He caused information to reach the sultan that 
Jawhar had taken money belonging to the djwan. The sultan 
commanded the amirs to investigate this. In the ensuing en­
quiry Jawharts wazir, Siqat ud-Din Abu Ha*far, said his mas­
ter had 2000 ghulams in his service and had to take what he
(Continued on next page.)
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The necessity of retaining the favour of the sultan* felt 
"by the majority of the amirs* is strikingly shown hy the case 
of Tughtegln and of Zangl. i'he former was Duqaq’s atabeg and 
ruler of Damascus* that is to say his domains were outside the 
effective control of the sultan. In $08 (1114/5) ke made a 
pact with Ilghazi and Roger of Antioch to rebel against Muham­
mad b* Malikshah* Shortly afterwards Ilghazi was defeated by 
Qirkhan b. Qaraja* governor of Korns.^  Meanwhile a large army 
was assembled under Bursuq b. Bursuq to fight Ilghazi and 
the Franks. In §09 Bursuq b. Bursuq reached Aleppo* and Ilgha^
zi* Tughtegln and the Franks assembled to oppose hi#, but both
2 ^forces dispersed when winter set in. Tughtegln after this 
took Rafaniyya from the Franks^ and in zu,l' Qa*da he came to 
Baghdad to put matters right with the sultan.^ Al-Qalanisi1 s
(Note continued from previous page.)
needed to provide for them from wherever he could get it 
easiest. Finally the sultan ordered the enquiry to be con­
tinued in his presence. Jawhar was troubled at this and on 
the advice of the hajib* *Ali Khairl, decided to make a 
feast for the sultan* to which *Ali would bring him, and to 
put before the sultan as a present all that his enemies ac­




2 iMd. 359< f  
^ iMd. 3^0.
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account of these events is illuminating. He states, "when the 
report was noised abroad in the districts of ‘Iraq and the 
court of the sultan of the vigour and boldness with which God 
had endowed Zahir ud-Din (Tughtegln) in fighting against the 
abominable Franks, and what he had granted him of victory over 
them and slaughter among them, in the defence of the people of 
Syria and warding off the Franks from them, and of his upright 
government over them, so that men blessed his name in the as­
semblies of the citisens and merchants and spoke of him with 
gratitude in the companies of traders from all parts, a number 
of high officers at the court of the sultan Ghiyath ud-Dunya 
wa*d Din (Muhammad b* Malikshah) became jealous of him and 
sought to disparage and calumniate him, desiring to do him an 
injury, and with the design of thwarting his hopes and under­
mining his position with the sultan. The sultan's confidence 
in him was disturbed, and the fact became known and spread 
abroad in every direction. Zahir ud-Din, being informed of 
this by letters from his friends, who sought his welfare and 
were anxious on his behalf, was filled with disquietude. For 
this reason he set about making preparations to proceed on a 
visit to the court of the caliph al-Mustazhir and the court 
of the sultan Ghiyath ud-Dunya wa*d Din at Baghdad, in order 
to make a formal acknowledgment of their patronage, and to pay 
homage to them and gain their goodwill by hastening to them, 
to lay before them a true account of his situation and to
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remove "by visiting them the impression which had been created 
in men’s minds, ... He was advised to abandon this project 
and warned against it, and efforts were made to make him over­
look the matter, but he paid no heed to this advice and answer­
ed no questions. He prepared for his journey with the utmost 
energy and thoroughness, and made ready various acceptable 
gifts to take with him, auch as crystal vessels, jewelry, 
Egyptian stuffs of various sorts, and swift Arab horses, 
suitable for conciliating these high dignitaries. He set out 
with his domestic officers and a body of his guards on whose 
loyalty he could depend on Sunday, 24th zu4l Qarda of this 
year (5^9# 9^h April, 1116)”  ^ Al-Qalanisi, however, does not 
mention Tughtegln and Ilghazi*s rebellion against Muhammad b, 
Malikshah, which was probably one of the chief reasons for 
Tughtegln* s journey to Baghdad. Al- Qalanisi oontinues that 
**when he (Tughtegln) approached Baghdad and the news of his 
arrival was announced, he was met by a number of the domestic 
officers from the high prophetic household of the caliph and 
from the court of the sultan, together with the officers of 
the state and the notables of the population, who showed him 
the utmost honour and respect. The warmth of his reception 
increased the joy of his friends, and broke the power of his 
detractors and enemies. He made plain the objects for which
he had come, and heard nothing but expressions of apology, of
T---------------------------- :--------------------------------
The Damascus Chronicle, 151^2.
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praise of* his action and of eulogy of his activities, which 
set him at ease and removed his disquietude. When he proposed 
to return to Damascus, end received permission to depart, he 
was honoured "by rich rohes and magnificent gifts, and received 
from the sultan a diploma investing him with the military and 
financial government of Syria, and giving him a free hand in 
disposing of its revenues at his own discretion and choice.**'
So he set out to return to Damascus with all his affairs in 
excellent order, safe and sound both himself and all his com­
pany, and increased in power and honour, and entered it on 12th 
Rabx' I. 510 (25th July, lll6)."2
Zangi is also an interesting case. He had taken posses­
sion of Mawsil in 521 (1127) an<i subsequently established his 
dominion over Nagibin, Sin jar, Khabur, Harran, and Aleppo,^ 
yet in 5^3 (1129) when he heard the sultan Mahmud b. Muhammad 
wished to make Dubais b. Sadaqa governor of Mawgil, he sent
presents, including 100,000 dinars to Mahmud, and went himself
* but the
to his court to deter him from doing so. This is/one of/many 
Q. 192-3j see Chapter V. p.228-9*
p
The Damascus Chronicle,Hi52-3 •
2 I.A. X.454-6. In order to obtain the governorship of Mawsil 
Ibn ul-Athir states he sent a large sum of money to the 
suit anf s treasury (X, 454).
^ Kainal ud-Din: History of Aleppo, p.663.
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intrigue
affected the position of even the strongest amirs and gover­
nors.
Subsequently in 53^ (1143/3) Zangl, -whose position by 
that time was extremely powerful, sent his son Saif ud-Din 
GhazI to be constantly with the sultan Masijd b* Muhammad, 
hoping thereby firstly to keep himself informed of the sultan’s 
plans and attitude towards hi®, and secondly to deter Masrud 
from attacking him. ^
The history of the successive governors of Mawsil shows 
how easy it was for the sultan to assign the territories of 
one amir to another, and how readily the amirs would join in
an attack upon one of their fellows. In 495 (1102) after the
-  -  2death of Karbuqa, Jigirmish became governor of Mawsil. In
Muharram 500 (1106) Muhammad b, Malikshah, displeased with 
his tardiness in paying homage, assigned his domains to 
Jawull Saqawu, who defeated and captured him.^ In the follow­
ing year (501) Mawdud b* Altuntegln, at Muhammad’s suggestion, 
went with a number of other amirs to take Mawsil, which he 






was succeeded on his death in 508 (1114/5) by Qasim ud-Dawla 
Aqsunqur al-Bursuqi, who was also made atabeg to Mas#ud b.
Muhammad, ^ but in the following year Muhammad feaye Mawsil and
2 ■ -  his other possessions to Jayush Beg, who also became atabeg
to Mas*ud.^
This practice of assigning the domains of a troublesome 
or powerful amir to a rival was facilitated-by the presence of 
"wandering” amirs, who had gathered around them bodies of 
unemployed troops, which they were ready to place at the dis­
posal of any leader in the hope of plunder. Hence it was 
usually possible for an amir to assemble a strong force to 
go and attack the amir, who held the territories which had 
been assigned to him. The "wandering" amirs also moved about 
the empire ready to seize any chance of conquering some dis­
trict for themselves. A typical example is^the ispahbad 
gabawu. In 494 (1100/1) he was with Barkyaruq b. Malikshah.^ 
The following year he went with Karbuqa to Azerbaijan. ^  On 
the death of Barkyaruq he played an active part in trying to 
obtain the recognition of Malikshah b* Barkyaruq as sultan, 
and was excepted from the peace made between Ayyaz and Muhammad
1 I.A. X..550-1; Bu. 159.
2 I.A. X.260-1.
2 A.S.D. 96.
4 I.A. X .205; Bn. 258.
5 I.A. X.235.
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Id . Malikshah dm 498 (1104/5.1 After the death of Ayyaz, he
p
joined Rudwan, hut in 5^0 (1106/7) went to Damascus, and was 
assigned the region of Transjordan. On "being driven out "by 
the ©rusadeisj, he returned to Damascus,-^ and in the following 
year he went back to ‘Iraq, and Muhammad b. Malikshah assigned 
him Rahba.4 In 0^2 (1108) he was with Jawuli Saqawu when the 
latter was defeated by Tancred and Rudwan, ^  while in 5^8 (1114/ 
5) he was with al-Bursuqi on his defeat by Da*ud b* Ruqman and
“  -  6  -  -r- -  -Ilghazi. It is possible that Jawuli Saqawu, who became gover­
nor of Mawsil and subsequently governor of Ears and atabeg to 
Chaghrl b. Muhammad, was originally also a "wahdering" amir.
(see p. 196 .) Even in the reign of Malikshah there are indi­
cations of the existence of "wandering" amirs si such as Sautegin. 
In 466 (1073/4) Malikshah assigned him Tirmidh^ and also Arran 
in 477 (1084/5) he was in Wasit and then Baghdad. ^ Subsequent­
ly he joined Isma'Il b. YaqutI in Azerbaijan,^  while in 488
—  — 11(1095) he was in Syria fighting for Rudwan against Duqaq.
1 I.A. X.266.
2 iMd. 271.









At the sultan1 s court there were various groups or
classes, all of whom took part in the current intrigues.
Among these were the sultan and members of the royal family, 
including the sultan’s wives, who played an. important part,'1' 
the bureaucracy represented chiefly by the wazir, and the 
amirs. Up to the death of Nizam ul-Mulk the amirs or the 
military element played a secondary role to the bureaucracy, 
and the wazir1 s influence was greater than that of any of 
the amirs. This was due probably to the skill and tact of 
Nizam ul-Mulk, rather than to any system. After his death
the balance began to be disturbed until finally the amirs and
%
atabegs deprived the "civil" element of all effective power* 
None of the wazlrs or other "civil" officials after Nizam ul- 
Mulk really succeeded in reimposing control over the amirs, 
and those who tried came to an untimely end. Majd ul-Mulk al- 
Balasanl, the mustawfl* s attempt ended in his death, as also 
did that of Mas‘ud b. Muhammad’s wazir, Kama! ud-Din, who 
only gave the amirs grants according to their rank and the
Tughril Beg’s nomination on his deathbed of Sulaiman b.
**Da*ud as his successor was due to the influence of Sulai- 
man^s mother who was with him (I,K«_III.230).
Turk an Khatun’s intrigue against Nizam ul-Mulk because he did 
not support the claim of her son Mahmud to succeed Malik­
shah has alreaity been mentioned (see Chapter II. p. 101-2.) 
Zubaida Khatun, Barkyaruq's daughter, Mas*ud b. Muhammad’s 
wife dominated the latter, and Qarasunqur thought it well 
to be on good terms with her and to earry out her plans 
(Bu. 60).
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numbers of their armies (see below). Shams ud-Din Abu’n 
Najib ad-Darkaz ini, when wazir tp Muhammad h . Mahmud, seems to 
have had some success in his dealings with the amirs, Bundari 
states he induced the amirs to give up something of the terri­
tories they had usurped so that the lands in the sultan's pos- 
session were increased. Other wazlrs on the other hand com­
pletely failed to impose any control over the amirs. Such, 
for instance was Mu1 ayyad ud-Din al-Marzi&an, who "became wazir 
for a short time to Mas‘ud "b. Muhammad in succession to al- 
Burujirdi. He was wazir only in name, the wazlrs of the amirs 
having gained the upper hand over him.^
The amirs were not only quick to oppose the domination of 
one of their own number, but, once they had begun to assert 
themselves, they equally resented the attempt of any member 
of the bureaucracy to establish domination over the sultanate. 
The case of Majd ul-Mulk Abu*! Fadl al-Balasani clearly illus­
trates this tendency and also shows the increasing power and 
arrogance of the amirs with relation not only to the "civil" 
government but also to the sultan. Majd ul-Mulk had seized 
the mustawfi *A1I b. Abl ‘All al-Qummi in 488 (1095) and become 
mustawfl himself, after which he successfully intrigued for 
the appointment of Fakhr ul-Mulk b* Nizam ul-Mulk to the 
wazirate.^ The fact that he succeeded in establishing his
1 R.S. 230; U.H.S, 121.
2 Bu. 225.
2 Bu. 180.
4 I.A. X.179; Bu. 79-
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own nominee us wazir no doubt went far to making his influence 
perdominant. This alone would have been sufficient to awaken 
the hostility of the amirs, but in addition he is said to 
have kept a tight hold on them. In 492 (1098/9) Unar rebelled 
and sent to Barkyaruq offering to return to his obedience on 
condition that al-Balasanl was surrendered to him.'1' Unar was 
meanwhile assassinated. The opposition to al-Balasanl, how­
ever, was not thereby ended. In Shawwal of the same year a 
number of amirs,including Baighu, the akhurbeg and the Ban! 
Bursuq, sent to Barkyaruq demanding the mustawfl should be 
handed over to them on the grounds that he was favourably in­
clined towards the Batinls. The sultan, in spite of al-Bala-
•« ••
sanl’s advice to him to comply with their demands, refused to 
do so, whereupon the rebels entered Barkyaruq* s tent, dragged 
out the mustawfl and killed him. Barkyaruq, angry at this
violation of his honour, fled with ten or fifteen followers
-  -  -  2to Re i and thence to Isfahan and Khuzistan. This incident
was thus apparently due partly to al-Balasanl being suspected
of Bat ini tendencies, but it must be remembered that it was a 
* *
frequent practice to accuse one’s enemy of being a Bat ini.
1 I.A. X.192.
2 R.S. 145-7; T.G. 452; U.H.S. 79; Bu. 80; l.A. X.I96-7.
I.A.’s account differs slightly in so far as_he states 
Barkyaruq finally agreed to surrender al-Balasanl, but 
made the amirs promise to spare his life. “When hhe was 
handed over the standing army killed him before he reached 
the emirs.
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From intriguing against the wazir and other members of the
bureaucracy to the appointment of their own nominees in the
wazirate was but a short step for the amirs. It was an obvious
way for an amir, who was absent in a provincial government,
to control the sultan’s policy and to neutralise counter in-••
trigues. As soon as the prestige of the wazirate decreased,
it was inevitable this development should happen, although
it does not pppear that there are cases of amirs and atabegs
actually appointing their own nominees to the wazirate until
the reign of Mas'ud b. Muhammad. In 533 (1138/9) Qarasunqur,
governor of Arraniyya, sent his wazir al-Burujirdl to the
sultan Mas#ud b, Muhammad on his own behalf and on behalf of
the two maliks, Seljuqshah b. Muhammad and Da*ud b. Mahmud,
and a number of amirs, threatening to rebel if Kamal ud-Din,
the sultan’s wazir, was not either killed or handed over to »•
them. Mas#ud submitted to their demand and handed Kamal ud- 
Din over in Shawwal 5 3 3 Qarasunqur then established his
_ -r - 2own wazir, al-Burujirdi, in the sultan’s wazirate. During
■ - - — — ■ — ........
Bu. 170; I.A. XI.42. Masrud and Kamal ud-Din had plotted to 
kill Qarasunqur, and having failed to bribe al-Burujirdl to 
hand over his master, they sent to Buzaba to come from Fars 
to kill-him. The account of this episode in the R.S. dif­
fers somewhat in detail. According to Rawandl a group of 
amirs wrote to Qarasunqur complaining of Kamal ud-Din. 
Qarasunqur, whom Mas*ud had ordered to go to Fars with 
Seljuqshah to put down Mangubars’ rebellion, sent a message 
to Mas*ud from Marghzari Sag refusing to continue until 
Mas*ud sent him the head and the right hand of Kamal ud- 




his wazirate Mas'ud was, according to Ibn ul-Athir, sultan
.......
only in name. Finally, some time after the death of QarEsun- 
qur, 'Abd ar-Babman b. Tughra/Trak and other amirs persuaded
the sultan Mas#ud to seize al-Burujirdl, which he did, handing—
-  - 2  -  -  him over to the ha jib Tutar. Meanwhile Buzaba had become one
of the most powerful men in the empire and in 540 (1145/6) he 
succeeded in having his own wazir Taj ud-Din Abu’l Fath b # 
Darast appointed to Mas'ud* s wazirate, and during his tenure 
of office the sultan did not oppose him in anything,-^ However 
he only held office for a few months. According to Ibn ul- 
Athlr he was dismissed from Mas'ud’s wazirate because he pre­
ferred Buzaba* s service to the sultan* 3,^ while Bundari states•t
that Mas'ud allowed him to return to Buzaba in the hope that 
he would restrain the latter from rebellion. ^  On the other
1 I.A. XI42.
2 r-R.S. 232. According to Ibn ul-Athir Mas ud seized al-Buru- 
jirdi in 539 (1144/5) handed him over to his successor 
al-Marzban b. 'Ubaidallah b. Nasr al-Isfahan! (XI, 67).
 ^ I.A. XI.69, According to Bundari Buzaba, *Abd ar-Bahman and 
'Abbas appointed Ibn Darast to Mas'ud* s wazirate in*order to 
control through him the sultan*s policy ( p,195)* If* how- 
ever_I.A, is correct in stating Ibn Darast became wazir to 
Mas'ud in 540, this cannot have been the case, for 'Abd ar- 
Rahman did not join.'Abbas and Buzaba until after the death 




hand Eawandl states that Taj ud-Din was dismissed hy Mas'ud
after 'Abbas was "beheaded in 541 (1146/7).*^ If Bundari is
correct din his statement it shows how the relations "between the
sultan on the one hand and the amirs and atabegs on the other
were changing* The amirs, no doubt, still strove to appoint
their own nominees to the sultan1 s wazirate, but the sultan»• •-»
himself also tried to have an agent at the amir1 s court; again 
if Bundari is right in stating Mas'ud b. Muhammad only appointed 
Shams ud-Ein b t an-Najib ad-Dark az Ini his wazir because of his
privileged position with Khas§ Beg in whose employ he had for-
2
merly been, it further shows that the position was rapidly 
being reversed: it was no longer the amirs who sought the 
favour of the sultan, but the sultan who tried to keep in withM •*
the amirs.
THE AT5BEGS. .
The atabegate was a special.Turkoman institution, which 
possibly originated in the social organisation and customs of 
the Turkomans. There is, however, no evidence that it $as in 
use under Tughril Beg or Alp Arslan,-^ and it is difficult to
1 R.S. 2J9.
2 Bu. 199.
 ^Da’ud.1 s appointment of Nizam ul-Mulk to look after Alp Arslan 
to whom he said, "Consider him (Nizam ul-Mulk) as a parent 
and disobey not his counsels,” (I.E. 1.413) can hardly be 
regarded as an atabegate, at least not in the later sense of 
the word. Equally doubtful is the appointment of Nizam Tiil- 
Mulk wazir to Malikshah with the title of liak or ata (D.V. 
156).
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explain why it was in abeyance during this period if it was 
an old Turkoman custom. It was apparently in use under Malik-
shah, since i|li h. Abl * All al-Qummi is mentioned as having
— — 1 — — 2been Barkyaruq’s atabeg, as also was Gumishtegln, the jandar,
Tutush also appointed atabegs to his sons. Budwan and Duqaq.^ 
After the death of Malikshah it became the usual custom for 
the sultan to appoint for each or some of his sons and for the 
younger members of the ruling house an atabeg or "father lord". 
The special feature of the institution was that the atabeg was 
married to the mother of the prince who was entrusted to his
4 -care. The atabegate had two aspects, a social and a political, 
In the first place the atabeg was in charge of the education 
of the prince who was entrusted to him. Such seems to have 
been the object of *AlI b. Abi *Ali al-Qummi* s atabegate to 
Barkyaruq. This case differs from many of the atabegates in
1 Bu. 77.
2 U.H.S. 73; A.S.D.75.
5 I.A. X.168/9-
4 This was_not invariably so. A notable exception is the case 
of_Mas*ud b. Muhammad who had, at different times, various 
atabegs. Al-Bursuql became his atabeg on the death of Mu­
hammad b, Malikshah (Bu* 159)» hut Mas*ud* s mother was mar­
ried by Mahmud b. Muhammad to Mangubars (I,A. X.J80; Bu.159) 
who had seized her on the death of Muhammad before the expi­
ration of her *idda (I*A. X*291) amL it was apparently not 
till 51§ (1122/3), when al^Bursuql was reappointed atabeg 
to Mas'ud, that he married the latter* s mother (A.M,4£>).
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so far as Barky aruq was not made a provincial governor during
the reign of Malikhhah. The appointment "by Barkyaruq on his
deathbed of -Ayyaz as atabeg to his infant son Malikshah1 seems
also to have been predominantly a social atabegate.
Further since in the Seljuq theory of administration there
was a marked tendency to give the provincial governments to
also
members of the ruling house (see/Chapter V.), in cases where 
the prince to whom a province was assigned was a child or a 
young man the atabeg attached to him was responsible for the 
government of the province during the minority of the prince. 
Hence the atabeg was in effect a provincial governor, and the 
only difference in status between him and the provincial gover­
nor was that his authority, by virtue of his paternal relation­
ship to the Seljuq prince, was greatly enhanced. Since the 
atabeg was to all intents and purposes a provincial governor it
is natural that we find the atabegs were almost without excep-
p —tion Turkish amirs. Secondly the atabegate had a political
function, one of its objects being to control the prince and
to prevent his rebellion in the province assigned to him.
Such was probably the dominant reason governing the appointment
1 I.A. X.260-1.
‘All b. Abi ‘All al-Qnmmi who has been mentioned above was 
an exception, he being a member of the bureaucracy. Many 
of the atabegs have been mentioned in the preceding pages, 
in connection with actions or events which have no special 
bearing upon the atabegate, but were typical of the amirs 
as a class.
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by Barkyaruq of atabegs for his brothers, Muhammad and Sanjar.
In 486 (1093) k0 assigned Ganja and its governorships to the
former and appointed Qutlughtegin atabeg to him. In this
case the atabegate did not achieve its purpose, for Muhammad,
when he felt himself strong enough., killed his atabeg and
took possession of Arran.'1' Similarly Barkyaruq appointed
Qumaj atabeg to San jar when he sent him to Khurasan in 49 0
.. — 2(1097) to put down the rebellion of Arslan Arghu. Mahmud b. 
Muhammad in appointing Kundoghdi atabeg to his brother Tughril 
in 513 (1119/20)2 and al-Bursuqi atabeg to his brother Mas'ud 
in 516 (1122/3)^ probably had a similar end in view. This 
seems all the more likely in the latter case, in view of the 
fact that al-Bursuqi had played an important part in the 
reconciliation between Mahmud and Mas ud.^ In the case of 
Tughril and Kundoghdi, Mahmud did not achieve his object, for 
although Kundoghdi had instructions to bring Tughril to 
Mahmud, he instead induced him to rebel.?
y
This was not the only aspect of the political atabegate. 
It was also used to retain tha nominal allegiance of powerful 
amirs, and it was this aspect, which, in due course, over­







rebellions amir atabeg to a prince, the sultan retained his 
nominal allegiance, and such conquests as he made were nominal­
ly under the sultan’s ultimate sovereignty, whereas if the* M
amir was not made an official atabeg it was more than likely 
that he would rebel against the sultan in the name of some 
minor member of the ruling house. As this aspect became more 
and more marked, the atabeg was often made the nominal as 
well as the actual governor of the province, and the Seljuq 
prince was sent with him merely as a matter of form.^ With 
the decline of Seljuq power, it was moreover inevitable that 
in due course the atabegs should substitute their own dynasties 
for those of their proteges. Thus the political atabegate 
became a potent factor in the disintegration of the Great 
Seljuq empire, which tended to break up into geographical 
units, virtually independent, yet maintaining nominal submis­
sion to the Great Seljuq sultan.
On the one hand the sultan hoped to retain the allegiance 
of powerful amirs through the atabegate, while on the other 
hand the amirs saw in the atabegate a means to establish their 
own virtual independence. As stated above sovereignty was in­
herent in the Seljuq family, and hence it was important for an
T “--------------------------------------- - --------------- - -
Fars in 50 2 (1108/9) s^is assigned to Jawull Saqawu and not to 
his ward, Chaghrl b. Muhammad (I.A. X.J61-2). Similarly al- 
Bursuql was made governor of Mawsil in $18 (1124/5)
Mahmud b* Muhammad’s son (I.A. xT439)-
2 Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusaders, pjk2j-4. The 
atabegates of Syria are. not included except incidently in 
this study.
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amir who desired to establish his virtual independence, to 
secure the person of a Seljuq prince in whose name he could 
aeti* The atabegate provided him with a ready means of doing so 
Illustrating this tendency of the amirs to regard the atabe­
gate as a road to power is the admission of the atabeg 
Qaraja as*-Saqi to Sanjar, 7/hen the latter captured him in 526 
(1151/2), that he had hoped to kill him (Sanjar) and set up 
as sultan a prince whom he could dominate.^ This was indeed 
probably the hope of many amirs. In view, however, of the 
mutual jealousy of the amirs it was easier for them to estab­
lish virtually independent kingdoms under the guise of ata- 
begates in outlying provinces, than to dominate the sultanate
itself. Any attempt to do so was, as stated above, immediate­
ly opposed, as happened in the case of Ayyaz and Malikshah b. 
Barkyaruq. These conditions favoured therefore the growth of 
independent or virtually independent dynasties in different 
provinces, such as the atabegates of Pars, Mawsil, Azerbaijan
The political atabegate in its second aspect as outlined 
above became a dominant feature of Seljuq organisation from 
the reign of Muhammad b # Malikshah onwards. The career of 
Jawuli Saqawu is interesting and illustrates well the rela­
tions of the sultan and the amirs, and shows on the one hand••
the weakness of the former and on the other the uncertainty of 
the position of the latter. JawuGL Saqawu first becomes
1 I.A. X.477.
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prominent when he established himself in the district between
Pars and Khuzistan. Muhammad b. Malikshah after his accession
Teaming Jawull, sent Mawdud b. Altuntegln to besiege him there
*
and after seven months Jawull finally submitted and came to 
Isfahan to pay homage to Muhammad. In ^00 (1106) the latter 
assigned to him Mawsil and the other districts which were in 
the possession of Jigirmish. ’ Jawull set out for Mawgil, took 
Bawazij and captured Jigirmish near Arbll. The people of 
Mawgil thereupon elected Zangl b. Jigirmish governor in his 
fathers stead and wrote to Sadaqa, ftilij Arslan and al-Bur- 
suql, who was shihna of Baghdad at that time, for help. Jawu­
ll meanwhile besieged Mawsil, but departed to Sinjar on the 
approach of Qilij Arslan. There he was joined by IlghazT 
b. Urtuq and a number of Jigirmish's followers.'*' Subsequently 
he united with Rudwan and took Rahba. He then defeated Qilij 
Arslan on the Khabur, and went to Mawsil, the gates of which 
were thrown open to him. Pinally he besieged Habashi b. 
Jigirmish in Jazlra b. *Umar, and the latter eventually sur-
p
rendered. Having established himself in Mawgil, Jawull 
Saqawu withdrew his allegiance from Muhammad b. Malikshah.
When the latter made preparations to march against §adaqa in 




offer of support to gadaqa, and when Jawull refused to send
any troops to help Muhammad in this campaign, the latter
proposed the spoliation of Jawull*s domains to the Ban! Bursuq,
Sukman al-Qutbi, Mawdud b. Altuntegin, Aqsunqur al-Bnrsuqi,
Nasr b* Muhalhil b. Abl Shawk, and Abu*l Haija. Jawull
thereupon prepared Mawsil for siege, and leaving his wife to
1
defend the city went to collect.reinforcements. He went to 
Naslbin, and was joined by Ilghazi, albeit somewhat unwillingly; 
and subsequently by Abu*n Najrn and Abu Kamil Man§ur, the sons
of Sadaqa. He agreed to go to Hilla with them, and they deci-
_  2
ded to make BektSsbb b, Tutush b. Alp Arslpn their spokesman,
presumably hoping thereby to strengthen their prestige. Mean­
while the i§pah&bad gabawu reached them and advised Jawull to 
go to Syria, firstly because the Franks had made many conquests 
there, and secondly because the sultan was In or near'Iraq, 
and JawifLi's expansion eastwards would therefore meet with 
opposition. Accordingly Jawuli made an alliance with Baldwin 
of Edessa and Joe el in, and went to Syria, but was ultimately 
defeated by Tancred in gafar ^02 (1108). Meanwhile Muhammad
b. Malikshah desired to win over Jawull and he sent Husain b.
%
Qutlughtegin to him as a mediator. Jawull agreed to submit if
Z1 I.A. X.319-20.
2 ibid. 323-4. In the text is Bektash b. Takash, but this is 
presumably an error for Tutush, cf. The Damascus Chronicle 
77-79 (where Irtash 5 Bigktasn),
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the siege of Mawsil was raised, and offered to send his son 
as a hostage to the sultan's court, Mawdud, who was besieging 
Mawsil, however, refused to send the aimy away, and before long 
Mawsil fell. Jawull then, realising he could hope for no suc­
cess either in Syria or al-JazIra, decided his only chance of 
re-establishing his position was to go to the sultan Muhammad
b, Malikshah, trusting that Husain b. Qutlughtegin would put 
in a good word for him. Accordingly he went to Isfahan, sur­
rendered Bektash b. Tutush to Muhammad and made his peace with
the sultan,^ who sent him to Fars in 502 (1108/9) as atabefe
—  ^
to his two-year-old son, Chaghri.
Muhammad’s lenience towards Jawull is strange on this 
latter occasion. Formerly when he had assigned him Mawsil, 
he no doubt hopddtto rid himself, temporarily at least, of 
trouble both from Jigimish and Jawull by pitting them against 
each other. His subsequent assignment of Fars to Jawull can­
not be so easily explained, for at th&t time Jawull had failed 
to establish himself anywhere, nor was his past record such 
as to give rise to expectations of loyalty. It may have been 
that since Jawull was married to a daughter of Bursuq, Muhammad 
did not wish to run the risk of offending Bursuq by killing
1 I.A. 2.321-7.
 ^ibid.. 361-2. He eventually died in Fars in 510 (1H6/7)
while preparing for an expedition agginst Firman, after 
having suffered a defeat by the Kirman *askar.(l.A. X.365).
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Jawull, but that Jawull alive was a potential danger and hence 
safer in Fars as an atabeg. Moreover Fars at the time was in 
a state of disorder and not effectively under the control of 
the sultan, and it was possible Jawull would succeed in sub-
m-m
duing the tribes and if not would at least be kept occupied 
by them.’1' On the other hand it was apparently Qutlughtegln 
and not Bursuq who interceded with the sultan for Jawull; the 
BanI Bursuq moreover had joined Mawdud in his attack on Maw­
sil.
In 504 (1110/1) Muhammad b. Malikshah assigned Ava, Sava
and Zanjan to his son Tughril (b. 503) a&d appointed Shirglr
-  2 -  atabeg to him. This also was presumably a political atafeeg-
ate. Shirglr*s career sheds some light on the relationship
of the atabeg and his charge. On the death of Muhammad b.
Malikshah, Kundoghdi, who was appointed atabeg to Tughril by
Mahmud b. Muhammad, seized Shirglr. Sanjair subsequently
freed him and he returned to his iqta** in Abhar and Zanjan.
Then in 515/6 (1121/2) he joined Tughril and Aqsunqur Abmadlll
in revolt in Azerbaijan, but in $16 peace was made with Mahmuc?.
 ^Jawull did in fact subdue many of the local leaders of Fars 
. (I.A. X.365).
2 I.A. X.384.
' it)id. 421-2. There is some conflict in the sources about 
these events. Bundari on the one hand states ad-DarkazIni 
recalled[Shirgir from the siege of Alamut on the death of 
Muhammad b. Malikshah and imprisoned him together with his 
son (p.133), while according to the A.S.D., Shirglr was dis­
missed from Tughrilfs atabegate by Sanjar in 521 (1127) and 
succeeded by”Qarasunqur (p.98).
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TOien he and his son were eventually killed in Jumadl II. 525
(1131) hy the wazir Abu*l Qasim ad-Darkazinl, Tughril resented
_ 1
this, being apparently attached to his late atabeg.
The atabegate of Aqsunqur al-Bursuql over Mas'ud b* Muham­
mad in 508 (1114/5) also predominantly a political one,
Al-Bursuql when he was appointed atabeg was made governor of
2
Mawsil at the same time, and since it was likely that he 
would follow in the footsteps of former governors of Mawsil 
and establish his virtual independence, the sultan perhaps 
made him an atabeg in the hope of retaining his nominal alle­
giance. There may also have been a secondary motive in this 
atabegate, namely, that since al-Bursuql was ordered to fight 
the Franks, Mas ud was sent with him in order that he should 
acquire increased prestige and so be enabled to unite the 
local leaders against the Crusaders.^ Al-Bursuql was deprived 
of the governorship of Maw§il in 509 (1115/6); after a varied 
career^hiawsil was again assigned to him in 515 (1121/2), and
1 Bu. 143; I-A. X.471.
2 I.A. X.350-1.
* Mawdud b. Altun^egin may have been made atabeg to Mas‘ud in 
505 (1111/2) partly for a similar reason (Bu7 158; I.K. III.
355).
^ In 512 (1118/9) al-Bursuqi was appointed shihna of Baghdad 
by Mahmud b. Muhammad. Mangubars was also appointed to this 
office, and succeeded in supplanting al-Bursuql. Peace was 
made_between them, largely because Mangubars was married to 
Mas*udfs mother, and al-Bursuql then went to Azerbaijan with 
Mas ud b. Muhammad (I.A. X.374; 378; 38O-I). TEence they 
joined Sanjar in 51^.(1119/20). (I.A. X.388). Subsequently 
al-Bursuql left Mas ud, because Jkibais b. gadaqa was intri­
guing against him, and joined Mahmud b. Muhammad, in whose 
service he gained pre-eminence (I.A. X.395).
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in the following year he was made shihna of Baghdad and re-
-  1appointed at ah eg to Mas ud, who had in the meantime heen
_  q
entrusted to the care of Jayush Beg. In 518 (1124/5) w&s 
dismissed from the office of shihna at the caliph’s request 
and returned to Mawsil as atabeg to one of Mahmud b. Muhammad’s 
sons with orders to make a jihad on the Franks.^
By the time of Zangi the political atabegate was beginning 
to take on a slightly different aspect. The tendency of the 
sultan to make an amir atabeg in order to retain his nominal
allegiance was receding into the background, and was becoming 
overshadowed by the tendency of the amjrs to take forcible 
possession of some prince - the sultan*s acquiescence being 
probably largely nominal - in order to increase their prestige. 
Zangi is a case in point. He had made himself master of Mawsil
1 I.A. X.424.JB.
2 Bu. 121.
 ^He accordingly returned to Mawsil and set -out for Syria 
where he captured Aleppo (I.a ! X.439-40). In 5^9 (1125/6) 
he made another expedition to Syria (I.A. X.443)* and on 
his return in 520 (1126) he was assassinated by a Batini 
(I.A. X.446). Al-Bursuql died before he had fully consoli­
dated his power in Mawgil, but by his efforts laid the 
foundations of a separate kingdom of Mawgil before whrch 
Frankish Syria was one day to perish (cf. Grousset I.6J1). 
He was succeeded by his son Izz ud-Dln (I.A. X.453)* "tint 
it remained for *Imad ud-Din Zahgl to establish after the 
death of *Izz ud-Din in 521 (1127) (I.A. X.453-5) & here­
ditary dynasty in Mawsil, which was to reign for over a 
cdntury.
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after the death of *Izz ud-Din b. al-Bursuql.^- At the some
period, two Seljuq princes came under his care. One Zangi
b
is said by Bundarl to have/captured from Dubais, to whom the
P
prince had been entrusted. If thiswa® so, Zangi may well 
have kept possession of him in order that Dubais should not be 
tempted to use the prince’s name to extend his territories, 
perhaps at the expense of his own (Zangi1 s).^ However that 
may be, according to Ibn ul-Athir, Zangi pretended to hold 
the country in his possession on behalf of the malik Alp 
Arslan b. Mahmud, who was known as al-Khaf aji, and that when 
he sent envoys or answered letters he did so in the name of 
al-Khafaji, awaiting the day when Mas*ud b. Muhammad should 
die to assemble an army and to seek the sultanate in al-Ehafa- 
jl’s name. As it happened Zangi died before being able to
*Imad ud-Din Zangi was originally in the service of al-Bur­
suql. In 516 (1122/3) he was sent to Basra and distin­
guished himself there in fighting the Arabs (I.A. X.439)*
He left Bagra t3> seek his fortune in the service of the 
sultan Mahmud b. Muhammad (A.M. 51)* 0n the death of *Izz 
ud-Km b. *al-Bursuqi, the mamluk_ Jawull, Nasir ud-Din iJuqur, 
Z ahgl’s na* ib in Mawgil and the qadi Bah a ud-Din ash- Shah- 
razuri successfully intrigued for’tlie appointment of Zangi 
as governor of Mawgil, which city Zangi entered in Ramadan 
521 (1127) (I.A. X.454).
2 Bu. 187. There is no reference to Dubais having_been made 
an atabeg. This prince was probably one of Mahmud b. Muham­
mad’s sons whom Dubais seized in 523 (1129) when Mahmud fell 
ill, and took with him to Hill a (I.A. X.46l).
^ There is some confusion over the names of these two maliks 




put M s  plans into action.1 That an amir of the power of 
Zangi, who was in effect a local ruler and not merely an amir, 
should he found pursuing such a policy is striking evidence of 
the uncertainty of the position of the amirs, and their need 
of a Seljuq prince to reinforce their prestige. Once, however, 
that an atabeg had firmly established his power, the dependent 
prince was allowed to fall into obscurity and the atabeg was 
able to transmit his province to his descendants as a practical­
ly independent ruler.
Mangubars also illustrates the tendency of the amirs to 
demand or even force the sultan to entrust to them a Seljuq
prince. He made himself master of Fars in succession to Qaraja
as-Saql, Seljuqshah b. Muhammad’s atabeg, whom Sanjar had
filled in 526 (1132),^ and then wrote to Tughril b. Muhammad
demanding he should send his son Alp Arslan to him, in wMch
case he (Mangubars) would recognise Tughril as sultan. Tughril»« »« •«
in due course sent Alp Arslan to him.^
From the reign of Masfud b. Muhammad onwards Azerbaijan 
and Fars were the scene of various attempts by atabegs to es.~ 
tablish their independence. The atabeg, Qarasunqur, governor 
of Arraniyya was not content with establishing himself in a
1 A.M. 126-7.
2 I.A. X.477-
' Bu. 148-9- According to_the A.S.D., Tughril made Mangubars 
governor of Fars and atabeg to Alp Arslan in 526 (p. 101).
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predominant position in Azerbaijan, but also tried to set up 
his own nominee in the person of Seljuqshah in Fprs. This 
attempt, howeveafc, was perhaps in answer to Mas*ud b. Muhammad 
and Kama! ud-Din’s intrigues against him (see above, p.188).'1’
In fact he did not succeed, for although he took possession of 
Fars without opposition and handed it over to Seljuqshah, when
he returned to Azerbaijan Buz aba captured Seljuqshah and recon-
2quered Fars.
Buzaba meanwhile in Fars had two maliks with him, Muhammad 
and Malikshah sons of Mas*ud, while fAbbas, governor of Rei, 
had with him Sulaiman b. Muhammad. These two amirs.perhaps 
realising that they could not attain to any considerable suc­
cess as rivals, and in view also of the opposition they would 
almost certainly encounter from other amirs,such as Jawull, 
who had succeeded Qarasunqur in Azerbaijan on his death in 
539 (1144/5)*^ should they attempt to establish their dominion,
1 According to I.A., Qarasunqur set out_for Fars in 535 (113^/9- 
to seek vengeance for his son whom Buzaba had killed in 
battle in 532 (XI.46).
 ^Bu. 172J I^A. XI.46. Buzaba who had been Mangubars’ na*ib 
in Khuzistan had taken possession of Fars on,the death of 
Mangubars (I.A. XI.39^40). According to the R.S., Mas^ud 
gave Fars to Muhammad b. Mahmud after the death of Qaraja 
and the devastation of Fars* married him to his daughter 
Gawhar Ehatun, who_had formerly been married to Da/ud, and 
put the atabeg Buzaba in charge of his affairs (R.S. 237;
T.G. 4677:
 ^Bu. 1£4; I.A. XI.52. According to the U.H.S., Sanjar, think­
ing _Abbas was becoming too independent, had meanwhile sent 
Mas*ud b. Muhammad to Rei to take him, but * Abbas had won 
. over Mas#ud who then went away (p. 122).
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•united together in secret opposition to the sultan, joining
• • 1  t 1
each other at Hamadan. Mas ud h. Muhammad, when he realised 
their intentions, wrote to Jawull and Ildegiz who were in
Azerbaijan for help. In the ensuing struggles the rebels were 
defeated, but with the death of Jawull in JumadI I. 541 (1146)
1 I.A. XI.68-9.
2 _ g
T/hen Jawull delayed in answering Mas ud fs call for help be­
cause he feared the sultan on account of_his seizuro of the 
yazlr al-Burujirdl, Mas*ud went to Baghdad. Buzaba and 
Abbas when they reached Hamadan were joined by various amirs 
and they wrote to Jawull offering him allegiance. He col­
lected an army and set out for Hamadan accompanied by Da*ud 
b. Mahmud and his atabeg Ayyaz and Shir in Aqsunqur (Bu. 180-1) 
It is*not clear what he actually intended to do when he set 
out, but when he found the road to Hamadan blocked by snow, 
he sent by pigeon post to Mas#ud in Baghdad asking him to 
join him. The sultan accordingly set out for Maragha, and 
joined Jawull. Subsequently they advanced against the rebela 
When the Ijwo armies approached Sulaiman fled one night to_ 
Eei, and Abbas when he learnt of this followed him. Buza­
ba became alarmed also, and_set out for Isfahan with the 
maliks Muhammad and Malikshah^on the following day. Sulai­
man subsequently came to Mas*ud and paid, him homage but he 
was nevertheless imprisoned, for the amirs said to Mas ud 
that as long as he was at liberty there was no guarantee 
he would not be seduced by ^thers and made to rebel.
Abbas also returned to Mas ud. Jawull meanwhile, who went 
in pursuit of Buzaba, sent to_him and made an alliance with 
him, because he felt the sultan, in view of his treatment 
of Sulaimanshah, could not be trusted to keep his pacts. 
Having done so he returned to the sultan. On his return 
Mas ud promised to make him atabeg to“his son Malikshah, 
who was brought out from the fortress of BarjIn and entrus­
ted to him (R.S. 234-6). Meanwhile tension arose between 
JawulE and the sultan. The former accordingly sent to 
Buzaba for help. Abd ar-Rahman b. Tughra^irak, however, 
blocked the road and prevented Buzaba joining Jawull, who 
was in Miyanej. The latter then retired to Zanjan where he 
died in JumadI 1.541 (1146). (Bu. 184-5).
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the balance temporarily established was disturbed. The alliance 
between 'Abbas and Buzaba was replaced by an alliance between 
'Abd ar-Rahman Tughra* irak, 'Abbas and Buzaba. The reason for 
this was that 'Abd ar-Rahman wished to obtain the governorships 
of Arraniyya and Armenia, which had been in the possession of 
Jawull v/ho was his son-in-law,1 but knowing he could not
■ y i-t/. V t k  ■ it
achieve this as long as Khass Beg b. Balankari dominated the 
sultan, he began to make friends with Bnaaba; 'Abbas also 
joined them. Mas 'ud b. Muhammad, learning of this alliance, 
v/hich though directed primarily against Khass Beg, would, if 
successful, deprive him of all power also, decided to separate 
the conspirators. 'Abd ar-Rahman he sent, as atabeg to Malik­
shah b. Mahmud, to Ganja and Arran where a number of amirs 
including Khass Beg killed him (see above), v/hile he took 
'Abbas with him to Baghdad, and beheaded him on hearing of the
murder of 'Abd ar-Rahman. Buzaba at this marched on Isfahan• •
and put Muhammad b. Mahmud pm the throne; thence he came to
__ o
Hamadan where he was defeated and killed in 542 (1147/8).
1 Bu. 175-
2 R.S. 241-2; T_.G_. 467; Bu. 197-200; I.A. XI.7§.
When Mas ud heard Buzaba had set up Muhammad b. Mahmud as 
sultan in Isfahan he left Baghdad for Hamadan and. sent to 
Khass Beg and Shirglr in Azerbaijan for help. Buzaba came 
slowly from Isfahan to Hamadan and hence they were able to 
reach Mas'ud, *many of whose army had fled, before Buzaba 
arrived at Hamadan.
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Thus one of the rare cases of an alliance among the amirs 
was broken up. The effect of this, however, was not so much 
to strengthen Mas'ud’s power as to put Khass Beg in a dominant 
position. Those amirs, who might have opposed hi&, were dead 
and for the moment there were no others strong enough to do so'!' 
Khass Beg perhaps more than any other amir succeeded in bring­
ing the sultanate itself into his power, but it must be remem­
bered that by this time the sultans of Iraq, and Persia (as 
distinct from Sanjar) ruled over a greatly reduced area. 
Moreover KhassjBeg?s attempt ended finally in disaster, and 
shows how difficult it was for an amir to succeed in such an 
undertaking. On the death of Mas*ud b. Muhammad in 547 (1152)
and the accession of Malikshah b. Mahmud, Khass Beg ruled
_ _  2
alone while the sultan devoted himself to pleasure. Never-m •
theless he does not seem to have had any confidence in the 
strength of his position. According to Rawandl he always saw 
Malikshah on horseback because he feared he would be summoned 
to a private audience and seized.-^  Finally after only four 
months he deposed Malikshah on the grounds that he was unfit
Ildegiz, Qaisar ^ Albaqish Kunkhar, Tutar, the hajib, and 
others left*MasqLdfs service in 545 (1148/9) ’because they 





to rule in favour of his brother Muhammad. A number of 
amirs meanwhile plotted with Muhammad to seize ICbass Beg, and 
this was done after the khutba had been read in Muhammad’s 
name in §afar 548 (1153)•^
1 Bu. 209; T.G. 468V
2 Bu. 208-9; I.A. XI.106-7; E.S. 259-61.
CHAPTER V.
IQTl'Sl.• •
In its widest sense the term iqta/ includes not only
the assignment of land or of its produce, but also provincial
governorships. The practice of giving assignments of land or
of the produce of the land is found in early Islamic times, and
is known as iqta/. The lawbooks recognise this practice and• *
lay down a number of conditions under which such a grant may 
be made. Too much dependence, however, cannot be laid upon 
their statements. The state law represents the Islamic ideal, 
and, as Becker states, what the compilers of the lawbooks 
most urgently desired and laid down was probably lacking in
practice, while that which they severely condemned may well
1 1have been the actual practice. Moreover, the jurists, such
as Mawardi, deal only with iqta/s in early Islamic times.
Both before and during Great Seljuq. times the iqta/ system 
was undergoing, like the rest of the administration, a process 
of militarisation, and. the principle of conformity with the 
law was being abandoned, if indeed it ever existed outside
the lawbooks. Although the culmination of this process was
not reached until the Ottoman and Mamluk empires, it was ;
 ^Becker: Islamstudien, I. 218.
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■widely developed "by the time of Nizam ul-Mulk, and one of 
the most important achievements of the latter was to systema- 
tize to some extent the militarised iqta*. This is not to 
say that in Great Seljuq times there was any regular system, 
according to which iqta*s were granted. The situation was 
still extremely fluid; various types of iqta* existed, and
there were no clear lines of demarcation between them.
Mawardi recognises two kinds of iqta*, iqta* ut-tamllk
and iqta* ul-istighlal. Lands which could be legally assigned
under the former class were dead lands, dating either from
pre-Islamic or post-Islamic times, and cultivated lands either
in the dar ul-islam or in the dar ul-harb, which, in the
latter case, could be assigned before conquest by the muslims.
In the case of the iqtac ul-istighlal, the land could be *ushr 
_ p
or kharaj land. Among those to whom it was most fitting to 
grant an assignment of kharaj, Mawardi counted the people of 
the army (jaish). Lastly under the iqta* ul-istighlal he
1 Becker’s statement (p.243) that Nizam ul-Mulk abolished 
payment in cash of the military, giving the generals and 
soldiers the right, not only to the surplus of the taxes, 
but also the taxes themselves, in return for which they 
were placed under the obligation to military service, does 
not fit in with the facts. Nizam ul-Mulk was concerned in 
these matters rather with regulation than innovation.
^ *Ushr land is strictly speaking property, but kharai land 
is only possession: ushr is a tax, kharaj a rent (Becker
p.226).
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included the assignment of mineral deposits.^ Ibn Jamafa on 
the other hand distinguished three principal types of iqta/,
2 -  t _  7. j
the iqta*ut-tamllk, the iqta ul-istighlal/ and the iqta ul- 
irfaq.^  In the third class he put the assignment of mines,
R — t —
roads, and markets,-' thus the iqta ul-irfaq is really a farm 
(iltizam) scarcely differing in principle from the farming of 
tax-districts.
On the conquest of land held formerly by the Byzantine
and Persian empires, large landed properties, which had been
| Byzantine and Persian crown lands, were acquired by the 
S Arabs, who took over unaltered the former Byzantine and 
j Sassanian administrative apparatus. In both cases the large 
landed proprietors had been responsible to the state for the
X
rent of the land for themselves and for the colonies living 
in village communities on that land. On the Arab conquests, 
many of the powerful large landed proprietors fled or perish­
ed, and the domains of the Byzantine emperors and Persian
kings became vacant, so that an abundance of productive and 
intensely colonised land was to be disposed of.
To the Byzantine and Persian state lands were added also
1 Mawardi: Ahkam as-Suitaniyya, chap. 17, pp.181-8.
2 t
Ibn Jama*a. Islamica VI. 4. p.374*
^ ibid. p.J80.
4 ibid. p.382-J;
'  Tisehendorf: Das Lehnswesen .. pp.18-19•
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all waste land, swamps and dead lands. These were collective­
ly known as qata/l and were assigned to the Arabs as iqta* 
ut-tamlik, and were recognised as inheritable property, liable 
to taxation. The jurists, such for example as Abu Yusuf, 
held that such land could only be given with a permanent 
tenure, and could not be transferred as long as the girst 
assignee had heirs and looked after the cultivation, but 
that if he let the land lie fallow, he lost his right to it.
In practice these estates were conceived of as possessions, 
for they were saleable. The state was only interested in 
the payment of the rent; it did not bother about the juridi­
cal theory, which held that these lands were only given on a 
hereditary tenure, and let its domains also on a short or 
lifelong tenure. These assignments were known as tu*ma.
Becker emphasizes the similarity between this type of tenure 1
and the Byzantine emphyteusis system and explains this develop- 
-ic
ment in Islam/land tenures as being merely a revival or
Becker, 2J8-9. In addition to these estates was land divi­
ded among the village communities, which were liable to 
taxation in a lump sum. These districts were farmed, as 
was the produce of whole provinces. The tax-farmer and 
the emphyteuticarius, or Arabic muqta* were very much 
alike, for there was hardly any difference between a tax- 
farmer who could collect taxes with force, and a private 
individual who, under state protection, was answerable 
for the taxes of the land he held as a tenant, hereditary 
or otherwise, from the state. The actual taxes were paid 
in both cases by the peasants; muqta* and tax-farmer were 
only the middle-men between the peasant and the state 
( P.239).
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development of the latter.^
The principal object in granting an iqta/ of uncultivated 
lands, with possession conditional upon their cultivation, 
was clearly to promote cultivation and'thereby to increase 
the revenue of the state treasury. Different motives on the 
other hand led to the granting of the second class of iqta/ 
enumerated by the jurists, namely the iqta/ ul-istighlal.
In this case the cultivation of the land was the concern of 
the conquered peasants who were liable to tribute, while the 
principal objects of such a grant were, firstly, to assure 
deserving members of the community, and especially the 
seasoned fighters for Islam, of a sure means of livelihood, 
to pay them for their services and to encourage them to fur­
ther deeds by the prospect of such reward, and secondly, the
desire to maintain in the hands of a powerful military aris-
2
tocracy domination over the conquered peoples.
Military assignments of a kind were therefore recognised 
by the jurists, and Mawardi, as stated above, considered that 
those entered in the diwan, i.e. the members of the aimy 
(jaish), were the most fitting people to receive an assign­
ment of kharaj. He stipulated, however, that such military 
grants (arzaq ul-jund) should not be hereditary.^
1 Becker, 221.
^ Tischendorf, 20-1; Balasuri, 127.
^ Mawardi, 185-6.
2X4
With the growth of mercenary armies, which replaced the 
citizen armies of early Islamic times, soldiers and amirs 
were assigned the rent of the land, either as a guarantee of 
their pay, or as part of their pay, and finally when the 
rent “began to come in with increasing irregularity, they were 
gradually given the estates themselves.1 In addition, the 
Turkish generals took over as emphyteuticarii or muqta*s 
large landed properties, and as tax-farmers extensive dis­
tricts. The sums due from them they frequently withheld, or
2only paid when compelled to do so “by force. These assign­
ments must he distinguished from assignments to the soldiery;*^ 
the latter grew out of the earlier and legally redognised 
assignments of kharaj, while the former were a development 
of the emphyteusis system, upon which was superimposed Turkish 
and, later, Mongol influences.
From the foregoing it will he seen that the muqta* 
had originally no military duties, and, according to Becker, 
it was only with the militarisation of the state that the 
military, hy ahuse, penetrated into the alreqdy existing
A
system of assignments. In his view the cause of this was
1 E.I. Article on Iqta*.
 ^Becker, 241.
? cf. Ihn al-Athir who distinguishes between^assignments to 
the generals under Mu*izz ad-Dawla, the Buyid, and assign­
ments to the army (VIII. J42). This distinction continued 
into Great Seljuq times (see helow) and appeared in Egypt 
150 years later (cf. Becker 242-^)*
4 Becker,240.
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chiefly the “breakdown in the financial economy of the state, 
which nnder the Umayyads and the early * Abb as ids had been pre­
dominantly a gold economy.1 Western feudalism was essentially 
an attempt to solve the problem of maintaining armies in a 
state, whose basis was a land economy, whereas in the fast, the 
iqta* system grew up as an administrative and bureaucratic 
system, and changed into a military system as the result of an 
attempt to meet a military problem when the gold economy had 
broken down, hot only therefore did the iqta* system differ 
from western feudalism in verious respects, notably that the 
muqta? originally had no military duties, but it also differed 
in origin.2
The seizure of power by the military on the breakdown of 
the financial economy of the caliphate had created a condition 
of anarchy. The revenue was largely diverted from the state 
treasury into the pockets of the military, who had no permanent 
interest in the land and were concerned in the main with 
squeezing in the shortest time as much as they could out of the 
land in their temporary possession.
Poliak, on the other hand, disputes Becker*s theory that 
the military only penetrated into the already existing system 
of assignments on the breakdown of financial economy in Islamic 
countries. As pr©of of this, he mentions that the majority of 
1 Becker, 235*p
cf. Moreland: The Agrarian System of Muslim India (p.220), who 
clearly shows that the iqta system din Mughal India was a 
a bureaucratic and not a feudal organisation.
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tax-farmers under the caliphs were members of the military 
classes. He further states that the revenue was the acknow­
ledged right of the dominant class, and hence naturally went 
to the military. He considers that the difference in the deve­
lopment of the iqta/ system in muslim lands and feudalism in
the west is to be aaaooonted for, not, as stated above, by the
a
fact that there was in the west/land economy and in the east 
a money economy, but by the concentration in the muslim world 
of assignees in cities, in opposition to t^heir dispersal in 
castles in the west. This concentration was made possible, 
he holds, by more highly developed monetary conditions, result­
ing from a coincidence of historical and geographical factors. 
Among the former was the fact that the near East was not devas­
tated to the same extent as the west during the decline of the 
Roman empire, and, secondly, that the natural antagonism 
existing in general betY/een the foreign feudal class and the 
indigenous population forced the former to establish themselves 
in large isolated military cantonments in the towns, which 
became centres of economic activity. He admits, however, that 
this antagonism was not greater than that which existed, for 
example, in England between the Barons after the coming of 
William the Conqueror and the native population. Hence he is 
forced to the conclusion that the most important factor in­
fluencing the peculiar development of Islamic feudalism was 
the geographic one. The muslim world lay in an arid zone,
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the population of which was mostly collected in oases, large 
fluvial valleys and mountain regions. The limited areas of 
these oases prevented their masters establishing themselves 
at a distance from one another. The mountain regions also 
were separated from one another by river valleys and stony 
slopes, which caused the growth of large villages rather than 
scattered settlements.^
Poliak’s statement that the criterion of the iqta/ system 
in muslim countries was the concentration of the assignees in 
towns seems, broadly speaking, to be borne out by the evidence 
at our disposal, but his rejection of Becker’s theory that 
the military penetrated into the system subsequently and by 
abuse seems more doubtful. In the early period of both the 
Arab dxpansion and the Seljuq expansion the movement was a 
tribal one. The basis of the dominion of the orthodox caliphs
land of the Umayyads was the ’citizen” army, and not till *Abba-ii
[sid times was this replaced by a mercenary aimy. That is to 
say, prior to this the dominant class was not the ’’military” 
in the usual sense of the word (i.e. mercenaries) but those 
belonging to the conquering race, whose chief duty as citizens 
was to bear arms to defend and to extend the dominion of the 
community of the faithful. Similarly the basis of the Seljuq 
power during the period of expansion was the Turkoman tribes, 
and it was only after the initial expansion that the basis of
 ^Poliak: LaFeodalite Islamique, R.E.I, 193& III-
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the Seljuq power "began to alter and the government came to 
rely more and more on armies composed of slaves and freedmen.
In.the case of the Arabs, and subsequently of the Seljuqs, 
the dominant class probably did regard it their privilege to 
receive the revenue, but in the early period of expansion, in 
either case, the actual administration was left largely in 
the hands of local officials, belonging to the former adminis­
trations. Further, in both cases as the composition of the j 
dominant class changed, the new masters - Turkish slaves and 
freedmen - appropriated to themselves such privileges as the 
former members of the dominant class had enjoyed, including j
j
the right to the revenue. Moreover, in view of the fact that 
the military were, in many cases, carefully trained, not only , 
in the arts of war, but also in administrative affairs, it j 
was natural they should take over, in a large measure, the j 
administration of the country, until finally, as their power j 
increased, they tended to divert the revenue from the central
i
treasury into their own poekets.
The Seljuq migration, as stated in Chapter I., can be
divided into various stages. At first the Turkomans were
lookdd upon as tribal auxiliaries by the local rulers, and as j
such they probably received at times assignments in accordance j
with the prevailing custom of making grants of- land to the
amirs and soldiers.'1' Gradually, as the Turkomans extended ;
 ^ *Ala ud-Dawla, for example, after Abu Sahl had refused to £ay 
him tribute, offered in 420 (?), to grant the Ghuzz iqta s, 
and nearly 1500 of them under the leadership of Qizil * !
joined him (I.A. IX.269).
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their conquests and consolidated their power, they reduced 
many of the former local rulers to the position of vassals, 
and "brought to an end the dominion of others. Lacking any 
administrative experience or organisation, the Seljuqs, during 
the early period of their expan&ifcon, made little attempt to 
rule the Gountry diredtly, "but left the administration largely 
in the hands of members of the former local ruling families 
and their officials, who became their vassals and governors.
In the course of time they began to assign large areas of the 
empire also to their followers, Turks and Turkomans.
As stated above, the iqta* system in Great Seljuq times 
was far from being carefully regularised as it was later in 
the Ottoman, Mamluk and Mughal empires. Nevertheless several 
different types of iqtar can be distinguished, namely (1) the
iqtaf grantdd to members of the Seljuq family, (2) the "admini; 
trative” iqta*, which was virtually a provincial governorship,
and included also, as a sub-group, the iqta/ which was merely 
^ the grant of the right to farm the taxes of a given area, (J) 
the military iqta/, (4) the iqta* granted to officials in lieu 
of salary, and (5) the iqta* granted as a personal estate to 
a private person. It must not be supposed, however, that these 
were the only kinds of iqta* - a notable exception is the iqta
M  * * *
granted by the sultan to the caliph, which does not fit exactly
into any of these categories - nor must it be supposed that all 
iqta/s belonging to the same type necessarily conformed to the
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same pattern. The»e was, no doubt, a general tendency to 
follow accepted precedent, which would have resulted in a 
general similarity of usage, hut this does not exclude the 
possibility of a variety of special provisions according to 
circumstances. Once the principle of conformity to the law 
had been abandoned, there was no check upon arbitrary action.
®he great Seljuqs conceived of the kingdom as the estate 
of the ruling khan, which he could dispose of as he wished,
' and it was an established practice for him to assign different 
parts of the kingdom to minor members of his family, sons, 
brothers and others.^ A condition usually observed in the case 
of an iqta* assigned to a member of the Seljuq family was that 
the assignee should actually reside during his tenure of office
*__ in the province or district assigned to him. This condition^
differentiates this type of iqta* from all other types, none 
of which had any condition, implied or otherwise, of continued 
residence by the muqta* in his iqta/.
These assignments to members of the Seljuq family were 
probably not intended to be of a permanent nature, but there 
arose a tendency for one branch of the family to regard certain 
districts as its own iqta/. Arslan Arghu, who had been assigned 
Ktawarazm by Alp Arslan,’1' had, by the reign of Barkyaruq, con­
quered Balkh, T.irmidh, Njshapur and the whole of Khurasan, and
1 A.S.D. 40.
See note 3. p.221.
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so he sent to Barkyaruq and to his wazir, Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk b.
Nizam ul-Mulk demanding that he should he confirmed in the *•
possession of Khurasan, on the grounds that his grandfather 
Di^ud had held the district surrounding Bishapur; he offered 
to make a payment for this, and guaranteed to refrain from 
fighting for the sultanate if his request was acceded to."*- 
Arslan Arghu in addition was, during the reign of Maliks hah, 
the muqta* of a sum of 7,000 dinars in the neighbourhood of 
Hamadan and Sava, and when after his iteath his son, a minor,
■ s
came to Barkyaruq, he was given the iqta* which his father had 
held in the days of Malikshah.^ In this case it seems likely 
that this was merely a grant of the right to farm certain 
taxes in that area.^
This type of assignment was to some extent a survival of 
tribal tradition, according to which the ruling khan did not 
exercise power to the exclusion of the other members of his 
family, but rather as the head of a council of elders.^ It
1 I.A. X . 1 8 0 . '
2 ibid. 179; Bu. 235; A.S.D. 84-5.
3 Ibn_BalkliI, who wrote during the reign of Muhammad b. Malik-
shah^states that Jahram in Bars was part of the pension 
(mawa.iib)of the wall ahd (F.N. 1J1).
4 -j - -In the Nasa ih Nama it is stated that Nizam ul-Mulk sa&d that
while he’was*at the court of Alp Arslan"many of the latter's 
relatives were at court receiving allowances. The amirs 
considered it expedient to send them to provincial govern­
ments, so that the money spent on their allowances might be 
saved and the provincial taxes paid in regularly. Alp Ars­
lan was favourably inclined towards the proposal. Nizagj. ul- 
Mulk, however, to deter him from acting upon it, told him a 
story of the caliph Mansur, for he (Nizam ul-Mulk) thought
(Continued on next page.)
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was no doubt also thought that if minor members of the ruling 
khan*s family were given assignments, they would, be less 
likely to dispute the position of the ruling khan. YThen 
Alp Arslan secured the recognition of Malikshah as his heir 
apparent, he gave iqta/s to other members of his family, pre­
sumably with this idea in mind. Inanj Baighu received Mazan- 
daran, Sul aim an b. Ba*ud Balkh, Arslan Arghu Ehwarazm, his 
son Arslanshah Merv, his brother Ilyas Chaghaniyan and Tukharis 
tan, Mas*ud b, Irtash the governorship (wilaya) of Baghshur, 
and Mawdud b. Irtash the governorship (wilaya) of Asfuzar.^ ■
On his deathbed Alp Arslan made further assignments. He gave 
to Ayyaz, his son, what had belonged to his own father Da’ud 
in Balkh and ear-marked for him 500*i000 dinars, but assigned
the fortresses in those districts to Malikshah, while he gave
<
Bars and Kirman to Qawurd b. Da’ud and allotted to him a sum
2 -  -  of money also. Subsequently Malikshah on the death of Ayyaa
assigned Balkh to his brother Shihab ud-Din Takash and gave
(Hote continued from previous page.)
such a practice would result in many evils (N. f.^lb).
This was not, however, the origin of the custom of giving 
provincial governments to Seljuq princes, which was much 
more probably a development of tribal practice.
1 I.A. X.J4.
2 -  ibid. 52; Bu. 45- After Qawurd*s rebellion Malikshah gaye
the governorships he had held to Sautegln, giving him the
laqab Imad ud-Dln and the right to ballistas and drums
(Bu T 47).
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him also Tukharistan. To his other brother Taj ud-Dawla ♦ •
,>s-f Tutush b. Alp Arslan he assigned Syria in 470 (1077/8),^ and1
to Burl Bars he gave Herat and the neighbourhood of Ghur and 
Gharjistan.^ Barkyaruq continued the policy of granting iqta/s 
to other members of his family. In 486 (1093) assigned 
Ganja and its governorships to Muhammad b. Malikshah and appoint 
ed Qutlughtegin (var. galihtegin) his atabeg.^  TVhen Tughril b. 
Muhammad fend Kundoghdl intended to rebel against Mahmud b.
\ Muhammad, the latter sent to Tughril promising him numerous 
iqta's, more than those which he already held, if he joined 
him.^ Mas*ud b. Muhammad, who rebelled in 512 (1118), was sub­
sequently assigned Ganja and its governorships by Mahmud in
6 -  524 ( H 30). The former, when he became sultan, assigned to
Seljuqshah b. Muhammad, who joined him about 531* ‘fc*ie country
that had belonged to Sukman al-Qutbi, namely Khalat and its
_ 7 _
dependencies, Manazkird and Arzan. To Muhammad b* Mahmud he
—  —  oassigned Ehuaistan and married him to his daughferr. San jar
 ^I.A. X.64; A.S.D. 58. According to the A.S.D. Malikshah gave 
Khurasan to Takash (p.6l).







in 512 (1118/9) assigned to Tughril b. Muhammad Sava, Ava, 
Saruq, Sam an, Qazwin, Abhar, Zanjan, G-Ilan, Dayalam and at- 
Taliqan and to Seljuqshah b. Muhammad and his atabeg Qaraja
quered IChwarazm in 555 (11J8/9) he assigned it to Ghiyath ud-
the reign of Muhammad b. Malikshah onwards the assignment to 
a Seljuq malik tended to be replaced by the assignment to the 
atabeg of the prince rather than to the prince himself (see 
Chapter IV.).
To what extent the prince to whom a province was assigned 
had jurisdiction over that province to the exclusion of the 
sultan is not clear. Complete financial control seems to have 
been handed over to him. In a diploma issued by Alp Arslan for 
one of his sons for the possession of Bilan and Khwarazm, 
these districts were given to the prince as his own property
of the people of those parts and to observe former rules in 
the collection of taxes. The people were also commanded to 
regard him as the owner (malik) of those districts and the 
officials of his diwan as in charge of those districts, and
as-Saqi he gave Fars and part of Isfahan; and when he con
T  -  -  2D m  Sulaimanshah b. Muhammad. In the course of time, from
( ). He was instructed to look after the interests
ordered to pay their taxes in full and without delay.^ The
1 A.S.D. 90; Bu. 122.
2 I.A. XI.44.
' Collection of Letters: Add. 7^88.
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prince to whom such an assignment was made probably could and
did assign districts in it to his own followers. The malik
Mas*ud, for example, assigned Maragha and a district as far as
Rahba to Qaslm us-Dawla al-Bursuqi, his at ah eg (495) • Jzer-
baijan, however, had not been assigned to Mas*ud - he had
merely taken possession of it.1 Tutush also made Urtuq b.
2Ajfcsab governor of Jerusalem in 479* tod assigned this city 
to the latter1s son, Suqman in 490 (1097)*^ There is little 
doubt, however, that the maliks, as the other holders of iqta/s 
had no rights as muqta*s, and merely held the area under them 
\f at -the will of the sultan, who could and frequently did revoke 
the assignment, the usual method being to assign the iqta* in 
question to a second person, who would then conquer or attempt 
to -conquer it from the first assignee. When Tughril b. Muham­
mad and Iqsunqur Ahmadili rebelled in 515/6 (1121/2), Mahmud 
b. Muhammad sent Jayush Beg to put down their rebellion and 
assigned to him the country.^
Not only did the Seljuqs make assignments to the male 
, members of their family, but their wives and the other Seljuq.
/
women also held iqtii/s. These were rather in the nature of*•
1 I.A. X.395.
2 I.E. I.171j I.A. X.96.
2 I.A. X.192. .
 ^ibid.. 421.
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personal estates. Tughril Beg, when he married the caliph’s 
daughter in 454 (1062), assigned to her Ba*quba and what had
t - 1 -Belonged to his late wife in Iraq.. Malikshah granted to his 
paternal aunt Safiyya, the wife of Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim h. 
Quraish, the city of Balad as an iqta/.^ Alp Arslan, after 
putting down the rebellion of Qara Arslan in Kirman gave to 
each of the latter1 s daughters 100,000 dinars and iq$a/s and 
estates (? ).? Samiram was part of Gawhar Khatujj,
i
Muhammad b. Malikshah.1 s wife’s pension ( )f Kamal-*
t *  -  4al-Mulk All as-Samirami’s father contracted for its revdnue.
The second type of iqta/, which became perhaps the most
important form of iqta'jn the Great Seljuq empire, was the
C s ’administrative” iqta* (or tu*ma). The traditional distinction
between the ”administrative” iota* and the iqta* ut~tamlik was
•• •»
still preserved, the former not being hereditary except by 
usurpation. The distinction, however, tended to be obscured 
because the ”administrative” iqta/ had by this time become 
-^militarised. The position of the holder of this type of iqtar 
approximated to the position of a provincial governor, and the 






synonymous. In some cases a slight distinction may have exist­
ed, the governor possibly being under the obligation, at least 
in theory, to remit the surplus revenue to the central govern­
ment. In general, however, there does not seem to hage been 
any such distinction. The fact that the same man is called 
j wall of such and such a place in one source, and muqta* in
' another supports this view.
Nizam ul-Mulk probably brought about a general unifica­
tion of the iqta* system, but it is with the "administrative”
type of iqta* that he is especially concerned. The old idea
of the promotion of cultivation, underlying the grant of the 
original iqta* ut-tamlik seems,moreover, to have reappeared
in the theory of Nizam ul-Mulk. He states that if attention««
is drawn to the ruin and dispersal of the inhabitants of any
district, it must be at once investigated and the condition
of the muqta* and the *amil enquired into, in order to prevent
the land becoming waste, the peasants being dispersed and
money being levied unjustly.^*
In practice it seems that the powers exercised by the
muqta.* of this type of iqta* were often far wider than those .
envisaged by Nizam ul-Mulk (see p. 258. ). Various documents
have come down to us in relation to the assignment of iqta's•*
which show that the muqta* had in many cases complete control 
in the area assigned to him. Ibn al-Qalanisi gives a copy of
1 S.H. 119.
228
the diploma for the civil and military administration of 
Damascus written "by the tughra*!, Atm Isma/ll al-Isfahan! on 
^  behalf of Muhammad b. Malikshah in Muharram $10 (1116) for 
Tughtegln, by which the latter was given full control of that 
district. This document begins with a description of the 
worthiness of Tughtegln, after which his diploma for the 
government (imara) of Syria is renewed and the conduct of 
war, levying of contributions ( tax, tithe
y  and other heads of taxation, the a(toinistra^p>n_pf^olice, the 
reviewing of the army, the payment of the salaries and the 
expenditure of courtiers, the administration of justice and 
all that a capable governor should look after are handed over 
to him. There follows an injunction to fear God, to obey 
Him and to lead a pious life. Tughtegin is then commanded to 
treat well the officials and others under him, to consult them 
and to give every class its due. He is further commanded to 
appoint brave and able men over the frontier districts in re­
lays and to furnish them with equipment and provisions. Trea­
ties were to be faithfully kept. He was commanded to give 
security to all his subjects, to protect them in their lawful 
businesses and to guard their persons, children possessions 
and trades, to prevent the strong oppressing the weak, to 
choose the most upright among his subjects as officials 





themselves with land taxes, instalments and shares ( ).
Lastly, he was to mention in the khutba and the sikka the 
name of the Seljuq sultan and to remain loyal to the *Abbasid 
dynasty. Prom this document it is clear that as far as 
Damascus was concerned at- this time (i.e. 510) the central 
government retained no power in the administration with the 
exception of the nomination of the governor, which was proba­
bly little more than a matter of form, and the only demand it 
made was the mention of the sultan* s name in the khutba and 
sikka.
In a collection of documents known as at-Tawassul ila^t 
Tarassul by Baha ud-Din Muhammad b. Mu*ayyad al-Baghdadi, who 
was at one time head of the chancellory (diwan ul-knsha) of 
the Khwarazmshah Takash, are a number of diplomas issued to 
muqta*s. The documents according to Bart1old refer to .the
years 578-9 (1182-4). They belong thus to the period imme­
diately following the Great Seljuq. period, and probably do 
not differ substantially from similar documents belonging to
i
Great Seljuq times. The style of these documents is, moreover, 
si&il&r to that of Tughtegln’s diploma. They each begin with 
a preamble describing the bounty of God, the regard of devotion 
and service and similar matters, followed by a description of 
the excellence and deserving nature of the muqta*, the grant 
to him of an assignment or the renewal of former grants, and
1 Q. 193-7.
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various injunctions and recommendations to him and the popula­
tion of those living in his assignment.^ These grants, with 
the possible exception of the assignment to Shihab ud-Din and 
his father (see In), are all relating to " administrative” 
iqta*s. By the,grant of the assignments of Nasa to Adud ud- 
Dawla wafd-Din Tughanshah Abu Baler b. al-M^ayyad complete 
financial and administrative control of these districts was 
given him. He was commanded to piety and justice, to see to
the welfare of his subjects ( ra*aya) and to practice modera­
tion in the collection of taxes. These were to be collected 
by his own officials (*ummal wa mutasarrifan), who were to 
levy only what was customary and were not to introduce any
new taxes. He was further commanded to order the shihnas^
and officials (gumashtegan) to promote religion. Lastly he 
was commanded to omit nothing in assuring the security of 
the roads in his iqta*. Finally, "the imams, qadis, #ulama, 
capable persons, amirs, army commanders, great and important 
persons, other classes and all the subjects (raraya) cf \ 3
1 In the decree increasing the iqta/s of Shihab ud-Din and his
father (pp. 118-9) n0 mention is made of his or the popula­
tion's duties. Perhaps this was the grant of a "personal" 
and not an "administrative" iqta*.
2
at-Tavassul, pp.30-8.
3 The shihna was presumably no longer an official directly 
responsible to the sultan (see Chapter VI.), but perhaps a 
local official appointed by the muqta*, corresponding to 
some extent perhaps to the earlier muhtasib.
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of the villages of Nasa which were included in the iqta* of 
his diwan were commanded to obey the muqta* and to pay their 
taxes promptly and in full.
In another decree,*^ in addition to the land assigned to 
the muqta*, the latter was given a grant of several thousand 
dinars for the expenses of his diwan. Similar commands to 
piety, justice and compassion towards the people were made. 
There was also an injunction to follow former administrative 
practice, and a command to tell the shihnas "to revive the 
customs of good administration and not to permit the tyranni­
cal to practice oppression upon those who are rightly guided, 
or the scandalous ones to commit excess against the pious", 
and finally the inhabitants of the iqta* were commanded to
obey the assignee and his officials, and to pay their taxes
2promptly and in full. A third decree increasing the assign­
ments of *Imad ud-Din, governor (wall) of Dasa, contains simi­
lar provisions and instructions. In addition to his iqta*,
••
*Imad ud-Din also received wages (mawajib) in cash, for these 
were increased by several thousand dinars, while the wealth 
(amwal) of the places fixed by the diwani *arz was assigned 
to him as an iqta* over which he exercised full control. From 





j to him, but merely its produce and the administration of that 
/ area, which is perhaps a theoretical rather than a practical 
distinction. In this document, moreover, the population of 
the district assigned are commanded to regard *Imad &d-Din as 
their muqta* and wall, which bears out the theory that there 
I was practically no distinction between the terms wall and 
j muqta*.
^ It is noticeable that in none of these documents is there 
any specific reference to military duties or military obliga-
i ,i
j tions towards the ruler who made the grant.
V ' '
Lastly, in the Tawassul there is a diploma issued for 
Abu Mansur Malikshah for the governorship of Jand.’*” On examina­
tion this is found to differ little from the diplomas to muqta*s 
/except in so far as he is given certain instructions regarding 
J his army. This difference may be due to the fact that Jand
j
; was a frontier dictrict. After a preamble concerning the 
thanks due to God for His grace, the devotion to duty of the 
ruler on whose behalf the document was issued, mention is made 
of the special position of Jand, in view of its being a fron­
tier district, and a description given of the worthiness of 
Abu Mansur Malikshah, to whom full control of Jand is entrus­
ted. He is then exhorted to piety and godliness, since leading 
personages have a greater obligation than others to cultivate 
these virtues, to hold public audiences at all times, to give
1 at-Tavassul, 1J-29.
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justice and to redress grievances, permitting no distinction 
to be made between the different classes, to honour the 
sayyids and to give pensions to them, to show favour to the 
imams and 'ulama, not allowing their fatwas to be transgressed 
in matters relating to the sharl*a, and to seek their advice, 
to support the qadls and hukkam, to give sadaqa to the righteous 
and to sufis and to show mercy to the leading shaikhs and 
their followers, to protect the cultivators and dihqans from 
forced labour, and the artisans and small merchants (ahli suq) 
from hardship. He is instructed to guard and treat in a friend­
ly way his cortege and the soldiers, not to tolerate quarrels 
among them and to see they are paid fully and at the right 
time by the officials of the diwan, to consider obligatory 
the reviewing of the army in person and the investigation of 
the condition of every soldier, and to demand from each, ac­
cording to his pay, a mount and arms, to encouragd the mujahi­
din and to establish on the frontier brave and experienced men, 
to assure the security of the roads and to protect the travel­
ler from attack and pillage, to be vigilant in the punishment 
of criminals, to consult his trustworthy servants, to observe 
faithfully treaties, to appoint in his diwan persons of inte­
grity and to order them to take from the owners of estates 
only what is fixed by law. Finally the people of Jand are 
commanded to obey him and to pay their taxes in full at the
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■beginning of the solar year.
In a diploma issued for Taj ud-Bln *A1I for Bar Chunligh
Hunt, also a frontier district, similar conditions are made.
In this case the ribat of Tughanln, the most important place*• *♦
- - - '
of that region, is granted: to Taj ud-Din as a present (inram), 
and the subjects of that place are instructed to pay to his 
officials the taxes and dues of the diwan; for the rest there 
are no provisions relating to financial administration.
' This practice of assigning administrative iqta/s to amirs 
and others was common during the reign of Malikshah. He 
assigned Syria, Liyar Bakr and Hilla to Qaslm us-Dawla iqsun- 
qur, ^  Buha and Qazwln to *Imad ud-Dawla Buzan, Mawsil to Jigir- 
mish,^and after him to the sons of Aqsunqur, Hisn Haifa to 
Urtuq, Mardln to Aqtlmur, Pars to Bukn ud-Dawla Khumartegln^ 
and Antioch to YaghI Siyan^, to mention some of the more promi­
nent cases. The later Great Seljuq sultans continued this 
practice, hut as the pov/er of the amirs increased, the grant 
of an iqta/ tended to become merely an official recognition of 
the possession of a given district by an amir. It was doubt­
less also inability to control the amirs which led the sultan 
to play them off one against another, by assigning to them each
other’s domains, or even assigning the same district simultan­
eously
T — — —  .
at-Tavassul, 38-43.
2 Q. 119; R.S. 129.





to two persons. Mawsil is a case in point. In 500 (1106/7) 
Muhammad b. Malikshah assigned it to Jawuli Saqawu together 
with Diyar Bakr and al-Jazira, which places belonged to
Jigirmish, who was at that time one of the most powerful amirs
2 -  -  -in the empire. But in 501 Mawdud b. Altuntegm went with
other amirs, at Muhammad’s suggestion to take Mawsil from
Jawuli. The city fell in §>afar 502 (1108) and Mawdud became
governor of Mawsil.^ Some years later (508) Mawsil came into
the possession of Aqsunqur al-Bursuqi,^ and in 509 (1115/6)
Muhammad b. Malikshah assigned it to Jayush Beg.^ gatyawu
-  6 
was assigned BaJhba by Muhammad b. Malikshah in 501 (1107/8) .
The latter place was al-Bursuqi1 s iqta* in 509*^ while in 521 
(1127) it belonged to Zangl.® In 515 (1121) Mahmud b. Muham­
mad assigned to Aqsunqur al-Bursuqi Mawsil, al-JazIra, Sinjar 
and what adjoined it, and al-Bursuqi went with a large army
■* On occasion, however, the sultan would help a Muqta* to
regain his iqta after it hacTTeen usurped by another. *A1I 
b. Sukman^seized Bafra, which had been assigned to Aqsunqur 
al-Bukhari, and Mahmud b. Muhammad sent an askar with the 









and took possession of what he had “been assigned. ** Jayush
Beg meanwhile was assigned Iz erbai jan by Mahmud b. Muhammad
in 515/16 (1121/2).^ In 516 (1122) al-Bursuql also received
Wasit.^
•«
It is evident that except in a case where an iqta/ was
granted merely by way of acknowledgment of the conquest of an
area by an amir, i.e., an iqta* by usurpation, the muqta* had,
generally speaking, to take possession of his iqta* by force,
and frequently to turn out from it the previous holder. TVhen
the Ban! Jahir, who had been attached to the caliph’s wazirate,
came to Malikshah in 476 (IO83) after dismissal from the
wazirate, the latter assigned Diyar Bakr to Bakhr ud-Dawla b.
Jahir, gave him a khil*a and granted him the right to have
the kettledrums (al-kusat) played and sent him with troops to
Diyar Bakr to take it from the Ban! Marwan.^ Soon after
Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahir reached Diyar Bakr, 3mid fell into
the power of his son Abu/l Qasim Za*Im ur-Ru’asa, and three
Mayyafariqln
months later he himself took/from Naslr ud-Dawla Mangur b. 
Nasr ud-Dawla b. Marwan.^ In Ramadan 482 (1089) kakhr ud-






Dawla occupied HasTbln and subsequently took possession of 
Mawsil, ^  Sin jar, Hahba and Khabur. ^  When Mas*ud b« Muhammad 
assigned Hilla to Salarkurd in 542 (1147/3) because of the 
disorders created by the troops of *Ali b. Bubais in whose 
hands Hilla was, Salarkurd marched with his * askar on IJilla, 
which he took,after putting *A1I to flight.^ Sometimes, how­
ever, the transfer was effected peacefully. When Mahmud b. 
Muhammad assigned Mayyafariqin to Ilghazi, Sukman al-Qutbl, 
governor of Khilat, in whose possession it was, handed it over 
to him.^ In some cases the dispossessed muqta* was given
other assignments, Mawdud b. Zangi, when taking al-Jazira from 
* -
G-hulbak, in 553 (H53)> gave him in exchange many iqta*s.5 
When Zangi b. Urtuq was restoi&dd to his rank and set free from 
prison by the sultan Muhammad b* Malikshah in 499 (1105/6), 
his brothers were dismissed from their iqta*s, namely Llshtar, 
Sabur Khwast, and others between Ahwaz and Hama dan, and were 
given in place of these other iqta*s, including Dinawar.
It is clear from the above that these administrative \/ 
assignments were not in theory hereditary or assigned on a 
life-long tenure. As the power of the amirs grew, however, a








v; hereditary tendency "began to appear, and there are several 
cases of amirs, who succeeded in establishing themselves so 
firmly in their assignments as to assure the succession of 
their sons or dependents after them.^" This happened in the 
case of al-Bursuqi, who was succeeded in Mawsil by his son 
fIzz ad-Din Mas*ud.^ Zangi, who founded the atabeg dynasty 
of Mawsil, is a striking case in point. On his death his 
possessions were divided between his two sons, ftur ud-Din, who 
became ruler of Aleppo, and Saif ud-Din, who held Maw§il. A 
third son, Biz aba, who was in the service of the sultans of 
*Iraq, was wall of Fars.^ Turkoman chiefs also succeeded in 
founding dynasties. Ilghazi had obtained various possessions, 
including Mayyafariqin, as stated above. On his death his 
domains were divided among his sons and nephev/s; Husam ud-Din 
Timurtash b. Ilghazi took Mardln, his brother Sul aim an
The hereditary tendency also appeared in the iqta*s which 
were sub-assigned. After Diyar Bakr was conquered from the 
Ban! Harwan, Fakhr ud-Dawla, to whom it had been assigned, 
gave Jujiuq, who was the shihna of the country, Hisn Ziyad as 
an iqtar. It remained in his hands and his children’s until 
Bahrain b. Urtuq took it, and it was given to Da*ud b. Suqman 
and his children (T.M.. fM48b).
§ J.A. I.452-
Izz ud-Din, after the assassination of his father in 5^0, 
took_possession of Aleppo, and came in_the following year to 
Mahmud b. Muhammad in Baghdad and Mahmud wrote for him a 
diploma for fiis father’s domains (Kamal ud-Din, p.655).
5 T.G. 504.
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Mayya.fariqin, and Badr ud-Dawla Sulaiman b* *Abd ul-Jabbar b. 
Urtuq kept Aleppo until his cousin Balak b. Bahrain took it in
517 (1123).1
Apart from hereditary transmission there are several
J cases recorded of the disposal of an iqta* by testament. Ear-
buqa, a muqta* of Maw§il (d. 495 (1101/2), on his deathbed
nominated Sunqurja as his successor. The latter, however, was
killed in a quarrel with Musa the Turkoman, governor of Hi§n
Kaifa on behalf of Karbuqa, who had also advanced on Mawsil
on the latter’s death; Musa then took possession of Mawjil,
but died almost immediately (495)* after which Maw§il fell into
the possession of Jigirmish.^ When Tughtegln fell ill in*  m
498 (1104/5) he conceived the idea of sending an invitation
to Suqman b. Urtuq to come to Damascus with his *askar, in
order that he might nominate him as his successor and that the
4 -rdefence of Damascus might be entrusted to him. Ahmadil 
(d.510), governor of Maragha, was apparently succeeded by one 
of his mamluks, for one Aqsunqur Ahmadlll was governor of 
Maragha in 5^5 (1121/2). Although there was, as stated above,
1 I.A. X.426,431.
 ^ibid.. JJLf.
2 ibid. 236. _ _
When Musa and Sunqurja met, the former said that
"the offices and the decision in the matter (of appointing 
the governor of Mawsil) were in the hands of the sultan , 
who would appoint whomsoever he chose (I.A. X .2J5)* which 
indicates that the sultan still retained some voice in the 
matter.
4 Gibb: The Damascus Chronicle, p.66.
(
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no established hereditary principle in the assignment of
iqta/s it is nevertheless probable that in the event of a
muqta* dying, the claims of his family and dependents were
favourably considered. TThen Sukman al-Qutbi fell severely
ill on the expedition led by Mawdud to Syria in 505 (1111/2)
Ahmadll determined to return to ask the sultan to assign him • •* .
the districts belonging to Sukman, to whom he was allied by 
marriage.**’
Included in the administrative iqta* are the assignments 
granted to members of former local ruling houses. These do 
not differ from the assignments- made to the amirs, except that 
the assignees had, in some cases, a connection in the past 
with the districts assigned to them. Various members of the 
former ruling houses had become Seljuq vassals, but in the 
course of time their status, in so far as they had not been 
entirely dispossessed, tended to be reduced to that of mere 
governors or muqta*s. Tughril Beg . assigned Kirmanshah (Qir- 
misin) in 447 (1055/6) to Abu *Ali b. Abl Kalijar^ to whom 
he had already given an iqta* in Jurbadhaqan together with 
two fortresses in that district in 445 (1052/4) when he mar­
ried him to one of the women of his people.^ Subsequently 
Abu *Ali was grantdd a revenue contract for the province of
 ^Q. 175- According to Ibn al-Athir he also determined to 
demand TughteginTs iqta* (X. 342).
p *\ - --  1929
I*A. IX.229, 432. Bowen: The Last Buwayhids, J.R.A,S. /Pt.II. 
243; Sibt b. JawzT: Mir1 at az-Zaman, Paris Codex f.llb.
3 I.A. IX.404.
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Basra By Alp Arslan, whom he went to meet at Hamadan iii456 
(1064), in return for which he surrendered the assignments 
of Qumm . and Kashan (for which he had perhaps exchanged that 
of Qirmisin in the interval).'*' Abu *A1I hastened to Basra, 
hut Hazarasp, in whose hands it was, on learning of his ap­
proach, objected that the sultan had no good reason for evict­
ing him. And he went on to argue that Abu 1 All's appointment
was ill advised; both he and his father Abu Kalijar had lorded
it in the province: and he would be too hazardously popular
a
with the inhabitants. So Ahu rAli was disappointed and 
although it is not stated explicitly that Alp Arslan revoked 
his order, it is to be presumed that he did, since Hazarasp 
remained in possession. However, Alp Arslan gave Abu rAli, 
perhaps in compensation, the assignment of Nawbandajan in Pars.^ 
Abu Na§r b. Jalal ud-Dawla, the Buyid, held al-Hada*in 
(Ctesiphon) and Dair al-*Aqul as an assignment from Malikshah.2*’ 
Tughril Beg, after entering Baghdad in 447 (1055/6) assigned 
Arrajan to Hazarasp b, Bahkir and farmed ( <5-*^  ) to him also
Basra and Ahwaz for 500,000 and 60,000 dinars respectively.5
■* Unless gumm wa gash an has been written here in error for 
qirmisin or qirmasm.
2
M.2. Paris Codex, f.99b.; Bowen, p,244.
^ Mir Khwand, 57 (Extract published by Wilken, Berlin 1855) J 
Bowen, pt, I. 245-4.
^ Bowen, pt.I. 245.
5 I.A. IX.422; F.N. 121.
Alp Arslan assigned Anbar, Hit, Harba as-Sinn and Bawazij to
■j
Sharaf ud-Bawla Muslim b. Quraish Id* Badran in 458 (1066). 
Subsequently Malikshah increased the assignments of Sharaf 
ud-Bawla Muslim b, Quraish and Baha ud-Bawla Mansur b. Bubais 
and their followers for their help in defeating Qawurd in 465 
(1075)^  when his own army had desired to see the latter*s
p _ _ __
victory . Alp Arslan also farmed Pars to Padluya, a local
tribal leader.^ Tin 479 (1086/7) Malikshah again increased
Muhammad b. Sharaf ud-Bawla*s assignments, giving him the city
of Rahba and its districts, Harran, Saruj, Raqqa and Khabur
4when he married him to his daughter. In this case, as in the
case of Abu cAli b, Abl Kali jar, the iqta/s assigned were
perhaps part of the marriage settlement. When Padlun b. Abl’l
Aswar ar-Rawwadi rebelled, Malikshah took Arran from him, but
assigned to him Astarabad.^ Saif ud-Dawla gadaqa b, Mansur b.
Bubais b. Hazyad, ruler of Hilla, was virtually a Seljuq vassal
outside Hilla, he held various iqta's including Wasit, which
 —  6was granted to him by the Seljuq sultan. ,
^ I.A. X.J5* According to Bundari this was in 457 (p*30)«
2 Bu. 47; I.A. X.5J>i 





On gadaqa's death in Rajah 501 (1108), his son, Bubais, was 
with Muhammad b. Malikshah, who gave him many iqta's.**" Surkhab
b, Kai Khusraw ka$ another case of a local person holding an
as
iqta*. He had held Sava/an iqta/, but Muhammad had apparently 
repealed his iqta*, for §adaqa stipulated the confirmation of 
Surkhab in his iqta* in Sava as a condition of his obedience 
of Muhammad b. Malikshah in $01 (1107).^
In appointing governors and muqta/s the sultan was not 
able altogether to ignore local opinion. After the assassina-
H  I  M  mm
tion of al-Bursuqi and the death of his son Mas ud, Mahmud b, 
Muhammad, who was then in Khurasan, appointed Bubais b. 
gadaqa governor of Mawsil. The commander of the citadel in 
Mawfil, an amir named Jawull, prompted by the desire of ob­
taining Mawsil for himself, sent envoys to Baghdad to secure 
that end. They, however, plotted for the nomination of Zangl . 
with al-Hustarshid, who was averse to the nomination of Bubais, 
To obtain this the caliph offered the sultan 100,000 dinars, 
while the envoys also engaged to pay him a certain sum of 
money, and as a result the nomination of Bubais was annulled.^ 
In Great Seljuq times there was no effective machinery
I. A. X.373. Muhammad #had also promised iqta*s to Sab it bf 
Sultan b. Bubais b. *Ali b. Mazyad, §adaqafs nephew, who 





,/ through which the dentral government could control the muqta s
or provincial governors. Former administrations had main­
tained some kind of control through the Jbarid, or postal system,
r and spies, hut this system, heing repugnant to Seljuq trihal
1 1 -1 traditions, had heen abolished. Hizam ul-Mulk, who had been
brought up in the Ghaznavid empire, deplored this fact. In the
Siyasat Hama he stresses continually the importance of the
supervision of all matters by the sovereign, maintaining that
only by such supervision and the prompt punishment of extortion
and rebellion by subordinate officials could the sovereign’s
prule be maintained and the kingdom be made flourishing. He
 ^One day Abu*l Fadl Sagzl asked Alp Arslan why he had no sahib 
khabar. He replied, ttHow shall I appoint a Sahib khabar?* 
fie, who is my friend and is sincere in his friendship, inte- 
grity and sincerity, will give no weight to the sahib khabar 
and will not bribe him, but he, who is my enemy, will make 
friends with him and give him money. Since it is so, the 
sahib khabar will unavoidably always bring to our ears had 
reports of our friends and good reports of our enemies.
Good and bad words are like arrows. If you fire several 
arrows, finally one will hit the target. Our heart every 
day will become more disposed against our friends and more 
pleasantly disposed towards our enemies. In short, the 
friend will become estranged and the enemy closer until the 
friend is regarded as an enemy.” (S.N. 65).
2
To obtain information of the subjects and the soldiers, of 
that which happens far or near from him, and to know all af­
fairs that take place, great or small, is obligatory upon 
the sovereign. If he does not, it is a shortcoming and will 
be attributed to negligence and injustice. It will be said, 
nIt is one of two things, either the sovereign knows or he 
does not know of the disorders and exactions which take place 
in his kingdom. If he is informed of them and does not reme­
dy them and forbid them, he is like the oppressors, and has 
given his approval to tyranny. If he does not know Yfoat 
happens, he is very negligent and ignorant”. In either 
case it is bad. (S.H. 58.)
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insisted also that spies should he sent to all parts of the 
kingdom in various guises, so that by means of the information 
transmitted hy these spies the sovereign would be able to put 
down immediately any rebellion,^ In addition he wanted to 
have at court an inspector (mushrif) who would have a deputy
(na*ib) in every town and district, who would inform him of
2all that happened.
Originally the muqta*s relation to the central government 
; may have been merely a financial one, and theoretically this 
was perhaps still so in Great Seljuq times (see p. 258 ), but 
in actual practice, owing to the general militarisation of the'/ 
administration, this financial obligation had largely been 
replaced by a military one. The muqta* was expected, in ac­
cordance with the size of his iqta*, to furnish the sultan withm
troops when required. Nizam ul-Mulk at the audience the caliph 
gave to Malikshah in 4$9 (1087) presented over forty of the 
amirs individually to the caliph stating the extent of each
1 S.N. 68. In addition, the postal service was to be regularly
established on the principal roads (p. 81).
2
S.N. p. 57* The salaries of these officials were not to 
be levied from the people, but what they needed was to be 
paid from the public treasury so that they would not be 
tempted to commit treason or take bribes.
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one's iqta' and the numbers of his ‘askar. In addition to
the obligation of the muqta* to furnish the sultan with troops
when required, he could also apparently he called upon for
money. When Zahir ud-Din Tughtegin and Fakhr ul-Mulk b.
*Ammar wrote to Muhammad h. Malikshah in 5^0 (1106/7) asking
for reinforcement against the Franks, Muhammad sent Sawull
Saqawu with an 4 askar and wrote to Saif ud-Dawla Sadaqa, ruler
of Hilla, and Jigirmish, governor of Mawsil, ordering them to
reinforce him with money and men for a jihad and to exert
*
themselves in helping him* Actually instead of doing this
_  p
they combined and attacked Jawull, hut were defeated. Also
it seems that the muqta* was expected to remit either goods or 
cash to the sultan in the event of his making fresh conquests. 
Ihn ul-Athir states that when Jawull Saqawu conquered (various) 
cities and obtained many goods from them, he did not transfer 
anything to the sultan,^ When Husain, son of the at ah eg
1 Bu. 74; I.A. X.144. Hizam ul-Mulk in the Siyasat Hama
states that the muqta* must hold ready the pay of the army 
(p. 91 )* "but this was merely the expression of a wish; the 
central government had no power to enforce this. In the 
B.S^it is stated that Kama! ud-Din Muhammad h* al-]Jusain, 
Mas ud h. Muhammad1 s wazir, gave grants (nanpara) according 
to the number and rank of the army (p. 230), which suggests 





Qutlughtegin, came to Jawull Saqawu in 50 2 (1108/9) to win 
him over to the sultan, Jawull said, ”1 am the mamlufc of the
sultan and in his obedience, who took him money and clothes 
••
of great value.1
It seems likely that the central government retained in 
some cases some kind of financial control in the territory 
administered by a muqta* or governor. It may be that certain 
heads of revenue were ttreserved”, or that within certain dis­
tricts which had been assigned the sultan possessed private 
domains. Husam ud-Din Timurtash said of Zangl that ^neither 
he nor his *askar transgressed the revenue (hasil) of the 
sultan in his (Husam ud~Dinfs) territories, when attacking 
them." ^
The sultan in certain cases had a na*ib or deputy in a
district which had been assigned. In 494 (1100/1) §>adaqa
turned out the sultan’s na/ib from AbuJl Mahasin’s assignment
(muqatara) in Kufa and annexed it.^ Mahmud b. Muhammad had 
•« # •
an overseer (nazir) in al-Batiha which was one of the iqta/sM .« • «•
of Haitian Kakuya, his khadim. Neither of these cases, however 






Basra to the amir Qumaj, sent Isma/il b« Arslanjiq to Bagra
as his deputy.'*’ In this case the sultan probably had private
domains in Bagra, for Bubais, in 523 (1129)* is said to have
-  ~  2plundered what belonged to the sultan in Bagra. Muhammad 
b. Malikshah similarly obtained revenue (dakhl) from. Bagra, 
and he had in this city a na* ib
In certain cases the provincial governor seems to have 
had a definite financial contract with the central government-, 
either that he undertook to remit the surplus taxation to the 
central treasury or that he farmed the district for a definite 
sum of money. Tughril Beg, when he left Baghdad in 455 (IO63), 
fanned Baghdad to Abu Saqd al-Qa*imi, who had formerly been in 
charge of the kitchen (matbakh) of #Amid ul-Mulk and the us tad 
of his residence, for 58*000 dinars. Fakhr ud-Dawla b.
Jahlr was made governor of Diyar Bakr by Malikshah in 476 
(1083/4). ^  Barkyaruq subsequently seized *Amid ud-Dawla and 
demanded from him 150,000 dinars on the pretext that his 
father, Fakhr ud-Dawla, owed this amount from the muqata#a
of Diyar Bakhr. *Amid ud-Dawla gave 50*0p0 dinars and
1 I.A. X. 232.
2 ibid. 461.




al-Mustazhir, -whose waz ir he was, produced for him a further
100,000 to obtain his release.^
This type of iqta/ merges into the revenue farm. In 
1 such cases the farmer or muqtar was under a contract to remit 
to the central government a certain sum, but was free to col­
lect over and above this sum in the area farmed. The dif­
ference between the position of the revenue-farmer and the 
muqta* of an H administrative” iqta* was that, whereas the 
latter had complete control of the general administration of 
the district and maintained armed forces which he might be
called upon to use in support of the sultan, the farmer was
2concerned merely with the collection of taxes. A further
 ^T.S. 284. According to Ibn ul-Athlr the matter was settled 
in 493 f°r 100,000 dinars and_60,000 dinars, which rAaId 
ud-Dawla transferred to Barkyaruq.
Muhammad b, Mansur an-Nasiri (d. Shawwal 494/1101) who was 
in charge of tiie officials of the lamps_( )
under Alp Arslan had collected the kharaj of Nishapur and 
its environs, and also held the governorship of IGiwarazm; 
on one occasion he was sent a receipt from the diwan by 
Nizam ul-Mulk, which suggests there was some kind of finan­
cial contract between Muhammad and the government (A.S.D.33)
2 The following suggests, however,that there was not a great 
difference between the status of a governor and a tax- 
farmer. Bubais b. gadaqa on the death of his father had 
been assigned Hilla. After his rebellion, he took refuge 
from_Mahmud b . * Muhammad with Ilghazi in 5 1 a n d ’nent ituj the 
sultan offering to farm Hilla for 1,000 dinars per day
(I.AV 1.418). #
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difference is that, with rare exceptions, the tax-farmers were 
non-Turks, which perhaps partly accounts for the difference in 
obligation.
Tughril Beg in 451 (1059) farmed Wasit to Abu *A1I 'b. 
Fadlan for 200,000 dinars and Basra to Abu Sa*d Sabur b. al- 
Muaaffar.^  In 452 he farmed the city of Baghdad to Abu*l 
kath al-Muzaffar b # al-Husain for three years for 400,000
o
dinars. Three years later, in 455 (IO65), he farmed it 
again to Abu. Sarid al-Qa*imI for 150,000 dinars.^  In the 
same year he seized the farmer of Basra, al-ArrabI Sa*d, and 
made an agreement with Abu Ja*far b, Saqalib to farm Wasit 
for 200,000 dinars.^  Alp Arslan farmed Wasit and Bagra to 
Hazarasp in 459 (1066/7) for 500,000 dinars.^  Malikshah 
also farmed out the revenue in various places. Ibn r Allan, 
the Jew, the farmer of Basra, was drowned on Malikshah’s orders 
at the instigation of Gawhar A/in and Khumartegin in 472 
(1079/80), and Basra was then farmed to Khumartegin for
100,000 dinars annually and'100 horse.^ When Sharaf ud-Dawla 







he sent to the sultan asking him to confirm him in the farming 
(daman) of it. Malikshah agreed to this and assigned to him 
.Jpalis in addition.**' Sharaf ud-Dawla was also tax-farmer of 
Antioch on hehalf of the Se.ljuq sultan. In the absence of 
the non-muslim ruler of .Antioch, who had gone to *Akka to 
get a wife, Sulaiman b. Qutulmish seized the opportunity to 
take possession of Antioch. Sharaf ud-Dawla then demanded 
the kharaj of Antioch from Sulaiman. The latter refused to 
pay, saying that since Antioch had come into the possession 
of muslims it was no longer liable to pay khargij. Sharaf ud-
Dawla thereupon marched against Sulaiman but was defeated
2 -and killed. The private domains of the sultan and the
caliph were also farmed, llizam ul-Mulk relates how he reple­
nished the royal treasury, deplenished by the cost of an ex­
pedition to Asia Minor, by imposing a levy of 10,000 dirams 
on a hundred of the amirs, who held Alp Arslan's private 
estates, on qanats and holdings, which had become newly pro­
ductive and were not entered in the old register.^ Al- 
Khafaji farmed the private domains of the sultan in Kufa in 
452 (1060) for 4Q000 dinars annually.4 Ibn ‘Allan farmed
1 I.A. X.742.




the districts of the waklls, which belonged to the private 
domains of the caliph for 6,000 kurr of grain and 100,000 
dinars: he only obtained from them 1,000 kurr and 20,000
-r - 1dinars and defaulted for the rest.
Except in the case of "reserved” taxes, if indeed such 
taxes existed, or in the case of private domains retained by 
the sultan in an assigned district, the muqta* seems to have 
had complete control. Theoretically the ‘amil, who is men­
tioned by Hizam ul-Mulk in the Siyasat Nama, together with 
the muqta* was probably concerned with the collection of 
taxes, but in practice the 'amil was seldom found, and com­
plete independence was, in most cases, exercised by the muqta*. 
He was, moreover, able to make assignments within the area of 
his own iqta* to his own followers and clients,^ and their 
relation to him was similar to that existing between him and 
the sultan.^ The re-assignment of districts within an iqta*
1 I.A. IX.454.
p t ^
cf. Uthman, who made assignments, especially of gawafi 
lands, and allowed such assignments to be made also by his 
governors, such as Mu*awiyya (Tischendorf, p.26).
x t
J Where the original muqta had sub-assigned part of his
igta*, the control was possibly even closer. When Abu Bakr, 
muqta of Has lb In, fled from Zangi to Husam ud-Dln Timur- 
tasE, the latter refused Zangi*s demand for his return.
When Zangi then besieged Mardln, Husam ad-Din sent Abu 
Bakr to the sultan Masud b. Muhammad1 s court. Zangi there­
upon sent presents to the sultan and his wazlr and obtained 
Abu Bakr’s surrender (A.M. 14217
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I by the muqta* is especially noticeable in the case of muqta*s
who attained to the virtual status of local rulers.
Suqman b. Urtiuq (d. Safar 498/1104), after taking Mardln
which had formerly been held by ‘.All b. YaqutI b. *Urtuq, his
kinsman, assigned Jabal 3aur to *A1I.^ This and other similar
cases perhaps resemble to some extent the assignment by the
Seljuq sultan of iqta*s to minor members of his family. Maw dud
when he was muqta* of Mawsil assigned an iqta* to Zangi, and
al-Bursuqi, when he sent Zangi and Altuntash al-S.buri to
Wasit to fight Dubais b. gadaqa in $16 (1122), assigned Wasit
to Zangi.^ The latter, after he became ruler of Maw§il, made
numerous assignments to his family and followers. Saif ud-
Dln GhazI held Shahrazur as an iqta*: Jawull was given Rahba
*• •
in 521 (1127) and *Izz ud-Din atl-DubaisI, another of Zangl’s 
amirs,held Duqaq among his :iqta*s.^ Saif ud-Dln after his 
father’s death assigned al-JazIra to Abu Bakr ad-BubaisI, in 
whose hands it remained until 552 (1157)*^ Zain ud-Bln *A1I,
after Zangi*s death also began to assign the country. To








of the ^akkariyya to Qaraja, the ruler of the 'imadiyya Kurds.^ 
When Horns was handed over to Shihab ud-Din in RabI* I.
530 (II36), he assigned it to a mamluk of his grandfather, one
Mu*In ud-Din Unar and placed in it a na*ib from among his
2 -officers, and returned to Damascus. Rukn ud-Dawla Khumar-
tegln, the governor of Fars, gave a small iqta* ( — ) 
to the Mas udiyan tribe in Fars.-'
In a similar way governors and muqta*s also farmed the 
taxes of some of the territory uad&r them. In *Iraq especially 
this practice appears to have been common. When gadaqa con­
quered Wasit in 497 (1103/4) he farmed it to Muhazzab ud-
Dawla b. Abl*l Jabr (var. 0* governor of al-Batiha, until
•* - 4the end of the year for 50,000 dinars. Subsequently after 
Muhammad b. Malikshah had given Wasit to gadaqa as an iqta*, 
he farmed it again to Muhazzab ud-®awla. In this case, however 
it seems that the farmer exercised jurisdiction’ over the 
general administration, for Muhazzab ud-Dawla appointed his 
sons and followers over its governorships, and they oppressed 
the people. When the year was up, §adaqa claimed from Muha^- 
zab ud-Dawla the sum due from him, and imprisoned him when he
1 I.A. XI.8.
2





failed to pay it. It appears, therefore, that the s^urn due 
from the farmer was paid at the end of the year, and not when 
the farmer took over the district. After Muhazzab ud-Dawla 
was seized, Hammad h. Abl*l Jahr farmed Wasit. Subsequently 
Badran b. gadaqa, who was related to Muhazzab ud-Dawla by 
marriage, obtained the latter*s release and brought him back 
to al-Batlha of which town he had been governor.^M •
The muqta* had a complete freedom of choice in the ap­
pointment of administrative officials and others in the country 
assigned to him. Where the muqta* had under his jurisdiction 
an extensive area, of necessity he appointed deputies and 
other subordinate officials to act for him. This was made 
doubly necessary by the fact that the muqtar was frequently 
absent from his iqta* on military campaigns with the sultan 
or on the latter*s behalf. Dad Habashi b. Altuntaq, whom
Barkyaruq appointed governor of IQiurasan in 490 (1097)* made
-  - 2Muhammad b, Anushtegin governor of Khwarazm. When Muhammad
b. Malikshah assigned Basra to Aqsunqur al-Bukharl, the latter 
appointed Sunqur al-Bayatl his deputy, who appears to have 
been generally responsible for the administration of Basra.' 
Subsequently in $14 (1120/1) *A1I b. Sukman seized Basra. He 
confirmed 2qsunqur*s officials (rummal) and deputies, and
1 I.A. X.502,; 107.
p
ibid. 182. The former governor, Ikniji, appointed by Bark­
yaruq, had died (I.A. X. 181-2).
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wrote to Hqsunqur demanding to be made his na1 ib in Basra; 
Sqsunqur refused his request and so #JO.Iadrove out . Sqsunqur’s 
na’ibs and took possession of the city,1 Zangi, when he ob­
tained sovereignty over Mawsil, conferred on Jamal ud-Din al- 
Jawad al-Isfahan! the government of Nasibin and, in conse­
quence of the able manner he fulfilled his duties, augmented 
his jurisdiction by the addition of Rahba. Then, having been 
admitted into the intimacy of Zangi, he was appointed by him 
mushrif of the entire principality, and authorised to act 
with unlimited power. Finally, in the latter part of Zangi’s 
reign he became head of his dlwan. Deputies, moreover, even 
appointed their own subordinates. Hasir ud-Din Juqur (d. gu*l 
Qa*da 539/1145) was Zangi*s deputy in Maw§il nominated one 
al-Qazwinl to a place of authority in Mawsil.^ In some cases 
provincial officials did not take up their appointments in 
person, but appointed deputies, remaining themselves at 
court. Sard ud-Dawla Yaranqush, who was mutawalli of Isfahan,
remained in the sultan Mas#ud b. Muhammad’s camp and had a
«• •
deputy (na'ib) named GhuLbak in Isfahan.






governorship was naturally under the muqta*, who maintained 
his own private army. In rare cases the sultan or whoever 
had appointed the muqta* reinforced him with troops. Tugh- 
tegin, when he conquered Hama in 5^7 (1123), established in
-1
it a governor and also provided an *askar for its defence.
In time of emergencies there was a tendency for the amirs to
return to their, assignments to protect them from others who
might usurp them in their absence. When Buz aba sent an
* askar to attack the fortress of al-Mahki in al-Lihf in 542
(1147/3), the amir Albaqish Kun Khar, whose iqta* it was,went
to defend it from Buzaba’s * askar. ^  When Sul aim an shah b.
Muhammad advanced on Hamadan in opposition to Muhammad b.
Mahmud, a number of the latter1 s soldiers, who had estates
in Hamadan, fled back to it,^ presumably to protect their
possessions from Sulaimanshah1s army. Similarly during the
siege of Baghdad in 552 (1157/®)* when news arrived that
Malikshah had set out for Hamadan with Ildegiz, the army
began to flee in tens and twenties for their estates in 
- 4Hamadan, presumably again to protect them.
The financial relation of the muqta* towards the central
1 I.A. XI.3.
2 ibid. ?8. '
3 E.S. 263.
4 E.S. 267-8.
' government has “been discussed, above. In the theory of* Nizamn 
ul-Mulk the rights of the muqta* over the population in his 
! iqta# were only financial; he had no rights over the land or 
the cultivators, the ruler merely having delegated to him cer­
tain financial rights. He states, "let the assginees (muqta'M 
who have iqta/s, know that they have no authority over the 
peasants beyond this, that they should take the due amount 
which h§s been assigned to them from the peasants in a good 
way, and that, when they have taken that,the peasants shall 
be secure in their persons, and their money, wives, children, 
goods and farms shall be secure, and the muqta*s have no claim 
over them .*. Let the muqta*s know that the country and the 
-—  subjects all belong to the sultan. The muqta*s, who are set 
over them, and the walls are like shihnas in relation to the 
subjects, as the king is to others (I.B. subjects not on 
assigned lands), so that the. subjects may be happy, and so 
that the muqta* may be safe from punishment and torment in 
the next world."1
Nizam ul-Mulk further forbids the muata* to prevent the •#
/subjects under him from coming to the court to represent their 
7 case, threatening him with punishment and the cancellation 
of his iqta/ should he do so.1 That such a warning was neces­
sary suggests that it may have been the common practice for
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muqta's to prevent those living in their assignments from 
going to court to obtain redress for their grievances. In 
practice the position of the peasants on assigned land varied 
considerably. Their freedom of movement was often restricted, 
and they were frequently subjected to forced labour.'*' A story 
is related about the treatment of the cultivators by Zangi and 
Husam ud-Din Timurtash respectively, which throws some light 
upon the matter. A number of cultivators from the city of 
Maw§il went to Mardln. Zangi thereupon sent to Husam ud-Din 
demanding they should be sent back. Husam ud-Din answered,
"We treat the cultivators well, and take from them by way of 
a share of the grain crops ( ) one tenth, and
if you had done likewise they would not have left you. ” Zangi 
replied in the following words to Husam ud-Din, "Say to your 
master, 1 if you took 1 per cent it would be too much, for you 
are occupied with your pleasures in Mardln, but we, if we took 
two thirds, it would be little in view of what we are charged 
with by way of jihad.1 But for me, it would be a long time 
since your master had drunk water, in security in Mardln, for 
the Pranks would have taken it. If you do not return the cul­
tivators, I will take every cultivator in Mardln to Maw§il."
*■ cf. The diploma for the governorship of Hand, quoted above, 
p.252. Nasir ud-Din'Juqur, who was governor of Mawsil under 
Zangi, is said to have refrained from imposing forced labour 
upon the people (Q. 281).
260
Husam ud-Din then sent back the cultivators in question.^"
While Maw dud had been governor of Mawsil also, many of the
population had fled the country because of his tyranny, Sub-
2
sequently, however, he is said to have reformed his conduct.
There is little doubt that the general tendency of Turkish 
government was towards oppression. It may be that those of 
the muqtars who looked upon their iqta/s as long term assign­
ments made some attempt to govern well,-'* but the majority, 
knowing their tenure would probably be a short one, exacted 
as much as they could in the shortest possible time from the 
land under them.^ The extent to which Nizam ul-Mulk stresses
1 A.M. 141.
2 Q. 188.
 ^An example of this is the case of Jigirmish, who as governor
of Mawsil, was popular among the local population. He sub­
mitted to Muhammad b. Malikshah on the death of Barkyaruq 
and left the*city to pay homage to Muhammad, whom he had 
yep to that time defied. When he left*the city the people 
of Maw§il "wept and put ashes on their heads", Muhammad 
received him kindly and told him to return to his subjects, 
saying, "their hearts are yours and they are awaiting your 
return". (I,A. X.26^-4.)
4 - -It is interesting to note that the Gur Khan did not assign
iqta ,s to the amirs because he said, "when they take the 
iqjsa , they oppress" (I.A, XI. 57).
Ghazali mentions the tyranny of the Turks and the general 
decay of morality under them. He ranks the Turks together 
with tax-collectors*and sultans as tyrants, whose wealth 
was unlawfu]**(K.S. f.93b). ~He stresses the need for severi­
ty on the part of the ruler, because of the unruly, and 
seditious nature of the population of his day, and their 
tendency towards oppression, in order that the people might 
be safe from one another (Nasihat al-Muluk, p.68; 79)-
*( fummal) ** (tiaram.)
tlie tendency of officials, provincial or otherwise, to oppress 
the population of the country the moment control was relaxed 
is striking,"^ To bombat this tendency he recommends a wide­
spread use of spies. Such a policy, however, would perhaps 
merely have aggravated the lack of security in the position 
of the officials, to which their tendency to oppress was,in 
all probability, partly due. Hence, by increasing the general 
attitude of suspicion and distrust, the use of spies would 
have increased rather than decreased the tendency towards ex­
tortion. Officials, assuming their period of office was 
likely to be short, would have tended all the more to make 
the most of that opportunity to enrich themselves. How far 
the extortion of the muqta*s and their subordinates was con­
trolled and restrained depended largely upon the power of 
the sultan. The following anecdote suggests that Malikshah 
attempted to exercise some degree of control. *Abd us-Sami* 
b. Da*ud al-* Abbas 1 related how two men from the town of al- 
Haddadiyya in Lower *Ii?aq having complained to him that their 
muqta*, Khumartegin, had extorted 1600 dinars from them, 
demanded that the sultan should exact retaliation for them. 
Malikshah accordingly wrote a decree dismissing Khumartegin 
from his iqta*, returned the money to them both and gave 
them both 100 dinars.^
^ Nizam ul-Mulk had perhaps an unhappy experience of the ex­
tortion of officials in his early career (see p. 82).
2 I.A. X.144.
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In any case, whether the muqta* governed the territories 
■under him with justice or not, personal attention to the adminis­
tration, and particularly to the collection of taxes, was es­
sential if he wished to obtain the full benefit from his 
iata*. Hence there was a tendency for the amirs to return to
1 h*.es*Xicrw*dL <k Cl
their iqta/s at harvest-time. ^Then Muhammad b. Mahmud decided
to advance on Baghdad in the spring of 550 (1155)> he was
forced, after going several stages, to return to Azerbaijan
owing to the fact that the amirs and the army would not leave
their homes and iqta*s because it was harvest time.'*’*•
The payment of the standing army and of the various junds 
was largely by assignments. In making such assignments to
their troops the Seljuqs were merely continuing the practice
2 —of the Buyids and others. Bundari’s statement that kizam ul-
Mulk introduced the practice of assigning iqta‘s to the soldiery 
is thus hardly correct. He goes on to state that Nizam ul- 
Mulk, seeing the disorder of the country and the irregularity 
of the payment of taxes, assigned the country to the ajnad, 
handing over to them its produce and the levy of taxes, the
5
income from which they devoted to making the country prosperous.
1 Bu. 225.
Ar-Rahim's (askar in Baghdad, for example, had iota/s. Tugh- 
ril Beg seized these from their holders in 447~Tl055/6)"and 




A unification of the military assignment and the administrative
 ^ assignment was indeed taking place, hut in Great Seljuq times 
«
there was still some slight difference between the two. In 
the latter case the amirs,when not on campaigns, lived on and 
administered directly their assignments, which were granted 
not only in reward for past services, hut also in the hope of 
future services, whereas in the former case, members of the 
standing army remained in service and merely received the pro­
duce of their assignments, which were granted for services 
l actually being rendered at the time.'3' The iqta*s of the stand­
ing army, moreover, naturally tended to be smaller than those 
of the great amirs. This was due partly to the fact that the 
standing army remained with the sultan under his direct control, 
whereas the great amirs, who were either sent to the provinces 
or went of their own accord, were able to usurp the control
of large areas. The distinction, however, is perhaps an arti­
ficial one.
A hereditary tendency also appeared in these military 
assignments, as in the "administrative" assignments, but it did 
not become the normal practice, according to Ibn ul-Athir until 
the tirde of Mur ud-Din b. Zangi, ruler of Aleppo (541-69/1146/75} 
The latter, when one of the ajnad died, would confirm his son
 ^Hizam ul-Mulk, for example, would assign to a jundi perhaps
lDOO dinars, half on Samarkand and half on Asia Minor
(A.S.D. 68).
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in his late father’s iqta*. If the new assignee had already 
attained to years of discretion, he would manage it indepen­
dently, but if he was still a minor Hur ud-Din would appoint 
someone to manage his affairs for him until he grew up. Thus, 
Ibn ul-Athir states, the ajnad, realising these estates (amlak) 
were their own property inherited from father to son, were 
willing to fight for them and showed great firmness in battle. 
Ibrahim Yamal, who went to Awana in 496 (1102/3) plundered the 
country and assigned the towns ( gj* ) to his soldiers.
Dubais b. gadaqa also paid his troops by iqta*.^
In addition to the assignments to the individual members 
of the standing army, it seems that under Malikshah there were 
a number of assignments throughout the country, which were 
reserved for the use of the army on campaigns. The Hahat u§- 
Sudur states that the iqta*s of Malikshah’s standing army 
were scattered throughout the country so that wherever they 
arrived provisions, fodder and what was necessary for their 
immediate expenses were ready.^ Whether these were merely •
^ A.M. 3O8. cf. al-Makrlzi (Ehitat 11.216) who quotes a state­
ment of a jundi belonging to the army of Kur ud-Din, "the 
assignment belongs to us, it is'our property. We pass it 
on to our children, from father to son, and in return for 
it we are willing -to run the risk of death.”
2 I.A. X.244.
' I.A. X.423. After making peace with the caliph in $16 he 
ordered a body of his troops to go to their iqta*s in Wasit.
4 E.S. ljl; T.6. 449; U.H.S. 60.
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stores "bought or levied from the local population by the 
sultan and kept in royal storehouses at different points, or 
actually the produce of land directly administered fvv the 
benefit of the standing army is not clear. This system was, 
in all probability, largely responsible for the ease and suc­
cess with which Malikshah was. able to carry out his campaigns 
and march large bodies of troops from one part of his empire 
to another. Under the later sultans, with the weakening of 
central control, such stores or lands ceased to exist, and 
were no doubt usurped by amirs.
For the upkeep of the ajnad or local militia a district 
or districts in the neighbourhood was assigned either to the 
individual members of the jund, or in some cases to the jund 
collectively.^ Tughril Beg, when he entered Isfahan in 44J 
(1051) drove out the ajnad of the city and gave them assign- 
ments in the hill country. Zangi, when he entered Aleppo in 
522 (1128) assigned its districts to the ajnad and amirs. ^ 
M a s rud al-Bilall, wall (or shihna) of Baghdad, went to Hilla 
on the death of Mas*ud and seized Salarkurd, who was at that 
time in possession of it. He then assembled the soldiers and
1 _ ^  f
Shams ul-Khawass was leader (muqaddjm) of the askar of
of Aleppo and * mut aw all I of the iqt a^ of the jund in 508 
(1114/5). This suggests that the**iqta* was a collective 
one assigned to the jund as a body and not to the individual 




assigned those districts ( ).^
1/ Fourthly, there were iqta's granted to administrative 
officials and others. A diploma issued by Alp Arslan for 
'Amid al-Mulk, one of the amirs d>f the dlwan, in payment for 
good service has been preserved. The walayat of Quhistan and
i
its dependencies with the taxes and produce were conferred 
upon him as an iqta* and he was given full control in those 
districts. He was exhorted to look after the interests of 
the population and to demand only the customary taxes * and to 
collect them with civility and gradually (?
This was perhaps an nadministrative” iqta' assigned to 'Amid al- 
Mulk, who may have given up his position in the djiwan and 
became instead a provincial governor. The usual iqta' granted 
to the wazlrs in the Great Seljuq period, whether the sultan’s 
wazlr ot the wazlr of governors was, according to Ibn Khalli- 
kin, one tenth of the produce of the soil. Such was the iqta' 
of Jamal ud-Din al-Jawad al-Isfahan!, who was wazlr to Zangi, 
and after his death to Saif ud-Din GhazI b, Zangi.^ This 
type of iq£a' - the grant of a portion of the produce of the 
soil - is clearly something different from the military iqta'. 
Hizam ul-Mulk was accused by Abu’l Mahasin b. Kama! ul-Mulk 
and his friends before Malikshah of misappropriation of the 
state revenue. He admitted to taking one tenth of Malikshah’s
1 Bu. 215; I.A. XI. 106.
Collection of letters. Add. 7&88. f.4b,5b.
2 I.E. III.297-
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wealth which he spent upon the standing army, alms, gifts and 
waqfs.^ This story may perhaps be the foundation of Ibn 
IQiallikan’s statement.
In addition the wazir in most cases also held various ^ 
assignments of land. Such assignments differed from the 
military and administrative assignments in so far as the 
holder was not under an obligation to furnish the sultan 
with troops, but since the maintenance of private armies by 
important persons was the general rule rather than the excep­
tion, the produce of these assignments was probably largely 
spent upon the upkeep of troops. It is clear also that the 
muqta* in such cases did not live in his iqta*. In 456 (1064)
Malikshah assigned to Nizam ul-Mulk, his wazir, iqta*s among 
_ p
which was Tus. It is, moreover, said that the assassin of 
Nizam ul-Mulk was suborned against him by Malikshah, because 
the latter was tired of seeing his wazir live so long and 
coveted the numerous assignments which he held in his posses­
sion.-^ Muhammad b. Malikshah, when he appointed Sa#d al-Mulk 
Abu’l Mahasin wazir, enriched him with iqta's.4' M u ’ayyid





■ul-Mulk b. Biz am ul-Mulk held the fortress of Khalanj an, 
fifteen farsakhs from Isfahan, and after his death it passed
_ _ 1 J.
into the hands of Jawuli Saqawu. This, however, was perhaps 
a private estate and not part of his emoluments as wazir.
Aitegln as-Sulaimanl, shihna of Baghdad was given Takrlt 
as an iqta* “by Uizam ul-Mulk; Gawhar A 1 In, who succeeded 
him as shihna of Baghdad in 464 (1071/2), also held Takrlt as 
an iqta* until Majd ul-Mulk al-Balasanl took it from him.^ 
Subsequently it came again into the possession of the shihna 
of Baghdad when Mas*ud al-Bilall held it.^ IlghazI b* Urtuq, 
another shihna of Baghdad was assigned Hulwan and other places^ 
and Qaslm ud-Dawla al-Bursuql, who became shihna of Baghdad 
in JumadI 1.501 (1108), was assigned Wasit by Muhammad b. 
Malikshah.^
Court officials also received assignments* Under Malik­
shah, Khwarazm belonged to the tasht-khana, and when Nush- 
tegln became tasht-dar (cup-bearer) the governorship of 





5 I.A. X.255. Urtuq, however, had keen governor of




who rebelled against the sultan in 544 (1149/50)* had. been a 
(court) jester.***
The following assignment does not fall exactly within 
the class of assignments to amirs or to administrative 
officials. Malikshah gave the amirs of Mecca and Madina an 
iqja and a ferant (rasm) in place of the former practice of 
levying seven gold dinars on every pilgrim,2
It seems that various members of the religious institu­
tion also held iqta/s. In the case of qagLls, these may per­
haps be included among the iqta's granted to officials, since 
the qadl was appointed by the government to exercise official 
control over the religious institution. Zangl, when he ap­
pointed Bah a ud-hln ash-Shahrazurl qadl;/al-qudat of all his 
domains, increased his assignments and personal estates 
(amlak).^
Fifthly may be distinguished .^personal" iqta*s granted
to private persons and others as a kind of gift. In many
cases it is extremely difficult to distinguish these from
other types of iqta/s; the same person frequently held not
only a "personal" iqta* but other types of iqta* as well. The
•» ■»
"personal" iqta* may probably have been granted in some cases 





Yaghl Siyan, governor of Antioch* for example, seems to have 
held a "personal*1 and hereditary iqta* in addition to his 
governorship. He was assigned during the reign of Malikshah 
an iqta* in the neighbourhood of Astarabad* and on his death* 
his son returned to the wilayat of his father in those parts.^  
More striking is the case of Anushtegin Shirgir, who having 
been seized by Kundoghdi on the death of Muhammad b. Malikshah* 
was set free by Sanjar, whereupon he returned to his iqta*,
Abhar and Zanjan. Had this been an administrative iqta*, it 
would surely have been assigned to someone else during the 
interval. Unar also seems to have had a "personal” iqta* in 
Azerbaijan, to which he returned from I§fahan in 492.^ Gawhar 
A*In, before he became shihna of Baghdad had been assigned
Wasit by Alp Arslan.^ Raihan Mahkuya, one of Muhammad b.
- - - < sMalikshah1 s khadims held Basra as one of his iqta s.-' Bark-...... . . ,, i— #
yaruq. further assigned Mardln and its governorships to a
^ This seems undoubtedly to have been a "personal
Originally it appears to have "been granted not by tEe sultan
but by the amir_Buz an. Fadlun had rebelled against Malik­
shah in Asterabad and been* defeated by Buzan, who had as­
signed his territories to a number of amirs* among whom 







- 2Such "personal” estates were also known by the term amlak. 
Between these and other types of iqta* some distinction was 
clearly drawn. Zangl forbade his followers from acquiring 
estates (amlak) saying, "As long as we have the country, what 
need have you of "personal” estates? Iqta's provide a suffi­
ciency. If the country passes out of our possession, the 
estates (amlak) will go too. When the followers of the sul­
tan have estates they oppress the subjects, act tyrannically 
towards them and usurp their estates ( )."3 xn
Fars there seems also to have been a distinction between 
milk and iqta*. At Bun, which was good meadow land with
M * A
springs and villages, part was milk and part iqta .
What were the rights of the owners of such landed estates 
over them is not clear. Barkyaruq's wazir, the ustad *Abd ul- 
Jalxl ad-Dihistani, is said to have taken away estates (amlak) 




cf. Nizam ul-Mulk who said, "I was desirous of having a 
village which should be my private domain ( ) and
^mosque (I.A. X.141).
The term khalisa, which subsequently became used in the
Lsense of crown land, may have also been at this time a technical term for a private domain or personal estate.
? A.M. 1^7.
4 F.N. 155, 124.
5 Bu. 82.
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Lastly, in a different class to the iqta/s previously 
mentioned is the iqta/ assigned hy the sultans to the caliphs?* 
This was granted to him to meet the expenses of his position, 
and clearly carried with it no obligations. This practice 
of assigning an iqta' to the caliph was not introduced by 
Seljuqs but survived from the preceding period. When al- 
Qa’im demurred at complying with Tughril Beg!s request for 
his daughter’s hand, the latter wrote to '.Amid ul-Mulk al- 
Kundurl instructing him to seize the caliph’s iqta/s, leaving 
him only what had formerly belonged to the imam al-Qadir.
The caliph being powerless to prevent this told Tughril to 
assign these iqta/s. Mahmud b« Muhammad, when he was sultan, 
sent to al-Muqtafi concerning the confirmation of the iqta' 
which belonged to the members of his court. The answer came 
back, "In the palace are eighty mules to transport water 
from the Tigris. Let the sultan consider what the people who 
drink this water need to be allotted,1* and it was agreed he 
should be assigned what had belonged to al-Hustarshid.^ Simi­
larly Mas'ud b. Muhammad sent to al-Muqtafl to ask him the 
number of his followers and the amount of his expenses* so
that he might give him districts which would suffice for his 
4 - rexpenses. This iqta was, as it were, thetTpersonal” estate
*■ Ibn ul-Athlr’s statement that the caliph had no iqta's, the 
revenues of which he collected, does not seem to Be borne 





of the caliph. Originally the caliph’s estates were not 
apparently re-assigned hy the caliph. When Zangi was given 
Sarlfain, the Harun Gate (quarter), and Jara Malik in 53^ 
(1155/6) by al-Muqtafl after he had become caliph, Ibn ul- 
Athir relates that this was, according to his father, the 
first time one of the provincial leaders ( — )
was given a part of the "personal” estates of the caliph.'*'
The caliph’s iqta* was administered by the officials of 
his diwan. When *AmId til-Daw la came to Baghdad in 462 (IO69/ 
70) and became wazir to the caliph, the latter charged him 
with the management of his iqta*. There seems to have been 
. s W a t . - a t  i* This w  =0—  psrkps
with the administration of the caliph’s iqta*, or with the 
districts lying immediately round Baghdad, which were known 
at one time under the technical name of muqata at.
The caliph’s wazir, as the sultan’s wazir, also received 
assignments as part of the emolument of his office. Abu*l 
Patli Mansur b. Ahmad b. Darast, when seeking appointment to 
the caliph’s wazirate in 453 (106l) offered to serve without 
an iqta.  ^ Apparently the assignment granted to the caliph's
1 I.A. XI.29.
2
Bu.55* ul-Athlr states that al-Mustarshid dropped from
the iqta* belonging to him all injustice and ordered nothing 
should~be taken from it except what it had been the custom 
to take formerly (I. A. X.382).
 ^ Ibn at-Ta*aw!z! (b.47&, <1*553* according to Y. b.519* d.5&3) 
was a katib in the diwan al-muqata*at at Baghdad. (I .K, III. 
162. Y. VII.31).
4 cf. Nuzhat, p.43.
5 I.A. X.8-9; Bu. 21.
27}
wazir was made "by the sultan, and not by the 'caliph* When 
Malikshah sent Abu’l-^Ala Muhammad b* al-Husain to Baghdad as 
wazir to the'caliph in Rabi* I. 463 (1070), he assigned him 
half the iqta* of the wazir Eakhr ud-Dawla b* Jahir.’*’ This 
was perhaps a money grant of revenue rather than the assign­
ment of land. The caliph’s wakils also held iqta*s, and these 
similarly were to some extent under the control of the sultan.
n-l.,-,
In 479 (1086/7) the sultan commanded that the Barz Canal of
  ----- c;
the Khurasan road together with 10,000 dinars from the commer­
cial transactions ( ZLcUue ) of Baghdad should be added to 
the iqta s of the caliph’s wakils.^
Towards the latter part of the Great Seljuq period, the 
caliph, as his power increased began himself to make assign­
ments, which, in view of the fact that the caliphate became 
one of the succession states of the Great Seljuq Empire, is 
only natural. When the caliph conquered *Iraq from Kufa to 
Hulwan and from Takrlt to * Abadan, he assigned Wasit and its 
governorships, Basra and its canals, strongholds ( )*
and districts ( LfJtVj ), Hilla, Kufa, the Nahr ul-Malik, the 
*Tsa canal, Dujail, Radan, and the Khurasan road district up 
to the neighbourhood of Hulwan, while he granted to his wazir






wazir and. his officials in this district.
Abu’l Ma*ali, who was appointed head (sahib) of the
caliph’s diwan in $01 (1107/8), mentioned how the caliph one
year made many assignments to the amirs and his intimates and
that as a result several dams were split up, many cultivated
p
places ruined and the revenue decreased. Al-Mu*ayyad, the. 
Baghdadi poet related to Usama b. Munqiz in Maw§il in 5^5 
(1169/70) that the caliph had assigned to his father a village; 
this place was infested with highway robbers, and al-Mu’ayyad* s
father endeavoured to please them out of fear of them and in 
order to profit a little from what they seized.^ This cor­
responded perhaps to a "personal*1 iqta*, as does also the 
following case. Ibn at-Talmidh, a famous Christian physicistn
in Baghdad held the Bar al-Qawarlr in Baghdad as part of his 
_  ^ When
iqta* './ Yahya b. Hubaira became wazir to the caliph, he took 
this away from him. Al-Muqtadi, when he learnt of this, gave 
Ibn at-Talmidh- another iqta*
1 Bu. 215.
2 T.S. 292.
* Hitti: An Arab Syrian Gentleman and Warrior... p.100.
4 Y. VII. 243-4.
275
CHAPTER V I .
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION.
The administration of towns and cities was in all proba­
bility left largely in the hands of local officials. The 
governor was appointed by the central government in the direct­
ly administered area, or by the assignee in the indirectly 
administered area. The various cities under the direct con­
trol of the central government there was a shihna or military 
governor. The precise meaning of this term is not absolutely 
clear, but in niew of the fact that the references to shihnas
-------------- y -
in the sources are chiefly, if not without exception, concern­
ing cities under the direct administration of the central 
government, including Baghdad, which, as stated in Chapter I., 
did not fall exactly into either of these categories, it may 
be that the shihna, generally speaking, was found only in 
directly administered territory. The appointment of a shihna 
to any specific region by a sultan or malik seems further to 
have been symbolic of the fact that he (the sultan or malik) 
had jurisdiction over that city.1 Baghdad was especially
1 The following references support this view. tt*Uman remained 
in_the_hands of the Seljuqs of Kirman till the time of Ar- 
slanshah b. Kirmanshah b, Qawurdshah, and the shihna of Kir­
man was always there”(Muhammad Ibrahim, p. 10). Towards the 
end of the reign of Muhammad b. Arslanshah, the Ghuzz came to
Khurasan, and the governor of Tab as gave the city back to Kir­
man and the shihna of Kirman faas in^sbas until the appear­
ance of Mu*ayyaff^T ibid. p.33).
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important in this respect. One of the first actions of a 
Seljuq prince who sought to establish himself as sultan was 
to appoint a shihna of Baghdad. This frequently led to
struggles in Baghdad between shihnas appointed by rival 
claimants to the throne. Tutush, although he was never general 
ly recognised as sultan, nevertheless had a shihna, Aitegin 
Hab, in Baghdad in 487 (1094), and in the following year he 
sent Yusuf b. Abuq there as shihna.'*' Barkyaruq and his brother 
Muhammad, during their struggles, were both intermittently 
represented by shihnas in Baghdad. Ilghazi b. Urtuq was ap­
pointed by the latter in 494 (1100/1). ^  Gumishtegln 'al^Qaisari 
reached Baghdad in 496 (1102/3) shihna on behalf of Bark­
yaruq. Ilghazi, hearing of his approach, sent to Suqman b. 
Urtuq and Sadaqa for help. Finally the caliph agreed to 
Sadaqa1s demand that Gumishtegin should be turned out.^
Local rulers such as gadaqa, the Mazyadid, also appointed 
4shihnas, but, generally speaking, it does not seem that the 
"landed” amirs established in the territory under them offi­
cials known as shihnas.
1 I.A. Z.166.
2 ibid. 225- 
^ ibid.. 246.
4 ' -f-r -e.g. v?hen Isma ll b. Arslanjiq capitulated in Basra in 499*
Sadaqa set up a shihna and returned to Hill a (11 A* X. 278).
Subsequently Muhammad b. Malikshah sent*a shihna and an
amid to Basra and took it from Sadaqa (I.A. X.284).
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Among the shihna*s duties were the defence of the city 
and the maintainance of public order and security, and for 
this purpose he had a number of troops under him, who belonged 
to the ‘askar and not to the jund or local militia. When Sulai- 
manshah b. Muhammad came to Isfahan in 549 (H54/3)* the 
shihna prevented his entrance. Similarly Inanj, shihna of
Rei, defeated Malikshah b. Mahmud and Ildegiz when they 
advanced on Rei in 552 (1157/8)- Isma#il b. Arslanjiq, when 
shihna of Rei under Malikshah, adopted severe measures towards 
the people and brought’them under control.^ Turkan Khatun, on 
her deathbed, ordered Unar and Surmuz, shihna of Isfahan, to 
hold the kingdom for her son Mahmud, which suggests that Surmuz
was relatively powerful.^" When Seljuqshah b. Muhammad advanced
I" u
on Baghdad in 532 (1157/8)» Albaqish as-Silahl, the shihna, 
came out against him with Bazar, the amir hajj, and jibined 
battle with him.^ The shihna of Baghdad had, moreover, a con­
siderable force at his disposal, and was even expected to
1 I.A. XI.1^6.
2 ibid. 142.
 ^I.A. X.2J2. The people of Rei and. the cotmtry people
( ) ka& "baffled those who had been set over
them.
4  ■ .
I.A. X.I65. Surmuz subsequently tried to stir up rebellion 
against Barkyaruq (I,A. X.198).
5 I.A. XI. 40.
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■undertake military expeditions. Gawhar A*In in 478 (1085/6)
went at the head of an * askar to help Fakhr ud-Dawla b. Jahir
in the siege of Mayyafariqin.'1’ In 480 (1087/8) he went to
^ p
fight Muhazzab ud-Dawla b. Abl’l Jabr, governor of al-Batiha, 
while in 485 (1092/5), he was sent at the head of an expedi­
tion to conquer the Hijaz and the Yemen. ^ Bak Aha, who was 
the shihna of Baghdad during the rule of Mas*ud b* Muhammad, 
was ordered to attack Hilla on the death of Dubais b. gadaqa, 
but he did not do so out of weakness and cowardice, and 
because of the formidable (askar with §adaqa b. Bubais in 
Hilla.^ Ilghazi, when shihna, was accompanied by Turkomans, 
and there were frequent riots between them and the populace.^
. After the outbreak of rioting between the Hanbalis and the 
Ash'aris in Baghdad in 470 (1077/8) Mu’ayyid ul-Mulk b. Kizam 
ul-Mulk, who was in the Hizamiyya madras a at the time, sent
for the ramid and the shihna. They came with the jund and
 --------
dispersed the people. When Gawhar 3/In left Baghdad for




' e.g. In Eajab in 495 (1102). Gawhar A'ln’s troops were
also unpopular. In gafar 481 (1088), a woman was attacked 
by the people of the Azaj gate for giving water to the 
troops. She appealed to Gawhar A*in who happened to be 
passing, and he.forbade the people to do this. A fight 
ensued between his troops and the mob, in which he took 




al-BatTha in 480 (1087/8)/ numerous disturbances broke out in 
the city, ^ which suggests that he was largely instrumental in 
preserving public order. During the riots in Baghdad in 482 
(1089/90)* Khumartegin, the shihna, came to the Tigris at the 
head of a body of horsemen and infantry, but failed to stop 
the ritrting. In Jumadi I. of the same year, the people of 
Karkh went with the shihna to put down a disturbance between 
the people of the Dujaj Canal quarter and the Sunnis, who had 
attacked them.^ In 487 (1094) Ibn Sinan, the katib of the 
naqib ud-nuqaba, Tirad az-Zainabi, was killed and Tirad went 
to the shihna, Aitegin Hab, demanding that someone should be 
sent to exact punishment for him, and Aitegin sent his hajib.
The people of the Ba§ra gate reviled him, and he returned to 
his master and complained. Aitegin then sent his brother to 
punish them. He accordingly went with a large body of follow­
ers and the people of Karkh followed them, burning and plunder­
ing. The caliph thereupon sent to the shihna ordering him to 
exact retribution from them, which he did.*^  In $12 (1118/9)* 
when the *ayyarun on the west side of Baghdad became numerous, 
the na*ib of the shihna crossed with fifty Turkish ghulgms but 
was defeated. On the following day he returned with two hundred
1 I.A. X.107.
2 ibid. 117.
 ^ ibid.. I63.
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and still failed to gain a victory.1 In 530 (1155/6) and
subsequent years the shihna also undertook measures against the
„
cayyarun. It was perhaps in his capacity as the guardian of 
public order and security that the shihna of Sava seized twenty- 
eight Batinis, who had assembled one year at the rid at the 
beginning of the movement.-^ As such the shihna further 
perhaps was able to some extent to restrain injustice, whether 
committed by the people or by the sultan’s troops and officials. 
This may have been the reason that the qadl of Wasit implored 
mercy for the people from Bakryaruq in 495 (1101/2) and deman­
ded a shihna be sent to the town to reassure the minds of the
people.4.
This was not the case, however, in Baghdad after the death 
of Malikshah, when the shihna*s position became even less secure 
than it had been formerly. A change in the sultanate meant a 
change of shihna in Baghdad, and as stated above this sometimes 
led to war between the rival claimants. ^  This fact further 
accentuated the lack of security in the shihna*s position, 
which, owing largely to the prevailing custom of intrigue, was
1 I.A. X.383.
2 ibid. XI.29, 40, 59.
' ibid. X.213. Subsequently he set them free.
^ ibid. X.226.
 ^Siddiqi: I.C. 2H.I. 38-9.
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common to almost all offices in the Great Seljuq empire, and 
reflected unfavourably on his conduct. Ilghazi and his fol­
lowers frequently plundered, hut they were admittedly Turko­
mans, and hence particularly prone to plunder, if ter a riot 
between them and the populace in 495 (1101/2), the caliph sent 
the qadl ul-qudat and Alkiya al-Haxxas to him to restrain him 
from plundering.1 Mangubars, appointed shihna in 512 (1118/9)* 
oppressed and fined the people. Those of the people who had 
wealth hid, while some took refuge in the haram of the caliph’s 
residence. The substance of the people was wasted, and his 
troops committed numerous acts of prostitution. When Mahmud 
b. Muhammad heard what he was doing, he sent to him urging him 
to join him, but Mangubars made excuses that he was collecting 
money and fines and delayed. The people of Baghdad having 
learnt the sultan’s outlook towards Mangubars had changed, then
desired his blood, and Mangubars, fearing they would take
2 -vengeance on him, fled. Ibn Albaqish as-Silahi, the shihna
of Baghdad, oppressed the people of Baghdad in an unprecedented 
way and in 552 (1137/8) Mas'ud b. Muhammad seized him.^
In Baghdad, if not in other cities, the shihna was, in
1 I.A. X.232.
2 ibid. 380-1.
' He was imprisoned in Takrlt and when he was about to be killed 
on Mas^d's orders, he threw himself into the Tigris and 
was drowned (I.A. 11.43).
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addition to his other duties, to some extent concerned with
the collection of taxes (see Chapter II.). The shihna of
Baghdad further, in view of the fact that Baghdad was the seat
t
of the caliph, had special duties. .Amongst his functions
was that of ambassador from the sultan to the caliph. As such••
he arranged with the latter for the mention of the sultan’s
name in the khutba. Bor example, when Tutush demanded of the*#
caliph that the khutba should be read in his name, Aitegin
Hab, his shihna, appeared continually at the diwan until his
1
demand was acceded to. In 497 (1104) after Muhammad b, 
Malikshah and Barkyaruq had made peace, Ilghazi appeared at 
the caliph’s diwan, and asked for the khutba to be read in 
Barkyaruq’s name.^ After the latter’s death, Ilghazi again 
appeared at the diwan and arranged for the khutba to be read
~ _ 4
in the name of Malikshah b. Barkyaruq. On ceremonial occa­
sions he probably represented the sultan in the absence of
the latter or his wazir, and had various duties.^ Not only
t in Baghdad
The first occasion a shihna was appointed/by a Seljuq was in 
452 (1060), when Tughril Beg appointed a shihna before he 




 ^Gawhar A’In, the shihna of Baghdad and others escorted the
bridal outfit of Malikshah’s daughter to the caliuh’s palace 
in 472 (1079/80) (I.A. X.106), and in 482 (IO89/9O) when 
the sultan demanded the return of his daughter because of 
the cali^E’s treatment of her, G-awhar A’in walked with her 
litter (I.A. X.116).
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was the shihna the sultan’s ambassador to the caliph, he had • ».
also to watch over the latter’s power to see that it did not
unduly increase. In 520 (1126) Yaranqush az-Zskawx, the
shihna of Baghdad went to the sultan, complained of the
caliph’s na*ibs, between whom and Yaranqush discord had broken 
out, and warned him of the caliph’s increasing power.1 Later
in that year when Mahmud b # Muhammad prepared to leave Baghdad
against
he looked for someone to appoint shihna, who would secure him/
_ ” "> <r\
the caliph, and he appointed *Imad ud-Din Zangl. Probably 
because he was the ambassador or representative of the sultan, 
the shihna of Baghdad enjoyed a high status, JThen Gawhar 
2/in reached Baghdad in Muharram 471 (1078), three nawbas, 
which was strictly speaking the ingignia of a malik, were 
beaten at his gate at the times of prayer.-^ Later this was 
forbidden. The shihna’, although he was an ambassador to the 
caliph, did not always treat the latter with respect. In 
Ramadan 529 (HJ5)* Bote. Aba reached Baghdad as shihna on 
behalf of Mas#ud b. Muhammad, and his slaves seized the 
caliph’s estates and took their crops,^ Subsequently when
1 I.A. X.447-8.
 ^ibid. 452.
 ^Bu. 501 I.A. X.72^. Gawhar 3.*in had demanded this privilege 
formerly, but had not received it because it was not custo^ 
mary.
4 VI.A, XI. 16. A number of the populace were roused at this, 
and fought the shihna’s troops, and 150 of the people were 
killed.
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ar-Rashid refused, to comply with Yaranqush az-ZakawI’s demand 
on behalf of Mas*ud to pay the money settled by agreement
with al-Mustarshid, Bak Aba prepared with Yaranqush to attack
T_. " 1  » T
the dar ul-khilafa. Masud al-Bilali, who also became shihna•
of Baghdad on behalf of Mas*ud b. Muhammad, used to behave 
with great impoliteness in the presence of the caliph, trans­
gressing the rules of etiquette and permitting his licentious 
followers to spread disorder through the city. Qawam ud-Din 
Abu*l Qasim rAlI b. Sadaqa, who was at that time the caliph’s 
wazir, wrote a number of letters to the sultan, requesting him 
to reprimand al-Bilali for his conduct, but could never obtain 
an answer. Subsequently *Aun ud-Din b* Hubaira at the caliph’s 
orders wrote to Mas*ud about this matter and received an answer
containing the sultan’s excuses with a formal disapproval of
- pal-Bilali’s conduct.
The jurisdiction of the shihna of Baghdad seems to have 
varied. At times it included part, if not all, of *Iraq as 
well. Indeed the shihna is sometimes called the ’shihna of 
‘Iraq.” Ilghazi b, Urtuq, while shihna, appointed his nephew 
Balak b. Bahram as ramil over the Khurasan Road district in 





Basra and ordered him to protect the city.1
The position of the shihna of Baghdad, apart from the usual
insecurity attaching to office, was precarious for other reasons.
Siddiqi states that on the one hand he was the representative
of the sultan and had therefore to carry out his duties in ac~• •
cordance with the latter1 s orders; on the other hand he had to 
deal with a still higher authority than that of the sultan, i#e. 
the caliph, who still considered himself the supreme authority 
in all matters, at Baghdad at least. In cases of negligence 
or malpractices started "by the shihna, the people instead of
complaining to the sultan, approached the caliph, who was at
_ p
Baghdad and thus easily accessible. Theoretically this may
have been so, but in practice, at least as far as the period 
up to the death of Malikshah is concerned, the caliph had 
little power, and there does not seem to have been much friction 
in administrative matters between the shihna and officials of 
the caliph*s diwan, until the Seljuq empire had begun to break 
up, though there was no doubt some overlapping of jurisdiction. 
While Gawhar I*In was shihna the administration of Baghdad seems 
to have been in his hands, and the city was apparently well 
administered by him.^
1 A.M. 46. On a former ocdasion the sultan appointed the shihna
of Basra (see above, p.276, note 4.)7
2 I.e. X.3. 406t7.
' Bn. 42. He was appointed according to Btmdarl in Rabi* II.
463 (1071)* and according to Ibn ul-Athlr in 464 (1071/2)
(I.A. X.47).
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After the death of Muhammad b, Malikshah and the gradual 
re-emergence of the caliphate as a temporal power, the posi­
tion of the shihna did, however, become increasingly diffi­
cult, On various occasions open quarrels arose. As stated 
above, discord broke out in 520 (1126) between Yaranqush and 
the caliph’s na’ibs. The caliph began as he increased in 
power to use the shihna to carry out his own plans,^ On the 
death of Mas#ud b. Muhammad in 547 (1152), Mas*ud al-Bilali, 
the shihna, fled to Takrit and the caliph took possession of
his house and the houses of his followers and of the sultan’s•«
2troops in Baghdad.
The payment of the shihna of Baghdad was by iqta# (see 
Chapter V.). There were no conditions limiting the appoint­
ment of the shihna. The majority were probably Tuiks. In 
Baghdad that office was filled by Turkomans (ilghazi being 
the most prominent), Turkish amirs and others. Mangubars, 
who became shihna in $12 (1118/9) actually a member of
the Seljuq family,Some of the most powerful amirs of their 
time were also appointed shihna, notably al-Bursuqi, who 
■became shihna in 498 (U04/5),4 512 (1118/9)5 and 516 (1122/3)°
After al-Bursuqi ties re-appointed shihna in $16 (1122/3) the
caliph proposed to him to turn LubaisT). Sadaqa out of Hil- 
la (I.A. X.422), and when Dubais plundered Basra in 53-7* 
(1125/4), the caliph reproached al-Bursuqi for having ne­







and *Imad ud-Din Zangl "who became shihna in 521 (1127).^ Dor
a time, during the reign of Mas*ud b. Muhammad, Pakhr ud-Din
b. *Abd ar-Rahman b« Tughra/Irak was shihna of Baghdad, which
post he was do doubt given because of the influence of his
2
father. On the latter* s death he was dismissed.
The caliph at times appears to have had some say in the 
appointment of the shihna of Baghdad. Al-Bursuqi was dismissed 
from the office of shihna in 518 (1124/5) caliph’s re­
quest,^ while earlier the caliph had refused to accept the re­
appointment of Aitegin as-Sulaimani as shihna, when he returned 
to Baghdad in 465/4 (1071/2). The reason for this was that 
the latter* s son, whom Aitegin had appointed to be his succes­
sor during his absence, had killed one of the mamluks of the 
palace. Y/hen Nizam ul-Mulk saw the caliph was resolved that 
Aitegin should not become shihna, he sent Gawhar A*Tn to 
Baghdad as shihna.^
It does not seem that there was a shihna in all large 
cities in the directly administered area. The most important 
cases in which shihnas are mentioned relate to Baghdad, Isfahan,




4 I.A. X.47-8; Bu. 42.
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fact directly administered towards the end of the period, 
though it may theoretically have been regarded as under the 
direct control of Sanjar's diwan (see Chapter I.).'*' Elsewhere 
there was perhaps merely a local governor, as there was in 
cities in the indirectly administered areas. The tenure of 
office of local governors and of other local officials was 
subject to less instability than that of other officials in 
the empire. In some cases there appears to have been a family 
attachment to a local office. The family of Abu *Ali Muhammad , 
Ja*fari, who became governor of Qazwln after Hamza b. al-Yasa/, 
held office some sixty years. To Fakhr ul-Ma*ali zu*s-Saradat 
Abu rAll Sharafshah b, Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Muhammad Ja'fari 
(d. 484 (1091/2)), the last of them, and his followers belonged 
most of the villages in the neighbourhood and gardens and 
arable land of the city; and the annual revenue of his estates
r\
was 366,000 gold dinars. 'When Malikshah appointed *Imad ud- 
Dawla Turin b, Alfaqash governor (hakim) of Qazwln, he ordered 
him to transfer his house and belongings there, so that he 
should have greater care in its affairs.^
Other local officials included the muhtasib and the
In the M.Z., however, * Abbas, who is elsewhere called muqta* 




sahib ush-shurta, who were both in a sense police officers.
« • ••
The former was probably no longer in the Seljuq period an 
important official, and is seldom mentioned in the sources.'*’ 
His duties were chiefly ecclesiastical (see MawardI), and the 
holder of the office was hence usually a jurist. In $01
(1108) the qadl, Abu'l * Abbas b. Ratabi was appointed muhtasib
_ p - 1of Baghdad. The sahib ush-shurta* s functions were purely
civil as opposed to ecclesiastical, but there was nevertheless 
probably some clash of jurisdiction between the muhtasib and 
the sahib ush-shurta. miring the riots between the people of 
the 5a^ a<l Canal quarter and the Bab ul-Arja quarter in Baghdad 
in 487 (1094), the sahib ush-shurta, Kamal ud-Din Yumn killed 
a man and was after dismissed.^ ?&ien Ibn ul-Kafl succeeded 
Kamal ul-Mulk as-Samirami as wazir and ordered the return of
l  r-:  \
allowances (rusum) and pensions and alms received during the 
preceding two years (see Chapter’-1 Ji»e), the shurta were 
charged with this matter in the provincial towns.^ Further
1 n-On one occasion when there were riots between the Sunnis and 
Shi * as in Baghdad during the waz irate of Abu Shuja*, the 
caliph ordered the latter to destroy the houses of ten of 
the leaders of the rioters. Abu Shuja* then summoned Abu 
Ja'far b. Kharaqi, the muhtasib, and sent him to buy these 
houses so that when he destroyed them he would only be 




there were officials in charge of the city gates and possibly 
the neighbouring districts. Such an official was known as 
the hajib ul-bab, and had apparently power to punish the 
people for disorders. TVhen the fuq,uha rioted on the death 
of Ya*qub, the katib, in Baghdad, in 547 (H52/3)* ‘t^ ie 
ul-bab siezed two of them, punished and imprisoned them.'1'
In addition to the officials mentioned above, there was 
fca*Is of the town. He was the link between the government 
and the citizens. Al-QalanisI gives an abstract of a diploma 
written on behalf of Tughtegln for Abufl Majall, son of Abu 
Muhammad b, As-§ufl, ra1 is of Damascus, and for Abu* 1 Daw ad 
al-Mufarraj, the brother of Abu Muhammad, for the sharing of 
the office of ra,is of Damascus. He commanded them to manage 
the affairs of the subjects and not to fail .to inform him of 
what was going on, so that he could favour the good and punish
p
the bad. It is possible also that the ra1 Is had financial 
duties of some kind.^ It is unlikely that he received a 
salary from the central government, but he may have enjoyed 
certain exemptions from taxation, and if he had himself
doubt
financial duties in the way of the collection of taxes, he no /
1 I.A. XI.115.
2 Q. 144-5.
' In a diploma issued by the court of Khwarazm for Sadr ud-
of Jurjan (at-Tavassul, 122-5)* latter was 
commanded to pay what was due to the diwan.
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retained himself a proportion of these.^ The appointment of 
the ra,is was naturally in the hands of the sultan or his 
representatives in the directly administered area, and of the 
muqta* in the indirectly administered territory; the common 
practice was probably to appoint a local man, perhaps even 
merely to confirm the recommendation of the leading persons
p
of the town. A hereditary tendency was probably to be found 
in this office.-^ The ra,Is was often a person of considerable 
importance locally. When the Mizamiyya mamluks took Barkyaruq 
from Isfahan to Hei and put him on the throne, Abu Muslim, 
ra*is of Hei, suspended the jewelled crown above his head.^
The story of Abu Hashim, ra* is of Hamadan, has already been 
told (see Chapter II.). That he was able to produce the 
large sum demanded of him within the space of seven days (or, 
according to another account, within forty days) from his 
treasury, without asking help from anyone in the city shows
In the diploma referred to in Note. 3* p .290 above, the 
estates and goods ( — ) or the ra*is in Jurjan and
Dihisjan were exempted from taxation and his pensions^and 
possessions ( ) in Jurjan
and Dihist an and the districts belonging to them were to 
be as before.
2
Support is given to this* view by the above mentioned diploma 
in which mention is made of the desirability of holding in 
respect ancient families and the strengthening of their 
positions.
 ^Families who held the local headship ( ) are men­
tioned in al-Batiha (I.A. X.302-3)* Hamadan (I.A. X.268, 
On the death of”Abu Hashim, ra*Is of Hamadan, Muhammad b. 
Malikshah appointed his son to the office of ra*is of the 
city (Bu, 93). The ra*Is of 3mid, Murid ud-Din b. Bisan 




1 - -he was a man of great wealth. On the death of Abu Hashim
250,000 dinars were transferred from his treasury to the
sultan* s, and so rich was he that this sum was not missed from • •
2 * *» u —his treasury. The ra is of Tahnz, Zarqan was also,
it seems, a wealthy man, for as stated above (see Chapter II.) 
he was fined 70,000 gold dinars by Ithd wa&ir.-ad-DarkazIni.^
Bn. 89-90; I.A. 552^3. The R.S. gives a slightly different 
account and states that Abu Hashim gave Muhammad b. Malik­
shah 800,000 dinars to obtain his protection against Ahmad 
b. Hizam ul-Mulk, who had designs upon him, and that he 






Urban life and development during Great Seljuq times no
doubt underwent various fluctuations. In the first place the
life of the cities cannot have been altogether unaffected by
the influx into Persia and the neighbouring countries of large
numbers of nomads. In so far as the city populations were
not exterminated, it is probable they carried on their former
occupations, but the presence of the nomads in the neighbourhood,
although to some extent a source of profit in that they bartered
the products of their flocks for grain and manufactured goods
was a perpetual menace to the cities, which had to be continually
prepared to defend themselves from the plundering inroads of 
(2)these bodies. * Secondly the presence of Turkish amirs and 
their troops in many of the towns as assignees - not a new 
institution in Islamic lands, but somewhat extended in Great 
Seljuq times - cannot have been without effect on the economic 
and social life of the cities. Lastly there were no doubt also
(1) e.g. In 496^(1102/3) Suqman b. Urtuq sent a body of 
Turkomans to Takrlt with loads of gypsum, butter and honey; 
they sold what they had brought and pretended Suqman had 
departed, whereupon the people of the city were reassured.
This however was merely Suqmin’s ruse, and that night the 
Turkomans attacked and entered the town. (I.A.X.245).
(2) cf. Sauvaget R.E.I. 1934, IV. 429.
fluctuations in urban development dependent upon the political 
conditions prevailing under the individual sultans; it is 
unlikely that periods of anarchy such as those following the 
death of Malikshah and the death of Muhammad b. Malikshah 
respectively coincided with periods of prosperity and progress 
in urban development.
The dominant factor in urban life, as in the whole struc­
ture of the Great Seljuq empire, was insecurity - not merely
combat the arbitrary measures and injustice of officials and
others - the protection of Qur^anic legislation being illusory,
and appeals to the sultan usually impractical owing to great
distances - the only effective defence of the population was
mutual help: only by grouping themselves according to their
religions, ethnical and above all professional affinities,
were the people able to protect, if necessary by force, their
lives and goods, or to buy intercessions and favours, which
(2 )relieved to some extent their lot.v ' This chronic insecurity 
thus played an important part in fostering the growth of corpor­
ations, which although not peculiar to or originating in the
(1) The people of the cities, in the case of Baghdad and 
perhaps elsewhere, went about armed. During a riot in 
Baghdad in 481 (1088), when the Turks struck the people with 
their cudgels (maqari ), the people drew their swords (I.A.X.
insecurity arising from a sudden crisis such as civil war or 
local nomadic raids, but a chronic state of insecurity. To
109)
(2) ,Sauvaget p.451,2.
Great Seljuq empire, were a marked feature in the life of the 
population of that empire.
There is a certain amount of evidence of the existence of a 
spirit of corporate feeling among the inhabitants of various 
cities, which manifested itself in rivalry between different 
t o w n s a n d  in the ability of a town to make settlements with in­
dividual leaders without reference to the central government or
(2 )its officials; ' Further, in spite of local differences, there
(1) e.gf in 490 (1097) there was a great riot in Khurasan 
between the people of Sabzawar and the people of Khusrawjird 
and large numbers of people were killed in the fighting, in 
which the people of Ehusrawjird were routed (I.A.X. 184;.
(2) Thejfollowing are some examples of this. When the people 
of Baghdad heard of Jugftril b. Muhammad and Dubais b. fjadaqa's 
march on Baghdad in 519? (1125) , they put on arms and remained 
on guard all night (I.A.X. 442). In 545 (1148/9) a number
of amirs left Mascud b. Muhammad, and approached Baghdad, 
whereupon the populace co-operated in the defence of the city 
against them (l.A.XI._88). On the other hand when Muhammad b. 
Mafomud besieged Baghdad in 551/2 (1157), the people opened 
the gates to him (I.A.XI. 142).
When Barkyaruq had been deserted by his army in 492 (1098/9),
he went from Eei to Isfahan, but the people of that city
refused him entry (I.A.X. 195) • Subsequently in 495 they 
seem to have invited him to Isfahan, but Muhammad b. Malikshih, 
learning of this preceded him there (I.A.X. 202). When 
Muhammad returned to Isfahan in 495 (1102) with 100,000 men, 
after having left the city to collect reinforcements, the 
people opposed his entry (I.A.X. 229)•
On_the death of Karbuqa, the prominent men of Maw§il wrote 
to Musa, the Turkoman governor of 0i§n Kaif£f asking him to 
hasten to Mawsil that they might submit the city to him.
(I.A.X. 255). When the Ban! Khafaja raided Kufa in 485 (1092),
the people^defended the city (I.A.X. 147)* In 496 (1102/j)
when IsmafIl Arslanjiq wanted to take WasiJ, the populace united 
with the jund and abused him (I.A.X. 255)- Basri, with the 
exception of one quarter, resisted §adaqa in 499 (1105/6) 
after he defeated Isma^Il Arslanjiq (I.A.X. 219).
was a marked tendency for the people of a city to unite in
times of common danger. In Uishapur for instance when it was
besieged in 488 (1095) by one of the amirs, the people united
and fought fiercely until the siege was raised after forty
days.^^ Unity was not always found however. When Tughril
Beg’s troops were attacked in Baghdad by the populace, the
people of Karkh protected them, for which £ughril subsequently
(?)
commanded the people of Karkh to be rewarded.v / Of the size
and relative prosperity of the various towns, the evidence is
somewhat fragmentary. Baghdad by the time of the Seljuqs had
already begun to decay, and was rivalled at the beginning of
the period by Ulshapur in numbers of population and in prosperity.
One of the most important cities of the Great Seljuq empire was
Isfahan which became the capital city. Kasiri Khusraw, who
gives an account of some of the towns he passed through on his
journey, writes that in Persian speaking lands the most flour-
—  (5)ishing and populous city he saw was Isfahan, ^* which he reached
(1) I.A.X. 171.
(2) I.A.IX. 420.
(3) It is difficult to make any accurate estimate of the 
numbers of the population. Little reliance can be placed 
upon the figures given in the sources, but a rough idea can 
perhaps be obtained from them. According to the E.S., when 
the BatinI leader, Ahmad b.*Attash, was led through Isfahan 
after his capture during the reign of Muhammad b. Malikshah 
more than 100,000 men, women and children came with different 
kinds of missiles to cast at him (p.161). Some idea of the
(continued overleaf)
in 444, This city was the centre of a fertile area, and had
not lain in the main path followed hy the Ghuzz invaders*
Jughril Beg was much attached to Isfahan where he chiefly
resided for twelve years, and expended in public buildings and
improvements a sum exceeding 500,000 dinars. ^  Royal patronage 
was moreover continued under the later suljjans. Alp Arslan was
greatly pleased with Isfahan and treated its people with marked 
favour, and Malikshah chose it as his capital and built many 
buildings in the city and outside; others of the Great Seljuq 
sultans also spent much time in Isfahan. This, together with 
the natural advantages of Isfahan, enabled it to hold its 
position throughout the Great Seljuq. period as one of the most 
flourishing cities of the empire. The fact that the Great
(3 continued)
population of different cities can perhaps also be gained from 
the following figures. Nearly 50,000 people perished in an 
earthquake in Tabriz in 434 (1042/3) (I.A.IX.351)• It was 
said that during an outbreak of plague in Bukhara in 449 
(1057/8) , 800 or 1,000 men died in one day in the dependencies 
of that city, and in the province during the outbreak 165,000 
died, and similarly in Samarqand many perished (I.A.IX.438,9)• 
Jawull Saqawu, when preparing Mawsil for siege in 501, (1107/8), 
turned out over 20,000 young men (l.A.X.320).
(1) N.K. 92,3
(2) E.G. Browne: Account of a rare manuscript history of 
Isfahan ... J.R.A.S. 1901, p.667* Jughril Beg also built a 
new quarter of Baghdad on the Tigris, which included a ,jamif 
and bazaars (aswaq); it was surrounded by a wall (Bu. 10).
(3) ibid. p.668.
(4) R.D. 132; T.G. 449; U.H.S. 64,5.
Seljuqs changed their capital on various occasions probably 
gave to the towns they successively chose as their headquarters 
a transitory phase of prosperity.
Benjamin of Tudela, who travelled between the years 1167 
and 1173, relates that Ghazna was a city of commercial import­
ance and that the people of all countries and tongues went there
(2 )with their wares.'1 ' It is probable that Ghazna enjoyed this
-  (*3) —  -position also during Great Seljuq timesw  . Al-Gharnaji mentions
that Shiraz was flourishing.^^ It is possible that the dis­
tricts bordering on Asia Minor may have been, at the beginning 
of the Great Seljuq period, in a relatively flourishing 
condition. Nasiri Khusraw states that Arzan was a flourishing
city in 438 (1046), well irrigated and with gardens, trees and 
(good bazaars;^' Benjamin of Tudela also notes that Rahba on
*
the Euphrates was a very fine city, large and fortified and 
surrounded by gardens and plantations.^^ That many towns were
(1) Jfughril Beg made Rei his capital for a time (R.S. 111). 
Chaghri Beg Da5ud made Marv his capital (Kuzhat p. 154). 
Malikshah built Panj Dih, one of the suburbs of Mary ar-RUd 
(Nuzhat p. 155).
(2) Jewish Travellers p. 53*
(3) c.f. The riches that San jar found in Ghazna when he took 
it in 510 (I.A.X. 355).
(4) Al-GharnajjT p. 204.
(5) R.K.7.
(6) Jewish Travellers, p.42.
.17?.
comparatively prosperous at the "beginning of the Great Seljuq 
period is suggested by the readiness and ease with which indiv­
idual towns made payments to the Ghuzz in the hope of saving 
themselves from being plundered. The following also suggests 
some cities had hidden sources of wealth* Abu Mun*a Khamls b. 
Taghallub b. gammad, governor of Takrit, (d. 435 /1043/4) found 
in that city 500,000 dinars apart from gold and silver jewels 
).^ Various cities in Khurasan on the other hand 
seem to have been in a state of decay at the beginning of the 
Great Seljuq period. Nasiri Ehusraw states that Tun, which
he passed through in Bablc II 444 (1052) "was a large city
(1)but when I saw it most of it was decayed.
The town in most cases consisted of the bazaars or suqs, 
residential quarters and the principal mosque; a fortified 
city wall defined the limits of the town and assured the
(1) Qazwln made peace in 420 (1029) with the Ghuzz under 
Kasghulx for 7,000 dinars (I.A.IX.270), and Qirwash, ruler of 
Maw§il attempted to buy them off in 420 (1029), promising
3,000 dinars; they refused this sum, and demanded 50,000 
dinarsV which sum was agreed to. However while the money 
was being collected the Ghuzz reached Mawsil, and Qirwash 
with his army and the populace came out to fight them, and 
were eventually defeated. After capturing Mawsil the Ghuzz 
laid an imposition of 20,000 dinars on the people of the cityt3 
and subsequently a further 4>000 dinars (I^A.IX.274)• Takrlt 




(l)safeguard of its population.v ' In many cases there was also
a citadel, which was the residence of the governor; it was the
last refuge of the defenders in case of siege, and a government
stronghold in case of revolt.
Within the city wall, which afforded protection to the
inhabitants irrespective of ethnical, social and religious
(2 )differences, the city was divided into quarters. ' In the
larger cities these were self-contained, having their own mosque,
bazaar for primary necessities, public bath, and leader, and
(3)lived a largely separate life from the other quarters. Each 
quarter was usually enclosed within its own walls. Nasiri 
Khusraw mentions that all the streets and quarters of Isfahan 
had strong bars and gates, (4) while Yaqut describes West Baghdad
(1) Herat, when all the cities of Khurasan, were plundered 
by the Ghuzz towards the end of Sanjar's reign, escaped _ 
because the Ghuzz failed to take the wall (R.S.183)* Abu 
Kalljar built a wall round the city of, Shiraz in 436 (1044/5) 
Cl .A. IX. 359). Jigirmish coated the city wall of Mawail with 
plaster and reinforced it; he built in front of it a wall 
of enclosure and also dug a moat (I.A.X.293)* Malikshah 
built a wall round Marv (Nuzhat 154). Yfrien nine towers in 
the city-wall of Antioch were destroyed by an earthquake in 
484 (1091/2) Malikshah commanded these to be repaired (I.A.X. 
135). When Bazghash besieged the Ismacllls in Jabas, he 
destroyed much of the city-wall with siege engines (manjaniq), 
but when he withdrew they began to repair what had been 
destroyed (I.A.X.221,2). In 489 £1096) Arslan Arghujlestroyed 
the walls of the cities of Khurasan including Sabzavar, Marv 
ash-Shah^jan and Shahristan, and the fortress of Sarakhs and 
the quhandiz of NIshapur (I.A.X.180).
(2) Each bazaar in Isfahan when Nasiri Khusraw passed through 
the city in 444 (1052; had a bar and a gate (N.K.92).
(3) cf. Sauvaget p.452,3.
(4) N.K.92.
3o/.
in his day as consisting of a number of separate quarters, each
enclosed by its own wall.^ The grouping of the various
quarters was in some cases religious, ethnical or occupational.
The different Islamic rites and sects tended to have a topograph-
_ (2Vical grouping, notably in Baghdad; V  in that city, the principal 
Shl(a quarter was Karkh, which however was not inhabited exclu­
sively by Shicas; there the suburb of Kazimain, where was the 
shrine of Musa al-Kazim and Muhammad al-Jawid, naturally became 
the rallying place of the 5hifa during their constantly recurring 
riots with the S u n n i . T h e  qimmis, Christians and Jews, in 
so far as they were found in any number were segregated in 
the city in their own quarters. The Christian quarter of 
Baghdad was commonly called the dar ar-rum.^^ There are 
numerous examples of quarters showing an occupational grouping. 
The AttaVbiyya quarter of Baghdad was famous for the manufac­
ture of fAttabi stuffs.^ In Karkh there was a district
inhabited by the canal-diggers and reed-weavers, in the
( n \  _  _








Le Strange: Baghdad During the cAbbasid Caliphate p,336. 
cf. Sauvaget p.460,1.






mentions a quarter known as the darb al-qayyar (street of the 
pitch makers), which took its name from those who were in that 
trade. ^  Between the gaqra and the Khurasan gates was the 
street of the water carriers. ^  In Mawsil Ibn ul-Athlr 
mentions the quarter of the plasterers and the gate of the 
b u t c h e r s . T h e  various quarters often lived in a condition 
of rivalry. This was in some cases due to sectarian differ­
ences and resulted in frequent riots between different quarters 
(see belov/). In others it was perhaps merely an expression 
of the corporate feeling which the inhabitants felt. Schefer 
states that the people of Marv were divided into two parties, 
and that the people of the quarter of the suq al-fAtIq and the 
people of the rest of the city lived in a state of perpetual 
rivalry. ^  The following also clearly shows the spirit of 
rivalry between various quarters in Baghdad: when the caliph
ordered a wall to be built round Baghdad in 517 (1125/4), the 
people worked in shifts, the people of each quarter working 
with drums (tubul) and pipes (zumur) and they decorated the 
city and made in it pavilions (? )^^
(1) ibid. p. 78.
(2) ibid. p. 27.
(5) I.A.IX. 274,5.
(4) N,.K. transl.275. Schefer does not give his authority
for this statement.
(5) I.A.X. 435.
The bazaar, which was the essential part of the city and 
the reason for its existence, was usually divided up into a 
number of sugs; in these most of the craft gilds of the city 
had their separate quarters in which the majority of their 
members had their premises. ^  The craftsmen did not,however, 
live in the bazaar, and at night they used to lock or bar their 
premises. Access to the bazaars at night was also locked and 
b a r r e d . T h e  following markets among others are mentioned in 
Baghdad by le Strange: the markets of the paper-sellers, book­
sellers,^^ clothes-merchants^^ and goldsmiths; ^  ^ among 
others were also the suqs of the saghat, sayarif, mukhallajln, 
and the raihaniyyln, which were burnt in Jumadi I 485 (1092).^^ 
A considerable part of the market of the perfumers, which had 
been at one time a place of considerable importance was thrown 
down during the alterations effected by al-Mustazhir between 
503 (1109) and 507 (1113).^
In the bazaar, or on its outskirts were also a number of
(1) Various of the crafts had their place of work outside the
bazaars. Some of the brickmakers and plasterers of Baghdad 
had their ovens and kilns respectively on the outskirts of






See aUove, p.JOO, note 2.
Baghdadk During the cAbbasid Caliphate, p.92. 
ibid p. 77. 
ibid. p.218.
I.A.X. 148.
(7) Baghdad^During the ‘Abbasid Caliphate. p#272.
karavansarais, at which goods on arrival at the city were
unloaded, and which merchants occupied during their stay in
the city; local merchants also had rooms where they carried on
their business in these karavansarais. Nasiri Khusraw states
■  "   — —  4
that the karavansariis of Isfahan (in 444) were pleasant ( )
and records that there was a street (kuoha) called Ku Taraz in 
which were fifty good karavansarais, and in each of these many 
merchants (bayya * an) and owners of rooms (hujra-daran) sat.^ 
Ibn ul-QalanisT mentions a khan or hostelry in Baghdad known 
as the makhazin ut-tujjar, which was burnt together with many 
suqs in 528 (1133/4) , and he states that the merchants who 
were present and also those who were absent lost an-unlimited 
amount of their goods and property in this fire.w 7
T/ith the probable exception of Priday, trade was carried 
on daily in the bazaars. In addition there were, in some 
cities, also special markets, such as weekly food markets.^
(1) Goods were sent from city to city by caravan, with 
which caravans merchants and others travelled. Nasiri 
Khusraw travelled to Isfahan in 444 (1052) with a caravan 
taking 1,300 kharvar of goods (N.K. 92).
(2) N.K. 92.
(3) Q. 243.
(4) In Mamluk times (i.e. 1260 onwards) an open market took 
place every Priday in Damascus in front of the north gate
of the citadel, which attracted wholesale commerce in 
vegetables and fruit (Sauvaget, R.E.I. 1934 IV. 465).
In Basra, when Hasiri Khusraw passed through in 443* (December/
January 1051/2) there were three daily places for trade: JUt
the beginning of the day trade was carried on in the suq al-
kbaza*a, at midday in the suqi<uthmanf and in the evening in
the suq al-qaddahln. ^
The urban population was composed of various elements.
Two main divisions can be made: firstly the military element
and the officials, and secondly the "civil? population proper.
Poliak maintains that the towns were "feudal cantonments1 and
that the whole economic life of the country was controlled by
"feudal urban society" compared to which the rest of the popula-
(2 )
tion remained citizens of second class.' 7 This was probably 
to some extent true, but the Turkish muqta*an and their troops 
were in most cases a changing element in the population. They 
were frequently absent on campaigns, and further their tenure of 
a district was in many cases only temporary. The fact of 
their presence however no doubt added considerably to the 
general insecurity of the urban population. The amirs and 
their troops probably did not take part in the local urban 
life, and there was, generally speaking, great hostility on 
the part of the local population towards the Turkish military
(1) U.K. 85.
(2) Poliak: la Peodalit£ Islamique B.E.I. 1936 III 252.
eJLassefc,, who remained a foreign and dominant element* It is 
moreover possible that the relatively close contact between the 
Turkish military classes and other classes of the population 
during the Great Seljuq period had a bad effect on general 
standards* Ghazall writes: “Formerly the people were asleep >
and the culama awake* How the culama are asleep and the people : 
dead, and to a dead people, what good is the word of sleepers ? 
In these days the judgment of the people is ruined and the 
people have all become evil-doers and evil-intentioned."
The local officials were of two kinds* On the one hand 
were the military governors and tax-collectors sent by the 
central government, who usually belonged in the case of the 
large cities to the military classes and to the bureaucracy 
respectively, and on the other hand the ra*is, who was in many 
cases a local man ( see Chapter VI)*
Of the local population proper the most respected and 
influential were the religious classes. The qadi was the chief 
local representative of the organised religious institution, 
and was to some extent almost a government official (see 
Chapter VIII). His position locally was often one of 
influence* In cases where there was no governor or other 
similar official in the town, the qafll was probably deferred to.
(1) Haclhat ul-Muluk p. 79*
The qa<j.Is and the religious classes in general were also to
some extent the spokesmen of the people. When Barkyaruq
reached Wasit in flight from Muhammad b. Malikshah in 494/5 ,
(1101) the caskar of Wlsit having fled at his approach, the qadi,
cAlI al-Fariql, came out to Barkyaruq!s caskar and implored from
Ayyaz, Barkyaruqfs leading amir, and his wazlr, mercy for the
people, and asked them to send a shihna to the town. They
agreed and asked him to produce means for them to take their
beasts and baggage over the river. The qadi accordingly
assembled the populace, and Barkyaruq having crossed to the
east side, he gave them abundant wages. The soldiers then
began again to plunder and so the qadi returned to the caskar
and spoke earnestly about their being restrained. Someone was
accordingly sent back with him to prevent the caskar plundering.^
When Atsiz came to Marv in 536 (1141/2), the imam Ahmad al-
Bakharzl came to him and asked for mercy for the people.
Similarly when he reached Nlshapur in Shawwal of that year, a
group of the fuqaha, *ulama and guhhad came out to him to ask
(2)him to spare the people.v ' Agalin it was under the leadership 
of the members of the religious institution that the populace 
expressed their opposition to the Isma£llls and their horror 




a ShafPI faqlh led an uprising against the Batinls in Isfahan
after they had first established themselves in that city. He
armed the people and they dug furrows, lit in them fires and
killed many of them.^ After the Bajjinls had attacked and
(2 )plundered a caravan near Qayin the people of that cityx ' 
hastened with the qa<jl al-Kirmanl^to make a jihad upon them.^
The culama were organised in corporations. At the head 
of each of the four Sunni rites in each town was a ra*Is. ^
In each of the large cities the cAlids also formed a separate 
corporation under their own naqlb. There was probably a
tendency for certain families to hold this office. Shams ud-Dln 
Ifa§i)ji ul-Islam Abu cAbdullah Muhammad b. Muhammad b* eUbaidullah 
al-Husainl was the naqlb of the cAlids in Baghdad in 543 (1148/9),




(5) e.g. Abu'l Latif b. al-Khujandl the ra?is of the Sh|ifIcTs 
in Isfahan has already been mentioned. Abu Wafa Ali b. TJqail 
b. Muhammad b.cUqail (d.513/1119) was the shaikh of the Hanballs 
in Baghdad (l.A.X.395)s Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Mansur b. Muhammad 
b. Abd ul-Jabbar as-Sam{anI (d.510/lI16/7) was the ra*Is of the 
ShafPIs in Marv (I.A.X.367). TheJLeader of the ShafP Is in 
Nlshapur in 489 (1096) was Abu'l Qasim, son of the Imam ul- _ 
Haramain al-Juwainl, and the leader of the Hanafls was the qadi 
Muhammad b. Ahmad b. SatId (I.A.X.171)
(6) e.g. the naqlb of the cAlids in Mawsil_in 434 A042/3) is 
mentioned (I.A.lS.351), also the naglb in Tus in 548 (1153/4)
(I.A.XI 119); Abu's Sacadat b. ash-Shajarl’*(b.450/1058 d.452 
(1148) was the na^Ib of the cAlids in Karkh (I.K.III 577)
,8
and his brother Diya ud-Dln was the nagib of the ashraf in 
Mawsil; his cousin had formerly been naglb of the cAlids in 
Baghdad, and another cousin was naglb in Khurasan.
Many of the culama had a considerable following among the 
people, Ardashlr b, Mansur Abufl Husain, the wacia had a great 
welcome when he came to Baghdad in Jumadl I 486 (1093) * because 
al-Grhazall and others of the imams and great Sufi shaikhs used 
to appear at his assembly (majlis); both men and women came to 
hear h i m . ^  Al-rAbbadx, the wa cig whom San jar sent as an 
envoy to the caliph in 541 (1146/7) also found great acceptance 
in Baghdad, where he preached, Mascud b. Muhammad and others 
came to hear him, and "as for the commoh people, they abandoned 
their occupations to be present at his assembly and to hasten 
to himw.^^ On one occasion when Abu Is£ag ash-Shirazi was sent 
on an embassy by the caliph to Malikshah in 475 (1082/3) at 
every town through which he passed in Persia the people came 
out to him with their women and children anointing his stirrups 
and taking the dust of his mule for a blessing. fhe bakers 
also came out and scattered bread, and likewise the fruiterers, 





There was probably about this period a development in the 
various Sufi corporations, some of which were genuinely devoted 
to a life of religious devotion, while others used Sufi garb as 
a means of obtaining their livelihood, and traded upon their 
supposed sanctity* Among such were the gilds of story tellers. 
Ibn JawzI warns against these in the Devil fs Delusion* He 
writest 1 In our time the story-tellers act in a way, which 
has no connection with delusion, since it is an evident way of 
making the stories a source of livelihood and of getting gifts 
from tyrannioal princes and obtaining the like from the 
gatherers of unlawful imposts and earning money by them in 
the provinces. Some of them go to the cemeteries where they 
dilate upon affection and parting with friends drawing tears 
from the women but not exhorting them to take warning.
Forming a kind of intermediary class between the artisans 
on the one hand and the bureaucracy and religious olasses on 
the other, were the merchants. The more prominent of the 
latter had considerable influence and ranked among the acyan 
or "notables" of the city, while the smaller merchants were 
probably little different from the more influential artisans. 
Broadly speaking there were three classes of merchants, the 
travelling merchant ( rakkad), the wholesale merchant ( khazzanl
(1) The Devil's Delusion I.C.X. 36.
and the exporting merchant ( mujahhiz ) . ^  The bureaucracy 
were probably favourably inclined towards the merchant and 
banking community, whose help was perhaps, as in former times, 
sometimes enlisted to make loans to the state. These however 
according to Poliak always remained, compared to the Turkish 
amirs, citizens of second rank.^ Abu’l Mahasin ad-Dihistinl, 
Barkya^ucL’s wazlr, treated the merchants well, and many people
became rich through him. They asked him to do business with
,ljL*r ( 3)him, and when he was killed much of their money was lost.
On occasion it seems likely that compulsory levies were 
made upon the merchants and other wealthy citizens. WhenfAlI
(1) cf. H. Eitter: Ein Arabisches Handbuch der Handelswissen- 
chaft, Per Islam VII p*58. According to al-QalanisI, Naslr 
ud-Dln Juqur, governor of Maw§il on behalf of ZangT, pursued 
a policy of maintaining the balance between merchants and 
travellers (?=travelling merchants) p.281.
i
(2) Poliak: la Feodalitd Islamique E.E.I. 1936. III. 252.
(3) I.A.X.230. It is related that a certain merchant sold 
Abu^l Mahasin ad-Bihistanl goods worth 1,000 dinars^ _Abu*l n 
Mahasin said, "Take for them_wheat ( t> ± ) from Eadan Jz-y
50 kurr, each kurr at 20 dinars." The merchant refused, 
saying, lfI only desire dinars." On the next day the merchant 
entered in to him, and he said, "May it bring you joy, 0 such 
and such a one !" He said, "What for ?n He said, "About
your wheat," He replied, "I have no wheat and I do not want 
it." He said, "Yes, and each kurr was sold for 50 dinars."
He said, "I do not accept that for it." So the wazir said,
"I am not one to break an agreement, which I have made."
He said, "I went out and I took the value of the wheat,
2,500 dinars and I added a like sum to it, and I did 
business with him." (I.A.X. 230).
-f/z
b. Dubays and various amirs attacked Baghdad in 543 (1146/9*
or according to others 544 ) orders came from the caliph to
compel the prominent persons, the wealthy and the merchants to
spend their wealth as a loan on the construction of the city
wall, moats and fortifications.^ During the siege of Baghdad
in 552 (1157), when Muhammad b. Mahmud was about to leave
Baghdad, the goods of the merchants ) were in the
(2)sultan la palace on the west side.v ' This may of course have 
been only for protection, but it is possible that these goods 
 ^ had been commandeered for the use of the army.
Foreign merchants also came to the Great Seljuq Empire to 
trade. In 462 (1069/70) when there was a severe famine in 
Egypt, merchants came from that country to Baghdad. They
j. ‘
brought the garments of the ruler of Egypt and his utensils 
(? alat), and many things which had been plundered from the 
caliph's residence in 381 (991/2), and articles that had been 
plundered during the revolt of al-BasasIrl, and 80,000 large 
pieces of beryl and 75,000 pieces of ancient dlbaj and 11,000 
kuzighand and 20,000 curved swords were brought out from their 
t r e a s u r i e s . T h e r e  were also foreign merchants present at
(1) Q. 302; I.A.XI.87.
(2) R.S. 268. The text has 550 (p.267) which is probably 
an error for 552.
(3) I.A.X. 41,2.
2Muhammad b. Malikshah*s court.♦
An important part was played in the life of the trading 
communities by brokers ( sarraf ), through whose hands much of 
the buying and selling passed. In Ba§ra it appears, for 
example, that all monetary dealings went through the garrafs. 
Nasiri Xhusraw who was in that city in 443 (Dec.-Jan.1051/2) 
relates that when anyone arrived in Ba$ra whatever he had ( by 
way of money ) he gave to a broker for anything he might buy 
while he was in the city, and gave nothing except the receipt of
the broker.^ He was in Isfahan in 444 (1052), and records
- (3)that he saw two hundred garrafs in one of the bazaars, w/ which
is a further indication of the importance of Isfahan as a
trading centre.
Ibn BalkhI describes the system by which the cloth trade
was carried on in Kazarun. He states, wAn official of the
dlwan oversees the work of the weavers of Kazarun, and there
A ^ _
are honest merchants (biyyacan) who place a just price on it, 
stamp it and sell it to foreigners. In former times the 
merchants sealed the loads of KazarunI (cloth) and foreigners
(1) Muframmad b. Malikshah, when inspecting his treasury after 
his khazin had been assassinated by a Bajini, found some 
jewels belonging to some foreign merchants; he summoned them 
and returned to them the jewels (I.A.X. 369).
(2) H.X. 85^6.
(3) H.X. 92.
came and bought them thus sealed without opening them, because
they relied upon the merchants, and at every town to which they
took these bales of cloth, they showed the writing of the
merchant and resold them unopened with profit, Thus a load
of KazarunI cloth would pass through ten hands unopened. Then,
since fraud became ripe and people dishonest, confidence
departed and treasury goods (mali dlwanl) are found deficient
(1)and foreigners avoid the merchandise of Kazarun.11'* 7
lastly there were the artisans and craftsmen, who organised 
themselves in corporations according to their several trades.
By such organisations they were better able to withstand the 
demands of the unjust officials; nevertheless forced labour was 
probably a common imposition (see Chapter V).
Ghazall, who may perhaps be regarded as representing trends 
of thought to be found among a certain section of society during 
the Great Seljuq period, has some interesting views upon differ­
ent arts and crafts. He recommends the individual to regard 
it as his personal duty ( ) to engage in some craft
in the bazaar, from which the muslims will benefit. He 
advises him to choose an occupation, which if left undone, 
would result in disorder and not such a craft as that of a 
goldsmith, painter or plasterer ( gachkandagarl ), all of which 
aimed at the adornment of this world, and were unnecessary, and
(1) F.N. 146.
5/sr,
indeed, according to Mm, were better left undone# He then 
mentions various unlawful crafts such as the making of brocade 
clothes (Ijo ) and the decorating of saddlery with gold, 
and also a number of crafts and occupations, which were disliked 
by former generations, such as the selling of food, the selling 
of shrouds, qaggabx ( butchery ) garrafi ( money-changing ), 
kannasl ( scavengering ) dabbaghl ( tanning ) shuturbanl ( camel- 
driving ) and dallall ( broking ). He further records that 
it is mentioned in the traditions that the best of trades was 
bazzazl ( drapery ) and the best of crafts kharrazl, namely 
the sewing of skins for carrying water. Four crafts he 
mentions as being held in contempts jawlahagl ( weaving ), 
pamba~furushi ( selling cotton ), duktarrashi ( spinning ) 
and mucalliml ( teacMng ), on the grounds that persons who 
engaged in those occupations would inevitably become weak in 
reason since their dealings and conversations were with women 
and cMldren.^
Among trades and arts to the exponents of which Ghazall 
considered it illegal to give wages were the following: dyers 
who made cloaks of brocade (dxba) and silk (cattabl, va abrl- 
shum ) for men, ^ ^hat-makers (kulahduzan) who made hats of 
brocade for m e n , ^  cayyaran, who made tattoos on the hand,^
f-z\
jesters, singers, jmoumers and poets who composed satires,
(1) K.S. f. 88b.
(2) K.S. f. 83a.
(3) K.S. f. 83b.
A
That the crafts and occupations mentioned above were in the
view of GrhazaLl undesirable, or unlawful, does not of course
mean that they were not practised* Indeed the reverse is
probably the case - it is very likely that he was expressing
disapproval of what were actually the conditions of his time;
further from his statement, it may perhaps be inferred that
bazzazi and kharrazl were the occupation and craft respectively
which enjoyed the greatest prestige at his time. Certain
acts, such as grave-digging, washing the dead, carrying the
coffin in a funeral procession could be legally rewarded by
wages according to Ghazall, although they were duties which
(1)were obligatory upon the community as a whole.
The most important of the corporations in Nlshapur, were 
the hosiers, silk merchants, leather workers and rope makers.
In Sava, among others, were shoemakers, whose speciality was 
the making of light sandals. ^  In Ghundljan in Pars there 
were many shoemakers ( kafshgar ), and of all the crafts in 
Qazwln, also, they^ were the most numerous in 438 (1046).^ 
Weaving was probably carried on extensively in most provinces. 
In Tun in 444 (1052) there were 400 factories ( kargah ),
(1) K.S. f. 84a.






where zilus were woven* Zilus and kirbas were also made in 
Jahram in Parsl^Ihe latter article was woven also in Juwaim^^ 
and Kavar, which made in addition reed matting ( tLaglr 
Yazd was an important centre for different kinds of cloth
etc.) ^  ^ ; various towns in Ears 
also produced cloth. In Kazarun garments known as tuzi, woven 
from the fibre of the flax plant, were made,^^ and in SlnTz
linen cloths, the finest variety being called slnizi, which did
(7) —not however wear well;x,/ in Grhundijan also there were many
weavers ( .lawlah ) * ^  Apart from corporations concerned with
provisions, weavers, shoemakers and others, there was probably
a growth in corporations which made equipment used by the
army - swordmakers, saddlers and so on. Iron and steel were
produced in 5aha ( Pars ) from which swords, known as chahlaki
(q) c.
swords, were made.w/ The caliph after the death of Mas ud b.







(7) F.N. 149, 50
(8) F.N. 143.
(9) F.N. 125.
in arms,^^ which perhaps means that he forced them to work
for him. luxury trades or crafts also no doubt continued.
It seems that Isfahan continued to make rose-water, the bottles
-  (2 )for which were made in Baghdad.v 9
Some of the corporations had special functions, in relation
to the state or local authorities, and while they were not
"state" corporations, it is possible they enjoyed special
privileges or immunities, in return for performing certain
duties. The saqqa, for example, may have acted as the local
♦fire brigade1. When fire broke out in Baghdad in 485 (1092),
Amid ud-Dawla b. Jahir, the caliph fs wazlr rode out and
collected the saqqa and continued to ride until the fire was 
(*)
put out.w '
There were rare cases of corporations working for the 
court, whether of the caliph or the sultan. In 512 (1118/9) 
the caliph abolished the system of farming out the spinning
(1) Bu. 226.
(2) cf. Levy: A Baghdad Chronicle, p. 223.
(3) I.A.X.148. On another occasion when fire broke out in 
Baghdad, and burnt the sultanfs palace, the gha§§al ( washers 
of the dead ) salvaged gold and what else they could from 
the sultan1s palace (I.A.X. 420.) A story is told of Ibn 
Jahir and a saqqa, who on the re-appointment of Ibn Jahir
to the caliph*s wazirate, sacrificed his only ox, on which 
he carried water, giving its meat as §adaqa. Ibn Jahir, 
hearing of this, summoned_him, and gave him a camel and a 
sum of money and the saqqa became rich (T.3. 257).
*'?•
of gold thread, from which the skilled workers in siqlatun
and al-mumazzaj, and others who worked with it had met with
severe treatment from the officials over them and suffered
great injury. In Kazarun the weavers by custom were allowed
to use the water of a certain water-channel ( kariz ), in
return for which they wove garments for the royal treasury
( diwani padishah ), which were collected by a representative
of the dlwan.(2)
Of the actual membership and methods of work of the various
gilds, the sources do not tell us much. Some idea of the terms
of their association may be obtained from al-Grhazall. He
states that there were three kinds of association which were
customary and were wrong. One of these was the association
of porters ( hammalan ), and artisans ( plshavaran ), who made
a condition of their association that they should pool their
individual earnings. In the second type of association the
parties to it pooled their capital and shared the subsequent
loss or gain, while the third of these "illegal1 associations
was that in which one person put up the money and traded on
the good name or some similar advantage of another person,
(1)with whom he shared the ensuing profits. w/
(1) I.A.X. 382.
(2) F.H. 145,6.
(3) K.S. f. 84b.
It seems likely that the craft gilds had in many cases 
learned men among their members. Ibn Kattan, the poet (b.478 
d.558) for instance was a druggist in Baghdad. The gilds 
were probably largely hereditary, and their craft handed down 
by tradition. They had their own organisations and were 
represented with the state by their officials. There are 
indications that the individual corporations and the corporations 
of the different cities as a whole, possessed to a greater or 
less degree some kind of corporate spirit. This was used, as 
in later times, to protest against government measures and the 
lack of justice of government officials and others. On one 
occasion in 512 (1118/9) when one of the followers of Mangubars 
the shihna of Baghdad broke into the house of a newly-married 
couple, wounded the bridegroom several times and went in to 
his wife, the bazaars were closed by way of protest. The
(l) I.E. Ill 5 8 4 Abu Muhammad Ja‘far b. Ahmad b. al-Husain 
as-Sarraj al-Baghdadi (d.^afar 500 /1106) was a great 
narrator, and wrote beautiful ta§nlfs and delightful poetry 
and was one of the prominent people of his time (I.A.X.505): 
Abu1! Fat^ t Aljmad b. Muhammad b. Aljmad b. SacId al-Haddad 
(b. 408 (1017/18) d. 500 1106/7) was a famous relater 
of traditions (I.A.X. 305 ). It may of course be that 
these two persons, although called as-sarraj and al-baddad 
respectively, did not actually carry on the trade of a 
saddler or an ironsmith.
offender was then taken to the caliph’s residence and confined 
for a day*v *
In the large cities there were, as distinct from the 
standing army of the sul$an and the troops of the ’landed" 
amirs and others who might be stationed in the city, a looal 
militia, known as the jund. Their duty was to protect the 
city to which they belonged, from attack and to preserve 
internal order. They were probably only called up in emer­
gencies.^^ In some cases it seems that the jund was responsible 
for the safe conduct of travellers along the roads in the neigh­
bourhood of the city to whiAit belonged. In 465 (1092) when 
the pilgrims left Kufa they were accompanied by the jund. On 
this occasion the Khafaja attacked them, killed many of the
(1) I.A.X. 380. When the siege of Maw§il in 501 (1107/8) 
became protracted a body of plasterers ( J, led by
a plasterer named Sa*dl, agreed to hand over the city, which 
indicates a certain amount of organisation among the 
plasterers (I.A.X.320). During the siege of Mawsil in 527
(1132/3) also there were divisions among the people and 
the plasterers ( ? agreed to hand over the
town, but they were put to death and the defence continued 
(I.A.XI.2).
(2) When Muhammad b. Malikshah advanced to Za'faraniyya in 
Rajab 501 (1108) preparatory to attacking gilla, §adaqa went 
to Matar with his caskar and commanded the jund to put on 
arms (l.A.X.311)* ^usam ud-Din Timurtash b. IlghazI 
appointed a deputy over Aleppo in 518 (1124) and established 
for him a jund (I.A.X. 436,7). Zangl b. Jirgimish after the 
capture of Jigirmish by Jawull Saqawu in 500 11106/7) distrib­
uted goods (amwal)* horses and other things to the jund 
after he had been proclaimed in his father’s stead in Mawsil 
(I.A.X. 293).
jund and routed the remainder. On rare occasions the jund
were sent on expeditions. §adaqa, for example, sent a “body
of the jund in 500 to help Hammad b. Abl'l Jabr take al-BaJiha
from IsmacIl Arslanjiq. ^  The official in charge of the jund
seems to have varied locally. In Baghdad the caliph1 s wazlr
( 3 )appears to have called up the jund in emergencieswhile in 
Basra the amid seems to have been in command of the jund.v 
Payment of the jund in some cases took the form of iq.tafs 
( see Chapter V ). In Baghdad the jund were sometimes paid in 
cash and sometimes in kind. In 552 (1157/8) during the siege 
of Baghdad the caliph, fearing a scarcity of food, opened the 
granaries and dispersed to the troops in lieu of their allow­
ances ( dates and grain; . they took this and sold it
in the bazaars and bought with the proceeds what they needed
( 5)of other t h i n g s . T h e  same difficulty was probably found 
in paying the jund as in paying the standing army. Muframmad 
b. Malik shah while being besieged in Isfahan by Barkyaruq in 
495 (1102) was forced twice in succession to ask loans of the 
prominent people of the city to satisfy the demands of the
(1) I.A.X. 147.
(2) I.A.X. 503.
(3) See Chapter VIII.
(4) I.A.X. 293.
(5) Bu.229; see also I.A.XI.141 who states the caliph's wazlr 
dispersed wheat to the jund instead of dinars.
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jund. Similarly the ,1nnd like the standing army appear to
have tended to oppress the people* Muhammad b. Malikshah in
498 (1105) restrained some of the jund of Isfahan from oppress-
(2 )ing the people.v 7
lastly in many of the large cities there were Jewish and 
Christian communities. These, as stated above, lived in their 
own quarters, had their own organisations and took little part 
in the life of the muslim community. They enjoyed freedom of 
religion and appointed their own officials, subject in the 
case of their leaders probably to the confirmation of the 
sultan or his offioials.^ The Jewish community was probably 
largely occupied in trade and commerce. Benjamin of Tudela 
relates that the Head of the Captivity in Baghdad had a fixed 
weekly revenue arising from the hospices of the Jews, markets 
and m e r c h a n t s . T h e  references in Arabic sources regarding 
Jewish commercial activity are scanty, but it is probable the 
Jews filled an important part in the life of the community as 
bankers and moneylenders ( Many of the Jews and
Christians were probably physicians. A well-known doctor was
(1) I.A.X. 228.
(2) I.A.X. 273.
(3) cf. Tritton: Islam and the Protected Religions, J.R.A.S. 
1931.
(4) Jewish Travellers p.49*
(5) cf. Pischels Jews in the life of Medieval Islam ... 
p. 2 et seq.
the Christian Xhn al-Talmid (d. Safar 560, Dee.-Jan. 1164-5)• 
Beiij.amin of Tudela, gives the numbers of the Jewish 
communities in various cities. He travelled, it is true, after 
the death of Sanjar, but from his figures an idea of the numbers 
of the Jewish communities in the cities of the Great Seljuq 
empire can nevertheless be formed, for it is unlikely that a 
very substantial change took place in the few years which 
elapsed between the Great Seljuq period and the travels of 
Benjamin of Tudela. In Baghdad Benjamin states there were 
about 40,000 Jews,^^ in Karkisiya about 500, in Anbar 3*000, 
in Hadara (=Hadr ?) 15*000,in rUkbara 10,000, in Ha^ iba on the 
Euphrates 2,000, in Mawsil about 7*000 and in Jazlra b. * Umar 
4,000.^ In Hamadan he records that there were 30,000 
Israelites, in Isfahan 15*000,^^ in Nihavand 4*000,^ in 
cImadiyya in Kurdistan some 25,000,^^ in Shiraz 10,000,^^ in 
Ghazna 80,000, in Samarkand. 50,000^ and in Bahrein 5,000.^ 
These latter figures however were given by Benjamin on hearsay, 
and were probably much exaggerated. At the beginning of the
(1) I.E. Ill 601.
(2) J ewish. Travellers






Seljuq period there were Jewish and Christian communities in 
Nishapur als©.^1  ^ t
$Uir*j2 s
Under Jughril Beg and Alp Arslan the gimmls, although free 
to carry on their own occupations and to have their own 
community life, took little part in the administration of the 
Great Seljuq empire. Under the subsequent rulers there was 
generally speaking probably little discrimination against the 
zimmls, but from time to time there was a revival of anti-zimml 
feeling’. In 4-84 (1091/2) a Jew called Abu Sacd b. Simha, who 
was Malikshah and Nizam ul-Hulk's wakll in Baghdad, after a 
huckster had struck him in the street went with Gawhar A4 In,
_ t
the shifrna, to the caskar to complain of Abu Shujac , the caliph's 
wazlr. Ihen they left, the caliph issued a decree ^forcing the 
ziimni to wear distinguishing marks on their clothes, and there­
upon the zimmls began to flee from Baghdad.^ In 515 (1121/2)
the sultan also made it obligatory for the zimmls to wear dis-
(1)tinguishing marks on their clothes.
As distinct from discrimination by the government against 
the gimmls, there may have also been popular outbreaks against 
them from time to time. In 542 (1147/8) the church of fakrlt 
was sacked. ^  In 447 (1055/6) when the maphrian had entered
(1) cf. Abu Sa^Id b. Abl'l Xhairj Asrar ut-Iaw^Id pp. 106; 107;* 
172.
(2) I.A.X. 123,4; cf. I.S. 283; Bu. 72.
(3) I.A.X. 420.
(4) Tritton p. 313.
Takrit, he had been stoned by the muslims. Somewhat later 
the Christians of Takrit were scattered and the maphrain fled 
to Mawsil and did not return till 506 (1112/3), when a new 
governor, an Armenian, who was well disposed towards the 
Christians, had taken office.^
The conditions of trade and industry during the Seljuq 
period no doubt showed considerable fluctuations. The state 
of insecurity and disturbance prevailing in Persia and the 
neighbourhood at the end of the Buyid period and the numerous 
expeditions and skirmishes in the early years of Great Seljuq 
rule can hardly have been favourable to trade, but under the 
comparative security of the rule of Alp Arslan and Halikshah 
it would seem natural that there should have been a great re­
vival in trade. If this was in fact the case, it no doubt 
declined again after the death of Halikshah during the ensuing 
period of anarchy, and at no subsequent time during the dominion 
of the Great Seljuqs were conditions as favourable as during 
the reign of Halikshah, although there were interludes of com­
parative security and order, when trade may once more have 
improved, notably towards the end of the reign of Muhammad b. 
Halikshah and part of the reign of San jar. The connection 
between security and prosperity is also seen within the various
(1) Tritton p. 322.
$17,
provinces and districts of .the Great Seljuq empire. Kamil
ud-Din records that Qaslm ud-Dawla Aqsunqur, muq^ac of Aleppo
reproved evildoers, destroyed highway rohhers, pursued brigands
and thiefs everywhere and exterminated them, and wrote to the
surrounding districts to do likewise so that the roads should
be safe. As a result the roads became secure and the people
were able to go to places they had been unable to go to before
for fear of robbers and Aleppo became prosperous in his days
because of the arrival of merchants and importers ( )
fl)from all quarters.v *
Under Malikshah the passage of his armies through the 
country was, to some branches of the trading community, a 
source of profit - particularly to those who dealt in provisions. 
His control was such that his followers paid for what they took. 
Ibn Khallikan relates that "when Malikshah entered Isfahan, 
Baghdad or any other city, accompanied by his followers, the * 
number of whom was immense, a great diminution ensued in the 
price of provisions and other objects, so that the persons who 
sought to gain their livelihood furnished provisions to the 
troops with much profit to t h e m s e l v e s . U n d e r  the later 
Seljuqs however the position was different; the country was
(1) Kamal ud-Din 704,5.
(2) I.K.III. 443.
***.
impoverished by the frequent passage of armies - followers of 
the suljan, of minor members of the Seljuq family, of the 
individual amirs, and unemployed soldiery - who, in most cases, 
lived upon the country as they passed through it. Under such 
conditions trade can hardly have prospered. Ibn BalkhI, the 
author of the Pars Kama, who wrote during the reign of Muhammad 
b* Malikshah comments upon the adverse effect of the lack of 
security and justice ( in Pars ) upon trade Taxes,
such as customs, transit and market dues were levied on merchan­
dise ( see Chapter II ), but it does not appear that these 
unduly hampered trade.
Ibn BalkhI gives various facts concerning the trade of 
Pars. Pruits, cotton and flax were exported from Pars.^
In Qujruh there were iron mines, but it is not stated if they 
( 3)were worked. ^7 In the Persian Gulf there was a certain amount 
of sea trade carried on. Siraf was dependent upon its sea­
borne trade and when Khumartegln, governor of Pars, was unable 
to recapture Siraf from the Khan of Qais Island, who had taken
(1) P.IT. 146.
(2) Bried apricots (zard alu) were exported from Surmaq and 
Arjuman to all places (P.H^ 124); nuts were taken from Tlr 
Murdan and Juyakan to Shiraz and other neighbouring districts 
fP.K* 144); much cotton was produced in Jahram and exported 
(P.IT. ljl); linseed (? ) and flax were abundant in
Mahruban and were exported (P.IT. 150).
(3) P.N. 168.
it, no merchant dared bring a ship to Siraf for shelter on the
way to Kirman, Mahruban, Dawraq or Basra and only leather and
pots and things the people of Fars needed were brought by the
road of Siraf, which for this reason became ruined. ^  Elshahr
(2 )also depended chiefly on sea trade.v y Qais Island at the time 
of Benjamin of Tudela was an entrepot for trade between Persia, 
India and Arabia. He mentions that "merchants who come from 
India and the Islands encamp there with their wares. Moreover 
men from Shinar, el-Yemen and Persia bring hither all sorts of 
silk, purple and flax, cotton, hemp, worked wool, wheat, barley, 
millet, rye and all sorts of food, and lentils of every descrip­
tion and they trade with one another whilst the men of India 
bring great quantities of spices thither. The islanders act 
as middlemen and earn their livelihood thereby.
In addition to commodities for which there was always 
some demand, the silk trade was probably one of the most 
important. Silk and other materials from Zhuzistan, of which 
the best known was probably Shustarl cloth, Balkh and elsewhere 
were dealt in. There may also have been trade in materials
(1) F.N. 136,7*
(2) "From Rishahr only goods of the sea ( ) which
are brought in ships, and fish and dates and flax are produced 
and the people of that place mostly engage in sea trade.1 
(F.N. 149).
(3) Jewish Travellers, p.57.
33e>,
with Egypt and Byzantium.
The prices of various commodities fluctuated considerably.
The main factors causing this were the passage of troops from
one place to another and the consequent increase in the demand
(2 )in the area in which the army was,' ' and calamities such as 
drought and famine, ^  the latter often the result of plunder
(1) cf. The qagida by Anwarl beginning
— e s'
in which he likens material to the work of the factory (kargah) 
of Shushtar, and states that owing to the skill of the people 
of Balkh he has on as a veil a fine linen garment of Egypt 
f o-* ) and has a Byzantine bed )
(Journal of Philogogy IV. p. 36-40).
(2) e.g. During Muhammad b. Malikshah*s stay in Baghdad in 
505 (1111/2) prices*rose, but fell on his departure from the 
city (Q.181).
(3) When Nasiri Khusraw reached Isfahan in 444 (1052) there 
had been a severe famine, but when he arrived, they were har­
vesting barley and mann of wheaten bread ( nani gandum ) 
was 1 dirham, as also was 3 mann of barley bread, and people 
there said they had never seen in the town less than 8 mann 
of bread for 1 diram (E.K. 93) _ '
In 448 (1056/7) the roads were closed incIraq for1 jfear 
of plunder, and there was famine followed by plague in that 
province. 1 ritl of meat sold for 1 qlrat, and fowls, quince, 
and pomegranates all rose to 1 dinar and everything in a like 
manner (I.A.IX. 434). In 449 (1057/8) there was again famine 
in Baghdad and cIraq, and a small bag of white flour sold for 
30 dinars and a bag of barley and millet (? ) for 8 dinars
(I.A.IX. 438). In 493 (1099/11002 there was famine in cIraq and 
the kurr of wheat reached 70 dinars and greatly surpassed that 
on some occasions (I.A.X. 20477 T n  502 (1108/9) the Tigris 
flooded and prices greatly increased in cIraq and a bundle of
flour mixed with bran ( 3l£n ) exceeded 10 imami
dinars, and bread was lacking and the people lived on dates, 
'beans and greens, and as for the people of the §awad, they 
only ate during the whole of £ama<Jan and half Shawwal hashish
and mulberries (I.A.X. 330). (continued overleaf)
(4) See next page.
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by the soldiery.^ The relation of prices to security is 
illustrated in the following. In 543 (1148/9) a number of 
amirs, who had deserted Mas*ud b. Muhammad, came to Baghdad.
The people of the $awad came in flight to Baghdad, their goods 
having been taken, and many perished from hunger and nakedness. 
Prices meanwhile rose in cIraq and food became scarce. ^  The 
caliph and the populace opposed these amirs, who dispersed 
and in 544 (1149/50) prices again fell in cIraq and the people 
of the Sawad returned to their villages. In 543 (1148/9) 
prices also rose in most of the provinces of Khurasan and the 
Jibal, and in Isfahan, Pars, al-JazIra and Syria.^
In 476 (1083/4) - a year during which there was in all 
provinces peace - cheapness was general; a kurr of excellent 
wheat fetched in Baghdad 10 dinars. ^  In 454 (1062) also,
previous page.
The best cord (rlsmah) in Nlshapur sold at 1 diram (weight) 
for 5 dirams, whereas in Egypt 1 diram of cord sold at 3 
maghribi dinars (=3s- Ulshapurl dinars) (U.K. 52)
(1) e.g. High prices became general in Bamghan after the 
KhurasanI caskar had sacked it in 494 (UOO/l), so that the 
food of the people was corpses and dogs. (I.A.X. 207)
(2) I.A.XI. 90.
(3) I.A.XI. 96. In 517 (1123/4), a year when Dubais b.
Sadaqa was plundering the countryside, prices rose in 
Baghdad until bread 'reached 1 dinar per 6 ritl (Q. 209)*
(4) I.A.X. 85.
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when all provinces were comparatively peaceful, there was a 
general lowering of prices throughout the whole country. In 
Basra 1000 rijl of dates sold for 800 qlrajs. ^  On the other 
hand after the khutba had been read in Baghdad in the name of— -T&—
Barkyaruq in Junadi I 497 (1104) high prices prevailed and
prevented trade. In the domains of Sharaf ud-Dawla Muslim
(3)b. Quraish security was general and also cheapness. ' During
the days of Basr ud-Dawla Ibn Marwan, who at the height of
his influence was a powerful ruler, prices fell and the people
made a show of wealth, presumably because they were fairly
secure in their possessions.^^
The social life of the urban population was probably
largely connected with the religious institutions that is
to say festivals and ceremonies were largely religious, and
the mosque probably still played an important part in the life
of the community as a general meeting place. The death of
a member of the ruling house, or a prominent person was usually
(the occasion for public mourning.v .





(5) When Ma^mSd b. MufoammadVs grandmother died in Marv (515) 
(1121/2) he held an assembly to mourn her in Baghdad, the like 
of which the people had not seen. (I.A.X.419) 6eetbe3ae&th of
(Continued on next page.)
to have been in Baghdad and probably also in the capital, and 
possibly in other large cities, the occasion of public rejoicing, 
the scattering of dinars among the people and of decorating the 
city. Y/hen Malikshah1 s daughterfs bridal outfit was trans­
ported to the caliph's palace in 480 (1087), Gawhar A*In, the 
amir Bursuq and others preceded it and the people of the Mucalll 
Canal quarter scattered dinars and garments for them. On 
the betrothal of Fatima, Muhammad b. Malikshah's daughter to 
the caliph MuqtafI in 531 (1136/7) and on the betrothal of
Muqtafl's daughter to Mascud b, Muhammad in 534 (1139/40)
(2 )jewels and cash were scattered.v ' When Muframmad b. Malikshah's 
sister was conducted to the caliph's palace on the occasion 
of her marriage to the caliph al-Mustazhir in Ramadan 504 (1111),
rejoicings took place "the like of which the people had not
( -  —seen", and when Fatima, Muhammad b. Malikshah's daughter was
married to the caliph al-MuqtafI in JumidI II 534 (1140),
Baghdad was decorated for ten days.^
It was over religious questions that it was most easy to 
rouse public opinion and to incite the mob to acts of violence.
(1) I.A.X. 106. (Note continued from previous page.)
. . Ahmad b. Malikshah the wall *ahrf. in 481
(2) I.S. 305« (1088/9)* in Marv, the population in Ba^ h-.
dad held an assembly to mourn for him fcr
(3) I.A.X. 339* seven days in the caliph's palace. No
one rede a horse and the women went out
(4) I.A.XI. 51. wailing in the bazaars and many people
collected in Karkh to walk about and to 
mourn, and they blackened their doors as
a sign of grief (i .a . Z.112).
In 504 (1111) when a deputation came from Aleppo to Baghdad 
to complain of the Franks, on the first Friday of Sha^ban, one 
of the sharlfs of Aleppo, a group of §ufls, merchants and 
faqlhs appeared at the jamic us-suljan calling for help. They 
broke the miipbars and prevented the people from prayers, and on 
the following Friday they behaved in a like manner at the jamic 
of the caliph.'1  ^ In 534 (1139/40) Kamil ud-Din h. ash- 
Shahrazurl came from Zangl to Baghdad to ask for help against 
the Crusaders. He could obtain no satisfaction and eventually 
engineered a popular outcry. He went to a faqlh, gave him 
some money and told him to give it to the awbash and strangers 
in Baghdad with instructions to rise and demand help on the 
following Friday in the jamic ul-qagr when the khatib got up 
in the miipbar and in the jimic us-suljan. His ruse was success­
ful and Mascud b. Muhammad after this outcry agreed to send 
an expedition.
Under the Great Seljuqs doctrinal dissensions and sectarian 
riots were a common occurrence, especially in Baghdad. These 
riots although not usually resulting in great loss ,of life were 
accompanied by looting and the destruction of buildings. In 




Shi * as of west Baghdad, the latter wishing to put over a gate
in Karkh an inscription in praise of *AlI. A riot ensued in
(1)which the shrines of Kazimain were burnt and plundered.v ' In
469 (1076/7) there was a riot in the suq. of the Nigamiyya during
(2 )
which the Hanballs killed a number of people.v 1 During the 
wazirate of Abu Shujac to the caliph, rioting between the Sunni 
and the Shlca exceeded all limits, and the caliph al-Muqtadl 
ordered Abu Shu;jac to destroy the houses of the leaders. ^  In 
Jumadl I 482 (1089) there was rioting between the people of 
Earkh and other quarters and a large number of persons were 
killed between them. The people of (various) quarters gained 
the mastery over a large part of the quarter of the Dajaj Canal 
and plundered and burnt it. In the same year there was a 
second outbreak of rioting; the people of Karkh rose up and 
plundered the street of Ibn Abl Awf; they also sacked the 
house of Abu'l Pa^ Ll Haairun. The people of the Ba§ra Cate 
also took part in these riots. After the second outburst of 
rioting in Baghdad in 482 had subsided, the people of Earkh 
wrote on their mosques "the best of men after the prophet of 






The caliphs, sultans and shihnas all failed in persuading 
the Sunnis and Shifas of Baghdad to live in amity f hut in 
Shacban 502 (1109) the two parties made peace. In this month 
the Sunnis prepared to make a pilgrimage to the tomb of Muscab 
b. az-Zubayr, which they had abandoned for many years, to 
prevent the occurrence of riots on that account. They equipped 
themselves to go, and expressed their intention of passing 
through Karkh, and the people of that district agreed to abandon 
their opposition to them. The Sunnis then began to send the 
people of all quarters alone, and with them decorations and 
weapons and many things. The people of the Bab al-Haratib 
quarter came out with a wooden elephant mounted by men with 
arm3, and they all set out to pass through Karkh. The inhabit­
ants of that district came out to meet them with smoke and 
perfume, water and cloths ( ^ J \ ) 9 and many weapons, showed joy, 
and accompanied them until they left the district. The Shi*a 
then went out at night from Karkh to the tomb of Musa b. Ja(far 
and other shrines and none of the Sunnis opposed them, and 
the people wondered at this. When the Sunnis returned from 
the pilgrimage to Muscab, the people of Karkh again met them 
with rejoicing, and the people of the Bab al-Maratib quarter 
broke their elephant at the bridge at the Harb Gate and a 
group of people read for them "Did you not see what your lord 
did to the people of the elephant1 to the end of the sura(^
(1) I.A.X. 529.
SJ?.
In Shacban 509 (1116) there was rioting among the Sunnis, which
spread to the people g e n e r a l l y . I n  517 (1123/4) after the
caliph had defeated Dubais b. §adaqa the populace of Baghdad
sought to avenge themselves on the 3hlfa and plundered the
shrine at the Bab at-Tibn,^ and in 529 (1134/5) the populace
again fell upon the Shlca after the shihna had seized the
(caliph*s estates.
Sectarian riots were not however confined to Baghdad.
In Nlshapur riots were also frequent. After the siege of 
Nlshapur by an amir had been raised in 489(1096), riots broke 
out between the Karamiyya and other sections of the people, 
and many were killed. Victory was to the ShaficIs and $anball£l^ 
Tiihen the Ohuzz left Khurasan for Jam after the capture of 
Sanjar, there were riots in Nlshapur every night in one quarter 
or another, because of religious differences and ancient 
hatreds.v y9 At ashura 510 there was a great riot in Jus at 
the shrine of fAlI b. Musa! ar-Ri<Ja, which had arisen from a 
quarrel between an *Alid and one of the faqlhs of Jus. The 




(4) I.A.X. 169, 171.
(5) U.S. f. 250a. R.S. 182.
killing whoever they found in it and plundering. The people
fl)of Mashhad (then) abandoned the khutba on Fridays in it.v '■
As suggested above it was through membership of a corporation
that the individual citizens were able to give voice to their
corporate feeling and indeed to enjoy civic functions. There
remains one other interesting form of corporate expression
which was fairly widespread in Great Seljuq times, namely the
cayyar. Owing to the repressive measures of the Turkish rulers
any attempt by the citizens to influence the course of events
was ruthlessly repressed and the energies of the citizens tended
to find expression in secret societies such as the IsmacIlTs
and undisciplined mobs which from time to time broke out in
(2 )Baghdad, and in other cities.' ' . These bodies, usually known 
as tayyar and in Syria as afrdath, had their own leaders, organ­
isation and rites of initiation. The latter resembled those
(1) I.A.X. 366.
(2) _When the Ghuzz plundered Nlshapur in 548/9 (1153/4) the 
cayyar also plundered the city but more severely than the _ 
Ghuzz (I.A.XI. 120). Jevdet quotes_an outbreak of the cayyar 
in Nlshapur on the rise of the Seljuqs circa 430 which is 
mentioned in the Masalik al-Ab§ar of Shihab ud-Din b. Fadlullah 
al-^Umari (Ms. Aya Sofya 3419 f«25) on the authority of an 
earlier work, no longer extant, but the former existence of 
which Jevdet confirms by its mention in a manuscript of 
as-Siyaq ( Istambul 3H5prulu 1152 f.32 ), ( L*Mucation aux 
foyers des Gens des Metiers en Asie Mineure et Syrie au
Xllme sifecle jusqufa notre temps, Vol.I, Supplement 5 un 
chapitre de la Relation du Voyage dfIbn Battuta, Istambul 
1350/51/1932, p.35,6.
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of the futuwwa organisations of which the c ayyar were in origin 
probably an offshoot.
In Baghdad, in Great Seljuq times, the cayyar had lost 
altogether the moral aspect of the earlier bodies, and were no 
more than mobs who took up arms, robbed and murdered the popula­
tion and spread terror through the city when opportunity 
(o\
offered. 7 These bodies threatened at times to completely 
disorganise local life, and at times were even a threat to the
state. In 532 (1137/8) the * ayyar increased in power. The
/
wall of Baghdad, Abu*l Karam feared their leader Ibn Bakran,
(1) cf. Qabus Nama, Chapter XLIV.
(2) On the death ofjfughril Beg the (ayyar became numerous
(I.A.X. 17)* In JumadI I 482 (1089) rioting in Baghdad was so
bad that_the caliph sent to Sadaqa b. Mazyad, who sent an army
to Baghdad; this pursued the seditious persons and cay.yarln 
who fled (I.A.X. 118). In Shacban 493 (1100) the importance
of the cayyar in the western quarter of Baghdad increased and 
the caliph ordered Kamal ud-Dawla Yumn to cleanse the city;
he accordingly seized a number of the prominent cayygr and 
the remainder_fled (I.A.X.204). In 497 (1103/4) there was a 
riot in Baghdad and the cayyar spread abroad (I.A.X. 259). In 
512 (1118/9) t h e cayyar became numerous in the west side of 
Baghdad. The nacib of the shifrna crossed to them with fifty 
Turkish ghulams but was defeated and the following day he 
attacked them with two hundred ghulams, but failed to defeat 
them and the cayyar plundered QuJuftS (I.A.X. 383). Y/hen 
Mascud b. Muhammad besieged Baghdad in 530 (1135/6) there were 
outbreaks of plundering and murder by the (ayyar especially 
in the western quarters of the city (I.A.XI. 26; 29). In 
532 (1137/8) also, during the fighting between Albaqish the 
shibna of Baghdad and Seljuqshah b. Muhammad, the cayyar, 
plundered, murdered and increased in power so that they 
attacked the rich openly, taking from them what they wanted 
and seizing goods from the heads of the porters (I.A.XI. 40).
and ordered his nephew Abu'l Qasim, the warden (framl) of the 
Bah ul-Aza;j to put on the sarawll of his futuwwa ( i.e. to be 
initiated into his order ) so that he ( Abu'l Karam ) should be 
safe from his ( Ibn Bakran*s ) evil. Meanwhile the power of Ibn 
Bakran and his companion Ibn Bazzaz continued to increase, and 
reached such a pitch that they wanted to strike coins in their 
own names in Anbar. At this the shibna and the caliph fs wazlr 
Sharaf ud-Din az-Zainabl sent to the wall threatening to kill 
him if he did not kill Ibn Bakran. The latter was in the habit 
of coming to the house of Abu'l Karam's nephew and drinking 
with him, and so one night when Ibn Bakran came, he killed him. 
Ibn Bazzaz was then also taken and killed, together with a body 
of ruffians ( fraramiyya ) and the people lived again in 
s e c u r i t y . I n  558 (1145/4) the question of the cayyar once 
more became serious. The reason for this was that the son of 
the wazlr and the son of Qawurd, the brother of a wife of the 
sultan, had made a league with them, sharing what they took. 
Bihruz the shihna was for this reason unable to restrain the
cayyar and probably did not dare to report the matter to the
-  (2 ) -  sultan.v * Finally Ildegiz, the na*ib shifrna, brought the
matter to Mas*ud b. Muhammad's knowledge and was authorised by
him to seize the son of the wazlr and Ibn Qawurd. The former
(1) I.A.XI. 41,2.
(2) I.A.XI. 51; 63.
fled but the latter was seized and crucified, and those of the 
cayyar, who did not fly, were also seized.
In Syria the afrdath were a similar movement to the cayyar, 
but had more the character of town bands who defended the city 
alongside the regular troops. These bodies were found especi­
ally in Damascus and Aleppo/2  ^ In 487 (1094) when Aqsunqur
Qaslm ud-Dawla set out against Tutush, with him were a group
 (*)
of the abdath of Aleppo, Dailam and Khurasan. ' A man known
as al-Mijann, the ra*is ul-abdath in Aleppo in 489 (1096) had
many followers and attained to considerable power. He appeared
before Junah? ud-Dawla Husain one day, asked and received
permission to kill Yusuf b. Abaq who, he said, was stirring up
trouble. After killing Yusuf he remained in Aleppo doing what
he pleased; he then desired to govern alone and to exclude the
authority of the king Rudwan. He said to Junah ud-Dawla, "The
king Rudwan commanded me to kill you, so take heed to yourself,"
and Junah ud-Dawla accordingly fled to Horns which belonged to
him. After however al-Mijann had established himself and begun
(4)to govern alone, Rudwan became jealous of him and killed him.^'
a ) . _I.A.XI. 63^ The M.Z. also mentions outbreaks of the 
fayyar in Baghdad in this year (pp. 110,11).
(2) Gribb: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades pp. 36,7•
(3) Kamal ud-Din 708.
(4) I.A.X. 174. This ra*is ul-abdath was originally a wood­
cutter.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE SELJTJQS AND THE CALIPHS OP BAGHDAD.
Prom the point of view of the history of I slam, the im­
portance of the Great 'Seljuq period is that, following as it 
did a period of ShT*ite supremacy, it not only restored Sunni 
rule, but to some extent also organised the religions insti­
tution. The Seljuqs had been converted to or become familiar 
with Islam at the time of Seljuq, who was converted when he 
migrated to the dar ul-islam.^ TThile there is little reason  ^
to doubt the sincerity of the belief of the Seljuq royal house j 
in Islam, there is little evidence to show that the Ghuzz 
hordes as distinct from the Sejjuq family were much influenced 
by Islam. Purther the attitude of the Seljuqs themselves
2towards Islam, sincere though it probably was in some aspects, 
was nevertheless governed by political motives. Their natural
1 I.A. IX.222.
2
Holy men were treated with respect by various members of the 
Seljuq family. It is related that Tughril Beg and Chaghri 
Beg made a pilgrimage to Abu Safid~b. Abl’l Khair before the 
battle of Dendengan (Abu_Sa*id b. Abl’l Khair: ^ Asrar ut-Taw- 
hld, p.129). Ibrahim Yanal also visited Abu Sa*id on another 
occasion (ibid. 193)* Tughril Beg once when passing through 
Ham a dan alighted with al-Kunduri before Bab a Tahir, Bab a 
Ja far and Shaikh Hamsha (U.S.98-9)- Sanjar also accorded 
great respect to the *ulama and was intimate with them, and 
used to have private sessions with hermits and ascetics (R.S 
171). He wore the robe (khirqa) of a certain Qutb al-ChalusI 
and visited his retreat. His wazir, Naslr ud-Din Muhammad 
b. Abi Tawba, hated and persecuted Qutb * al-Chalusi and was
always trying to persuade hisjnaster that he 
and an impostor (Ibn Isfandiyar,80-1). Sanj 
are said to have beeh the followers (murxaj
Mjarvazi (Asrar ut-Tawhid 308).
was a hypocrite 
ar and his army
°f Shaikh Mahdi
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tendency as Turks was probably towards orthodoxy, but be that 
as it may, for political reasons, since they were in opposi­
tion to the Shi‘a Buyids, they were pro-Sunni and anti-Shl‘a. 
Alp Arslan is reported by Nizam ul-Mulk to have said, "We have 
taken the country by conquest; we are all pure muslims and 
these ‘Iraqis are of bad religion and partisans of the Dailam-
ites. To-day God most High has made the Turks exalted on
this account that they are pure muslims and do not recognise
V  '
desire and innovation." This is a political valuation, and 
perhaps illustrates the attitude of the early Seljuqs. It is, 
moreover, significant that the strict orthodoxy of the early 
Seljuq sultans was considerably modified later, apparently 
from the time of Maliks hah onwards, by which time the Buyids 
had been defeated and deprived of their power. Nizam ul-Mulk 
protests against this relaxation and states that "in the time 
of Mahmud, Mas*ud, Tughril Beg and Alp Arslan, no Zoroastrian, 
Jew, Christian or rafidi, had the audacity to come into the 
open country (sahra) or before the great ... and the Turks 
never gave them an office, saying, * these are the co-religion­
ists of the Dailamites and their well-wishers.’ ... But now 
the matter has reached such a pitch that the dargah and diwan 
are full of them, and every Turk has ten or twenty of them 
round him, and they follow a policy of allowing few Khurasanis 
to enter their door and court to find means of subsistence.
1 S.N. 140.
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Tughril and U p  Arslan, when they heard a Turk or an amir 
had admitted a rafidi, reproached him."'*'
The religious policy of the Great Seljuqs ean he divided 
broadly into negative and positive measures, Among the former 
v^ere measures against the Shi4 a, which were largely, as sug­
gested above, the outcome of political circumstances. Simi­
larly, the opposition of the Great Seljuqs to the Fatimids was 
dictated primarily by political motives. Among the latter was 
■fehe organisation of the religious institution and of the 
madras as, which during the Great Seljuq period were Sunni
p
strongholds. By the strict observance of religious rites 
and duties, and by public manifestations of respect^ the
1 S.N. 139-
2 The organisation of the madras as will not be dealt with here.
 ^Every Friday at the regular hours Tughril Beg attended the 
five prayers (in the mosque); he lasted every Monday and 
Thursday (I.A. X.18; I.E. III.227), wrought numerous works 
of charity* founded mosques and used to say, ,TI should be 
ashamed to appear before God were I to build for myself a 
dwelling and not erect a mosque beside it (I.E. III.227). 
Both Tughril_Beg and .Alp Arslan were accompanied by a 
"private” imam on expeditions (of. I*A. IX.445: X.44). When 
the Seljuqs entered Nlshapur in Ramadan in 429(1038), Tugh­
ril Beg forbade his followers to plunder on the ground"that 
it was the month of Ramadan, and ^ ordered them to delay until 
1 the breaking of the fast#(Bu. 7)- Malikshah was apparently 
I zealous in the cause of religion. Among his good works were 
the construction of tanks and inns ( % ) on_the road to
the Hijaz, and the abolition of protection (khafarat) on j 
the pilgrim road; he also gave an iqta* and grant to the 
amir of Mecca and Medina and presents to the Arabs of the 
desdrt_employed in the Ka'ba (R.S. 131; 444; Nuzhat
ul-Qulub 162-3)- He built in Baghdad the jami* us-sultan 
which was commenced in Muharram 485 (1092) (I.A. X. 134-5J 1
I.K. III.441). In the territory which he conquered from I
(C ont inued on next page.)
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Seljuqs sought to increase the prestige of the religious insti­
tution and to strengthen it against further reverses. Religious 
affairs generally were placed under the supervision of the 
wazir as stated in Chapter II. Further the qadi, whose appoint­
ment was theoretically vested in the caliph, was in most cases 
appointed by the temporal ruler and was, in fact, a servant of 
the state.^ Nizam ul-Mulk makes it clear that his appointment 
and dismissal was in the hands of the temporal ruler: the qaals 
were the na*ibs (deputies) of the sultan, hut at the same time 
he admits - perhaps as a concession to orthodoxy - that they 
were the na’ibs also of the caliph; it is evident, however, from 
his exposition that their responsibility was in fact to the 
sultan and not to the caliph. ".All the qad.13," he states, "are 
the na1 ibs of the sovereign and it is indispensible for the 
latter to implement the authority of the qadls and the respect 
in which they are held must be complete, for they are the na*ibs 
of the caliph, whose mantle has devolved upon them. They are
"Pthe delegates and representatives of the ruler and do his work. ~
(Note continued from previous page.)
Byzantium he placed fifty mimfears (Bu. ^2). Together with 
Nizam ul-Hulk he visited various shrines including those of
*Ali and Husain, Musa b. Ja*far, Ahmad b. Hanbel3 Abu Hanifa 
and others in 479 (1087) (I.A. X.1&3)* and'tSe tomb of the 
Imam Rida in Tus (I.A. X.143).
 ^The use of qadls as envoys by the Seljuqs is noticeable. This 
was perhaps partly due to the respect in which the qadls were 
held by the population; pn the other hand it was possibly part­
ly due to the policy of the Seljuqs in incorporating the reli­
gious hierarchy within the framework of the government.
2 S.If. 40-1.
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Nizam ■ul-Mulk also regarded the qadi as an important link 
in the system by which justice and security WettSJ maintained 
in the kingdom, and stressed the necessity of preserving 
intact his prestige.^ In fact, the main function of the 
qadi was probably to watch over the religious institution 
on behalf of the government. Not only was the qadi included 
among the ranks of the officials of the temporal government, 
but an attempt was made to incorporate also the religious 
classes generally. By this means control of the religious 
institution was to be centralized. This policy, although 
perhaps inspired partly by reppect for religion, was primari­
ly due to political motives. Nizam ul-Mulk considered it 
obligatory upon the sultan to hold the jurists in respect 
and to give them means of subsistence from the public 
treasury; the sovereign was also to honour and respect 
those who abandoned themselves to the practice of devotion
and abstinence. Nizam ul-Mulk farther maintained that it••
was necessary for the sultan to admit to his proximity once 
or twice a week doctors of religion and to listen to the 
commandments of God from them and to hear the commentaries 
of the Qur’an, the traditions of the prophet and the stories
o




Seljuq sultans received generous patronage and many of them
“became famous thereby."** In Ramadan learned disputes between
the * ul am a used to take place in Alp Arslan’s audience between
-  2afternoon prayer and iftar. It is interesting to note that
Nizam ul-Mulk apparently desired to extend to the religious 
••
field also the system of espionage which he recommended so 
strongly in the general administration of the country. In 
order that subordinate officials should conduct their affairs 
in accordance with the commands of religion, he proposed the 
ruler should appoint in every town a god-fearing man to 
watch over and to give information about the condition of 
the 'arnil, qadi, muhtasib, and the subjects.^
The establishment of the religious institution by the 
Great Seljuqs led to a reconsideration of the position of 
the sultan vis-a-vis the caliph. The office of caliph was 
a stumbling-block to the attempt of the Seljuqs to centralize 
and to control the religious institution. Except for a 
period during the reign of Malikshah (see below) the Great 
Seljuqs nevertheless do not appear to have contemplated the 
abolition of the caliphate. Indeed, it was politically im­
portant for them to preserve the institution. By adopting
1 R.S. 19-20.
2 II. f . J 5 a.
2 s.it. 43.
3*9
the role of defenders of Sunnism they were able to acquire a 
certain prestige, while by obtaining the s anction of the 
caliph, their rule received legal validity. Further, since 
the Ghaznavids had received diplomas from the caliph, the 
Seljuqs, perhaps in order to place themselves on a level with 
the Ghaznavids, also insisted on receiving diplomas.'1' The 
Seljuqs, however, while maintaining the caliphate in._ exis­
tence, made it clear that the caliph was to exercise no 
temporal power, and sought further to control him by instal­
ling their own nominees in his wazirate and-by marriage al­
liances.
It may be that al-Qa*im at first saw in the Seljuqs a
—   —)
possible means of ridding himself of the Buy id domination 
and was hence prepared to encourage tLhem, Any hopes he may 
have had, however, of restoring his own power as a result of
this, must have been rapidly disillusioned by their subse-
2 -  _  -  '
quent conduct. After the Seljuqs entered Nishapur in
Ramadan 429 (1038), al-Qa’im sent Abu Bakr at-Tusi as an 
envoy to them. They welcomed him and presented him with 
robes of honour;^ subsequently after their defeat of Mas#ud
^ As far as the sultans after Malikshah were concerned; they 
endeavoured to obtain the caliph’s recognitione/in order to 
strengthen themselves against rivals. ^
2 This view is supported by Bundari’ s_statement that alHjja’im 
intended by his marriage with Arslan Khatun, Tughril Beg’s 
niece, to strengthen the sultan’s, prestige and"cement his 
friendship with him (p. 11 )7
3 Bu. 7*
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b. Mahmud in 431 (1040), they wrote to the caliph reporting 
this, and requested him to bestow on them the sovereignty of 
the already conquered lands.^ When this letter reached the 
caliph, he sent hack an answer with Hibatullah Muhammad al- 
Ma'muni, inviting Tughril Beg to come to Baghdad, and ordering 
Hibatullah to remain with Tughril until he could bring him 
to that city. For three years Hibatullah remained with 
Tughril, who had no leisure, in view of his preoccupation
• 4
in conquering the kingdom, to comply with the caliph’s
p_________________________________________________ _
request. In 435 (1043/4) al-Qa/im sent al-Mawardi to Tugh­
ril in Jurjan, with the purpose of making peace between 
Tughril, Jalal ud-Dawla and Abu Xalijarj in the following 
year al-Mawardi returned to Baghdad and informed the caliph 
of Tughrilfs submission to him and his respect for his command? 
Gregory Abu*l Faraj mentions that al-Qa/im sent an envoy to 
Tughril Beg in 436 (1044). His message contained four
1 Siddiqi: I.C. X.J. p.392-3; H.S. 103.
E.S. 105; U.H.S. 38. According to the T.G. there was an 
interval of eighteen years between the caliph’s invitation 
to Tughril Beg to come to Baghdad and his arrival in that 
city in 447 (1055/6) Op-437)- If this is so, the caliph 
must have invited Tughril to Baghdad in 429 (1038) on the 
occasion of his first embassy to the Seljuqs.
 ^ I.A* IX.357- According to Bundari, al-Mawardi was sent on 
an embassy to Tughril Beg . in 433 (1041/2), and on that occa­
sion al-Qa/im wrote a letter to al-Mawardl abusing Tughril 
(p. 26).
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stipulations: 1) that Tughril had made sufficient conquests 
and should not hanker after the countries of the rest of 
the governors of the Arabs; 2) that he should hold himself 
in strict subjection as a vassal and that he should swear
•
legal oaths concerning the divorce of his wives, and the 
freeing of his slaves and undertake to give dues of all 
his possessions if he resisted the caliph’s command; 3) that 
he should act righteously end not set men of error over the 
faithful; 4) that he should send each year the tribute of the 
countries he had taken* according to the custom of his pre­
decessors. According to Abu*l Faraj, Tughril did not accept 
any of these conditions.^ Eventually in 447 (1055/6) Tughril
_ p
Beg came to Baghdad. When he reached that city, the caliph 
sent him money and presents.^ but it was not till he returned 
a second time to Baghdad in zu’l Qa*da 449 (1058) that the 
caliph gave a personal audience to him.^
1 Gregory Abu*l Far a jr., ed. Budge, 203-4.
2 I,A. IX.419.
3 R.S. 105.
4 Gregory Abu,l Faraj, ed. Budge, 209, 211-2, Tughril on
this occasion was crowned, and adorned with a necklace 
and bracelet, and seven black khil*as were given to him.
He desired to kiss the ground, but could not because of 
the crown on his head. He then sought to kiss the caliph, 
who raised his hands to him twice, after which he girded 
on Tughril another sword, which marked the end of the 
audience (Bu. 13-4; I.A. X.103-4).
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In 550 (IO58) when al-Basasiri marched, on Baghdad, the
caliph sent an urgent message to Tughril Beg, who was absent 
putting down the revolt of Ibrahim YanaL, asking him to re­
turn.'1' Before Tughril arrived, the caliph left Baghdad with 
Quraish, and the khutba was read in the city in the name of 
al-Mustansir, the ‘Alid. At the approach of Tughril, al- 
Basasirl departed from the city (zu’l Qa‘da 451 (Dec.-Jan. 
1059/60) ) and Quraish entrusted al-Qa/im to Muharish b. 
Badran. Tughril then brought the caliph back to Baghdad.^ 
After this Tughril su^imoned ‘Amid ul-Mulk al-Kundurl, his
wazir, and told him to tell the caliph that he must assign a
♦
grant in the neighbourhood of Baghdad for the expenses of 
his (Tughril’s) army, since he had come to Baghdad in the 
interests of the state. ‘Amid ul-Mulk expressed the opinion 
that the caliph would make a similar demand for means of sub­
sistence upon Tughril. He set out on his mission, and it is 
reported that he met the caliph’s wazir on the way. ‘Amid ul- 
Mulk returned with him to the sultan’s court, and it turned 
out as he had anticipated; the caliph’s wazir had come to ask 
a grant from the sultan. Tughril, on the prompting of al- 
Kundurl, pretended that he had been about to arrange this.
1 R.B. 107.
2 I. A. IX.440-3. 
^ ibid..445-6.
VAl-Hunduri then asked for the records of the administration
of Baghdad (kitahi qanun), fixed the amount of the grant of
the caliph,^" and took charge of the wholhe of the official
-  2correspondence of Baghdad.
Tughril Beg’s attitude, both in deferring his coming toM
Baghdad-until 447, in spite of the caliph’s invitation, and 
in taking over the administration of Baghdad, suggests that 
his relations -with the caliph were governed predominantly by 
political motives. Throughout the Great Seljuq period, until 
the caliphate began to .re-emerge as a political force in 
*Iraq and the neighbourhood during the reign of al-Mustarshid 
(512/1118 - 529/11,35)* caliphate was deprived of all 
temporal power. In so far as the caliph refrained from inter- 
fering in political or temporal affairs, the sanctity of his 
office was increased. He was, moreover, no longer liable, as 
he had been in the Buy id period, to arbitrary deposition by 
the temporal ruler, and he was allowed to enjoy his allowance 
and the income of his personal estates without fear of any 
demand being made on him, or his estate being confiscated.^ 
Further, by emphasizing the sanctity of the caliph’s office, 
the Seljuqs restored to some extent the dignity and the good 
name of that office.4 This prepared the way for that increase
^ U.S. 110-1; T.G. 438. The succeeding caliphs also received
grants from the sultan (see Chapter V.)1  .
2 R.D. f .240a.
2 Siddiqi: I.C. X.}. p.297-8.
4 cf. A.M. 91.
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in the power of the caliphate -which revealed itself towards 
the end of the Great Seljuq period, hut once the caliph
began to exercise temporal power again, the sanctity of his 
office declined, and like any other temporal leader he became 
subject to attack and siege.
At times it would seem that Tughril Beg had a genuine 
respect for the caliph. When negotiating with al-Basasiri 
for the return of the caliph to Baghdad in 451 (1059/60), he 
was apparently prepared to agree that he (Tughril) should not
!-v ^
enter *Iraq, and should merely have his name mentioned in the 
khutba and on the coinage.^- Nevertheless, as stated above, 
once the caliph had returned to Baghdad, al-Kundurl success-
A
fully planned for Tughril to take over the administration of 
the city. On the occasion of the caliph1 s return to Baghdad 
Tughril Beg came out to meet hi® at Nahrawan to do him homage. 
He then went in advance to Baghdad, and when the caliph ar­
rived he arose and took the bridle of his mule until he 
reached the gate of his private apartments. In 455 (106j) 
when Tughril came again to Baghdad, the caliph wanted to go 
to meet him in person, but Tughril excused him from this, and 
his wazir Ibn Jahlr came instead.^ It apparently became the
1 I.A. IX.451.
ibid.. 446-7- On a later occasion Mas*ud b. Muhammad is 
said, when he made peace with the caliph in 5^9 (1134/4), 
to have carried the saddle-cloth before the caliph, who 





regular custom for the caliph’s wazir, the qadi ul-qudat and the 
naqlbs to meet the -sultan when he arrived in Baghdad.^
On the other hand Tughril Beg did not treat the caliph 
with respect when insisting that al-Qa’im’s daughter should 
he given him in marriage (see helow). On other occasions also 
it seems that the respect of the Great Seljuqs for the caliph- ! 
ate did not go beyond formalities. TThereas in Buyid times the ; 
caliph’s residence was a refuge for all who feared the Buyids, 
this was not tolerated in the Great Seljuq period. TThen Easul- 
tegin, Tughril Beg’s half-brother, took refuge with the ra*is 
ur-ru* as a, and the caliph summoned *Amid ul-Mulk to command 
him to inform the sultan of Basultegin’s position, *AmId ul- ! 
Mulk said Ba^ultegin ought to be surrendered out of respect 
for the sultan; eventually it was agreed that the caliph should
~ p
keep Basultegin in chains. Malikshah on a subsequent occasion |
■i
actually violated the caliph’s haram. Alp Arslan’s murderer |
had been killed by a man named Jami* Farrash. One of the
caliph’s ghulams subsequently killed Jamies son, and fled to
the caliph’s haram. Malikshah happened to be in Baghdad, and ;
Jami* asked him to exact vengeance for his son, as he, Jami*,
had for his, Malikshah* s, father’s murderer. The sultan <••
thereupon sent the amir hajib, Qumaj, to bring the ghulam out 




but Malikshah refused.^ It seems clear therefore that the i 
respect of the Great Seljuqs for the caliph was a strictly < 
limited one, and only effective in so far as it did not inter­
fere with their own political aspirations or personal wishes.
iruring the reign of Alp Arslan an attempt was made to 
control the caliphate through his wazirate; and Nizam ul-Mulk . 
sought to make Fakr ud-Dawla b. Jahir, al-Qe^im's wazir, his 
tool. Up to 460 (1068) his relations with Fakhr ud-Dawla be- ; 
came more and more cordial. In that year, however, al-Qa*im 
dismissed Ibn Jahlr because of his too subservient attitude
to the Seljuq court. Nizam ul-Mulk thereupon sought to im-
••
pose a nominee of his own, ar-Rudrawari, the father of Abu 
Shuja*; he died, however, b&fore reaching Baghdad, and Fakhr 
ud-Dawla was reappointed in 461 ( 1 0 6 8 / 9 0n condition that J
1
his relations with the Seljuqs should in future be more cor­
rect. As it happened they in fact soon grew strained, until ] 
Nizam ul-Mulk came to attribute any unwelcome event in Baghdad,
to Fakhr ud-Dawla1 s influence.^ In 469 (IO76/ 7) there was a ]
■# '
1 R.S. 121-2; U.H.S. 53-4. j
2 _
Bowen in his article on Nizam ul-Mulk in the Encyclopaedia \
of Islam describes Nizam ul-Mulk* s relations with the ealijii 
and. with the Ban! JaJhir. I have largely drawn upon this j 
article in describing these events. j
2 I.A. X.39; Bu. 34.
E.I. Recording to Bundari. Abu Shu j a * came to Baghdad in j 
Rabi^. 1.464 11071) from the sultan to serve the caliph. The 
sultan.had given him the laqab wazir ul-wuzara and assigned 
hinThalf of Fakhr ud-Dawla* s iqta . TVhen he arrived the 
caliph refused to receive him (p. 42-3).
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riot in the suq of the Nizamiyya &adrasa, “which Nizam ul-
Mulk attributed to the Bani Jahir, and when in Shaban 470
(1078) Nizam ul-Mulk’s daughter, the wife of #Amid ud-Dawla
b. Jahir, died, relations were broken off between than;'*'
Nizam ul-Mulk then sent Gawhar 3L*in back to *Iraq as shihna,
•• •
with a letter to theicaliph requesting the dismissal of 
Fakhr ud-Dawla from the wazirate, and he commanded G-awhar 
3* in to seize the Ban! Hahir and their friends. In 471 
(1078/9) Gawhar 3.*In gave this letter to the caliph and 
Fakhr ud-Dawla was confined to his house, Al-MuqtadI, who had 
become caliph by this time, being forced to agree. = *Amid 
ud-Dawla had meanwhile gone to the sultan’s court to try to 
conciliate Nizam ul-Mulk. He succeeded in doing so and the 
wazir married him to another of his daughters, and sent him 
back to Baghdad with instructions to the caliph to make him
T 2wazir. The caliph, however, refused, ordered Fakhr ud- 
Dawla and fM i d  ud-Dawla b. Jhhir to remain in their houses, 
and appointed Abu Shu j a* b. Muhammad b. al-Husain to the 
wazirate. Nizam ul-Mulk then wrote again to the caliph 
concerning the return to office of the Bani Jahir, and
^ E.I. T.S. 28J. According to the latter the quarrel arose 
over the property of Nizam ul-Mulk(s daughter, #Amid ud- 
Dawla having produced a”number of witnesses to show that 
his wife, who had died in childbirth, had died before her 
infant son, to whom therefore her inheritance went.
2 Bu. 51J I.K. III.281; I.A. X.75-
558
and finally * Amid, ud-Dawla was appointed wazir in gafar 472
(1079)*^ Some years later in gafar 476 (IO85) *Amid ud-
i Q
Dawla was dismissed by al-Muqtadl and replaced by Abu Shuja*. 
The Bani Jahir thereupon took refuge at the Seljuq court; 
they were then sent to attack the Marwanids.^ Bowen suggests 
that this was possibly intended to be a preliminary step in 
the abolition of the caliphate.^ In the following year, how­
ever, Nizam ul-MulkTs hostility towards the caliph, which had 
been roused by these events, was transformed as a result of 
his first visit to Baghdad and the caliph’s gracious reception 
of him on the occasion of his (al-Muqtadl’s) wedding to Malik­
shah 1s daught er.^
It was not only during the wazirate of Nizam ul-Mulk that 
the sultan or his wazir appears to have had some control over 
the appointment and dismissal of the caliph’s wazir. In 554 
(1159/40) quarrels arose between al-Muqtafi and his wazir,
*A1I b. Tirad az-Zainabi, because the latter opposed his ••
wishes. *Ali eventually fled to the sultan’s palace. The 
X.75.
2 I *A • X • 85^  — —
Abu Shuja was dismissed at the sultan and Nizam ul-Mulk’s 
orders in 484 (1091/2) because of His oppression, after 
which the caliph sent to them to ask if he might make 
*AmId ud-Dawla wazir (I*A. X.124; Bu. 72).
2 I.A. X.
4 E.I.
 ^E.I. See also p.8jT above.
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caliph then sent to the sultan, 7/ho gave permission for the 
dismissal of ‘All.1 Subsequently when Mas‘ud b. Muhammad came 
to Baghdad in 532 (1137/8), az-Zainabl asked him to interdede 
for him with the caliph. The sultan accordingly sent his 
wazir to the caliph, with the result that az-Zainabi was 
given permission to return to his residence, while his brother
■r ■ —  2was reinstated as naqlb un^nuqaba.
An important aspect in the policy of the Great Seljuqs 
towards the caliphate, as noted above, 7/as the making of 
marriage alliances with the caliphate. By this means they 
hoped in the first place to increase their own prestige, and 
secondly to curtail still fiurther the power of the caliph.
In Muharram 448 (IO56) Arslan Ehatun, Da/ud1 s daughter, was \
I
betrothed to the caliph.*^ 7/ith increasing power, Tughrilfs 1 
aspirations gre7/, and in 453 (106l), he sent the qadi of 
Rei to Eaghdad to demand the hand of al-Qa,imfs daughter in i
marriage. This demand caused the caliph great vexation, - j
\
even the Buyids had never forced him to such an action. He *
tried to get it withdrawn, and commanded his envoy to demand j
1
of Tughril, if he persisted in the marriage, J00,.000 dinars.
1 I.A. XI.50; T.M. f.172*). ;1
2 I.A. XI.59- i
' I.A. IX.424. According to al-QalanisI the *aqd was first 
made for al-Qa*imfs son, Zahir ud-Din, and when he died 
it was transferred to al-JJa/im (p. 86). \
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Al-Kunduri, however, told the caliphs envoy hlimtly that
refusal was* out of the question, and reported to Tughril that
the caliph had agreed. The sultan rejoiced at this, and sent
*AmId ul-Mulk with Arslan Khatun, who had been betrothed to
the caliph in 4-48, with 100,000 dinars and jewels to Baghdad.
The caliph refused to assent to the marriage and al-Kundurl
returned to Hamadan. Tughril then wrote to the qadi ul-qudat
and Abu Mansur b. Yusuf, reproaching them and complaining of
the caliph’s ingratitude towards him after his exertions in
the cause of the caliphate. He further ordered al-Kunduri
to s&ize the caliph’s iqta* and to leave him only what al-
* •
Qadir had formerly held under the Buyids. Tughril then 
demanded the return of Arslan Khatun, and the caliph, realis­
ing the matter was serious, repented of his refusal, and the 
marriage contract was ratified in Sha*ban 454 (1062) outside 
Tabriz.1
1 Bu. 18-20; I.A. X.12-14; I.E. III.227. The caliph's daugh 
ter’s marriage payment was, according to the H.S., 400 silver 
dirhams and one gold dinar (p.Ill), but according to other ac­
counts it was 1000 dinars (A.S.D. 21; I.A. XI.51). The sadaq ; 
of Muhammad b. Malikshah1 s sister, when she married al-Mustaz- 
hir in 5^4 (1110/11), was 100,000 dinars (A.S.D. 81). After 
the *a.qd was celebrated between Tughril Beg and al-Qa/im’s 
daughter, the sultan sent to Baghdad with the caliph’s envoy i 
Ibn al-Muhallaban”and the ra*Is of the two *Iraqs thirty j
Turkish ghulams for the caliph and Turkish slave-girls on 
thirty horses, servants and horses with golden bridies and 
saddles set with precious jewels and 10,000 dinars, and for 
his bride 10,000 dinars, and he assigned her Ba^quba and what j 
his late wife (who had died in zu’l Qa*da 452/1060) had held ; 
in *Iraq, and a necklace of thirty pearls, each of which 
weighed a mithqal, and for *Uddat ud-Din 5000 dinars, and for 
the bride’s mother 3000 dinars. I
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In the following year Tughril Beg oame to Baghdad, and 
*Amid ul-Mulk went to the caliph to demand his daughter. It 
was pointed out that it had been understood that the object 
of Tughril fs marriage was honour and not union, and that if 
she was to be seen by Tughril, it was to be in Baghdpd, in 
confirmation of which there was a statement in the hand of 
al-Kunduri. The sultan accepted this, and in gafar the 
caliph’s daughter was taken to the sultan’s palace."** Never­
theless she did in fact leave Baghdad shortly afterwards. In 
Rabi* I. 455(IO65) al-Kunduri went to the caliph’s palace to 
ask formal permission for Tughril to depart, and for Alslan 
Khatun and the caliph’s daughter to go with him (al-Kundur 1), 
saying that they would shortly return. The caliph gave per­
mission for the departure of Arslan IQiatun, who had complained 
of his (al-Qa* im’ q) treatment of her, ^  and unwillingly per­
mitted his daughter to go also.^
Subsequently, in 464 (1071/2) al-Qa*im sent Ibn al-Jahlr
*" I.A. X.11-12; Bu. 24; I.E. III.227-8. She sat on a golden 
throne when Tughril entered to her; he kissed the ground, 
paid her homage, and sat opposite her on a silver throne.
She did not unveil before him. He remained seven days 
paying her homage daily.
 ^I.A. X.l6. She returned to Baghdad in 459 (1066/7) (X.J7)«
 ^Bu. 24-5- She was sent back by Alp Arslpja in 456(1064) (I.A, 
X.25). Al-Mustazhir, al-Muqtadl’s successor compelled her 
to remain in her house, lest she should intrigue for his 
overthrow (I.A. X.251). She died in Muharram 496 (1102).
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to ask for the hand of Alp Arslan’s daughter for his wall *ahd
al-Muqtadi, to which the sultan agreed.^ Al-Muqtadi, also,
after he had 1)6001116 caliph, sent Ihn Jahir to Malikshah to
ask the hand of his daughter, hizam ul-Mulk went with Ihn
Jahir to Turkan Khatun, the princess’ mother, to discuss this
matter with her. She said that the Ghaznavid-ruler and the
Khaqan had already asked her hand in marriage and each had
given 400,000 dinars, hut that if the caliph would give her
this sum, she would agree. Arslan Khatun, however, pointed
out to the princess that such a union was an honour for her,
and that it was unseemly to demand money from the caliph, and
2
eventually she agreed. She was taken to the caliph’s resi­
dence in 480 (1087/8).^ Subsequently she wrote to Malikshah 
complaining of the caliph’s neglect of her, and so the sultan 
sent to the caliph demanding her return, ”in such a way that 
there was no escape from compliance”, and she returned to 




Bu. 67; I.A. X.77; I. A. states she (Malikshah’s daughter) 
made it a condition that she should receive a preliminary 
payment of 50,000 dinarsf which was agreed upon.
3 I.A. X.109.
4 ibid. Il6. She died in Isfahan in 482 (1089/90)*
In Sfra'ban $02 (1109) al-MustazMr was 'betrothed, to
_ *1
Muhammad b. Malikshah’s sister, and in 518 (1124/5) al-Mus-
p
tarshid married Sanjar’s daughter; al-Muqtafl in 531 ( H 36/6)
asked the hand of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad b. Malik-
shah and the sister of Mas*ud,^ while in 534 (1139/40) Mas'ud
- r  4
b. Muhammad asked the hand of al-Muqtafi’s daughter. For the 
caliph to give his daughter in marriage to the Seljuqs was 
apparently no longer a great concession. Once the principle 
had been granted that the caliph should give his daughter 
in marriage to the sultan, it ceased to be the important 
event that it had been during the time of Tughril Beg.
I Under the Buyids, the caliph had not exercised any power,
but the separation between-the temporal and religious functions 
1 of the caliphate had not, as yet, taken place. During the 
Great Seljuq period there was, however, a complete severance, i
^ I.A. X.330* She was taken to the caliph’s palace in Rama­
dan 504 (1111) (I.A. X.3 5 9 ).
2 a.2. 69.
 ^ I.A. XI.3 1 . Fatima was conducted amid much pomp to the 
caliph’s palace three years later (Jumadi II. 534/1140).
The bridal outfit of Malikshah’s daughter on the occasion 
of her marriage to the caliph in 480 £1087) consisted of 
1 3 0 camels, adorned with brocade ( dibaj ar-rum!), while 
most of their trappings were gold and silver, and 74 mules 
adorned with brocade ( dib a j al -rnulk1 ), with gold and silver 
bells and headropes, twelve boxes containing innumerable 
ornaments, and 33 flue horses with golden saddles set with 
jewels. She was also accompanied by 200 Turkish slave 
girls (I.A. X. 106-7).
4 I.A. xi.51,51; T.s. ^05; UK. H i . 254.
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Temporal affairs were delegated, to the sultan, while the
caliph remained the supreme authority in matters relating to 
legal administration. The clearest instance of this is the 
following. The sultan issued a diploma to Tughtegin for the 
province of-Syria in Muharram $10 (1116) (see Chapter V.),^ 
hut in order to carry out certain adjustments in land tenure, 
Tughtegin obtained a formal decree from the caliph. For 
the rest the caliph’s function was merely to occupy himself 
with the performance of prayers (namaz) and religious leader­
ship.^ When, however, the Seljuq power began to disintegrate; 
strong or capable caliphs tended to revert to the earlier 
position, and finally, under al-Muqtafi, the caliphate 
actually became one of the succession states of the Great 
Seljuq empire.
1 Q. 1 9 3 -
2 - -rQ. 219. The qadis of Syria, although appointed by the 
local rulers, received investiture from the caliph. Abu 
Ghanam, £adl of_Aleppo received, it seems,_a diploma for 
the officg* of qadi and muhtasib from the qadi ul-qudat 
All ad-Damghani* at the order of al-Mustazhir in gafar 
49§ (1102) (Y. VI.30). Abu’l Fa<jl Hibatullah b. Abi 
Ghanam, who succeeded his father as qadi in 534 (1139/40) 
had a deed of investiture from Zangi b! Ajsunqur and sub­
sequently received a diploma from the qadi ul-qudat az- 
Zainabi at the order of al-Muqtafl (Y. V I .31)•
2 Siddiqi: I.C. XI.I. 48-9.
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The administration of Baghdad, as stated above, was 
handed over to Tughril Beg during the wazirate of al-Kunduri. 
Broadly speaking thenceforward down to the reign of al-Mus- 
tarshid, administrative authority (
‘Iraq, the farming of the country and the tribute levied 
upon the nomads, was under the sultan and his officials.'** 
T^ithin Baghdad itself, there was to some extent a conflict 
of authority. The population, ncrt unnaturally, tended to 
refer to the caliph, who was alY/ays accessible to them, 
rather than to the sultan, Y/ho was often absent from Baghdad,
- p
but the caliph could do little but refer back to the sultan.
• »
In 464 (1071/2) the people, including many of the imams, 
complained to the caliph of the number of singing girls and 
drunkards in the city, asking him to destroy the taverns, 
and he promised he would write to the sultan concerning 
this;^ in 475 (1082/3) the caliph complained to Malikshah 
and Nizam ul-Mulk of the * amid of ‘Iraq, which resulted in 
the dismissal of the * am1d .^
**" A.M. 91 •_ °f* I.K., who states that Baghdad was part of 
Malikshah1 s domains and that the caliph had only nominal 
authority there (III.444),
2 In conflicts betY/een the caliph and the sultan, there was 
a general tendency for a large part of the~population (to 
support the caliph. Tvhen the caliph threatened to leave 
Baghdad in Muharram 521 (1127), if Mahmud b. Muhammad 
continued to advance on the city, the "people abused the 
sultan and 30,000 *&en of Baghdad and of the Sawad assem- 




On the other hand the caliph still seems to have re­
tained some power to levy taxes locally. Jizya in so far as 
it was paid, was apparently collected "by the caliph’s wazir. 
Abu Shuja*, al-Muqtadi’s wazir,forced the zimmis to pay 
jizya, and subjected them at the same time to humiliation."^ 
However, when a levy was made on the zimmis of Baghdad in 
515 (1121/2), 20,000 dinars went to the sultan and 4000 to 
the caliph. In gafar 5^7 (1123) al-Mustarshid made a levy 
upon the people for the cost of the repairs to one of the 
city walls. This caused distress among the people, and the 
caliph then ordered what had been collected from them to be 
returned.^ In 530 (1155/6) the caliph, ar-Rashld, repaired 
the city wall,^ while, as stated in Chapter VII,, when *Ali 
b. Dubais and various amirs attacked Baghdad, the caliph 
began to build a city wall, to dig a moat and to fortify 




 ^ I.A._X.4J5* -fllMiad b. Nizam ul-MUlk, his wazir, gave 15,000 
dinars for tliis, and paid the rest by instalments upon 
the rich. According to the T.S. al-Mustarshid wanted to 
levy 15,000 dinars from the people for the expenses of re­
pairing the city wall, but Ahmad b. Nizam ul-Mulk, his 
wazir, gave this sum from the treasury"(p.301) .
4 I.A. XI. 23. I
 ^Q. 302; I,A. XI.87- According to Bundari al-Muqtaf I, af-
ter the death of Mas*ud b. Muhammad, fortified the walls 
of; Baghdad and dug a moat (p. *215).
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The caliph’s wazir seems to have had some kind of 
judicial authority. Alu Shuja/ used daily, after the mid­
day prayer, to hold a mazalim court till the evening prayer, 
and had a proclamation made to the effect that anyone who 
had a grievance or need should come to the dlwan; if he
learnt that one of the sultan’s followers had committed••
oppression, he would summon him and speak severely to him.'*'
The responsibility for local order and security, although
technically vdsted in the shihna, seems to some extent to
have been shared by the caliph and his officials (see also
Chapter VI.). When rioting broke out in Baghdad in 478
(1085/6) between the people of Karkh and the people of other
districts, Abu Shuja/, the caliph’s wazir, sent a group of
2the jund to restore order. When, however, there was rioting 
and looting at the shrine at the Bab at-Tibn in 517 (U23/4), 
the caliph sent Nazar the amir hajj to punish those respon­
sible.^ During the floods in 466 (1073/4) Altegln as-Sulai- 
manl told the wazir that the ferrymen were practising ex­
tortion upon the people, and so the wazir sent for them,
commanded them to take only the customary fees and threatened' 





them 1,7ith death if they disobeyed. 1
Tughril Beg’s attitude to the caliphate has been 
briefly described. During the reign of Alp Arslan a rela­
tively conciliatory policy was pursued under the guidance
feelings towards the caliph during the reign of Maliks hah. 
altered, and how this 7/as followed by a reconciliation 
7/ith the caliph. Malikshah, on the other hand, as a result 
of his daughter’s unfortunate marriage with al-Muqtadi, con­
ceived a hatred of the caliph. In 484 (1091) 7/hen he came 
to Baghdad, .3ae ignored the caliph’s presence, and even con­
templated the termination of the caliphate of al-Muqtadi, 
perhaps as a prelude to uniting the caliphate and the sul­
tanate. It is probable, however, that his subsequent actions 
were actuated solely by personal dislike of the caliph, 
and that any political motives he may have had were subsi­
diary. Al-Muqtadi had designated as his successor his 
elder son, who subsequently became al-Mustazhir, but Malik­
shah insisted that he should revoke this nomination and 
declare Abu*l Fadl Ja*far, who was the son of Malikshah* s 
daughter, heir to the caliphate, put him in possession of
_  . p
of Hizam ul-Mulk. It has also been shown how the latter’s
I.A. X.62-3.
The latter was rewarded for this by the laqabs Qiwam ud- 
■ Din and Radi Amir il-Mu'minin (Bowen E . I. J.
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Baghdad and then remove himself to Basra, The caliph felt 
the greatest repugnance to execute this, and used every ef­
fort to change the sultan’s determination, hut finding all**
remonstrance fruitless, he asked and obtained a delay of 
ten days in order to make the necessary plans, for his depar­
ture. Meanwhile in Rabi* I. 485 (1092) Malikshah left Bagh­
dad for Isfahan, arid took Abu*l Fadl Jaffar with him. Short­
ly afterwards before the delay given to al-Muqtadi had 
elapsed, Malikshah died, and al-Muqtadi was relieved of the 
necessity of complying with his command’."*" According to
some accounts it seems that the intention had been to set
2up the caliphate in Isfahan, which project in the view of
fiashid ud-Din might well have succeeded, but for the death
of Malikshah.*^
Turkan Khatun, on the death of Malikshah, asked the
caliph to recognise her son, Mahmud, as sultan. The caliph• • •
agreed, somewhat unwillingly, to her request, and she sent
M & f 7 _
Abu 1 Fadl Ja far back to him.y Mahmud was a minor and • +
hence his government, from the point of view of the shari * a,
1 I.K.^III.445; Gregory Abu’l Faraj, ed. Budge, p_,231- Bun-
dari states Malikshah suggested that al-Muqtadi should 
choose either Damascus or the Hijaz as his residence (p. 
65). The T.S. merely relates that Malikshah on his arri­
val in Baghdad sent someone to the caliph to tell him to 
leave the city (p.283).
2 U.H.S. 72-3; U.S. 140.
2 E.D. f . 244a.-
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was illegal. The agreement of the caliph to her request 
shows his weakness; he did, it is true, stipulate that the 
amir Unar should "be in charge of the leaders of the army, 
and the protection of the cities, and that he should act 
on the advice of Taj ul-Mulk Abu’l Ghana’im, the wazir, who 
was to he in charge of taxation and administration.^
The struggle for the sultanate following the death of 
Malikshah gave an unexpected opportunity to the caliph to 
assert his independence. That he failed to do so, can 
only he attributed to the great weakening of his power 
during the wazirate of Nizam ul-Mulk. ^After the death of
<^CL.<L*kA4i Y
Malikshah with the decline of the sultanate, the caliphate^/
hegan ~kfrn~n to reap the benefit of the strengthening of the
religious organisation which had been the policy of the
first three sultans. The caliph from that time onwards began
to take part in the struggles for temporal power, but it
b • Malikshah
was not until after the death of Muhammad/in $11 (1117) 
that the caliphate became an important factor in this
.
struggle, from which it ultimately emerged successful; this j 
was marked by the establishment in *Iraq of a state over 
which the caliphate exercised full control, temporal as 
well as religious. There were two main aspects in the
1 I.A. X.145. ■
2 cf. Siddiqi: I,C . ’II. I. p.37.
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policy.of the caliphs directed towards this end. In the 
first place they took sides in the family quarrels of the 
Seljuqs, hoping thereby to weaken them, and secondly they 
tried to truild up their own armed forces.
It was only gradually that the caliph emerged as a 
military power. Towards the end of the period he had his 
own standing army. Ibn ul-Athir mentions the ghilman ad- 
dariyya with the caliph in the battle with Mas*ud b, Muham­
mad in Ramadan 5^9 (1135)*1 and these were presumably mem­
bers of the caliph1s standing army. Al-MuqtafT, when he 
succeeded apparently rcwore not to buy any Turkish mamluks, 
and hence had only Armenian and Byzantine (rumi) slaves.
The elect of these were known as the khailiyya and were
2
charged with high positions. The first of the caliphs to 
assemble an army during the G-reat Seljuq period, and to lead 
it in person was al-Mustarshid. In 517 (1123/4) he led an 
army against Dubais, whom he defeated.^ Moreover, as the 
caliph began to have his own army, the amirs tended to join
1 A.M. 89.
2
Bu. 215* The caliph’s v/azir also began to have military 
functions. In 547 (1152/3) *Aun ud-Din b. Hub air a, _al- 
Muqtafi’s. wazir, dispatched armies to Kufa and to 77asit, 
which cities they captured (I.A. XI.106); in 549 (H54/5) 




him as they joined the temporal leaders. In 527 (H32/3) a 
number of amirs joined the caliph while'the Seljuqs were 
preoccupied with family s t r u g g l e s T w o  years later in 
529 (II34/5) after Mas*ud b. Muhammad had conquered Hamadan, 
Yaranqush Bazdar, Qizil Akhur, Sunqur al-Ehuznartegini, wall 
of Hamadan, *Abd ar-Rahman b. Tughra/irak, Rubais b. Sadaqa 
and other amirs sent to the caliph for permission to come and 
pay him homage. Tfhen they reached Baghdad the caliph wel­
comed them and sent them provisions ( ) and robes
of honour. Mas*ud b. Muhammad’s name was then left out of 
the khutba, and these amirs encouraged al-Mustarshid to 
oppose him. The caliph then left Baghdad to attack M asrud, 
and was joined also by Bursua b. Bursuq, after which the 
forces with him numbered 7*000 horse, while Iqbal al-Murshidi 
remained behind in rIraq with 3000 horse. .Amirs in the 
neighbourhood of Hamadan had meanwhile written to the caliph 
offering him obedience, but when he delayed most of them 
made peace with Mas'ud. After the murder of *Abd ar-Rahman 
b. Tughra/irak, eAbbas, his ally, who was in Baghdad at the 
time, united with al-Muqtafi against the sultan. Their plot 
failed, however, and r Abbas was himself murdered while trying
1 I.A. 7,1.2.
2 Ibid. 14-15.
mto flee from Baghdad.^
The struggle of the caliphate to emerge as the dominant
'temporal force in fIraq was not a simple hattle with the
Seljuqs* hut was complicated by the existence of the Mazya-
dids of Hilla and the Atabegs of Mawsil. During the period
of anarchy following the death of Malikshah the caliph was
not strong enough ito stand alone* and he supported first
one and then the other of the Seljuq leaders according to
2
circumstances. During the reign of Muhammad b. Malikshah* 
the caliph's power was limited by the existence of the 
Mazyadid gadaqa. The latter was the only ruler at this 
time to whom the caliph could turn for help against the 
Seljuqs. But $adaqa was a Shi*a* and probably aimed himself 
at obtaining possession- of *Iraq; hence* as stated in 
Chapter I.* he checked any tendency of the caliphate to
U.S. 238-9- They had determined to seize the sultan
when he went into the country outside Baghdad to celebrate 
the *Id. As it happened heavy rain fell that day, and 
the sultan did not leave his residence.
2 In Muharram 487 (1094) the khutba was read in_Barkyaruq' s 
name*in Baghdad (I.A. X.155l7”^ ut when Barkyaruq was de­
feated by Tutush in the same year* the letter's request 
to have the khutba read in his name was acceded to (I.A. 
X.158), In zu'I Hijja 492 (1099) the khutba was read in 
Muhammad b. Malikshah's name (I,A, X .I96)V but when Bark­
yaruq came to Baghdad in §afar 493 (Beo*- 1099/H00)
his name was once more mentioned in the khutba (I.A. X.198, 
The following year, however* saw the khutba”being read in 
Muhammad b. Malikshah's name again (I♦ A.~X.210). In 
xu'l Qa*da 497 (1104), after Barkyaruq and Muhammad had 
made peace the khutba was read in the name of * Barkyaruq 
in Baghdad (I.A. X7254).
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to reassert itself.1 On various occasions the caliph did
2in fact turn to Sadaqa for help, but the Mazyadid ruler show­
ed little real readiness to cooperate with him against the 
Seljuqs. In 5°1 (1108) gadaqa was killed. Dubais, who suc­
ceeded his father had neither the power nor the ability of 
the latter. Thus a stumbling-block to the expansion of the 
caliphate as a temporal power was removed, and when Muhammad 
b. Malikshah died in $11 (1117) an opportunity arose for an 
energetic caliph to increase his power. A kind of triangular 
struggle then ensued for the possession of *Iraq between 
the caliph and al-BursuqT against Bubais, who was subsequent­
ly joined by Zangi, with the sultan playing an uneasy part 
in the background. On the death of Muhammad b. Malikshah, 
Mahmud b, Muhammad appointed both al-Bursuql and Mangubars 
to the office of shihna of Baghdad. The former appealed to
It is interesting to note, however, that the caliph ap­
pointed various Shi*as to_his wazirate during the Great 
Seljuq period, namely, Abu’l Maali Hibatullah, whom 
Rashid ud-Din states was a Shi*a (Athar ush-Shi*at il- 
Amamiyya, p.5&), Anushiravan b. 13£halid, and Jalal ud- 
Lin *A1I b. gadaqa.
 ^During the riots in Baghdad in 482 (1089/90), £ke caliph 
appealed to Sadaqa, who sent an army to Baghdad and put 
down the rioting (I.A. X. 117-6). Malikshah was at that 
time absent on an expedition to Khurasan and Transoxania, 
and hence it was impossible for the caliph to receive help 
from the sultan immediately, and secondly he may have ap­
pealed to Saclaqa because the Shi*a of Karkh were involved 
in this rioting.
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the caliph, who wrote concerning this to Maljmud.^ " The 
details of the ensuing struggle between al-Bursuql and 
Mangubars, who was joined by Bubais b. Sadaqa, are involved.
Mangubars finally established himself as shihaa in 512
■ -
(1118/9). Bubais subsequently again began to create dis­
turbances in *Iraq, and in 516 (1122/5) Mahmud b. Muhammad 
made peace with him and determined to leave Baghdad. The 
caliph was displeased at this and suggested Bubais should
be sent away from *Iraq. The sultan instead reappointed*  •«
al-Bursuql as shihna, and ordered him to fight Bubais if 
he interfered in the affairs of *Iraq.^ Nevertheless when 
Mahmud left Baghdad, Bubais returned to his evil ways, and 
so the caliph proposed to al-Bursuqi to turn Bubais out of 
Hilla. Bubais, however, defeated al-Bursuqi, after which 
he made peace with the caliph on condition the latter dis­
missed Jalal ud-Bin *Ali b. gadaqa, his w a z i r Bubais 
then sent an army to Wasit, which, after an initial victory, 
was defeated. He then again made peace with the caliph, 







caliph finally determined to march against Bubais. He as­
sembled the ajnad of Baghdad in 5^6 and set out with Sulei­
man b. Muharish, governor of al-Hadltha, Qirwash b. Muslim,
the rUqailid, al-Bursuql and others. The raskar of Wasit 
also joined them, and they defeated Bubais.'1* Meanwhile in
518 (1124/5) al-Bursuql was dismissed from the office of
2shihna at the request of the caliph, who perhaps was begin- . 
ning to see in him an obstacle to his own aggrandisement. 
Bubais, after his defeat, joined Tughril b. Muhaznmad and 
advanced upon Baghdpd again in 5^9 (1125/6). The caliph 
ordered the shihna, Yaranqush az-Zakawi, to prepare for war, 
assembled the soldiers and set out from Baghdad. Rumour 
spread that Bubais had captured Baghdad, and the caliph’s 
army fled, and he himself would have been destroyed by T-ughri], 
had the latter not fallen sick and been delayed. Finally 
Bubais and Tughril left *Iraq^ W0n’t Sa^ar*
Mahmud b. Muhammad himself advanced towards rIra^ in j 
520 (1126). The caliph, who was perhaps beginning to feel 
his new power, sent to Mahmud to ask him to delay his coming, ’ 
on the grounds that the country was in a state of ruin after 
the invasion of Bubais and Tughril, and he gave Mahmud much




money to obtain this. Mahmud, however, feared the caliph’s 
growing power, which fear Yaranqush, the shihna, had con­
firmed, and so he hastened on to fI*raq. The caliph, there­
upon, threatened to leave Baghdad if Mahmud advanced. The 
sultan tried to conciliate him, hut the latter was adamant
in his demand that Mahmud should leave *Iraq; the sultan
*  * *•
becoming angry at this, marched on Baghdad, sending at the
same time to Basra Zangi, who defeated the caliph’s khadim,
#Afif.^ On reaching Baghdad, Mahmud sent to the caliph to
negotiate for peace. The latter refused to do so, whereupon
pMahmud summoned Zangi and prepared to fight. Al-Mustarshid 
then decided to make peace; an agreement was made and the 
caliph gave Mahmud money, arms, and other gifts.^
In 525 (1129)* Mahmud b. Muhammad came again to Baghdad 
with instructions from Sanjar to obtain Dubais’ re-instate- 
ment in Hilla. Although Bubais, in addition, gave the 
caliph 100,000 dinars to this end, al-Mustarshid refused 
to agree, and began to muster troops.^- Bubais, thus having
1 I.A. X.448.
p _
According to Bundari, it was due to_the instigation of 
ad-Barkazinl, his wazir, that Mahmud determined to march 
on the dar ul-khilafa (p. 158).
 ^ I.A. X.448-50* Al-Qalanisi states that the cessation of 
hostilities was brought about by the mediation of Jalal 
ud-Bin *A1I b. gadaqa, the caliph’s wazir (p. 216). When 
Mahmud fell ill in Baghdad and left the city for Hamadan 
in*521 (1127), he sent an envoy to the caliph to ask his 
forgiveness for what had happened (Q. 217-8).
4 I.A. X.460.
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failed to obtain his re-instatement, went to Syria. In 525 
(lljl) he was captured by Taj ul-Muluk, and the caliph when 
he heard this sent to the latter demanding the surrender of 
Dubais. He was too late, Bubais having meanwhile been
handed over to Zangi.^ The following year (526) Bubais and
_  _ p
Zangi advanced on Baghdad, but were defeated by the caliph.
On the death of Mahmud in 525* "both Ba*ud b. Mahmud and 
Mas*ud b. Muhammad sent to the caliph to have the khutba 
read in his own name. The caliph refused their demands, 
and wrote to Sanjar asking him to have the khutba read in 
his name alone.^ In doing so al-Mustarshid no doubt hoped 
to obtain a virtually free hand in *Iraq, thinking that 
Sanjar would remain in Khurasan. Sanjar, however, refused 
to agree to this proposition, and the caliph accordingly 
supported first one and then another of; the Seljuq princes, 
and thereby weakened the sultanate, until finally he succeed­
ed in re-establishing the supremacy of the caliphs in rIraq.
When Seljuqshah b. Muhammad arrived in Baghdad in 526 
(1132) with Qaraja as-Saql, the caliph joined them against 
Mas*ud b. Muhammad and Zangi. The latter was put to flight, 
whereupon Has*ud sent to the caliph to negotiate for peace;
1 I.A. X.470.
2 ibid. 478.
 ^ ibid. 474.
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he induced, the caliph to believe Sanjar, who had come to 
Rei, was determined to attack him (al-Mustarshid). Accord­
ingly they made an alliance against Sanjar, by the terms of 
which *Iraq was to belong to the caliph’s wakil, and the.
sultanate to Mas*ud, while Seljuqshah was to be his wall*ahd 
— n(Jumadi I.526). They then set out against Sanjar who ad­
vanced himself to Hamadan, while ordering Zangi and Bubais 
to attack *Iraq. The caliph accordingly returned to defend 
the province, and defeated Zangi and Bubais on 8th Rajab, 
526.^ Mas*ud meanwhile was defeated by Sanjar, who, after 
appointing Tughril b. Muhammad sultan and sending Mas*ud to 
Ganja, returned to Khurasan. Ba*ud b. Mahmud, after being 
defeatedjby Tughril, entered Baghdad with his atabeg Hqsunqur 
Ahmadlll (zu’l Qa*da 526) and was welcomed by the caliph.-^
In the following year Mas*ud joined Ba*ud in Baghdad and the
khutba was read in the name of the former.^ It was then • •
agreed Mas'ud and Ba*ud should go to. Azerbaijan, and that 
the caliph should send an army with them.^
i
^ I.A. X.475* According to Bundari, al- Mustarshid sent ■ 
envoys on the accession of Tughril b. Muhammad in Jumadi ; 
II.526 (II52) to the latter’,* but they failed to make any 
treaty, owing to the intrigues of the wazir, ad-Barkazinl,. 
who sought to obtain bribes from them {"p.'ljo) .
2 I.A, X.478.
2 ibid. 480.
4 ibid. 482; Q. 237-
5 I.A. X.482.
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Al-Mustarshid meanwhile sent an insulting letter to
Zangi* The latter seized his envoy, whereupon the caliph
set out for Mawsil in Sha*ban 527 (1133) at the head of
30,000 warriors and "besieged the city for three months. He
finally raised the siege because he heard Masfud intended to
attack Baghdad.^ In 529 (1134/5)* when Zangi was in Damascus,
al-Mustarshid sent to him commanding him to abandon his
interference in the affairs of Damascus, to read the khutba in*»
the name of Alp Arslan b. Mahmud and to return to *Iraq to
2
administer its affairs. Probably the caliph thought that 
he had by this time got the upper hand of Zangi in the 
struggle for the possession of Iraq, otherwise he would I
hardly have summoned him back to *Iraq, unless perhaps he ) 
intended to utilise him in bringing an end to the rule of 
the Seljuqa.
Mas*ud had meanwhile fled from Tughril b. Muhammad near 
QazwTn in Hamadan 528 (1134) and received permission from 
the caliph to enter Baghdad. Seljuqshah also came to Baghdad 
arriving shortly before Mas ud.y Al-Mustarshid then ordered 
Masfud to go to Hamadan to fight his brother Tughril. Maksud 
promised to do so, but put the matter off, until finally : ’
1 I.A. XI. 2.
2 Q.. 248; I.A. XI. 12,1}. 
^ I.A. XI.6.
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the caliph promised to go with him. A numter of the caliph’s 
n.mTrs at this time deserted him for Mas*ud. Al-Mustarshid * 
demanded their return, hut Mas*ud made excuses. Insults 
passed between them and the caliph again ordered Mas#ud to 
det out for Hamadan. News meanwhile arrived of Tughril b. 
Muhammad’s death and Masfud went to Hamadan, and established., 
himself as sultan,^ Subsequently some of Masfud1s amirs 
deserted him for the caliph, who then determined to fight 
Mas*ud.2 On 20th Rajab 529 (H35)* se^ but was delayed 
by the rebellion of the governor of Basra, and did not finally 
leave until Sha*ban, at the head of 7000 horse. He was de­
feated and captured by Mas*ud at Dayimarj on 10th Ramadan.*^
Da*tLd b* Mahmud had meanwhile rebelled in Azerbaijan, and so
- ■ j
Masfud went to Maragha, taking the caliph with him. There
'j
Mas*ud made peace with al-Mustarshid on condition that he \
4promised him a sum of money, and that he would not again
j
assemble soldiers nor leave his residence. Before, however, j
• ' J
al-Mustarshid had been sent back to Baghdad he was assassinated^
1 I.A. XI.10-11.
2 £■ _ f —
I.K. states that Mas ud’s officials in Iraq, after he be­
came sultan, began to encroach upon the possessions of the . 
ealipET wEo eventually took the field against them (ill.
555).
2. I,A. XI.14-15; Q. 249; Bu. l6l.
The stun was apparently 400,000 dinars, for in 550 (1155/6) 
Yaranqush az-ZakawI demanded on behalf of the sultan from 
ar-Eashid 400,000 dinars, which had been settled by agree­
ment with al-Mustarshid (I.A. XI.22-3).
j
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by a Batini (17th zu'l Qarda 529)-^
Ar-Rashid, succeeded his father as caliph. He agreed,
on his accession, that he would resign if he levied troops
_ 2
or opposed the sultan with the sword. In spite of this ar-»•
Rashid continued the policy of his predecessor of inter- , 
fering in the family quarrels of the Seljuqs. Da’ud h. Mah­
mud came to Baghdad, and in gafar 5J0 (1135) ar-Rashid read
the khutba in his name, and made an alliance with him and ••
Zangi, to whom he sent 200,000 dinars.^  The latter then went 
to Wasit and made peace with Seljuqshah b. Muhammad. Mas*ud 
b. Muhammad meanwhile advanced on Baghdad in zufl Qa*da. 530 
(II36). Ar-Rashid determined to fight Mas*ud from within
mm A fmm
the walls of Baghdad, and after fifty days Mas ud raised the
siege. The caliph then joined Zangi and went with him to
Mawsil. This was contrary to the agreement he had made on
his accession and so Mas*ud b. Muhammad ordered his dismissal,•
1 I.A. XI.16; T.S. 295j Q. 249.
2 I.A. XI. 26-7.
^ I.A. XI.22-3- The caliph's wazir, Halal_ud-Din *A1I t>.
Sadaqa, meanwhile took refuge from ar-Rashid with Zangi.
4 I.A. XI.24.
.582
and appointed al-MuqtafT in his place.^ Ibn al-Azraq al- 
Fariqi gives an account of the election of al-Muqtafi, and 
states that Mas*ud obtained personal sureties of high stand- 
ing for his good conduct. Masfud also ordered all the gold* 
silver* jewels* arms and quadrupeds to be taken away from 
the caliph’s palace, for fear lest al-Muqtafi should be 
tempted to lead an army against him.^ This precaution
I.A. XI*27. The dismissal of ar-Rashid was no doubt 
facilitated by his personal unpopularity. Al-Mustarshid’s 
wazir Sharaf ud-Din * All b. Tirad and the sahib makhzan, 
Kamal ud-Din al-Baqshalani, and Ibn Anbari ,* who had been 
with the sultan since his capture of al-Mustarshid, 
spoke ill of" ar-Rashid, and the officials of Baghdad 
confirmed this, for they feared him, he having seized 
some of them and fined others. For a while after his 
dismissal, Mas'ud apparently regarded ar-Rashid as a 
potential and likely centre of opposition (I.A.. X I *30).
The latter eventually left Mawsil in 53I (1136/7) £or 
Azerbaijan. Mangubars, governor of Pars, Buz aba, Abd 
ar-Rahman Tughra Irak and Da/ud b. Mahmud offered to 
join film and to return him to the caliphate. Ar-Rashid 
agreed, but would not join them in person. After Mas'ud 
b. Muhammad had met Da ud in 532 (1138), on which occa­
sion both sides fled, some of ar-Rashid’s amirs advised 
him to set out for rIraq, while others counselled him 
to pursue Mas#ud. He did neither, but joined Da*ud in 
KhuaistSn; thence he went to Isfahan, where he was assas­
sinated in Ramadan 532 (1138) (i.A. XI.40-1).
2 Q. 260 note.
5 T.S. 403.
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turned out to be of little avail. On the death of Masrud
in 547 (1152), al-Muqtafi /was the dominant force in rIraq*
and became ruler of the province. He turned out of Baghdad
Mas*ud al-Bilall* the sultan’s shihna and other officials of•• •
the sultan* and took possession of their allowances and ••
iqta*s.^ He appointed his own governors and officials over
the districts of *Iraq and sent spies ( )
2
and sahib khabars to all the cities. In 549 ( H 5 4 )  Q- 
number of the amirs who had been deprived by the caliph’s 
action of their iqta/s determined to march against the 
caliph with Arslan b. Tughril* in spite of Muhammad b. 
Mahmud’s effort to prevent them. They were defeated by the
•I
caliph at Bakmaza (Sha*ban). Por this event the caliph*
according to Bundari* never forgave the Seljuqs.^
Al-Muqtafi continued to increase in power: In 550/1
(1155/6) Sulaimanshah b. Muhammad came to Baghdad to ask help
of al-Muqtafi. After a time* the latter read the khutba in
■ •
Sulaimanshah’s name. Sulaimanshah in return agreed not to 
encroach upon /Iraq in any way. Al-Muqtafi then went to 
Hulwan* sent to Malikshah b. Mahmud* who was at Hamadan





inviting him to agree. Malikshah accordingly joined the 
caliph, who appointed him wall *ahd to Sulaimanshah. He 
then gave them money and weapons and they went off to Izer- 
baijan to join Ildegiz."L The respect shown to Sulaimanshah 
in Beghdad as sultan was strictly limited. When he arrived 
in Baghdad, he was not met, as was customary, by the caliph’s 
wazir, the latter merely sending his son. Further the 
caliph appointed his (Sulaimanshah’s) wazir in the person of 
Sharaf ud-Din al-Khurasanl, and also made Quwidan, governor 
of Hilla, his amir hajib.^ Subsequently after Sulaimanshah 
had been put to flight by Muhammad b„ Mahmud in Jumadi I.
551 (II56), the latter asked the caliph to read the khutba 
in his name, which demand the caliph refused. Thus the 
caliph had emerged victorious in the struggle for the pos- . 
session of #Iraq. It was, however, only by virtue of the 
sword, and on account of the weakness and preoccupation of his 
rivals that he was able to do so.
1 U.S. 265-6; U.H.S. 141-2; I.A. XI.I36.
2 Bu. 220-1.
2 A.M. I93.
A  s 'l
Bu. 215-6. In (1157) Muhammad set out to besiege Bagh­
dad. During the ensuing siege the caliph’s wazir sent to 
Ildegiz to urge him to go with Malikshah or Arslanshah to 
Hamadan to create a diversion. As a result, when Malik-_ 
shah-went to Hamadan, Muhammad raised the siege of Baghdad 
in RabIY 1.552, after which h e 'tried without success to 
conciliate the caliph (I.A. XI.142; Bu.2^1). For an ac­
count of this see also Le Strange: Baghdad during the 
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The Regulation of the Waters o f  the Zayande Rud
By A n n  K. S. L a m b t o n  
HE Zayande Rud, from Lenjan to the Gav Khuni, was regulated
by an elaborate system, which is said to go back to Safavid 
times. This system remained in force until a.h. 1315 (shamsi, a.d. 1936), 
when it underwent alteration, owing to the fact that, on government 
orders, the cultivation of cotton was substituted in the lands watered 
by the Zayande Rud for the cultivation of rice.
The details of this regulation are found in an interesting document, 
popularly known as Shaikh BahaTs tumdr, to be found in the 
Finance Ministry of Isfahan. The precise date of the origin of the 
tumdr is uncertain. The following words are written a t the beginning 
of the docum ent: “ W ritten in the sealing office of the late Shah 
Tahmasp 9 2 3 . This is clearly an error, for Shah Tahmasp did not 
ascend the throne until a.h. 930 (a.d. 1524). Further, if the date 
a.h. 923 is correct, the tumdr cannot have been the work of the well- 
known Shaikh BahaT, who was not born until a.h. 953. I t  is quite 
possible and even probable tha t the tumdr was not the work of the 
famous Shaikh Baha‘i, but because he was a well-known man, learned 
in mathematics and other sciences, was subsequently attributed to 
him, in the same way th a t many old buildings are, a t the present 
day, popularly attributed to Shah ‘Abbas.
Mention is made in the tumdr, in some cases, of an original 
allotment of a share (asl) in the waters, where this differed from the 
share allotted by the tumdr (ezafe), and mention is also made in 
various instances of the share given to such and such a place by the 
late sadr (marliume sadr). Shaikh Baha‘i became the sadr of Isfahan 
under Shah ‘Abbas, and it is possible therefore tha t the Zayande 
Rud had been regulated some time prior to the reign of Shah ‘Abbas 
and tha t Shaikh Baha'i revised this regulation. That the t/umar, 
as it exists a t present, is not the original copy is moreover evident, 
for mention is made of various madis which had no share assigned to 
them, because they were built after the regulation of the waters of 
the river.
The main interest of the tumdr lies in the description it gives of 
the regulation of the Zayande Rud, but it also has a subsidiary topo­
graphical interest, for in the tumdr are recorded in detail the names
664 a Stn k . s . l a m b t o n —
of the villages and districts watered by the Zayande Rud from Lenjan 
to the Gav Khuni.
The Zayande Rud rises in the Kfih Rang mountains in the Bakhti- 
yarl country, some thirty farsakhs south-west of Isfahan. I t  flows 
north-east for seven farsakhs through the Bakhtiyarl country, watering 
the lands of the II Babadl and then, passing through the Sudegan 
gorge, enters the boluk of Farldan. There the Zayande Rud is joined 
by a tributary stream called the Pelamason, which drains the boluk 
of Farldan, and contributes a tenth of the volume of the water of the 
Zayande Rud. The river then waters some ten villages (qora) of the 
boluk of Farldan and, leaving that district, five or six villages of the 
Chahar Mahall, after which it enters the boluk of Lenjan, and one 
district of the boluk of Lenjan, named Aydoghmesh, from the cultivated 
lands of the river (chamlid) to the Kalle Bridge, is also watered by 
the river. The regulation of the water begins from the Kalle Bridge 
and continues to Varzane near the Gav Khuni where water is sold.
The waters of the Zayande Rud were allotted under three different 
rules, azad, mokhtass and moshtarek, so tha t having been divided 
according to location, with due regard for the needs and extent of the 
cultivation of each boluk, the division was not subject to any variation, 
and being based on the water a t the sources of the river, even in 
years of drought or scarcity of water, it required no alteration.
1. Azdd.—From the beginning of Azor until the 15th of Khordad 
the water was not regulated, so tha t in winter every boluk could make 
good any previous deficiencies in the irrigation of its crops. In the first 
month of spring, when the flood water was a t its height, the surplus, 
after the wheat crops had been irrigated, flowed down to the Gav 
Khuni. From the second month of spring until the 15th of Khordad 
if the water was abundant, it was sufficient for the irrigation of the 
wheat crops of all the boluks, but if it was scarce, from the 20th of 
ArdI Behesht onwards, it did not reach the boluks of Rudashtain and 
Bara/an, for which special provisions were made. (See below.)
2. Mokhtass.— Mokhtass prevailed a t two seasons of the year : 
the first was from the 14th of Khordad to the end of Khordad when, 
the wheat in the other boluks having been irrigated, the water was 
reserved for the final irrigation of the wheat crops of the boluks of 
Rudashtain and Bara‘an ; and the second period was from the 14th 
of Aban until the end of Aban, during which the water of the river 
was reserved for the cultivation of these two boluks. In each of these 
two periods of fifteen days it was reserved for ten full days for the
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sole use of Rudashtain and then for five days the boluk of Bara;an 
also shared it. During the first of these two periods of fifteen days 
a little water from seven or eight places was also allowed to flow 
into the irrigation channels (nahrha) of Alenjan, to be given to the 
newly planted rice.
3. Moshtarek —  From the 1st of Tlr to the 18th of Mehr the water 
was shared in two ways. Firstly in six periods of fifteen days, and 
secondly in one period of eighteen days, the water from the Kalle 
Bridge to the Marnan Bridge was shared among five boluks in four 
keshiks 1 by turns according to the following system. During the 
periods of fifteen days from the 1st of Tir, Lenjan had the right to the 
water to wherever it reached for three days, and Alenjan up to the 
Falavarjan Bridge for four days ; secondly Lenjan had the right to 
the water for two days and Marbin, Jay  and Barzerud up to 
the Marnan Bridge for six days. During the period of eighteen days 
it was shared from the 1st of Mehr by Lenjan and Alenjan, in three 
keshiks, for eleven days and for seven days by Marbin, Jay  
and Barzerud in one keshik so tha t the summer rice should be irrigated. 
From the 19th of Mehr to the 15th of Aban, which was the 
beginning of the second period when the water was appropriated 
for Rudashtain, the water was also shared by seven boluks as follows : 
Lenjan and Alenjan ten days, Marbin, Jay  and Barzerud ten days, 
Kararei three days, and Bara‘an four days. The sharing of the 
water in rotation was known as tanavobi.
The regulation of the water by the mokhtass, moshtarek and tanavobi 
principles was in accordance with the exigencies of the cultivation 
and the need for water of the crops sown in each boluk. Thus the 
water was appropriated for Rudashtain and Bara‘an, a t the time 
when the crops there were in the greatest need, and would be 
completely destroyed if they did not have water, whereas the wheat 
and opium of the moshtarek lands had no need of water a t tha t time, 
for during the azad period, the wheat crops of the moshtarek boluks 
had, by the 15th of Khordad, been irrigated four times and therefore 
required no further water and suffered no harm. In the mokhtass 
lands, on the other hand, in years when water was scarce, from the 
20th of Ardi Behesht onwards the water was cut off from their wheat 
crops after they had been irrigated only once or twice, and hence if
1 The area watered the river was divided into six keshiks and an official known 
as the sar keshik was responsible for the regulation of the water in each keshik.
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the last water were not to reach the wheat crops of these boluks they 
would naturally be destroyed. Similarly in the moshtarek boluks, 
when it was the turn of the boluk of Alenjan and Lenjan to be 
irrigated, Marbin Jay, and Barzerud, did not go without water for 
more than three periods of nine days, during which time they did not 
require water.
The tanavobi principle which prevailed in the moshtarek boluks 
was also in accordance with their needs, because during the time 
tha t the seeds were taking root in Lenjan and Alenjan, wdiich was 
from the 10th of ArdI Behesht to the end of the month, and until 
the end of the azad period, i.e., the 15th of Khordad, the ground was 
inundated and therefore able to do without water for six or seven 
days.
On the 1st of Tlr when the transplantation ) of the rice
began, the seeds planted in the land belonging to Rudashtain, having 
been flooded, were ready to be transplanted, and then the lands of 
Lenjan and Alenjan were in their turn flooded two, three or four times, 
and the rice wTas transplanted. While the water was being thus distri­
buted in rotation, the periods during wrhich Lenjan had no water did 
not exceed four or six days, but Alenjan was without water for eleven 
days when the water belonged to Marbin, Jay  and Barzerud, and 
during th a t time careful attention had to be paid to the rice cultiva­
tion of Alenjan.
The above regulation of the waters of the Zayande Rud according 
to special rights (ekhtesds), joint rights (eshterdk) and rights by rotation 
(tandvob), was the basis of the system, and each of these was divided 
according to three further principles, by district {boluk), by streams 
(anhdr) and by villages (qord).
1. By District.—The water allotted to the boluks or to a boluk, the 
boundaries of which were limited by a keshik, was regulated according 
to shares allotted to the streams within its boundaries.
2. By Streams.—Each village or hamlet {mazra'e) received the water 
according to its rightful share by means of the systematic regulation 
of the irrigation channels.1
3. By Villages.—The water allotted to some boluks such as Marbin, 
Jay  and Barzerud, was regulated by tdq, i.e., one day or one night’s 
water, and each tdq referred to a certain portion of the village lands {ardzl 
va sahrd) and was divided into fenjane, penq or piydle, with reference
1 The heads of the channels were blocked by stones, mud, mortar and plaster 
(saruj) up to a certain height and width for a certain time.
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to the lands of the tdq, so tha t finally each cultivator in the boluks 
knew what days of the week and for how many hours and how many 
minutes each jarib of cultivation, which he possessed, had w^ater and 
cultivated his land accordingly.
T h e  T u m a r  o f  S h a ik h  B a h a 'i 
He is God most high. His power is mighty.
The sealing office of the late prince, may his resting-place in 
paradise be eternal, Shah Tahmasp, may God make light his tomb.
The royal command was given that, since differences had arisen 
in the villages and the water shares of the Zayande Bud of 
Isfahan, the competent authorities of the State should appoint a few 
persons of the reliable and aged men to establish, under the signatures 
of the exalted and honourable mostawfis and the confirmation of the 
kadkhodas and nsh-safids of the boluks, wdiich share the water of the 
Zayande Rud, honestly and to the best of their knowledge, the shares 
and lot of each village and hamlet (mazra‘e) in each boluk, according 
to its capacity and need, and to enter these in the registers under 
guarantee, so that th a t regulation (of the waters) should be put into execu­
tion. Since the boluk of Jay  is in the middle of the boluks watered by 
the Zayande Rud, it has been the custom from former times th a t one of 
the reliable and trustworthy kadkhodas of tha t boluk should be charged 
with the responsibility of the office of mirab ; and the same procedure 
as was followed in former days must be followed a t the present time. 
I t  is hereby established tha t the honourable officials and government 
representatives in the villages and kadkhodas and nsh-safids of the 
above-mentioned boluks and the mirdbs, mobdshers, madisaldrs and 
subordinate officials (‘amala) of the river, in obedience with this high 
command, having established, according to the instructions in the 
tumdr, the water rights of every place according to its share, shall 
not act contrary to this, and having avoided being punished and 
called to account by the high authorities of the State shall honour 
the agreement.
Written in the month of Rajabo ’l-Morajjab, a .h . 923.1
The agreement for the regulation of the water of the Zayande 
Rud of Isfahan among the cultivators of the above-mentioned 
boluks, according to the command of the world-conquering prince
1 20th July— 18th August, 1517.
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(navdb) and the signature of the mostawfis and the confirmation 
of the kadkhodas and rishsafids for one solar year.
The agreement is as follows, th a t each of the villages 1 of Lenjan 
and Alenjan, which give the equivalent (of the produce) of 1,000 
man of covered rice 2 to the State Treasury,3 should have the right to 
cultivate thirty-three jaribs of rice, and if an area greater than this 
is cultivated by them, the cultivators of Marbin and Jay  also are 
permitted to increase the area they plant to the same extent. Every 
year the water is assigned for two periods to Rudashtain and cut off 
from the other boluks. (The regulation of) the water of the first period, 
which is the dun a b f is from the eve of the seventy-sixth day of the 
Nawruz, which is the middle of Gemini, until the fifteenth day, and 
is as follows : on the seventy-sixth day qdseds are stationed a t the head 
of all the madis ; before sunrise they stop the flow of water into all the 
madis from the head of the Kalle Bridge to the last of the madis of 
Bara‘an 5 until the tenth day, and then for five days they open the 
madis and let a little water through,6 and, in order tha t severe damage 
may not befall the newly planted crops of the district, a little 
water 7 is let into the madis from the head of the Kalle Bridge to the 
last modi of Bara/an on the sixth and seventh day. The second period 
of vonesh is during the khak db, and in the same way as during the 
first vonesh, the flow of water into the madis is blocked and then a little 
water is let through,6 and, because the Feda modi 8 flows into the 
town, three-quarters of a sang of water is let into it, and, because 
the Nayasarm mddi of Jay  waters some of the State domains, it is 
important and has the following assignm ent: one day before the 
vonesh of Rudashtain, the mirab increases its shurdbe and entrusts it to 
the kadkhodas, mddi saldrs and qdseds, so tha t this regulation shall be 
maintained without alteration until the end of the vonesh, and during 
the five days when a little water is let into the madis 9 a share is also 
given to Bara4an.
There follows a description of the regulation of the waters 
of the Zayande Rud according to the azad, mokhtass and moshtarek
1 d >  2dlyli-. 3 u ljo .
4 Water given to wheat when it is nearly ripe.
5 6j^„k 7
8 at the present day called
9 jjiiC j iyi 4,1 j
THE REGULATION OF THE WATERS OF THE ZAYANDE RUD 669
principles with reference firstly to time and secondly to the shares 
of each boluk. The method of regulation during the mokhtass and 
moshtarek periods is then described in the following words :—
The regulation (of the water) is as follows : one day before the 
vonesh, the mirab, having assembled the qdseds of Marbin and Jay, 
who are set forth below, on the Falavarjan Bridge, divides the water 
of the keshiks of Alenjan and Lenjan, and entrusts these to the 
servants 1 of each keshik, to guard the entrance to the madis, tha t 
the grass 2 and stubble 3 may be collected, and stations the qdseds of 
the Nayasarm mddi in the keshik of Marbin, and goes himself into the 
districts of Osliyan. In the morning, before sunrise, the servants 
of the mirab of every keshik block all the madis under their care, so tha t 
two hours after sunrise all the madis of the three keshiks are closed. 
After water flows from the water-mills a t the head of the Falavarjan 
Bridge, the servants of the mirab of the keshik of Marbin close the 
madis of Marbin, and the mirab from the Kalle Bridge seals all the 
madis tha t have been closed, and goes down as far as the entrance to 
the Nayasarm mddi of Jay. When the water, after reaching the head 
of the Nayasarm mddi, has ground one man of flour in the mill of 
Mo£men Aqa, which is situated a t the head of the Marmanan Bridge, 
the mirab goes upstream and seals the water of every mddi according 
to the shares in the regulation which he has in his possession, and the 
mirab (then) goes into the middle of the keshiks and tours them until 
the morning of the sixth day, when the flow of water into the madis 
is stopped, a dam being put across the mouth of each mddi and, whether 
the water suffices for the needs of Alenjan and Lenjan so tha t it reaches 
everywhere, or whether it is scarce, a vonesh is made : for five days it 
goes to Lenjan as follows : after the vonesh of Marbin and Jay  it goes 
towards Oshyan for three days to every mddi which it reaches, and 
then four days to Alenjan, and after tha t Lenjan takes it for two 
days, and then it is the vonesh of Marbin and Jay  which is as above. 
Thus, if there is not a great scarcity of water, the madis in Alenjan 
and Lenjan are opened a little 4 so tha t water should reach all the 
madis of the three keshiks. As regards the water rights 5 of Marbin 
and Jay, the mirab must take into consideration the rice of Alenjan 
(i.e. he must not be bound strictly by the regulation but give the rice 
a little water if necessary), provided tha t not more than the stipulated 
amount (of rice) has been sown. The madis of Kushk and Qarteman
1 S's?’ 2 ty*' 3 ^2**' 1 k °
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of Marbin, since they are situated in the keshik of Alenjan, share the 
water of Alenjan, and in their place the madis of Shahababad and 
Darjazln, which are situated in the keshik of Marbin, share the allot­
ment of Marbin. On the first day of jolbandi, the removal of 
the dams a t the heads of the madis is begun; for three days 
all the madis of Alenjan, Lenjan and Marbin, are blocked, so tha t 
the water may reach the madis of Jay, then all the dams are 
removed, tha t a restricted flow of water may go into the madis,1 
and qdseds are taken from Marbin and Jay  for twenty days and sit 
a t the heads of the madis of the four keshiks, so that they shall not be 
blocked until the moment of the vonesh of the khak db of Rudashtain. 
If in any year the water should be scarce, so tha t the newly 
sown crops of Marbin and Jay  are not irrigated, from the 15th 
of Scorpio thirty  or forty sangs of water are added to the 
shurabe of Kararej and Bara‘an, so th a t they may plant their crops, 
and after five days a vonesh is made, but since the shurabe of Kararej 
is sufficient for their autumn crops 2 they have no fixed vonesh except 
in the vonesh of Marbin and Jay, so tha t if the water is abundant 
the mirab helps them and in the vonesh of the khak db of Rudashtain 
also a little water 3 is given to them. The distribution of the qdseds 
of each boluk and district is according to what is entered in the vonesh. 
All the boluks are subdivided under each village as follows and the 
water-mills pay 1,000 dinars per sang, and birun db 4 350 dinars per 
jarib.
A list is then given of the engagement of the qdseds and their 
station in every boluk, with reference to boluks and mddis. This is 
followed by a detailed statement of the regulation of the waters of 
the Zayande Rud according to the shares of the boluks and the sub­
divisions with reference to villages and madis. Each of the seven 
boluks, Alenjan, Lenjan, Marbin, Jay, Bara‘an, Rudashtain and 
Kararej, has allotted to it so many shares as a boluk, and each boluk 
is subdivided into mddis, to wdiich are given their respective shares, 
and each mddi waters a number of villages, each of which have 
similarly a share or shares in the water. Particulars follow of the wages 
of the mirab and his servants, which amounted to 630 tumdns 2 krdns 
12 shdhis.5 Each boluk paid towards these a certain sum which was
1 UiLkl . 2 3 I
4 i.e., land which has not a right to water from the Zayande Rud.
5 This was the sum paid to the mirab about a hundred years ago ; more recently 
it was in the neighbourhood of 6,000 tumdns.
/THE REGULATION/OF THE WATERS OF THE ZAYANDE RUD 671
divided in the boluk among the villages belonging to it. Finally a 
list is given of the mddis of the river from its source to its end.
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VOL. IX. PART 3.
A district.
Taking away the dams at the mouths 
of mddis.
Land which had no right to water from 
the Zayande Rud.
A water clock, hour-glass.
Some villages had no fixed share of the 
water, and the mirab used to open 
the mddi and let water through as 
he thought fit. This opening was 
called a tambushe.
The transplantation of rice.
The period beginning with the 18th of 
Mlzan, when the weather becomes 
cold and the peasants wear their 
felt coats.
The arch of a bridge.
Cultivated land by the side of the river.
The right to a share of the water (of 
the Zayande Rud).
The first water given to wheat.
To let through (more or less) water into 
a mddi (cf. T. to disperse.)
If it was difficult to dam a mddi a t its 
junction with the river it was dammed 
below the junction and such a dam 
was known as a dare mirdbi.
W ater given to wheat when it is nearly 
ripe.
A village.
Material used to block the head of 
a mddi, stones, mud, mortar and 
plaster, etc.
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t i l keshik
To open the heads of the madis a little 
from the Kalle Bridge to the last 
mddi of Bara‘an for the last five days 
of the vonesh of Rudashtain.
A span.
W ater which trickles through the head 
of a mddi which is blocked.
Stubble.
(Water appropriated) for watering the 
streets.
Autumn crops (cf. melons,
marrows, cucumbers, etc).
The government representative in a 
village.
One day or one night's water.
A water-clock, hour-glass.
An official in charge of the regulation 
of the water of a mddi or a portion 
of a madl. The qdseds were appointed 
by the people locally to look after 
their interests. At the period of the 
vonesh in every district to which the 
qdseds went, each one in whatever 
keshik he was gave 1,000 dinars as 
a due (f^-j) to the servants ( j f y ) 
of the mirab.
Property on the banks of the river 
which is mostly fertile and partly 
unproductive (£ jy  )^.
In  some districts kadkhodas were 
appointed to oversee the qdseds. 
For example in Rudashtain from 
each of the three madis there were 
ten kadkhodas appointed to oversee 
the qdseds, who numbered sixty. One 
of the kadkhodas of Jay  was, according 
to custom, appointed to the office of 
mirab.
The area watered by the river is divided 
into six keshiks.







t y  margh 
‘-r>\_r* mirab
j .u j vonesh
A sixteenth part of a zar‘i shah.
A  division a t the head of a madi for the 
regulation of the water.
An irrigation channel leading off from 
the main river, and subsequently- 
subdivided.
The official in charge of a mddi.
The representative of the owner of a 
village. *
The subdivision of a village.
Grass growing near a stream.
The official in charge of the regulation 
of the waters of the Zayande Rud.
The reservation of the water for 
Rudashtain, during the first ten days 
of which no water flowed into the 
mddis before it reached Rudashtain.
